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Preface
It is great to be out in the sun.
To me, working on this thesis has been a puzzling, fascinating and en-
lightening experience. Even now, when all is about to be finished, I still can’t
entirely figure out my reasons for starting and staying in research, though I am
very glad that in the end I did stay (which for a large part is due to the support
of others; read on . . . ). Research itself has also been puzzling. Often, I have
felt like a child lost in the woods on a moonless night, looking for the way
home. Science brings compelling riddles to be solved, that can sometimes tor-
ture the mind by their mere existence. At the end of many days of thinking and
typing at the University, I only seemed to have discovered more questions and
discarded previous answers, and came home with a brain so tired that watching
television (the dumb programs) was the only attractive evening pursuit.
But still, in spite of the puzzlement, it has been fascinating to see how new
concepts arise from faint ideas and hazy intuitions, slowly growing into mature
scientific results when nurtured well. The charms of logic and the magic of
words in the end often showed a path out of the forest and into the sunlight.
I have greatly enjoyed the creative experience of making up new universes of
agent concepts, even though the struggle to achieve this creation often seemed
too long. But the darkest part of every night is just before the dawn, and expe-
riencing a sunrise is always overwhelming.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction: What about
Abstraction, Agents and Interaction?
Nothing worth having comes without some kind of fight
Gotto kick at the darkness till it bleeds daylight
Bruce Cockburn
At first sight, the title of this thesis seems to contain a lot of vague yet fash-
ionable terms used in modern computer science and in artificial intelligence in
particular. We live in times where many web pages are ‘interactive’. In the near
future, companies may advertise their systems with the slogan ‘agents inside’,
while at present the agent research community is still debating and outlining the
exact nature of agents. The phrase ‘abstraction’ in science has so many uses
that, without further details, it doesn’t have clear intuitive connotations. And
the common sense meaning of ‘abstract’ isn’t very encouraging either, as ‘ab-
stract’ is used in the sense of ‘hazy’, ‘not well elaborated’ or even ‘too inspired
to make sense’ (when referring to paintings). In this thesis, we will neverthe-
less use these phrases often to discuss useful features of the software paradigm
of multi-agent systems. We start by clarifying our use of the phrases ‘abstrac-
tion’, ‘agents’ and ‘interaction’, and by explaining why abstract approaches to
agent interaction are beneficial.
1
Abstraction
In the relatively brief history of computer science, abstraction has been one of
the driving forces of the development of programming languages and software
engineering paradigms. With abstraction, we mean the process of defining con-
cepts to describe, direct or analyse the computation processes taking place in
computer systems, reducing complexity by leaving out details. A computer
system can consist of several connected computers, each of which is a complex
piece of hardware, with one or more processors, memory chips, a central clock
which sets the pace of the system and connections to transfer bitstrings from
one part of the system to another. Fortunately, it isn’t necessary anymore to un-
derstand the hardware of computers in order to program them. Programming
languages have been developed, which abstract from electronical details and
allow the programmer to view the computer as an information processor. Com-
pilers and interpreters translate computer programs to lower-level languages,
which are close to the machine level and can be directly processed by the hard-
ware implementation.
Different programming paradigms use different concepts to model the com-
putation, storage and information passing of a computer system. We will re-
view several software paradigms. We mainly focus at command-based pro-
gramming approaches (which are programming languages where the basic op-
erations are commands and programs basically describe sequences of com-
mands), although we will also briefly discuss other paradigms, such as func-
tional programming, logic programming, and constraint programming. In this
overview, we discuss the use of abstraction for structuring data and control in
computer programs. We refer to [51, 112, 120] for more extensive descriptions
of the different paradigms. We start at the lowest level of abstraction above the
binary machine languages.
Here, we have the assembly languages. These languages are very close
to the machine level. The model of computation is performing simple opera-
tions on values in memory locations, such as shifting data from one memory
slot to another, or adding two values. Variables are used to represent mem-
ory locations. Assembly languages abstract from the binary nature of com-
puter representations and provide the programmer with the possibility to use
mnemonic terms to refer to memory locations and program instructions. The
only kind of data values are integers; other data types are simulated in terms
of these. The contents of memory locations can be tested, using relations like
< and =. Depending on the outcome of these tests, the control can jump to
alternative program lines. The earliest assembly languages did not facilitate
structuring of programs in any way; there was no mechanism to group together
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lines of code that implement one particular operation and name them to in-
dicate their function. Later on, assembly languages improved in this respect:
named subprograms (macros) are introduced, such that a group of statements
can be considered as a single action. But it remains possible to jump to an-
other program statement from every point in such a subprogram. The low-level
data representation, together with the jump-wise nature of the control, makes
assembly programs very hard to read, write and debug. A program mainly is
an amorphous heap of manipulations of memory locations. It is very hard to
discover whether an assembly program is a game of pacman or a library filing
system, as assembly gives little possibilities to include the intuitions of the pro-
grammer in the representation of the program. Information passing is also done
in a rather primitive manner, through shared variables. When a value created
by one part of the program is needed in another part, the program parts use the
same variable to store and reference the value.
The paradigm of imperative programming is a large step up in abstraction
level. Imperative languages have a richer vocabulary than assembly languages;
they contain more different statements and control constructs. In general, in or-
der to create the effect of a single statement in an imperative language, several
assembly statements would be needed. Thus, programs can be shorter and more
understandable. Imperative programming languages provide facilities to struc-
ture the program into a main program and several procedures and/or functions.
Procedures and functions are named pieces of a program. The names (when
well-chosen) can provide intuitions about the meaning of procedures and func-
tions. Control moves from one program location to another through procedure
calls. Jump-like statements do not occur anymore in most imperative program-
ming languages (except for the infamous GOTO-statement [38]). These fea-
tures enable the programmer to write neatly structured programs, where each
procedure has a conceptually independent function. Like in assembler, vari-
ables are used to represent values. In imperative programs, values can be of
different data types, such as characters, integers, booleans, or reals (real num-
bers). Imperative languages also provide structured data types, for example
arrays and sets, such that the data representation chosen can provide intuitions
about the relations between values. The user has the possibility to define his
or her own data types, starting from the built-in types and type constructors.
Data can be made local to a procedure, hiding it from the rest of the program.
A procedure can take a number of parameters, which are special variables that
implement the transfer of information to procedures and back. Actual values
or variables are passed to the procedure when it is called, and when the pro-
cedure finishes, values or variables are passed back to the location from which
the procedure was called. Procedures provide process abstraction, as each pro-
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cedure implements some higher-level operation, such as sorting an array, and
it is not necessary to always keep in mind the details of the code of the pro-
cedure when using it to sort a particular array. Information passing is done
using the parameter mechanism of procedures. Additionally, global variables
(variables visible to the whole program) can be used, though this is sometimes
considered bad practice, as using global variables overrides the separation of
data into logical units belonging to procedures. In short, imperative languages
provide structure, for data as well as control.
The next programming paradigm we consider is object-oriented program-
ming. In this paradigm, computation and data are encapsulated in units called
objects. While in imperative programs, data is local to program parts, in object-
oriented programming, the processes that operate on the data are also localised.
Data units which conceptually belong together and the functions which operate
on this data, are grouped together in an object. Implementation details of both
data and operations on the data are hidden inside the object and not accessible
to its environment (the other objects and the user). Functions (or procedures)
are called methods in this paradigm. For example, an object can represent a
library. The object has data structures for the administration of the library col-
lection (which books have been lent, where each book is located) and for the
personal data of the members of the library. The library object can have meth-
ods for borrowing a book, or for registering a new member. The only way to
access the data encapsulated in an object is by using the methods of the object.
Methods are parameterised, as are procedures in imperative programs. Ob-
jects pass values around through method invocation. Compared to imperative
programming, object-oriented programs provide still more structure, as pro-
cesses are also localised into objects. There are several object classes, which
are generic stencils, that act as an object factory. New objects can be created
during execution by generating an instance of a class. The object classes form
a hierarchy, where the top classes are very generic, and the classes in lower
branches of the hierarchy are tailored to a specific function. All features of a
class (variables and methods) are inherited by child classes. Thus, the object-
oriented paradigm provides facilities to reuse objects and classes for different
applications. As all data is encapsulated in objects, information passing takes
place through method invocation and the associated parameter mechanism. The
object-oriented paradigm uses many features of the imperative paradigm, and
adds new concepts, such as data encapsulation. Nevertheless, it is an indepen-
dent paradigm, as the object-oriented view on computing is entirely different
from the imperative view. In object-oriented programming, control is centred
in the objects, which means that the responsibility for the computations is in-
herently more distributed.
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The last abstraction step up we take here is the step towards agents. Like in
objects, agents encapsulate both data and processing of data. The most impor-
tant innovation of the agent-oriented paradigm is the use of anthropomorphic
concepts. Instead of using variables and values as basic concepts, as the pre-
vious paradigms did, agents process beliefs, goals, plans, desires, intentions,
perform actions and observations, and communicate requests and information
to other agents. As these concepts have an intuitive common-sense meaning,
they provide a powerful abstraction from details of their particular implementa-
tion, which can be helpful in the design and construction of complex software.
We repeat the words of Hofstadter here, written in 1981 [64]:
“But eventually, when you put enough feelingless calculations to-
gether in a huge coordinated organization, you’ll get something
that has properties on another level. You can see it – in fact you
have to see it– not as a bunch of little calculations, but as a sys-
tem of tendencies and desires and beliefs and so on. When things
get complicated enough, you’re forced to change your level of de-
scription. To some extent that’s already happening, which is why
we use words such as ‘want’, ‘think’, ‘try’, and ‘hope’, to describe
chess programs and other attempts at mechanical thought. Den-
nett calls that kind of level switch by the observer ‘adopting the
intentional stance’.”
The computation model of agent-oriented programming is that of multiple
agents, situated in an environment, which they change by performing actions
and about which they obtain information by performing observations. Locally,
each agent has a mental state where it stores its beliefs, goals, plans, desires,
or whichever informational and motivational attitudes it employs. This mental
state replaces the association of values to variables, which constitutes the state
in the earlier paradigms. Clearly, using anthropomorphic concepts to repre-
sent information offers a higher level of data abstraction. On the other hand,
variable-based states offer more freedom of expression. Agents interact with
each other by communication, that is, by sending and receiving messages. Gen-
erally, agents perform or can be seen as performing a sense–reason–act cycle:
an agent acquires information about its environment (the world and the other
agents) by receiving observation results and messages from the other agents,
then it reasons to update its beliefs, intentions, plans (or whatever it uses to rep-
resent its objectives, information and possible courses of action) and to choose
its next actions, and finally it acts, after which the cycle starts over. Information
passing in agent-based systems happens through communication. Unlike in the
previous paradigms, and in line with the way information is represented in the
5
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Figure 1.1: The evolution of abstraction in different paradigms
mental states, the information usually is more than a set of variables and values.
Messages can be requests for particular information or for assistance in certain
activities, or they can contain information (which need not be true) about the
environment or the mental state of the sending agent. Expressive agent com-
munication languages have arisen to phrase these messages [46, 133]. Unlike
objects, agents don’t have to react to messages. As agents are anthropomor-
phically inspired, they are autonomous, which means that they can sometimes
ignore others and just follow their own desires. Agents have total control over
their own state and actions. Thus, both data and control are entirely localised.
In Figure 1.1, we summarise the development sketched above in a picture.
From assembly to agents, programs and information have become increasingly
structured and encapsulated, and information passing has evolved from shared
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variables to message passing. For agents, messages to other agents aren’t the
only means to interact with their environment, as agents also perform actions
and observations. The figure shows an evolution from chaotic, fine-grained,
unstructured programs to neatly structured, more conceptual programs. As-
sembly languages provide mnemonic names for statements and variables. Im-
perative languages offer the possibility to design, name and implement your
own data types, and to group together lines of code together into procedures
which are named. In object-oriented languages, data and operations on these
data are encapsulated in objects, which are also named, such that the methods
of a particular object can be called by other objects. And finally, in the agent
paradigm, the interaction an agent has with its environment is conceptualised
through the notions of observation, action and communication. Internally, the
agent is modelled using high-level, anthropomorphic concepts. Thus, infor-
mation has become more abstract and each piece of information is named to
be a belief, desire, intention, or yet something else. Also, the processing of the
agent becomes more structured; most agents perform a sense–reason–act cycle,
from which they can’t deviate.
There is a pattern recognisable in these developments: structure is added to
order the complex computations, which results in new concepts, which are then
named.1 This way, new abstractions are created that match the intuitions of a
certain paradigm. Each paradigm provides a way of viewing the world, and
the abstract concepts used in a paradigm determine the way the programmer
will conceive his or her problem specification, the application domain and the
program to be built. The successive paradigms increasingly pre-structure the
systems built according to these paradigms. As the abstraction level becomes
higher, there are more details that the programmer cannot determine anymore.
For example, in an agent program, it is not possible to refer to a memory lo-
cation, while in an assembly program, this is possible (through a variable). As
another example, agent programs generally are executed in sense–reason–act
cycles, from which the programmer cannot divert, while in object-oriented pro-
grams the control of the program can be largely determined by the programmer
1It seems that this way of approaching reality is quite divinely inspired, as the following Scrip-
ture texts about the creation show: “In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And
the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. . . . And God
said, Let there be light: and there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good: and God
divided the light from the darkness. And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called
Night.” (Genesis 1: 1–5) God structures the chaotic earth, creates new concepts (such as light)
and names parts of the new reality (day and night). Later on, man is encouraged to do the same:
“And out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air;
and brought them unto Adam to see what he would call them: and whatsoever Adam called every
living creature, that was the name thereof.” (Genesis 2: 19)
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(except that objects have to respond to messages by executing the method in-
vocated), and programs in assembly allow each possible control flow (through
jumps). Though the pre-structuring diminishes flexibility, it provides the sys-
tem builder with clean-cut, intuitive concepts that aid in constructing compact,
powerful software.
In spite of what our historical overview might suggest, the agent paradigm
isn’t merely the next command-based paradigm. In fact, agent programming
also use ideas from other paradigms. The most commonly used other paradigm
in this context is logic programming. In general, the basic building block of a
logic program is a conditional rule, which allows to draw a conclusion when the
conditions hold. This style of programming has been used in artificial intelli-
gence for expert systems and knowledge-based systems. As the representations
agents use also are logical in nature (there are modal logics that formalise be-
lief, desire and intention, as well as other mental notions the agents might use
[21, 34, 85, 102]), a logic programming style fits well with agent program-
ming. In the agent programming language we will define in Chapter 5, we will
use a combination of logic programming and imperative programming. The
coordination language of Chapter 6 also is inspired by logic (constraint) pro-
gramming. The work we present in Chapter 2 and 3 assumes that the agent
specification language is logical in nature, and in Chapter 4, the local agent
state consists of logical formulas. The languages in Chapter 5 and 6 are in-
spired by constraint programming. Here, the values of unknowns are gradually
determined by adding constraints on the unknowns. Constraint programming is
especially suitable for planning and negotiation, which are important activities
for many agents. Another potentially influential paradigm is the concurrent
paradigm. As agents operate independently, they are concurrent by definition,
and so abstractions for synchronisation from concurrent programming can be
useful for agents. We will use synchronous communication statements in Chap-
ter 5 and 6, which have been inspired by the concurrent language CSP [61].
The functional paradigm, where the basic program unit is function application,
might also provide usable concepts for agents, though we haven’t seen any
agent programming language using ideas from functional programming yet.
The agent paradigm employs a high level of data abstraction and control
abstraction. Also, the agent concept doesn’t fix a particular style of program-
ming. Thus, starting from anthropomorphic abstractions, the agent paradigm
can integrate useful features from different software paradigms.
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Agents
In our view, agents are conceptual entities, designed and/or constructed and/or
analysed using anthropomorphic notions, which interact with each other and
with the world they are situated in, showing both initiative to achieve their
objectives and consideration of the ever changing environment. As is clear
from the vagueness of this ‘definition’, we don’t rigidly demarcate the phrase
‘agent’. We don’t demand that agents use specific intentional notions, like be-
lief, desire and intention, in their local (mental) state, nor that agents always
are programmed in an agent programming language. In our view, it is perfectly
well conceivable that an agent-based system is programmed using an impera-
tive or object-oriented programming language. The most important feature of
the agent-oriented paradigm to us is the agent metaphor, which allows us to
conceive a piece of software as using common-sense, intuitive, anthropomor-
phic concepts.
Other authors use other definitions of agents. We will give three of these
in an attempt to give a sketch of the research field of agents. We start with the
view of Jennings, Sycara and Wooldridge, given in [69]:
“For us, then, an agent is a computer system, situated in some
environment, that is capable of flexible autonomous action in order
to meet its design objectives.”
This definition is close to our view on the agent concept; to us, situatedness and
the ability to flexibly and autonomously interact with the dynamic environment
are also essential for agents. The difference between the two agent conceptual-
isations is that we additionally include the use of anthropomorphic concepts in
our definition.
One of the best-known agent definitions is by Wooldridge and Jennings
[130]:
“Perhaps the most general way in which the term agent is used is
to denote a hardware or (more usually) software-based computer
system that enjoys the following properties:
∗ autonomy : agents operate without the direct intervention of
humans or others, and have some kind of control over their
actions and internal state;
∗ social ability : agents interact with other agents (and possibly
humans) via some kind of agent communication language;
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∗ reactivity : agents perceive their environment (which may
be the physical world, a user via a graphical user interface, a
collection of other agents, the Internet, or perhaps all of these
combined), and respond in a timely fashion to changes that
occur in it;
∗ pro-activeness : agents do no simply act in response to their
environment, they are able to exhibit goal-directed behaviour
by taking the initiative.”
This is the weak notion of agency, according to Wooldridge and Jennings. In
the strong notion of agency, an agent is a computer system that
“ . . . in addition to having the properties identified above, is either
conceptualised or implemented using concepts that are more usu-
ally applied to humans. For example, it is quite common in AI
to characterise an agent using mentalistic notions, such as knowl-
edge, belief, intention, and obligation.”
This definition emphasises the use of the anthropomorphic agent metaphor, as
we also did above.
In the prologue to the textbook on multi-agent systems edited by Weiss, the
following agent definition appears:
“An agent is a computational entity such as a software program
or a robot that can be viewed as perceiving and acting upon its
environment and that is autonomous in that its behaviour at least
partially depends on its own experience. As an intelligent entity, an
agent operates flexibly and rationally in a variety of environmental
circumstances given its perceptual and effectual equipment.” (p.
1, [125])
These definitions, as our own (which we gave at the start of this section), con-
tain many terms which coin intuitive associations but have no definite, well-
demarcated meaning. This might seem a weakness of the field. In our opinion,
it is one of the attractive features of the agent paradigm, as it clearly shows
that multi-agent systems start from intuitions rather than from technicalities.
This sets agent-based systems apart from other computer systems. Agents are
conceptualised and built starting from a perhaps somewhat hazy vision of an
intelligent, interactive, independent and individualised computer process. Even
if the agents which presently exist in implemented form aren’t yet living up to
the high expectations coined by the ‘definitions’ given above, it is worth while
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to have a high-pitched ideal to strive for, which keeps scientists and system
builders from getting lost in the symbolic clutter of many computer systems,
built using the earlier paradigms.
Interaction
There is a reason why agent technology seems to be an answer to the question
of how to deal with the inherent complexity of modern-day software. To quote
the book of Weiss again:
“Modern computing platforms and information environments are
distributed, large, open, and heterogeneous. Computers are no
longer stand-alone systems, but have become tightly connected
both with each other and their users. The increasing complexity of
computer and information systems goes together with an increas-
ing complexity of their applications. These often exceed the level
of conventional, centralised computing because they require, for
instance, the processing of huge amounts of data, or of data that
arises at geographically distinct locations. To cope with such ap-
plications, computers have to act more as ‘individuals’ or agents,
rather than just as ‘parts’. The technologies that distributed ar-
tificial intelligence promises to provide are among those that are
urgently needed for managing high-level interaction in and intri-
cate applications for modern computing and information process-
ing systems.” (p. 2, [125])
Thus, modern computer application domains often require separate, indepen-
dent pieces of software to interact with each other and the rest of the envi-
ronment in order to accomplish some task. The multi-agent metaphor fits this
demand like a glove.
In [66], Huhns supports this view. He even coins the phrase ‘interaction-
oriented programming’ to describe the type of software engineering which is
currently needed.
“Computing is in the middle of a paradigm shift. After decades
of progress on representations and algorithms geared toward indi-
vidual computations, the emphasis is shifting toward interactions
among computations. The motivation is practical, but there are
major theoretical implications. Current techniques are inadequate
for applications such as ubiquitous information access, electronic
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commerce, and digital libraries, which involve a number of inde-
pendently designed and operated subsystems. The metaphor of in-
teraction emphasises the autonomy of computations and their abil-
ity to interface with each other and their environment. Therefore,
it can be a powerful conceptual basis for designing solutions for
the above applications.” (p. 29, [66])
According to Huhns, agents are very suitable for interaction-oriented program-
ming, and we agree with this view.
In this thesis, we focus on interaction aspects of agents, which means that
we don’t focus on internal agent aspects. This book isn’t in the first place about
the structure of the mental state of an agent, about the private beliefs, desires
and intentions of agents, or about the practical reasoning an agent performs in
order to decide what to do next. These aspects have been extensively studied
in the agent field, and although there are still many controversies and unsolved
issues, we choose to study the inter-agent aspects of the multi-agent paradigm.
Agents interact in various ways:
directly with the environment, through:
∗ observation
∗ physical action
∗ events (interfering with actions)
directly with other agents, through:
∗ communication
∗ coordination
∗ cooperation
∗ group action
∗ distributed planning
indirectly with each other via the environment, through:
∗ interfering physical actions
∗ synergy of actions
∗ observing and interpreting behaviour of other agents
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In this thesis, we will use the term ‘coordination’ in a broader sense than
is usual in the area of multi-agent systems. Coordination in our use means that
agents adjust their behaviour to the actions of the other agents and the circum-
stances and events taking place in the environment, to avoid negative effects
or to attain positive effects. This encompasses the more usual meaning of the
term, which is avoiding harmful interaction between agents. In our terminol-
ogy, an agent can coordinate its behaviour with the events taking place in its
environment, either to avoid disturbance of its actions by events or to make use
of events happening. And agents can coordinate with each other in order to
agree on and perform a group action, or to make a distributed plan which they
will execute as a cooperating group.
Synergy of actions takes place when the effects of the combination of ac-
tions is different from the sum of effects of the separate actions. Synergy is
mostly used to designate positive effects. Seen this way, interfering actions and
synergetic actions are dual notions.
In this thesis, we study agent interaction. All forms of interaction men-
tioned in the list above play a major role in one or more chapters of this thesis.
We don’t answer one specific question in this book, but explore different fea-
tures of interaction from different angles of incidence. In order to come to
successful interactive agent systems, we need new abstractions, and the work
in this book is a contribution to this. To conclude our exploration of interaction
in agent systems, we include a quote of Wooldridge and Ciancarini, from their
introductory article in the proceedings of a recent workshop on agent-oriented
software engineering:
“It is now widely recognised that interaction is probably the most
important single characteristic of complex software. . . . Many re-
searchers now believe that in the future, computation itself will
be understood as chiefly as a process of interaction. This has in
turn led to the search for new computational abstractions, models,
and tools with which to conceptualise and implement interacting
systems.” (p. 1, [129])
Overview of the thesis
With this thesis, we aim to contribute new abstractions which capture different
aspects of agent interaction to the field of agent-oriented software development.
As we pointed out earlier, abstraction leads to more powerful and more intu-
itive concepts. In the agent paradigm the abstract concepts used are inspired
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by folk psychology and common sense explanations. We specifically focus on
abstract approaches to agent interaction, because interaction is such a central
agent feature. By its nature, interaction leads to complexity: when multiple
computational processes interact, a combinatorial explosion of execution pos-
sibilities results. The new abstract concepts we present in the next chapters aid
to make this complexity more manageable.
A danger of using abstraction is that abstract concepts are introduced with-
out grounding them in the computational reality. Just finding intuitive notions
is not enough; each notion also has to have a clearly defined meaning. We
take care to always relate our abstract notions to lower-level concepts, such
that we don’t perform abstraction by simply stripping away the underlying dy-
namics. We structure complex agent interaction and provide intuitive names
for the newly identified agent concepts in such a way that the intuitive abstract
notions have a formally defined, unambiguous semantics. Thus, we provide
foundations for our intuitions about interaction.
The reason we chose the rather broad title ‘Agent Interaction: Abstract Ap-
proaches to Modelling, Programming and Verifying Multi-Agent Systems’ for
this thesis is that the research accumulated in it explores different issues in the
agent field. In the various chapters, we provide formal tools to interpret agent
behaviour as motivated by beliefs, desires and intentions (Chapter 2), we per-
form agent verification (Chapter 3), we construct a generic real-time semantical
models of agents (Chapter 4), we design an agent programming language for
actions performed by groups of agents (Chapter 5), and we devise a coordina-
tion language for distributed planning (Chapter 6). In spite of the diversity of
these subjects, interaction always is our focus and abstraction always is our
main tool. In Chapter 4, 5 and 6, we introduce abstract statements to program
agent interaction and we relate these statements to the computational reality by
defining their formal operational semantics. In Chapter 3, we show how we
can abstract from complex, detailed logical formalisations by defining more
abstract notions in terms of the lower-level language. And in Chapter 2, we
ground the abstract intentional notions of belief, desire and intention in the
temporal dynamics of the interaction of the agent with its environment.
We give an overview of the chapters in this book:
Chapter 1: Introduction: What about Abstraction, Agents and Interaction?
Chapter 2: Abstracting Agent Interaction Histories into Intentionality
For humans the notions ‘belief’, ‘desire’ and ‘intention’ are intuitive no-
tions to describe behaviour. We use these notions to explain and pre-
dict the behaviour of fellow humans, but also of computer applications
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(‘Word believes that I want to create an enumerated list here, while in
fact I don’t.’). Whenever behaviour gets complex, intentional notions
can help to structure and understand it. Because of their intuitiveness and
their high abstraction level, intentional notions are particularly useful to
describe agent behaviour. They can also be used by agents themselves
for this purpose: one agent can ascribe beliefs, desires and intentions, ab-
breviated as BDI, to another agent, on the basis of observed behaviour,
with the purpose to explain and predict its behaviour, and maybe even
to manipulate its future behaviour. This chapter addresses the question
of how an agent can attribute intentional notions to another agent, on the
basis of observed behaviour, to model the other agent’s behaviour.
The intentional stance (as advocated by Dennett; see [25, 26]) states that
decisions of agents are based on information about the recent and more
distant past; these data can be stored in the form of BDI-formulae and
thus determine future behaviour. However, the relationships between
such notions and actual observed behaviour of an agent are not always
trivial. In this chapter, we lay a connection between the temporal dy-
namics of the interaction of an agent with its environment (observations
received and actions performed over time) and the mental notions belief,
desire and intention. These notions thus get a temporal grounding. We
define justifying conditions that a (candidate) formula must satisfy in or-
der to qualify as a representation of belief, desire or intention. Using
these conditions, intentional notions can be attributed to agents on the
basis of externally observed behaviour.
This chapter is an extended version of [76].
Chapter 3: Reuse and Abstraction in Verification: Agents Interacting with
Dynamic Environments
To make verification a manageable part of the system development pro-
cess, comprehensibility and reusability of properties and proofs is es-
sential. System developers usually are not extremely skillful in logic,
so the properties and proofs have to be as easy and intuitive as possi-
ble. We contribute to these objectives by introducing language abstrac-
tion, which makes the formulae easier to understand, and with abstract,
generic, reusable systems of properties and proofs.
Language abstraction facilitates the communication with the system buil-
ders and stakeholders, as verification results in abstracted form can be a
readable part of the system documentation. By using two logical lan-
guages to phrase properties, an abstract one and a detailed one, the prop-
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erties have a well-defined relation to the semantics of the system specifi-
cation and yet can be intuitively formalised.
Often occurring patterns in agent behaviour can be exploited to establish
a library containing properties and proofs. This is illustrated here by
verifying action successfulness for the class of single agents acting in
dynamic environments. An action is successful if all its expected effects
are established. In order to establish action successfulness, agent and
environment must interact in a coordinated manner. The properties of
the generic system for coordination formalise this proper interaction of
an individual agent with its environment. The properties can be used
to prove action successfulness for a large class of systems, simply by
instantiating the system-specific details into the generic properties.
This chapter is a thoroughly revised and extended version of work pub-
lished in [74] and [73]. For the running example, we used some material
from [72].
Chapter 4: An Abstract Model for Agents Interacting in Real-Time
We offer a new operational model of agents, which focuses on the inter-
action of agents with each other and with a dynamic environment. In this
model, we don’t abstract away the dynamic external world, interference
of actions and observations that are not accurate due to changes in the
world, as our main purpose is to (more) realistically model agent inter-
action. The model does abstract from the inner workings of agents by
offering a definable mental lexicon and a flexible cycle of sensing, rea-
soning and acting. It consists of a skeleton programming language and its
operational semantics; by filling in details of the syntax and semantics,
a ‘real’ agent programming language is obtained. The operational se-
mantics is based on step semantics, which means that each action takes
a number of steps, and thus has a duration. The change to the world
state during a certain time step is computed by combining the effects of
all sub-actions and events taking place then. This way, we can suitably
formalise real-time multi-agent behaviour. The model contains a world,
which is not totally controlled by the agents and where events take place.
Agents can perform individual actions and group actions. Group actions
are executed synchronously by the agents participating; this amounts to
these agents performing individual actions according to a group action
scheme, prescribing the timing of individual actions.
This chapter is an extended and updated combination of the articles [123]
and [124].
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Chapter 5: An Abstract Programming Language for Agents Interacting through
Group Actions
Coordination and cooperation are crucial notions in multi-agent systems.
Agents can interact with each other in order to discuss and execute co-
ordinated actions to establish objectives which they can’t attain individ-
ually, or in a less effective way. Proper formalisations for this kind of
coordination are scarce in agent programming languages. We provide a
constraint programming language called GrAPL, with facilities for group
communication, group formation and group collaboration. GrAPL in-
cludes three novel statements. Two of these enable groups of agents to
communicate about possible constraints on a specific action they might
do together. The constraints concern the parameters of the action and
the group of agents performing it. If the demands of the agents are com-
patible, the group reaches an agreement regarding future executions of
the action discussed. The third statement is synchronised action execu-
tion. Groups of agents can perform an action together, as long as their
constraints on the action are satisfied.
The language has a formally defined operational semantics. The three
group operations are performed synchronously. GrAPL is (to be) im-
plemented on top of a constraint solver which checks whether the con-
straints are respected when actions are executed. GrAPL uses ideas from
constraint programming to pose constraints on and test the constraints
bound to actions. The language largely abstracts from the internal rea-
soning of agents. We focus on providing new statements of a high ab-
straction level which facilitate agent interaction (coordination) about and
through group actions.
This chapter is an extended version of [122]; in this article, we just pre-
sented the syntax of GrAPL, while the chapter also details its operational
semantics.
Chapter 6: An Abstract Coordination Language for Agents Interacting in Dis-
tributed Plan-Execute Cycles
We introduce a coordination language for distributed planning and syn-
chronised plan execution in multi-agent systems. The language enables
heterogeneous agents to jointly form a plan by negotiating about con-
straints on the plan. We abstract from internal agent reasoning, includ-
ing the planning algorithms the agents employ, and focus on providing
high-level coordination statements through which agents can interact to
come to a jointly agreed plan, which they subsequently can execute. The
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statements of our language enable agents to form groups dedicated to
constructing a distributed plan together, to communicate about details of
the plan (as produced by the planning algorithms used by the agents), to
jointly decide that the plan is sufficiently elaborated by committing to it,
and finally to execute it.
The coordination language has a formal operational semantics. The lan-
guage is constraint-based, like the programming language GrAPL. The
constraints pertain to the objective of the plan and the circumstances in
which the plan will be executed, the group of agents negotiating about
the plan, the actions that are part of the plan, the actors that will execute
the actions and the order of the actions. Agents thus negotiate about and
execute structured plans instead of simple group actions. The statements
of the coordination language enable system builders to program coordi-
nation between agents doing distributed planning in a neat and abstract
manner.
Moreover, we propose a coordination architecture for multi-agent sys-
tems. This architecture provides support for managing the constraints on
plans by means of a constraint solver and provides control mechanisms
for the distributed execution of plans.
The work in this chapter has not been published previously.
Chapter 7: Conclusion: Abstract Interaction is what Agents are for!
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CHAPTER 2
Abstracting
Agent Interaction Histories
into Intentionality
The only baggage you can bring
Is all that you can’t leave behind
U2
2.1 Introduction
As agents become ever more sophisticated and their behaviour often goes be-
yond purely reactive behaviour, means are needed to understandably describe
and predict their actions. A general human tactic to understand the behaviour
of their fellow human beings is to ascribe mental notions to them. For exam-
ple, when you see a man running along a train platform, you will probably
think that this man wants to catch a train of which he believes that it’s almost
departing. This conclusion abstracts the interaction of the man with his en-
vironment into simple, familiar concepts. An attractive feature of the agent
paradigm is that it often uses anthropomorphic, intentional notions like those
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in the example to describe system behaviour. These notions offer a high level of
abstraction and have intuitive connotations, because of their folk-psychological
nature. While there is no generally accepted definition of agent systems, several
authors [21, 85, 102] hold informational and motivational attitudes as useful at-
tributes of an agent. Informational attitudes usually are the notions of belief and
knowledge, and motivational attitudes are concepts like desire, intention, goal,
plan, obligation and choice. There is no fixed set of intentional concepts; while
the main ideas are similar, different approaches make different choices. Nev-
ertheless, belief, desire and intention, abbreviated as BDI, seem to constitute a
classical kernel set of mental notions.
In [25, 26], Dennett puts forward the intentional stance as opposed to ex-
planations from a direct physical perspective (the physical stance). According
to the intentional stance, an agent is assumed to decide to act and communi-
cate based on its beliefs about its environment and its desires and intentions.
These decisions, and the intentional notions by which they can be explained
and predicted, generally depend on information acquired by observations and
communication in the past and not only on information just acquired. The
role of the intentional notions often is to extract and maintain relevant features
of the agent’s history. To be able to analyse the occurrence of intentional no-
tions in the behaviour of an observed agent, the observable behavioural patterns
over time form an empirical basis. We present means to abstract these patterns
in the interaction history of the agent with its environment into intentional no-
tions. According to Dennett, the intentional stance provides folk-psychological
means to compactly and intuitively describe system behaviour, at a level that
sufficiently abstracts from physical details that clutter understanding.
Dennett’s account is philosophical and informal in nature. In this chapter,
we formalise Dennett’s ideas by providing justifying conditions for intentional
notions. In the formalisation introduced below, the temporal aspect of the dy-
namics of the interaction with the environment is made explicit and related
to mental notions. We propose justifying conditions for the notions of belief,
intention and desire. The formal criteria describe the relation between the in-
tentional notions and the externally observable behaviour of an agent. If we
attribute belief, desire or intention to somebody else, then we do this based on
the actions we see this person doing, and also on the information we presume
that this person must have obtained by observation and communication. For
example, suppose we are in the main post office in Utrecht. If you enter this
post office, you have to take a number to be served. We enter, just following
a woman in a yellow dress. She has taken a number, which we observe to be
358. We both sit down somewhere to wait for our turn, watching the electronic
board indicating whose turn it is. We see that this board currently shows num-
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ber 214. We then assume the woman in the yellow dress also saw this. If, after
five minutes, we see the woman impatiently leaving the post office, while the
board indicates 218, then we can ascribe to her the desire to be served quickly
or not at all. Similarly, the justifying conditions we introduce relate intentional
notions to observed and communicated information the agent receives and to
actions the agent decides to perform.
Received information (observed or communicated), and decisions to per-
form specific actions (including communicative and observative actions), con-
stitute the input and output interfaces of an agent to the environment in which
the agent functions. Externally observed behaviour traces of the agent are for-
malised as temporal sequences of the agent’s input and output states. We use a
temporal trace language to express properties of behaviour. In this language, a
temporal formula in terms of the agent’s input and output states defines a class
of (possible) histories of interaction with the environment. The formal criteria
express when such a formula defines a class of interaction histories that can be
related to a specific belief, desire or intention. A temporal formula satisfying
these criteria for a specific intentional notion is called an external representa-
tion or temporal grounding of this notion. If a formula, describing a specific
behaviour pattern of an agent, is an external representation of an intentional no-
tion, and the formula holds for a certain agent behaviour, then we can ascribe
the intentional notion to that agent. Note that the formal criteria are useful both
for agents that have explicit internal representations of BDI and for agents that
don’t have these. Using the justifying conditions, internal representations can
be grounded in the agent’s behaviour and intentional notions can be attributed
to agents without internal representations of belief, desire and intention by def-
inition in terms of external behaviour.
The formal analysis of intentional notions in agents as performed in this
chapter can be compared to the cognitive approach in the study of animal be-
haviour. A biologist trying to interpret animal behaviour can first gather a large
amount of data on the actions of the animal in various situations by field studies
and experiments. Based on this empirical data, he can try to find an explanation
of why the animal acts like it does, and then go on testing this explanation in
new situations. This explanation is given in terms of internal mental represen-
tations. The cognitive approach has been severely criticised by behaviouristic
biologists, as they disapprove of presupposing cognitive representations in ani-
mals. The approach followed in this chapter has similarities with the cognitive
approach: based on a set of externally observed behaviour traces of an agent,
high-level notions such as beliefs, desires and intentions are attributed in such a
way that an easy to understand explanation can be given of observed behaviour,
and behaviour can be predicted. But our approach differs from the cognitive
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approach, in that we don’t presuppose mental representations in agents, and
that we have a detailed formalisation of the attribution process, which lacks in
the cognitive approach. Also, we provide criteria that fix the connection be-
tween the attributed intentional notions and the behaviour of the agent, making
the attribution of notions a testable and rigorous process.
Ascription of beliefs, desire and intention can be done in various contexts.
In this chapter, we focus at organisation modelling. In organisations, behaviour
is assumed to be constrained by the organisational structure (cf. [43, 44]), in-
cluding, in particular, behavioural role specifications (cf. [45]). These role
specifications prescribe to a certain extent the dynamics of the organisation, in
order to have well-coordinated processes in the organisation. A role specifi-
cation usually does not completely fix behaviours, but often allows some free
space for personal initiative. This freedom also may provide possibilities for
agents to avoid certain behaviours as expected by others, negatively effecting
the degree of coordination in the organisation. If avoidance behaviour is pos-
sible in an organisational structure, it is useful when agents fulfilling a certain
role in the organisation can reason about the possible behaviour of the agents
in other roles, for example using the intentional stance. For example, to an
agent functioning within an organisation it may be helpful to have capabilities
to predict in which circumstances certain inappropriate desires or intentions are
likely to arise as a basis for the behaviour of a colleague within the organisa-
tion, either to avoid the arising of these intentions by preventing the occurrence
of circumstances that are likely to lead to them, or if these circumstances can-
not be avoided, by anticipating consequences of the intentions. Similarly, for
cases that appropriate desires or intentions may or may not arise depending
on circumstances, interpretation and prediction of the behaviour of colleagues
makes sense. Such capabilities of anticipatory reasoning about the behaviour
of colleagues in an organisation are quite important for an organisation to func-
tion smoothly. More specific examples can be found in Section 2.6 below. This
chapter gives a formal basis for these types of anticipatory reasoning.
In Section 2.2 we discuss background material from various research areas.
Section 2.3 informally discusses the assumptions made on the notions belief,
desire and intention, and the way they interact with each other and with ex-
ternal notions. In Section 2.4 the formal temporal trace language used in this
chapter is introduced. Section 2.5 is the formal heart of the chapter; here, cri-
teria formalising the relation between the intentional notions and the external
behaviour of an agent are defined. In Section 2.6 an example application to
organisation modelling is addressed. Section 2.7 is a discussion.
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2.2 Background
Intentionality is presented from several perspectives in agent related literature.
In this section, we will illustrate the positions taken by several influential au-
thors from philosophy, computer science and artificial intelligence. Also, I
review a less famous author by relating my master thesis to the present issues
in this chapter.
In their famous overview article [130], Wooldridge and Jennings advocate
the usage of animistic, intentional explanations of the behaviour of agents.
They even hold intentionality a necessary condition for agent-hood, as this
quote shows:
An agent is a system that is most conveniently described by
the intentional stance; one whose simplest consistent description
requires the intentional stance.
So, a system which can be easily explained using other means than intentional
concepts is not an agent system, according to Wooldridge and Jennings. We
tentatively agree with this opinion. Agents generally don’t just react to im-
pulses from their environment, but also take initiatives to achieve conditions
in their environment. That is, agents show pro-active as well as reactive be-
haviour. In order for an agent to have non-reactive (that is pro-active, initiative-
taking) behaviour, its internal reasoning process must use other motivational
attitudes (for example goals and/or intentions) besides beliefs to decide on the
actions to be done. These other motivations are not based primarily on the in-
formation the agent has about the environment, but on the aims the agent wants
to realise in its environment.
The level of abstraction needed to give an intuitive explanation of a mecha-
nism or system is indicative for the level of complexity of the system. To quote
Wooldridge and Jennings again:
Put crudely, the more we know about a system, the less we
need to rely on animistic, intentional explanations of its behaviour.
However, with very complex systems, even if a complete, accu-
rate picture of the system’s architecture and working is available,
a mechanistic, design stance explanation of its behaviour may not
be practicable. Consider a computer. Although we might have a
complete technical description of a computer available, it is hardly
practicable to appeal to such a description when explaining why
a menu appears when we click a mouse on an icon. In such situ-
ations, it may be more appropriate to adopt an intentional stance
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description, if that description is consistent, and simpler than the
alternatives. The intentional notions are thus abstraction tools,
which provide us with a convenient and familiar way of describ-
ing, explaining, and predicting the behaviour of complex systems.
The ascription of mental attitudes to computer programs such as agents
has been criticised as being mere anthropomorphism. By pretending computer
programs have goals, plans and desires, just like humans, they seem more in-
telligent, while in fact the functionality isn’t any higher. On the one hand,
this criticism is justified; just by giving things a different name, software isn’t
getting any smarter. But when intentionality is used as an abstraction tool to de-
scribe reasoning behaviour of a certain level of complexity and ingenuity, this
criticism isn’t justified. Using anthropomorphic, intentional notions is a good
way to make agent behaviour explainable. The more complex the software, the
more useful intentional notions can be. John McCarthy supports this view, as
the following quotation1 shows.
To ascribe beliefs, free will, intentions, consciousness, abili-
ties, or wants to a machine is legitimate when such an ascription
expresses the same information about the machine that it expresses
about a person. It is useful when the ascription helps us understand
the structure of the machine, its past or future behaviour, or how to
repair or improve it. It is perhaps never logically required even for
humans, but expressing reasonably briefly what is actually known
about the state of the machine in a particular situation may require
mental qualities or qualities isomorphic to them. Theories of be-
lief, knowledge and wanting can be constructed for machines in a
simpler setting than for humans, and later applied to humans. As-
cription of mental qualities is most straightforward for machines
of known structure such as thermostats and computer operating
systems, but is most useful when applied to entities whose struc-
ture is incompletely known. (McCarthy, in [89])
Note that McCarthy thinks the ascription of intentional qualities can aid in
understanding past or future behaviour of a machine (or an agent). This is one
of our starting points, as we explained in the introduction.
Dennett also advocated the use of higher abstraction levels to explain sys-
tem behaviour. In [25, 26], Dennett introduces the design stance and the inten-
tional stance as two viewpoints that abstract from the details of the
1This fragment is quite popular. We found it in [130], where Wooldridge and Jennings repeat
McCarthy’s words as Shoham quoted them in his article on agent-oriented programming [113].
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physical stance. Different description levels with ontologies for emerging pat-
terns in the simulation environment Life are used to explain the advantage of
higher levels; cf. [25], pp. 37-39; [26], pp. 37-42. In addition, Dennett uses
the description levels in computer systems (actually of a chess computer), em-
bedded (and hence visualised) in the two-dimensional Life environment as a
metaphor to explain the advantage of design stance and intentional stance ex-
planations for mental phenomena over physical stance explanations:
The scale of compression when one adopts the intentional stance
toward the two-dimensional chess-playing computer galaxy is stu-
pendous: it is the difference between figuring out in your head
what white’s most likely (best) move is versus calculating the state
of a few trillion pixels through a few hundred thousand genera-
tions. But the scale of savings is really no greater in the Life world
than in our own. Predicting that someone will duck if you throw
a brick at him is easy from the folk-psychological stance; it is and
will always be intractable if you have to trace the protons from
brick to eyeball, the neurotransmitters from optic nerve to motor
nerve, and so forth. [26], p. 42
The intentional notions in this philosophical account aren’t formalised.
Agent theories [21, 85, 102] provide different logical formalisations of several
intentional notions. Each of the logics, which are reviewed in [121], focuses
on a different set of informational and motivational attitudes, formalises these
in modalities, and provides properties of the notions by axiomatising them.
These theories are also known as BDI-logics. The logics generally provide
logical relations between the different intentional notions, focusing more on
static aspects than on the dynamics of the intentional notions. The logical the-
ories mostly don’t relate the history of an agent’s past actions and observations
to its present internal motivations.
The temporal dependencies between the different intentional notions and
between the intentional notions and the observable behavioural ‘real world’
patterns, are thus only covered partially in the literature on BDI-logics as men-
tioned: within a BDI-logic, for a given world state all beliefs, desires and in-
tentions are derived at once, without internal dynamics. In other references
from the area of cognitive science and philosophy of mind, this omission has
been criticised, and instead a different perspective is proposed, where dynam-
ics of mental states and their interaction with the environment are central; e.g.
[9, 19, 20]. For example, in [9] Bickhard emphasises the relation between the
(mental) state of a system (or agent) and its past and future in the interaction
with its environment:
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When interaction is completed, the system will end in some
one of its internal states — some of its possible final states. Some
environments will leave the system in that same final state, when
interactions with this system are complete, and some environments
will leave the system in different possible final states. The final
state that the systems ends up in, then, serves to implicitly cat-
egorise together that class of environments that would yield that
final state if interacted with. A possible final state, then, implicitly
defines, in an interactive sense, its class of environments. Dually,
the set of possible final states serves to differentiate the class of
possible environments into those categories that are implicitly de-
fined by the particular final states. The overall system, with its
possible final states, therefore, functions as a differentiator of en-
vironments, with the final states implicitly defining the differenti-
ation categories. (. . . ) Representational content is constituted as
indications of potential further interactions. (. . . ) The claim is
that such differentiated functional indications in the context of a
goal-directed system constitute representation — emergent repre-
sentation.
This suggests that mental states need to be grounded in interaction histories on
the one hand, and have to be related to future interactions on the other hand.
However, in this literature no formalisation is proposed based on this perspec-
tive. In the formalisation introduced below, the temporal aspect of the dynamics
of the interaction with the environment is made explicit and related to mental
notions. In [71], Jonker and Treur propose a formalisation of Bickhard’s philo-
sophical interactivist perspective.
Returning to the area of agent research, we briefly mention agent program-
ming languages and -architectures. There are several agent programming lan-
guages and architectures based on the mental perspective, where agents have
beliefs, goals and plans. Examples of programming languages are [59, 101,
113]. Agents written in these languages execute a sense–reason–act-cycle; they
sense their environment through observation and communication and update
their beliefs, they reason to keep their plans and goals up-to-date and to de-
cide which actions to perform next, and then they execute the chosen actions,
after which the cycle starts again. Agent architectures with intentional inspi-
ration are for example IRMA [13] and GRATE∗ [67]. As agent programming
languages and agent architectures are meant to actually build agents that in-
teract with their environment, mental notions in programming languages and
architectures are related to external agent actions and observations, in contrast
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to agent theories, where this is usually neglected. Unfortunately, the relation
between internal intentional notions and external agent behaviour is often not
formally described.
The final background perspective we review is taken from my master the-
sis, called “Motivated Machines and Longing Logics” [121]. In this report, I
review the work of the philosopher Nelson [94] in particular. Nelson is a mech-
anist, which means that he believes the human mind functions according to a
system of rules and is thus nothing but a machine. Nelson thinks the mind es-
sentially is the same as a nondeterministic finite automaton. To give evidence
for this thesis, Nelson then tries to define finite automata that implement belief
and desire. Though I show in [121] that there are many flaws and weaknesses
in Nelson’s account, his conception of desire is very interesting. According to
Nelson, an agent desires something if, whenever it thinks there is an oppor-
tunity to perform an action to get what it wants, it acts, and the result of its
act is that it expects to have what it desired. Note that this notion of desire is
quite strong, as each desire leads to actions if there are opportunities for these
actions. Other authors generally take desire to be weaker; a desire only leads
to actions if an agent chooses to make it into a goal and adopts intentions to
perform actions for achieving this goal. Nelson’s desires are as strong as goals
and/or intentions are in other work. Also, it is unusual to include expectation
in intentional definitions. As will become clear in the next sections, we use a
definition for intention that is very close to Nelson’s desire definition, minus
the expectation part.
2.3 Basic assumptions
In this section, we informally discuss the notions of belief, desire, and inten-
tion, and their interdependencies, as shown in Figure 2.1. The solid arrows in
this figure show how mental notions depend on other mental notions; for ex-
ample, an intention to do some action arises from a desire for something and
the belief that there is a reason to pursue this desire by doing the action. The
dashed arrows indicate that part of the history of an agent can lead to desires or
beliefs; this doesn’t involve every aspect of the history. The interdependencies
in Figure 2.1 are based upon a number of assumptions on beliefs, desires, and
intentions. These assumptions have been inspired by the work of Dretske on the
understanding of behaviour [31]. The assumptions we make keep the notions
relatively simple; the approach can be extended for more complex notions.
Assumptions on beliefs. In the simplest approach, beliefs (β in Figure 2.1)
are just based on information the agent has received by observation or commu-
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Figure 2.1: Relationships between the BDI notions
nication in the past, which has not been overridden by more recent information.
This entails the first assumption: if the agent has been informed in the past
about a world fact, and no opposite information has been received since then,
then the agent believes the world fact. The second assumption is the converse:
for every belief of a world fact, there was a time at which the agent was in-
formed about this world fact (by sensing or communication), and no opposite
information was received since then. These assumptions can also be replaced
by less simple ones, if required. For example, in some domains, observation
is not reliable and some of the other agents provide untrue information, and so
the agent can only believe information if a reliable agent communicates it, or
if the same information is provided from two different sources. Note that we
restrict ourselves for the sake of simplicity to perceptual beliefs in this chapter;
we don’t consider beliefs the agent obtains by reasoning. For this kind of belief
other assumptions are needed.
Assumptions on intentions. In the first place, when an agent performs (θ in
Figure 2.1) a physical or communicative action (a in the figure), we assume the
agent has intended (γ) to do that. The agent thus doesn’t perform actions by
accident. Secondly, we assume that an agent who intends to perform an action
will execute the action when it believes that an opportunity (α) occurs. The
agent can initiate the action some time after it believes there is an opportunity,
because its reasoning processes could take some time. Note that these two
assumptions closely match Nelson’s definition of desire, as discussed in the
previous section.
Assumptions on desires. The first assumption on desire is that every inten-
tion is based on a desire (δ). An agent can desire states of the world as well as
28
actions to be performed; so, x in the figure can be a world state or an action. If
the desire depicted in Figure 2.1 is for an action, then x and a coincide (x = a).
When the agent has a set of desires, it can choose to pursue some of them. A
chosen desire for a state of the world can lead to an intention to do an action
if, for example, expected effects of the action (partly) fulfil the desire. The
second assumption is that, given a desire, for each relevant action there is an
additional reason (ρ), so that if both the desire is present and the agent believes
the reason, then the agent will intend to perform the action. In case the desire
is for doing an action, then ρ merely selects desires which are to be pursued; in
case the desire is for achieving a world state, the reason ρ both selects a desire
and picks an action that can lead to its fulfilment.
Determinism Assumption. Another basic assumption we make is that a soft-
ware agent’s internal states functionally depend on the history of the agent; i.e.,
two copies of the same agent build up exactly the same (internal) states if they
have exactly the same histories of input. For a software agent, running on a
deterministic machine, the Determinism Assumption can be considered a rea-
sonable assumption. Differences between the behaviours of two copies of the
same software agent will be created by their different histories. For most of
the concepts defined below, this assumption is not strictly necessary. However,
it is an assumption that strongly motivates the approach. If determinism is as-
sumed it makes sense to exploit temporal formulae that describe the history of
the agent as candidates for representations of externally attributed intentional
notions; otherwise these formulae will not be found.
2.4 Formal preliminaries
To be able to formulate properties of agent behaviour, we need a formal tempo-
ral language. In this section, we define and explain this language. We base the
language in representations used in agent systems. No matter what architecture
or programming language is used, an agent needs data structures for observa-
tion results and incoming communication and for actions the agent has decided
to do. Different agent systems use different representations. In this chapter, we
assume the agent is logic-based, and that all information the agent handles is
logically formulated. For example, if an agent decides to do action a, this is
represented by the atom to be performed(a) getting the truth value true.
The agents we consider have three different information spaces, as Figure
2.2 shows. The input interface contains information coming in from the envi-
ronment, that is, the external world and the other agents. The output interface
contains representations of actions the agent is about to do; these actions can
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Figure 2.2: An agent in its environment
be physical, communicative or observative. When the agent executes a physi-
cal action, the atom representing the action is transferred to the external world,
where the actual execution takes place. Observations are processed similarly;
the atom representing the observative action is transferred to the external world,
which then returns the observation result to the agent. Note that performing a
communicative action is the same as sending a message, as is the case in this
agent model. The third information space is the internal agent state. If the
agent internally employs BDI-notions, then beliefs, desires and intentions are
stored in this space. The internal agent state can contain whatever information
the agent programmer holds useful for the reasoning processes of the agent.
For example, the agent could maintain a history of observations performed in
the past, or it could have expectations about the outcomes of actions it is doing.
For our present purposes, these choices are not relevant.
In the specification of agent programs formal ontologies (i.e., vocabularies)
for the agent’s input, output and internal state are used and formulae based on
these ontologies. We adopt these ontologies as the basis of the temporal lan-
guage for describing agent behaviour. For simplicity, we use predicate logic to
specify both ontologies and formulae. An ontology is specified as a finite set of
sorts, constants within these sorts, and relations and functions over these sorts
(sometimes also called a signature). By applying the relations and functions
to the constants, ground atoms are obtained, which form the basic constituents
from which formulae can be constructed. The union of two ontologies contains
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the sorts, relations and functions from both ontologies and is again an ontol-
ogy. If functions are used, recursion is excluded, to keep the number of ground
atoms finite. By considering the finite set of ground atoms as proposition sym-
bols, the logical languages based on it can be treated as propositional.
2.4.1 State Language
First, we use an ontology for facts concerning the actual state of the exter-
nal world: ontology EWOnt. For example, in a system modelling an artifi-
cial mouse looking for food in its environment, EWOnt contains constants like
mouse and cheese, and relations like at position(. . . , . . . ). A formula based on
this ontology is for example at position(mouse, p 2)∧at position(cheese, p 1).
Some of the other (agent) ontologies will make use of EWOnt, as we will show
later on. Next, we have ontologies for the three agent information spaces.
These ontologies form the basis of a language to describe the state of the agent.
The agent input ontology InOnt contains constructs for observation results and
communication received. The following input atoms are used. The observation
result that ϕ holds is denoted by observation result(ϕ), where ϕ is describing
information on the external environment. This means that ϕ is a formula based
on the ontology EWOnt. Similarly, communicated by(ϕ, i) denotes that agent
i has communicated ϕ. The agent output ontology OutOnt contains constructs
to represent decisions to do actions within the external world, as well as con-
structs for outgoing communication and observations that the agent needs to
obtain. The following output atoms are used: to be performed(a) denotes that
the agent decides to perform action a, to be communicated to(ϕ, i) means that
the agent sends information ϕ to agent i, and to be observed(ϕ) denotes that
the agent decides to perform an observation to investigate the truth of ϕ. All
expressions introduced to formalise the interaction of the agent with its envi-
ronment are meta-expressions; some of their arguments refer to statements in
an object-level language. In the above expressions, the symbol ϕ refers to a
formula based on EWOnt. So, ϕ could be at position(cheese, p 1), and then
to be observed(at position(cheese, p 1)) denotes that the agent wants to per-
form an observation regarding the position of the cheese. The internal agent
ontology InternalOnt is used for the internal (e.g., BDI) notions. The agent in-
terface ontology is defined by InterfaceOnt = InOnt ∪ OutOnt; the agent on-
tology by AgOnt = InterfaceOnt ∪ InternalOnt, and the overall ontology by
OvOnt = AgOnt ∪ EWOnt.
The logical language based on the ontologies defined above is called the
state language (abbreviated as SL) and its formulae are called state formulae.
State formulae describe the state of an agent or of the world at one partic-
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ular (unmentioned) point in time. Existential and universal quantification is
allowed in formulae. So, the formula ∃p ∈ POSITION : at position(cheese, p)
is a formula of SL, and means that there is cheese at some position. As there
are different ontologies, there are different state languages, each based on an
ontology. All state formulae based on a certain ontology Ont constitute the
language SL(Ont). SL is the overall state language; it is an abbreviation of
SL(OvOnt). Note that SL(Ont) ⊆ SL for each ontology Ont. An information
state of the input of the agent is an assignment of truth values {true, false,
unknown} to the set of ground atoms in SL(InOnt). The set of all possible infor-
mation states of the agent’s input is denoted by IS(InOnt). Similarly, IS(OutOnt)
and IS(InterfaceOnt) are the sets of all possible information states of the agent’s
output state and internal state. The set of information states of the overall agent
then is IS(AgOnt), which we usually abbreviate to IS(Ag). We define the set
of information states of the external world IS(EWOnt) (abbreviated to IS(EW))
and of the overall system IS(OvOnt) (abbreviated to IS(S), where S refers to
system) analogously.
2.4.2 Temporal Language
To describe behaviour of agents, we refer to time in a formal manner. For our
approach, it isn’t relevant whether time is dense or discrete. The only restric-
tion we need is the finite variability assumption, which we provide in the next
subsection. For now, we assume the time frame is the set of natural numbers
or a finite initial segment of the natural numbers. The finite variability assump-
tion basically means the time frame is isomorphic to one of these. An overall
trace M over a time frame T is a sequence of information states (Mt)t∈T,
where Mt ∈ IS(S). We also have traces of an agent, or of the external world;
then, the information states pertain to the agent or the world instead of the
whole system. A temporal domain description W is a set of overall traces.
The information on agent behaviour in the temporal domain descriptions can
be compared to the information a biologist gathers on an animal by repeatedly
studying its behaviour in various circumstances. There can be many temporal
domain descriptions for an agent system, as there are many sets of system traces
possible. In order to give a well-founded explanation of the agent behaviour, it
is necessary to carefully select a world description which is large enough and
diverse enough to be a good representation of all possible agent behaviours in
each possible situation. Given a trace M of agent Ag, the information state of
the input interface at time point t is denoted by state(M, t, input(Ag)). Anal-
ogously, state(M, t, output(Ag)) denotes the information state of the output
interface of the agent at time point t, and state(M, t, internal(Ag)) the internal
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information state. We can also refer to the overall information state of a system
(agents and environment) at a certain moment; this is denoted by state(M, t).
These formalised information states can be related to state formulae via the
formally defined satisfaction relation . If ϕ ∈ SL(InOnt), then
state(M, t, input(Ag))  ϕ
denotes that ϕ is true in this state at time point t, based on the strong Kleene
semantics (e.g., [10]). The sorted predicate logic temporal language TL is built
on atoms like the one above, using the usual logical connectives and quantifi-
cation (for example, over traces, time and state formulae). This structure of
TL is comparable to the approach in the situation calculus, where formulas are
built from atoms like holds(ϕ, S), which informally translates to “In situation
S, formula ϕ is true”. TL is the language we use to formalise properties of the
dynamic behaviour of agents. An example of a formula of TL is
∀t1 : state(M, t1, output(Ag)) 
to be performed(kick ball through neighbor window)
⇒
∃t2 > t1 : state(M, t2, input(Ag)) 
observation result(angry neighbor at door)
The meaning of this property is straightforward. In contrast with SL, which
is a three-valued logic, TL is a two-valued logic; an atom can either be true
(state(M, t)  ϕ) or false (state(M, t) 6 ϕ). The reason that this is so is the
way we defined information states; an information state is total, in the sense
that it fixes a truth value (true, false or unknown) for each ground atom of the
state language involved. Thus, the truth value of a composite state formula
ϕ ∈ SL in an information state state(M, t) can always be computed to be
either true, false or unknown. In case the truth value is true, the temporal atom
state(M, t)  ϕ has truth value true; if the truth value of ϕ in the state is
unknown or false, then state(M, t)  ϕ has truth value false. These are the
only two options. In other words, there is no way to construct a temporal atom
state(M, t)  ϕ which has truth value unknown. Note that if ϕ is unknown in
the state, then both state(M, t)  ϕ and state(M, t)  ¬ϕ have truth value
false. If a composite temporal formula ψ ∈ TL is constructed from temporal
atoms like these, the truth value can be determined using traditional semantics
for two-valued logics.
Sometimes, we employ the notation ψ(M, t) to refer to a formula from
TL in which trace M and time point t occur. We allow additional language
elements as abbreviations of formulae of the temporal language.
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To focus on different aspects of the agent and time, we need ways to restrict
traces. Restrictions have two parameters, one for the ontologies and one for
the time interval. The ontology parameter indicates which parts of the agent
are considered. For example, when this parameter is InOnt, then only input
information is present in the restriction. The time interval parameter specifies
the time frame of interest. To illustrate this, the notation MOutOnt[0,t〉 denotes
the restriction of M to the past up to t and to output atoms. The restriction
MOntInterval of a trace M to time in Interval and information based on Ont is
defined as follows:
MOntInterval(t)(α) = M(t)(α) if t ∈ Interval and α is a ground atom
of Ont
unknown otherwise
In the next section, we will give criteria that relate beliefs, desires and inten-
tions at a certain point in time to formulae describing the history of the agent up
and until that point in time. Therefore, it is useful to define the category of past
formulae. A past formula for M and t is a temporal formula ψ(M, t) ∈ TL
such that each time variable different from t is restricted to the time interval
before t; no reference is made to time points beyond t in ψ(M, t). In other
words, every time quantifier for a variable t′ is bounded by a restriction t′ ≤ t,
or t′ < t, or is within the scope of another variable t′′ and bounded by a restric-
tion t′ ≤ t′′ or t′ < t′′. This way, no variable in ψ(M, t) refers to a time later
than t. The set of past formulae over ontology Ont with respect to t is denoted
by PL(Ont, t). Note that for any past formula ψ(M, t) it holds:
∀M ∈ W ∀t ψ(M[0,t], t) ⇔ ψ(M, t)
This is the case because ψ(M, t) describes a property of the part of trace M
before t; whether this property holds thus only depends on the time interval
[0, t].
2.4.3 Finite variability and change pinpoint principle
In the previous subsection, we mentioned that the time frame T can be either
discrete or dense. In case the time frame is dense, we need some provisions to
ensure that traces can be sliced up into intervals such that the overall informa-
tion state is stable within each interval. A property that guarantees this is finite
variability (we use a variant of the one in [5]). This property forbids gradual
changes in information states, like for example the changes to the position of a
ball falling down. Traces with a dense time frame that adhere to finite variabil-
ity are isomorphic to traces where time is discrete, because the moments that
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states change can be related to discrete time points. To be precise, the finite
variability assumption defines a specific subset of all linear time traces, namely
only those traces where between any two time points only a finite number of
changes occur, and after each change, a first time point exists for the new state:
∀s, t ∀ϕ : s < t ⇒ ∃n ∈ N \ {0} ∃t1, . . . , tn : s = t1 < . . . < tn = t ∧
∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1} ∀t′ ∈ [ti, ti+1〉 :
[(state(M, ti)  ϕ⇔ state(M, t′)  ϕ)∧
(state(M, ti)  ¬ϕ⇔ state(M, t′)  ¬ϕ)]
Traces satisfying this adhere to the following change pinpoint principle, as we
will prove in the continuation of this subsection. The change pinpoint principle
expresses that any change in the state of the agent system can be related to
a unique time point: for each change that occurs in a trace M it should be
possible to point at a time point where this change has just occurred:
∀ϕ ∀t3 : state(M, t3)  ϕ ⇒
∃t2 ≤ t3 ∀t ∈ [t2, t3] : state(M, t)  ϕ ∧
(t2 6= 0⇒ ∃t1 < t2 ∀t′ ∈ [t1, t2〉 : state(M, t′) 6 ϕ)
This means that it is always possible to find a moment in time were a for-
mula has just become true. If this moment isn’t the start of the time line (time
point 0), then the truth value of the formula has changed at this moment. For
the cases that ϕ is false or unknown at t3, similar formulations can be given.
In case we have finite variability, we also have the change pinpoint princi-
ple:
PROPOSITION 2.1
for all traces M:
M satisfies finite variability ⇒M satisfies the change pinpoint principle
PROOF (sketch):
Suppose finite variability holds for a trace M. We take a point in time t3
and we suppose state(M, t3)  ϕ. In order to prove the change pinpoint
principle for M, we have to show:
∃t2 ≤ t3 ∀t ∈ [t2, t3] : state(M, t)  ϕ ∧
(t2 6= 0 ⇒ ∃t1 < t2 ∀t′ ∈ [t1, t2〉 : state(M, t′) 6 ϕ). We call this asser-
tion F. So, we have to show there is period before t3 where the formula
holds, and in case this period doesn’t start at time 0, that there is an earlier
period where the formula doesn’t hold. We have two cases:
ϕ holds at all time points up to t3: In this case, we take t2 = 0. This t2
works to validateF.
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ϕ doesn’t always hold before t3: We use finite variability, with 0 substi-
tuted for s and t3 for t. This renders that the time between 0 and t3
can be divided into a number of consecutive right-open time inter-
vals, such that the system’s information state according to M is sta-
ble in each interval. Time point 0 belongs to the first interval, while
t3 (where ϕ holds) immediately follows the last interval. We call the
left boundary of the last interval v, so this last interval is [v, t3〉. We
now have two cases again, depending on whether ϕ holds in the last
interval.
state(M, v) 6 ϕ: This means that ϕ doesn’t hold in the last interval.
Thus, the interval prior to t3 where ϕ holds consists only of time
point t3. We take t2 = t3 and t1 = v. With this t2 and t1, F
holds.
state(M, v)  ϕ: This means that ϕ holds in the last interval before
t3, and possibly also in earlier intervals. Because we know that
ϕ holds at t3, we can conclude that ϕ holds in the interval [v, t3].
As ϕ doesn’t hold on the entire interval [0, t3], there must be
an earlier interval where ϕ doesn’t hold. Take the most recent
interval before v where ϕ doesn’t hold. Suppose this interval
is [u,w〉. Thus in all subsequent intervals, ϕ holds, up to and
inclusive t3, that is in [w, t3]. We take t2 = w, and t1 = u, and
F holds.
End of PROOF.
To express that some formula has just become true, we introduce the fol-
lowing notation pronounced as just . In the definitions below, as in the rest of
this thesis, we will use ‘≡’ to mean ‘is defined as’.
⊕state(M, t1, interface)  ϕ ≡ state(M, t1, interface)  ϕ ∧
(t1 6= 0⇒ ∃t2 < t1 ∀t ∈ [t2, t1〉 : state(M, t, interface) 6 ϕ)
⊕state(M, t1, interface) 6 ϕ ≡ state(M, t1, interface) 6 ϕ ∧
(t1 6= 0⇒ ∃t2 < t1 ∀t ∈ [t2, t1〉 : state(M, t, interface)  ϕ)
So, if a formula ϕ holds initially, we have ⊕state(M, 0, interface)  ϕ, and
at all other time points t 6= 0 we have ⊕state(M, t, interface)  ϕ if the truth
value of ϕ changes to true at t.
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2.5 Criteria for beliefs, desires and intentions
In this section, we provide formal criteria that temporal formulae from TL must
adhere to in order to qualify as a representation of belief, desire or intention,
respectively. We assume there is one agent on which we focus, and whose
identifier is Ag. The criteria take a candidate formula ψ(M, t), and check
whether this formula has the properties of belief, desire or intention informally
described in Section 2.3. If so, then ψ(M, t) is a representation of the in-
tentional notion at hand being present in the agent in trace M at time t. All
formulae from TL can be tested with the criteria. For example, we could have
a formula ϕ(M, t) describing input- and output behaviour of an agent before
and after t and test whether this formula qualifies as an intention representa-
tion. But if so, this formula is not very useful, because if we later want to know
whether at some time t we can attribute intention to the agent, we have to know
future information states of the agent in order to check whether ϕ(M, t) is true,
and so we have to wait a while before we can decide. We will focus on two cat-
egories of candidate formulae for belief, desire or intention being present at t,
namely formulae describing the input history of the agent up and until t (recall
the Determinism Assumption) and formulae phrasing a property of the internal
agent state at time t. The latter formulae can be tested to find out whether the
intentional notions an agent uses internally are proper. We discuss both classes
of formulae in Section 2.5.5.
2.5.1 Beliefs
Recall that in Section 2.3 we have assumed that an agent believes all infor-
mation which it has received in the past and which is not overridden by more
recent information. Before giving a temporal characterisation of the notion of
belief, we need an auxiliary definition:
DEFINITION 2.1 (Informed)
Let ϕ ∈ SL(EWOnt), then:
Informed(ϕ, t,M) ≡ ⊕state(M, t, input(Ag))  observation result(ϕ)∨
∃ B ∈ AGENT : ⊕state(M, t, input(Ag))  communicated by(ϕ,B)
Here AGENT is a sort for the agents names. So, Informed(ϕ, t,M) means
that the agent has just received information that ϕ (describing world state in-
formation) is true at time point t. The following characterisation of belief is
based on the assumption that an agent believes a fact if it was informed about it
in the past and the fact is not contradicted by later information of the opposite.
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We restrict ourselves to beliefs of formulae describing the state of the world
(∈ SL(EWOnt)). For ϕ, the complementary formula ∼ϕ is defined as ∼ϕ ≡ α
if ϕ = ¬α and ∼ ϕ ≡ ¬ϕ otherwise. We adopt the convention to denote
(candidate) belief formulae by β(M, t), corresponding to the symbols used in
Figure 2.1 (Section 2.3).
DEFINITION 2.2 (Belief representation)
Let ϕ ∈ SL(EWOnt). The temporal formula β(M, t) ∈ TL is an externally
grounded belief formula for ϕ with respect to a world description W if
∀M ∈ W ∀t1 : (β(M, t1)⇔
∃t0 ≤ t1 : [Informed(ϕ, t0,M)∧∀t ∈ [t0, t1] : ¬Informed(∼ϕ, t,M)])
Formulae satisfying the condition in Definition 2.2 are called externally
grounded, because they only hold at t in the traces of W when the externally
observable agent behaviour (that is, what takes place in the input- and output
interface of the agent) has certain properties. So, belief formulae are grounded
in the external agent behaviour.
A formula is an externally grounded belief (or desire or intention) formula
with respect to a certain world description. The formula is induced from the
behaviour in the world description. If this world description is representative
for all possible behaviours of the agent, then the externally grounded formula
can be used to ascribe the intentional notion involved in traces which were
not part of the world description. Whenever the externally grounded belief,
desire or intention formula holds, we can conclude that the agent has the belief,
desire or intention, respectively. But there is no guarantee that this ascription is
correct. It could happen that a formula which is an externally grounded belief
(or intention or desire) formula with respect to W holds in a new trace not
part ofW , and the criteria for belief (or intention or desire, respectively) aren’t
fulfilled. It’s like the famous induction example of the black swans; even if you
have seen a thousand swans that are all black, you can’t be certain that all swans
are black. Coming across a white (or blue, for that matter) swan always stays a
possibility. We will often be sloppy and leave out the phrase “with respect to a
world description W” when dealing with externally grounded formulae.
Note that the temporal past formula Belief(ϕ, t1,M) in PL(InOnt, t1)
defined by
∃t0 ≤ t1 : [Informed(ϕ, t0,M)∧∀t ∈ [t0, t1] : ¬Informed(∼ϕ, t,M)]
itself is an externally grounded belief formula for ϕ.
The following proposition gives two properties of belief formulae. In the
first place, it states that all externally grounded belief formulae are temporally
equivalent, which means that they have the same truth values in each trace in
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the world description, at each moment in time. Secondly, the proposition states
that a belief formula for a certain fact and a belief formula for the complemen-
tary fact never are true together.
PROPOSITION 2.2 (Properties of belief formulae)
Let ϕ ∈ SL(EWOnt) be given.
(a) All belief formulae for ϕ are temporally equivalent; i.e.,
if β1(M, t), β2(M, t) ∈ TL are two externally grounded belief formulae
for ϕ with respect to W , then
∀M ∈ W ∀t : β1(M, t)⇔ β2(M, t)
(b) At each time point there are no belief formulae true for complementary
world state formulae; i.e., for any world state formula ϕ, if β1(M, t1) is a
belief formula for ϕ and β2(M, t1) is a belief formula for the complemen-
tary formula ∼ϕ, then
∀M ∈ W ∀t : β1(M, t)⇒ ¬β2(M, t)
Note that temporal equivalence of two belief formulae (as in part (a) of the
proposition) does not imply equivalence of the two in the ordinary sense. Tem-
poral equivalence is defined with respect to the models in the world description
W , while for classical equivalence the two belief formulae have to have the
same truth values in all possible models. When two formulae are temporally
equivalent, then for each trace within the world description W , the truth values
of both formulas are the same at each moment in time.
2.5.2 Intentions
Motivational attitudes refer in their semantics to the future actions of the agent
(see Section 2.3), so it can be expected that in the criteria for intentions also
reference to future actions of the agent is made. We review our assumptions
regarding intentions before formalising them in two conditions that candidate
formulae for intentions have to satisfy. We assume that an agent who intends
to perform an action (physical, communicative or observative) will execute the
action when it believes that an opportunity (α) occurs and that when the agent
performs an action (θ), the agent intended (γ) to do that. These two assump-
tions result in two conditions a candidate intention formula has to satisfy, the
sufficiency condition for intention and the necessity condition for intention, re-
spectively. The sufficiency condition expresses that whenever the candidate
intention is present, and the most recent world information is that the agent
has the opportunity to do the action, this is sufficient for an action to occur
at some later point in time. The necessity condition states that for the action
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under focus to occur, it is necessary that at some earlier time point the can-
didate intention formula holds and the most recent information is that there
is an opportunity to do the action. Again, we use the symbols introduced in
Figure 2.1. An opportunity α is a state formula based on the ontology of EW,
formalising the conditions on the state of the world under which the action
can be done. In the definition below an action atom θ(M, t) is an atom of
the form state(M, t, output(Ag))  ψ with ψ being one of to be performed(a),
to be communicated to(ϕ, i), or to be observed(ϕ).
DEFINITION 2.3 (Intention representation)
Let α ∈ SL(EWOnt) be an external state formula and θ(M, t) an action
atom. The temporal formula γ(M, t) ∈ TL is called an externally grounded
intention formula for action atom θ(M, t) and opportunity α with respect
to a world description W if the following conditions are fulfilled:
Sufficiency condition for intention:
∀M ∈ W ∀t1 : (γ(M, t1) ∧
∃t0 ≤ t1 : [Informed(α, t0,M)∧∀t ∈ [t0, t1] : ¬Informed(∼α, t,M)]
⇒ ∃t2 ≥ t1 : θ(M, t2))
Necessity condition for intention:
∀M ∈ W ∀t2 : (θ(M, t2)⇒
∃t1 ≤ t2 : γ(M, t1) ∧
∃t0 ≤ t1 : [Informed(α, t0,M)∧∀t ∈ [t0, t1] : ¬Informed(∼α, t,M)])
The criteria above mean that a candidate temporal formula γ(M, t) is a proper
formalisation of intention to do an action, if whenever this formula holds in a
trace of the world description under consideration and the agent also has non-
refuted information that there is an opportunity to do the action, it acts at a later
moment (sufficiency), and also that whenever the agents performs the action in
a trace of the world description, there was an earlier time at which γ(M, t) held
and the agent also had non-refuted information that there was an opportunity
to do the action. As is clear in the light of the previous subsection, having non-
refuted information that there is an opportunity comes down to believing that
there is an opportunity.
The world description provides a behaviour sample of the agent, and is used
to check the hypothesis that γ(M, t) is an intention formula. It is possible that
a candidate formula is an externally grounded intention formula with respect to
a world description W , but not with respect to a larger domain description W ′,
as the larger domain description can contain traces which are counterexamples
of the criteria above. To have enough information to determine whether a can-
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Figure 2.3: A world description
didate formula is an externally grounded intention formula that is useful for a
wide range of agent behaviours, the selected world description has to be large
enough and diverse enough.
Note that the criteria above don’t force the intention to hold on until the
moment the agent decides to do the action. In the period between the intention
being present (t1) and the decision to do the action (t2), γ(M, t) doesn’t need
to hold. In other words, we don’t have persistence of motivations.
In Figure 2.3, we illustrate the intuition of the criteria for intention. In
this figure, we schematically depict a world description W1, which for the pur-
pose of the example consists of only four traces. In the previous subsection,
we saw that the formula ∃t0 ≤ t1 : [Informed(α, t0,M) ∧ ∀t ∈ [t0, t1] :
¬Informed(∼α, t,M)] is also denoted by Belief(α, t1,M). For readabil-
ity, we use this shorter notion and abbreviate it even further into B(α). The
figure shows that at certain time points in certain traces the formulas γ and
B(α) and the action atom θ are true. For brevity, we omit the parameters M
and t of these formulae. We assume that at the other time points, the formu-
lae don’t hold (or their truth value is irrelevant). To find out whether γ is an
externally grounded intention formula, we have to check each trace to see if
truth of both the candidate intention formula γ and the belief that there is an
opportunity B(α) always gives an action θ at a later moment, and whether for
each action θ there is an earlier time at which B(α) and γ hold. As can easily
be checked, this indeed is the case, so whenever γ is true, the agent intends
to do θ. Note that the criteria for intention allow situations such as in the first
(topmost) trace, where two action occurrences take place, even though there
is only one time at which there is the combination of intention and believed
opportunity. The criteria also allow that only one action takes place when there
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are two earlier moments where there is the intention for θ and the belief that
there is opportunity. These things might seem strange, and indicate that it is
valuable to have a large domain description (containing much more than four
traces), in order to rule out unwanted intention formulas.
In contrast, in Figure 2.4, γ is not an externally grounded intention formula.
In this figure, there is a violation of the criteria in three of the four traces. In the
W2
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θ θ
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γ, B(α) θ
γ B(α)
γ, B(α)
time
θ
θ
Figure 2.4: Another world description
first trace, the first occurrence of the action is not preceded by an intention to-
gether with believed opportunity. In the third trace we have the same problem,
and in the fourth trace truth of the candidate intention formula and the belief
that there is opportunity to do θ don’t lead to an action.
As already suggested by the examples above, externally grounded belief
formulae can replace the sub-formulae formalising that there is non-refuted
information on an occurrence of an occasion for the action under focus. If there
is an externally grounded belief formula for the opportunity α (for example
Belief(α, t,M), as used above), then the characterisation of an intention can
be reformulated.
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PROPOSITION 2.3 (Shorter intention conditions)
Let α ∈ SL(EWOnt) be an external state formula, βα(M, t) be an externally
grounded belief formula for α and θ(M, t) an action atom. The temporal
formula γ(M, t) ∈ TL is an externally grounded intention formula for ac-
tion atom θ(M, t) and opportunity α if and only if the following conditions
are fulfilled:
Sufficiency condition for intention:
∀M ∈ W ∀t1 : (γ(M, t1) ∧ βα(M, t1)⇒ ∃t2 ≥ t1 : θ(M, t2))
Necessity condition for intention:
∀M ∈ W ∀t2 : (θ(M, t2)⇒ ∃t1 ≤ t2 : γ(M, t1) ∧ βα(M, t1))
This proposition follows immediately using Definition 2.2.
2.5.3 Desires
In Section 2.3, we sketched the properties of desires, which we will formalise
here. An agent can desire states of the world as well as actions to be performed.
Not all desires lead to intentions and subsequently to actions; the agent needs
to believe an additional reason (ρ) before it chooses to associate an intention to
do an action with the desire. For each action that can contribute to the estab-
lishment of the desire, there is a different reason. For example, if you desire
to have an ice-cream, and you believe that there is ice-cream in your freezer,
then you probably will intend to open the freezer. But if you don’t believe
this, and you do believe the snack-bar on the corner sells ice-cream, you will
intend to walk over to the snack-bar. A reason thus describes a state of the
world in which a desire can be fulfilled by doing a certain action. Just like in
the previous subsection, we have two conditions for formulae to qualify as an
desire. The first is that when an agent desires (δ) something, and it believes the
reason associated with a certain action, then it will develop the intention (γ) to
perform that action. And the second is that there are no intentions without de-
sires causing them. The criteria for intention and those for desire have similar
formalisations and intuitions.
43
DEFINITION 2.4 (Desire representation)
Let an external state formula ρ ∈ SL(EWOnt) and an intention formula
γ(M, t) be given. The temporal formula δ(M, t) ∈ TL is called an ex-
ternally grounded desire formula for intention γ(M, t) and reason ρ with
respect to world description W if the following conditions are fulfilled:
Sufficiency condition for desire:
∀M ∈ W ∀t1 : (δ(M, t1) ∧
∃t0 ≤ t1 : [Informed(ρ, t0,M) ∧ ∀t ∈ [t0, t1] : ¬Informed(∼ρ, t,M)]
⇒ ∃t2 ≥ t1 : γ(M, t2))
Necessity condition for desire:
∀M ∈ W ∀t2 : (γ(M, t2)⇒
∃t1 ≤ t2 : δ(M, t1) ∧
∃t0 ≤ t1 : [Informed(ρ, t0,M)∧∀t ∈ [t0, t1] : ¬Informed(∼ρ, t,M)])
The sufficiency condition for desire demands that whenever a candidate desire
formula δ(M, t) holds in a trace, and there is non-refuted information on the
reason ρ to pursue this desire in a certain manner, then a matching intention
occurs somewhat later. The necessity condition states that whenever a certain
intention arises, there must have been a matching desire and believed reason
some time earlier. Again, we don’t demand that the desire continues to be
present until the intention is generated. Note that these criteria presuppose that
intentions and desires are coupled in a one–to–one manner. Of course, this is
not very realistic. For example, if I intend to visit the snack-bar, this does not
necessarily mean that I desire an ice-cream. I could also have a craving for
chips. In order to take care of these situations, the necessity condition can be
adjusted.
As the intuitions of the criteria for desire resemble those of the criteria for
intention, we only give one example to illustrate the desire criteria. In Figure
2.5, we show a world descriptionW3. Again, we use B(ρ) for Belief(ρ, t1,M).
The candidate formula δ is not an externally grounded desire representation,
because in the second trace the necessity condition is violated (as there is no
non-refuted information about ρ) and in the fourth trace the sufficiency condi-
tion doesn’t hold (no intention is generated).
If for the external state formulae used for the reason, any belief formula
(e.g., an internal belief representation) is given, then we can reformulate the
characterisation of a desire:
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Figure 2.5: Checking a candidate desire formula
PROPOSITION 2.4 (Shorter desire conditions)
Let ρ ∈ SL(EWOnt) be an external state formula, βρ(M, t) an externally
grounded belief formula for ρ and γ(M, t) an intention formula. The tem-
poral formula δ(M, t) ∈ TL is an externally grounded desire formula for
intention γ(M, t) and reason ρ if and only if the following conditions are
fulfilled:
Sufficiency condition for desire:
∀M ∈ W ∀t1 : (δ(M, t1) ∧ βρ(M, t1)⇒ ∃t2 ≥ t1 : γ(M, t2))
Necessity condition for desire:
∀M ∈ W ∀t2 : (γ(M, t2)⇒ ∃t1 ≤ t2 : δ(M, t1) ∧ βρ(M, t1))
2.5.4 Changing the BDI-criteria
The criteria for being a proper belief, desire or intention representation given in
the previous subsections embody assumptions on these notions (see also Sec-
tion 2.3). There are many theories and conceptions of what belief, desire and
intention are, and the formalisation of these notions can also depend on system
or domain characteristics. The assumptions of Section 2.3 thus might not be
applicable in all contexts. The criteria can be modified to embody different as-
sumptions. In this subsection, we will give examples of different assumptions
and show a few modified criteria.
The criterion for belief is based on the assumption that the agent believes
all information it receives, as long as it is not overridden by newer information.
If required, these assumptions can also be replaced by less simple ones, possi-
bly in a domain-dependent manner. For example, we could take into account
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reliability of sensory processes in observation or reliability of other agents in
communication. Or we can assume that an agent will believe some fact when
it received non-refuted information from two different sources (two different
agents, or one agent and observation) that the fact holds. We will show a mod-
ified criterion for this last assumption. First, we need an additional notion for
being informed from two different sources:
DEFINITION 2.5 (DoublyInformed)
Let ϕ ∈ SL(EWOnt), then:
DoublyInformed(ϕ, t1, t2,M) ≡
[⊕state(M, t1, input(Ag))  observation result(ϕ)∧
∃A ∈ AGENT : ⊕state(M, t2, input(Ag))  communicated by(ϕ,A)]∨
[∃ A ∈ AGENT : ⊕state(M, t1, input(Ag))  communicated by(ϕ,A) ∧
⊕state(M, t2, input(Ag))  observation result(ϕ)]∨
[∃ A,B ∈ AGENT : A 6= B ∧
⊕state(M, t1, input(Ag))  communicated by(ϕ,A)∧
⊕state(M, t2, input(Ag))  communicated by(ϕ,B)]
DoublyInformed(ϕ, t1, t2,M) means that agent Ag has received information
regarding ϕ from two different sources, at time points t1 and t2. Now, we can
define a new belief criterion:
DEFINITION 2.6 (An alternative belief representation)
Let ϕ ∈ SL(EWOnt). The temporal formula β(M, t) ∈ TL is an externally
grounded belief formula for ϕ if
∀M ∈ W ∀t0 : (β(M, t0)⇔
∃t2 ≤ t0 ∃t1 < t2 : [DoublyInformed(ϕ, t1, t2,M) ∧
∀t ∈ [t1, t0] : ¬Informed(∼ϕ, t,M)])
So, using this alternative criterion a candidate belief formula is a good belief
representation for ϕ if it is temporally equivalent with being informed from two
different sources about ϕ, while not receiving information on ϕ not holding
since the information from the first source came in.
For another variant of the belief criterion, we look at the time between
being informed and the belief being formed. With the original criterion, this
time is zero; the moment the agent receives information regarding ϕ, it believes
this information, until it is refuted. It is very reasonable that an agent needs
time to process incoming communication and observations, before it creates
new beliefs. To allow for this time, we modify the original belief criterion. If
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the maximum time the agent needs to process incoming information into new
beliefs is , we have the following alternative conditions for belief:
DEFINITION 2.7 (Yet another belief representation)
Let ϕ ∈ SL(EWOnt). The temporal formula β(M, t) ∈ TL is an externally
grounded belief formula for ϕ if the following conditions are fulfilled:
Sufficiency condition for belief:
∀M ∈ W ∀t1 : ([∃t0 ≤ t1 −  : Informed(ϕ, t0,M) ∧
∀t ∈ [t0, t1] : ¬Informed(∼ϕ, t,M)]⇒ β(M, t1))
Necessity condition for belief:
∀M ∈ W ∀t1 : (β(M, t1)⇒
∃t0 ≤ t1 : [Informed(ϕ, t0,M) ∧
∀t ∈ [t0, t1 − ] : ¬Informed(∼ϕ, t,M)])
The first condition formalises the intuitive idea that whenever the agent was
informed about ϕ at least  time ago, and this information hasn’t been refuted
until now, then the agent believes ϕ. This condition is asymmetric, in the sense
that  only plays a role in the first conjunct of the lefthandside of the implica-
tion, and not in the second. This is so because  is the maximum reasoning time
the agent needs. Sometimes, the agent is quicker. So, we have to exclude re-
futing information in the entire interval [t0, t1], and not only in [t0, t1− ]. The
second condition has a similar asymmetry. It states that whenever the agent be-
lieves ϕ, it must have received information on ϕ earlier, which wasn’t refuted
until  time ago.
The criteria for intentions and desire also can be adjusted to accommodate
for different intuitive conceptions of intention and desire. The criteria for in-
tention as given in Definition 2.3 formalise the case that all actions are intended
actions. However, it is not difficult to define weaker variants. For example, if
also unintended actions are allowed, the second (necessity) condition can be
left out. Weaker desire notions can be defined as well. For example, the sec-
ond condition of Definition 2.4, that no intentions occur without desire, may
be debatable. If also undesired intentions are allowed, the second (necessity)
condition of Definition 2.4 should be dropped.
Another possible adjustment of the criteria for intention and desire con-
cerns persistence, which means that the reasons for the rise of an attributed
notion must continue to be valid as long as the notion is present. Thus, the de-
sire and the believed reason that gave rise to a later intention must stay present
until the intention dissolves, and the intention to do an action and its believed
opportunity must continue to be true until the action has been initiated. Alter-
native desire criteria and intention criteria can be found to incorporate this.
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2.5.5 Ascription and checking
The criteria for being a belief-, intention- or desire representation can be ap-
plied to all kinds of formulae from TL. To give a far-fetched example, in case
we have a single agent system with a cleaning robot in an office environment,
we could phrase a candidate formula for the robot intending to clean a window
at t1 stating that the window is dirty at t1 and that it is clean at some time
t3 > t1. If the only way the window can become clean is the robot cleaning it,
this formula is an externally grounded intention formula for the action of clean-
ing windows. But this formula is not very useful. The agent can’t have used
this formula in its reasoning to decide to clean the window, because the formula
refers to the future, and the agent can’t reason using information that is not yet
available. If we want to use the formula to attribute intention to the agent, we
have the same problem; in order to decide whether the agent intends to clean
the window at t1, we have to wait till after the agent has actually cleaned the
window, and only then we can attribute the intention to the agent. It would be
much more useful if we find a past formula describing the observable behaviour
of the agent before t1.
Actually, there are two categories of temporal formulae that we can sen-
sibly consider candidate BDI representations. The first category is formed by
the formulae ψ(M, t) ∈ PL(InOnt, t), which are formulae describing the input
history of the agent up and until t. In case the Determinism Assumption holds,
the history of an agent’s input interface completely determines its behaviour.
So, these formulae are useful candidates for being a representation of an inten-
tional notion. If such a past formula qualifies as a BDI representation, then we
can attribute or ascribe the notion at hand to the agent based on the past in-
put behaviour of the agent. When we build this attribution quality into another
agent in an agent system, this agent can understand and predict the actions of
the agent studied, without having to wait until the agent actually has acted. This
can be very useful. Ascription of intentional notions is possible irrespective of
whether the agent in focus employs BDI-notions for its internal reasoning. If
the agent uses some form of BDI internally, we ignore this in the attribution
process.
However, if internal notions of belief, desire and intention happen to ex-
ist in an agent, or at least are claimed (e.g., by the designer of the agent), our
framework can be applied to them as well. So, for the other category of can-
didate BDI formulae, we focus at agents that internally use BDI notions for
their decision making. Using the criteria, we can check whether the notions
used internally are proper formalisations of BDI. In this case, the category
of formulae which are subjected to the criteria contains formulae of the form
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state(M, t, internal(Ag))  σ, where σ ∈ SL(InternalOnt) is an internal state
formula formalising belief, desire or intention. If we apply the criteria to these
kind of formulae, we are checking whether the intentional notions the agent
internally uses are right, in the sense that they live up to the demands to be a
proper BDI representation.
We introduce special terminology for formulae from the two categories
above that fulfil the criteria:
DEFINITION 2.8 (Historical external BDI representations)
∗ The past formula β(M, t) ∈ PL(InOnt, t) is called a historical exter-
nal belief representation for ϕ if β(M, t) is an externally grounded
belief formula for ϕ.
∗ The past formula γ(M, t) ∈ PL(InOnt, t) is called a historical exter-
nal intention representation for action atom θ(M, t) and opportunity
α if γ(M, t) is an externally grounded intention formula for θ(M, t)
and opportunity α.
∗ The past formula δ(M, t) ∈ PL(InOnt, t) is called a historical exter-
nal desire representation for intention γ(M, t) and reason ρ if it is an
externally grounded desire formula for intention γ(M, t) and reason
ρ.
DEFINITION 2.9 (Internal BDI representations)
∗ The internal state formula β ∈ SL(InternalOnt) is called an externally
grounded internal belief representation for ϕ if the formula
state(M, t, internal(Ag))  β is an externally grounded belief for-
mula for ϕ.
∗ The internal state formula γ ∈ SL(InternalOnt) is called an externally
grounded internal intention representation for action formula θ(M, t)
and opportunity α if the formula state(M, t, internal(Ag))  γ is an
externally grounded intention formula for θ(M, t) and opportunity α.
∗ The internal state formula δ ∈ SL(InternalOnt) is called an exter-
nally grounded internal desire representation for intention γ(M, t)
and reason ρ if the formula state(M, t, internal(Ag))  δ is an exter-
nally grounded desire formula for intention γ(M, t) and reason ρ.
2.5.6 Example
The following simple example illustrates the attribution process. The agent in
this example is an artificial mouse, that is in an environment where there some-
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times is food. The mouse agent is sometimes prevented from getting to the food
by a transparent screen. We have a world description W of the system, with
four rather short traces. Of course, for reliable attribution of mental attitudes
we need a lot more than four traces, but this small set suffices to illustrate the
idea. The mouse receives observation results on the presence of the screen and
the food. This mouse doesn’t communicate and doesn’t receive communication
from other agents. Depending on the circumstances it can decide to eat the food
(action eat). Below we display the world description W . The traces concern
the input- and output interface of the agent. For shortness, we abbreviated the
atoms present in the interfaces. Instead of observation result(food) we simply
use food, and we don’t mention that this atom is part of the input interface of the
agent. Similarly, ¬ screen denotes that observation result(¬ screen) is present
in the input interface of the mouse, and eat denotes that the output interface
contains the action atom to be performed(eat).
time time
point 0
time
point 1
time
point 2
time
point 3
time
point 4
time
point 5
trace
trace 1 food
screen
¬ food
¬ screen
food
screen
food
¬ screen
food
¬ screen
eat
food
¬ screen
eat
trace 2 ¬ food
¬ screen
food
¬ screen
¬ food
screen
food
¬ screen
food
¬ screen
food
¬ screen
eat
trace 3 ¬ food
¬ screen
¬ food
¬ screen
food
screen
food
¬ screen
food
¬ screen
food
¬ screen
trace 4 food
¬ screen
¬ food
¬ screen
food
screen
food
screen
food
¬ screen
food
¬ screen
eat
Table 2.1: Example set of observed traces
Because this mouse doesn’t receive any messages, being informed is equiv-
alent with receiving observation results. It can easily be checked that the for-
mula
βϕ(M, t1) ≡
∃t0 ≤ t1 : ⊕state(M, t0, input(mouse))  observation result(ϕ)∧
∀t ∈ [t0, t1] : ¬ ⊕state(M, t, input(mouse))  observation result(∼ϕ)
is an externally grounded belief formula for ϕ according to the belief criterion
in Definition 2.2.
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For the state formula ¬screen as opportunity, the following past formula is
an adequate intention representation (with regard to the eat-action):
γ(M, t) ≡ state(M, t, input(mouse))  observation result(food) ∧
∃t1 ≤ t : [state(M, t1, input(mouse))  observation result(¬food) ∧
∃t2 ≤ t1 : state(M, t2, input(mouse))  observation result(food)]
Informally this formula can be explained as follows: the agent has the intention
to eat at each time point that food is visible and in the past the agent experienced
that visible food can suddenly disappear. Checking that this formula obeys the
intention criteria is easy; the two conditions from Definition 2.3 must hold
for the world description depicted above, with ¬screen substituted for α and
state(M, t, output(Ag))  to be performed(eat) substituted for θ(M, t). For
this specific example, the criteria state that the mouse decides to eat if and only
if at some earlier time point the formula above held (meaning that the agent has
seen that there is food, which can disappear) and the mouse also believed that
there was no screen. As can be seen from the traces in Table 2.1, this is indeed
the case.
2.6 Anticipatory reasoning in organisations
Viewed from a dynamic perspective, organisational structure (cf. [43]) pro-
vides specifications of constraints on role behaviour and interactions (cf. [44,
45]). These specifications to a certain extent enforce coordinated dynamics on
an organisation. In human organisations role specifications usually do not com-
pletely prescribe behaviours, however. To a greater or lesser extent some space
of freedom in behaviour and personal initiative is allowed. This freedom has
its positive elements; in the first place, human agents can find more satisfaction
if they can do things in their own way. In the second place an organisational
structure does not anticipate on all possible circumstances; in unforeseen situ-
ations it can be beneficial if agents have some space to improvise.
The reverse of the medal, however, is that this freedom also may provide
possibilities to agents to avoid certain behaviours (based on their individual
interest) as expected by others, and thus may decrease the extent of coordi-
nation. To function more efficiently in an organisation, where roles do not
completely prescribe behaviour, it is useful if agents fulfilling a certain role in
the organisation can reason in an anticipatory sense about the behaviour of the
agents in other roles, for example, using the intentional stance. This section
addresses this application of the framework introduced in Section 2.5 in more
detail. Some examples of the phenomena described for human organisations
are:
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(a) An employee has done something very important very wrong, and deliber-
ates whether or not to tell his manager: ’If he believes that I am the cause
of the problems, he will try to fire me.’
(b) An employee has encountered a recurring problem, and knows a solution
for this problem, on which he would like to work. He deliberates about
how to propose this solution to his manager. ’If I tell this solution imme-
diately he will not believe that the problem is worth working on it. If I
make him aware of the problem, and do not tell a solution, he only will
start to think about it himself for a while, without finding a solution, and
then forget about it. If I make him aware of the problem and give some
hints that direct him to a (my) solution, he will believe he contributed to
a solution himself and he will want me to work on it.’
(c) A manager observes that a specific employee in the majority of cases func-
tions quite cooperatively, but shows avoidance behaviour in other cases.
In these latter cases, the employee starts trying to reject the task if he
believes that his agenda already was full-booked for the short term, he
believes there are colleagues capable of doing the task, and he believes
there are colleagues available with less full-booked agendas. Further ob-
servation by the manager reveals the pattern that the employee shows
avoidance behaviour, in particular, in cases that a task is only asked
shortly before its deadline, without the possibility to anticipate on the
possibility of having the task allocated. The manager deliberates about
this as follows: ’If I know beforehand the possibility that a last-minute
task will occur, I can tell him the possibility in advance, and in addition
point out that I need his unique expertise for the task, in order to avoid
the behaviour that he tries to avoid the task when it actually comes up.’
The reasoning processes on predicted behaviours described in (a) to (c) can
be based on prescribed role behaviours (as may be the case in (a)), or on an
analysis of the other agent’s personal motivations (as is the case in (b) and
(c)). Especially in these latter cases, the analysis framework developed in this
chapter is applicable. To show this, we address example (c) by making the
following interpretation.
The desire to avoid a task is created at time t by the employee if the follow-
ing holds for the history:
∗ at time t the employee heard the request to perform the task
∗ at time t the employee observes that the task has to be finished soon
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∗ the employee did not hear of the possibility of the task at any earlier time
point
The intention to avoid a task is generated at time t if the following holds for the
history:
∗ the desire to avoid the task is available at time t
∗ the belief that colleagues are capable of doing the task is available
at time t
∗ the belief that colleagues are not full-booked is available at time t
The action to avoid the task is generated at time t if the following holds for the
history:
∗ the intention to avoid the task is available at time t
∗ the belief that the employee’s own agenda is full-booked is available at
time t
The formalisations of these conditions are as follows:
∗ The input ontology InOnt of the employee agent includes:
observation result(task urgent),
observation result(own agenda full),
observation result(colleagues agenda not full),
observation result(colleagues capable of task),
communicated by(task request, manager),
communicated by(task possibility, manager).
∗ The output ontology OutOnt includes:
to be communicated to(task rejection, manager).
Define the past formula δ(M, t) ∈ PL(InOnt, t) for the desire to avoid the task
by state(M, t, input(Ag))  communicated by(task request,manager) ∧
state(M, t, input(Ag))  observation result(task urgent) ∧
¬∃t0 < t : state(M, t0, input(Ag)) 
communicated by(task possibility,manager)
The reason ρ to generate an avoidance intention is:
colleagues agenda not full ∧ colleagues capable of task
The past formula γ(M, t) ∈ PL(InOnt, t) for the intention to avoid the task is
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defined in short form by
δ(M, t) ∧
Belief(colleagues agenda not full ∧ colleagues capable of task, t,M)
The extensive form is:
state(M, t, input(Ag))  communicated by(task request,manager) ∧
state(M, t, input(Ag))  observation result(task urgent) ∧
¬∃t0 < t : state(M, t0, input(Ag)) 
communicated by(task possibility,manager) ∧
∃t2 ≤ t : [Informed(colleagues agenda not full∧
colleagues capable of task, t2,M) ∧
∀t1 ∈ [t2, t] : ¬Informed(∼ (colleagues agenda not full∧
colleagues capable of task), t1,M)]
The opportunity α to perform the avoidance action is:
own agenda full
The past formula ω(M, t) ∈ PL(InOnt, t) for the action to avoid the task is
defined in its short form by
γ(M, t) ∧ Belief(own agenda full, t,M)
Note that the desire to avoid a task immediately springs up when the employee
hears of the urgent task, and that the intention to avoid the task and the avoid-
ance action itself are also instantly generated when the agent has the relevant
beliefs. For human agents, with their quick brains, this seems plausible. The
criteria for motivational attitudes that we presented in Section 2.5 allow a delay
for reasoning, which this employee agent apparently doesn’t need.
Given this formalisation it can be illustrated how the manager agent can
reason and act in an anticipatory manner to avoid the employee’s avoidance
desire, intention and/or action to occur. This can be done in the following three
manners:
(1) Avoiding the desire to occur
This can be obtained by communicating in advance to the employee that
possibly a last minute task will occur. This would make the third condi-
tion in the definition of the temporal desire formula fail.
(2) Avoiding the intention to occur (given that the desire occurs)
This can be obtained by refutation of the reason to generate the intention,
e.g., by telling the employee that he is the only one with the required
expertise.
(3) Avoiding the action to occur (given that the intention occurs)
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This can be obtained by refutation of the opportunity, e.g., by taking one
of the (perhaps less interesting) tasks from his agenda and re-allocating
it to a colleague.
2.7 Discussion
In this chapter, we introduced formal criteria for intentional notions. These
criteria relate behaviour patterns of agents to informational and motivational
attitudes. Viewed from the outside, the behaviour of an agent is a complex
function, which selects actions to be performed (physical, communicative or
observative), based on the history of received information (by observation or
communication) and earlier performed actions. In our view, intentional no-
tions can be used to abstract the interaction histories into intuitive and compact
representations. This way, mental states are grounded in interaction histories.
In many other approaches using BDI notions (logics, programming languages
and agent architectures), this relation between beliefs, desires and intentions
and the observations and actions of the agent is less clear. A contribution of the
work in this chapter is thus that BDI notions that satisfy the conditions given
in Section 2.5 have a rigorously defined meaning in terms of agent behaviour,
and can’t be used arbitrarily. This doesn’t imply that we think our conceptions
on BDI as laid down in the criteria for BDI are the right ones; the criteria can
be adjusted to accommodate other definitions.
Basically, the criteria can be used in three manners. The criteria allow
for (1) externally ascribing motivational attitudes to agents (that may not use
any belief, desire or intention internally) by defining these notions in terms
of the external behaviour of the agent, (2) for analysis of internal notions (in
case the agent possesses these), to verify that these internal notions have a
well defined relation with the behaviour of the agent, and (3) for anticipatory
reasoning to affect the circumstances that may lead to the generation of beliefs,
desires and/or intentions. The combination of (1) and (3) allows an agent to
interpret the behaviour of other agents. Within a multi-agent system, an agent
can observe the behaviour of other agents, attribute justified intentional notions
to their behaviour, and (partially) predict the behaviour of the other agents. For
example, an agent responsible for the safe use of a car might learn to predict
that a human standing on the edge of the pavement and looking across the road
is probably intending to cross the road.
The application of our formalisation of intentional dynamics in anticipatory
reasoning (and acting) makes it useful to analyse certain phenomena occurring
in organisations. As shown by a number of examples in Section 2.6, usually
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organisations leave some freedom in performing a certain role. To cooperate
with other agents with such freedom, agents within an organisation not sel-
domly try to affect, in an anticipatory manner, the circumstances that may lead
to the generation of other agent’s beliefs, desires and intentions. The capability
of performing such anticipatory reasoning and acting may be crucial within or-
ganisations (where often some of the agents have certain ‘directions for use’).
To avoid unnecessary obstruction of the organisation’s processes, these ‘direc-
tions for use’ better can be taken into account in cooperation. Section 2.6 shows
in detail how this can be done based on the framework introduced in Section
2.5. Based on a number of experiences (observed traces) a temporal representa-
tion can be identified; this may be a computationally expensive process which
has to be performed once (for example, off-line). After such a representation
has been identified, it can be reused in a very efficient manner in all relevant
new situations the agent encounters (on-line).
A second type of application of this work can be found in verification of
agents internally designed on the basis of a BDI-model. The criteria presented
in this chapter can be used to verify whether an internal representation, meant
to represent some intentional notion, is a correct formalisation of such an in-
tentional notion.
As a third use from an application-oriented perspective, the results pre-
sented in this chapter are relevant for Requirements Engineering for distributed
and agent systems. Requirements for agents often concern agent behaviour;
analysis and specification of such requirements is a difficult process. In prac-
tice, specification of requirements for simple reactive behaviour is feasible, but
if the behaviours become more complex, requirements specification becomes
much harder [23, 37, 57, 82]. In order to tackle this complexity, abstraction
of complex behaviour patterns into concise notions can be very helpful. The
importance of using more abstract notions in requirements specification, as op-
posed to the more directly formulated behaviour constraints, is stressed in [23].
Ideally, to support reuse of agents, the aim is to specify behavioural require-
ments without any reference or commitment to the internal structures or states
of the agent. However, in practice, when specifying more complex behaviour,
often not only reference is made to the dynamics of input and output states of
the agent, but also to internal states, as these may contain the sought-for ab-
stract notions. This may obstruct replacement and reuse of agents; if another
agent is introduced it may have a different internal structure. One possible solu-
tion for this problem is to restrict reuse to agents with some comparable unified
standard internal structure, for example a standardised BDI-structure.
The solution that can be proposed on the basis of this chapter is a different
one. It is shown that to be able to use high level concepts in specification of
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behavioural requirements, it is not necessary that the agent actually possesses
these concepts. We showed how these concepts can also be attributed from out-
side, and still have a formal definition in terms of the input and output states,
as required within a principled Requirements Engineering process. This com-
bines the best of two worlds: (1) requirements specification at a higher level
of abstraction, and (2) not demanding a specific internal structure within the
agents. In addition, if agents do happen to possess such notions, it is possible
to relate them to the concepts introduced here, as indicated. An added ben-
efit of using abstract intentional notions for formulating requirements is that
they are intuitively clear to all parties involved. Often, the stakeholders of the
system to be developed, the requirements engineers, and the system designers
do not use the same concepts while talking about the intended behaviour of
the system. Intentional notions are easier to understand by all because of their
intuitive meaning.
In order to show that the defined notions and criteria for BDI are operational
and provide a basis to develop applications of agents that monitor and interpret
the behaviour of other agents, we developed a dedicated agent architecture for
intention attribution and built an executable prototype implementation. In [76],
we report on this work.
The formal analysis and implementation of belief, desire and intentions pre-
sented here differs from the approaches in BDI logics [21, 85, 102] in that we
relate intrinsically internal notions to external notions, like observations, com-
munications and actions. We do this taking into account the dynamic nature
of the ongoing interaction of agents with their environment. Thus, the moti-
vational criteria in Section 2.5 relate the occurrence of intentional notions to
temporal patterns in the externally observable agent behaviour. In BDI logics,
the static connections (at one specific moment in time) between belief, desire
and intention generally are formalised through axioms, but the dynamic con-
nection between motivations and behaviour is neglected.
The temporal trace language TL used in our approach is much more expres-
sive than standard temporal logics in a number of respects. In the first place,
it has order-sorted predicate logic expressivity, whereas most standard tempo-
ral logics are propositional. Secondly, the explicit reference to time points and
time durations offers the possibility of modelling the dynamics of real-time
phenomena, such as sensory and neural activity patterns in relation to men-
tal properties (cf. [100]). Third, in our approach states are three-valued; the
standard temporal logics are based on two-valued states, which implies that
for a given trace a form of closed world assumption is imposed. For example,
in Concurrent METATEM [47], if the executable temporal logic specification
leaves some atom unspecified, during construction of a trace the semantics will
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force it to be false. To avoid this, an atom has to be split into a positive and a
negative variant. Fourth, the possibility to quantify over traces allows for speci-
fication of more complex behaviours. As within most temporal logics, reactive-
ness and proactiveness properties can be specified. In addition, in our language
also properties of different types of adaptive behaviour can be expressed. For
example, we can formalise the property ‘exercise improves skill’, which in-
volves the comparison of two alternatives for the history. In TL, traces (that is,
histories) are part of the language, and thus we can compare different traces and
even quantify over traces. In linear time temporal logics different alternative
histories cannot be compared. Branching time temporal logics do allow com-
paring different histories. Fifth, in our language it is possible to define local
languages for parts of a system. For example, the distinction between internal,
external and interface languages is crucial, and is supported by the language,
which also entails the possibility to quantify over system parts; this allows for
specification of system modification over time. Sixth, since state properties
are used as first class citizens in the temporal trace language, it is possible to
explicitly refer to them, and to quantify over them, enabling the specification
of what are sometimes called second-order properties, which are used in part
of the philosophical literature (e.g., [79]) to express functional roles related to
mental properties or states. In this chapter only part of the features of the lan-
guage as discussed above are exploited. But the benefit of using this expressive
language is that we can extend our approach to more complex behaviours and
mental properties, such as, for example, relative adaptive behaviours.
An approach that in some aspects is similar in perspective to ours, is that of
Rosenschein and Kaelbling [107]. They ascribe knowledge to so-called situ-
ated automata, which are processes that do not have any internal representation
of knowledge. A process with a certain internal state S knows ϕ if ϕ is true
in all environment situations which are possible when the process is in state S.
Our approach for ascribing beliefs is different; we relate belief to the acquired
information on the environment. Furthermore, Rosenschein and Kaelbling give
no account of desire and intention, which is a main contribution of our work.
The same holds for recent work presented in [132], where Wooldridge and
Lomuscio concentrate on the informational aspects, and abstract from moti-
vational and temporal aspects; actually, in [132] exploration of the temporal
aspects, as presented above, is mentioned as one of the four items on the list of
issues for future work.
In research on plan recognition, such as [3, 81, 99], ascription of intentional
notions is also done. The observing agent ascribes intentions and plans that are
probable to the actor, based on observed actions of the actor agent. Plan recog-
nition is performed using data on the actions from a single, ongoing interaction
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of the agent, and uses domain knowledge on actions and their expected effects
in a crucial manner. Our approach is quite different. The analysing agent pri-
marily takes into account circumstances that may lead to certain intentions,
beliefs or desires, using information on the observed and communicated in-
formation in the past of the actor studied, in order to find hypothetical past
formulas representing the beliefs, desires and intentions of this agent. These
formulas are tested against information on the behaviour of the observed agent
during a significant number of (possible) interactions of the agent. No domain
knowledge on actions and effects is used. Once an externally grounded inten-
tional formula has been found, it is possible again and again to anticipate on
the generation of intentional attitudes at forehand, without any action being
performed by the actor.
From a fundamental philosophical perspective the approach presented here
provides a formalisation of philosophical views on the explanation of behaviour,
as addressed informally in, e.g. [31]. The characterisations introduced provide
a formally defined bridge between an agent’s mentalistic notions such as be-
liefs, desires and intentions, and materialistic notions such as observation and
action performance in the world. Our approach has its perspective on ground-
ing of mental states in the interaction in common with [9, 19]: in particular the
relation between the internal agent state and interaction with the environment
in the past on the one hand and potential further interactions in the future on the
other hand is similar to our views (see the citation in the introduction above).
Also in [20] emphasis is put on the functioning of cognition in interaction with
the environment. A difference is that in our approach a formalisation is pro-
posed, and that an explicit relation of the interaction patterns with a number
of well-known intentional (BDI) notions is addressed. In continuance to the
work in this chapter, [71] introduces a formalisation of the ideas in [9]. An-
other difference with the philosophical efforts mentioned above is that in our
approach no commitments to specific internal (goal-directed) system structures
and specific internal states need to be made.
The work of Wijngaards, Treur and Jonker [77] sprouts from the same in-
spiration and intuition as our work. In [77], mind and matter aspects of the
dynamics of intentional behaviour are analysed and simulated using an im-
plemented software environment. We restrict our attention to analysis in this
chapter. Another difference is that Wijngaards, Treur and Jonker presuppose
internal motivational attitudes in the agent, while we do not. The temporal re-
lationships between external behaviour and intentional notions in our work and
[77] are slightly different, but similar in spirit.
In this chapter, we provided means to abstract the complex interactions
that agents have with their environment into intuitive, compact intentional no-
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tions. Anthropomorphic notions aid in making agent systems graspable and
designable, and are thus at the heart of agent technology.
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CHAPTER 3
Reuse and Abstraction in Verification:
Agents Interacting with Dynamic
Environments
Oh, baby, baby, it’s a wild world
I’ll always remember you like a child, girl
Cat Stevens
3.1 Introduction
Agents sometimes are called the next software paradigm [66, 68, 128], as the
anthropomorphically inspired agent concepts provide a new manner to con-
ceive computer systems. Agents in multi-agent systems generally interact with
each other and with their environment in different ways than other software
entities do. Comparing agents to objects, agents are autonomous, which means
they have total control over their own state and behaviour, while objects have
to react to requests from other objects for certain actions (method invocation)
by providing the services requested. Agents can always refuse, or not react
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at all. Comparing agents to imperative programs, the gap is even bigger. Im-
perative programs usually take an input from the user, and process this into a
result. During the computation, the program isn’t open for unrequested infor-
mation coming in from its environment; the program can perform additional
information seeking, but then the initiative is taken by the program. Flexi-
ble communication between processes and interaction with the dynamic world
outside the imperative program is mostly not present.
The four discerning characteristics of agents according to Wooldridge and
Jennings in [130] are autonomy (agents don’t need intervention of humans or
of controlling software processes in order to operate), social ability (agents
interact with each other through communication and coordination), reactivity
(agents perceive their environment and respond to changes) and pro-activeness
(agents take the initiative in order to pursue their objectives). The combination
of these four agent characteristics leads to agents that display complex interac-
tive behaviour in the environment consisting of the other agents and the world
the agents inhabit.
For agent-oriented software development to become a mature Software En-
gineering paradigm, the scientific community needs to create principled meth-
ods to develop agent-based systems. These methods should provide for the
whole software life-cycle, consisting of requirements analysis, specification,
design, implementation, verification and/or testing. Of these phases in the de-
velopment process of software, verification seems to be getting the least atten-
tion in the agent research community (exceptions exist; we mention the work
of Fisher and Wooldridge [48]). Currently, there are many agent architectures,
such as IRMA [13], GRATE [67], INTERRAP [93] and PRS [50] (see also [92]
for an overview of agent architectures). There are some agent programming
languages as well, such as 3APL [59], AgentSpeak [101] and AGENT-0 [113].
To specify the design of agent-based systems, there are design languages, such
as concurrent MetateM [47] and DESIRE [15]. Agent logics, such as the BDI-
logics of Cohen and Levesque [21] and Rao and Georgeff [102], could be used
to specify requirements on agent systems and to verify whether a finished sys-
tem indeed meets the requirements, if there is a well-defined relation between
the logic used and the design language, programming language or architec-
ture used. Unfortunately, this relation is often impossible to find, because of
the lack of proper formal semantics for agent architectures and programming
languages or because the semantics of the architecture or programming or de-
sign language is not covered by the semantics of the logical languages. In the
chapters following this chapter, we will define programming languages with
a properly defined formal operational semantics, in an attempt to address the
poor formal basis of many agent models.
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In this chapter, we focus on verification of agent systems. We don’t choose
a particular architecture, programming language or design language the agent
system is built in, but offer a very general approach. Even if there is a well-
defined relation between the specification language for requirements and the
language the system is specified in, verification of agent systems is not an easy
task. As agents may operate in a world that is constantly changing, and agent
systems can consist of a number of interacting but independent agents, express-
ing behavioural requirements may lead to complex formulae. Nevertheless,
verification is important, because it is the only way to guarantee that demands
made on aspects of the system behaviour are satisfied. The high degree of com-
plexity of agent system behaviour is as much the reason as the problem here:
by simply checking the code of the agent system or by testing, establishing
that the system shows proper behaviour is intractable. Proper functioning is of-
ten crucial, because agent systems are increasingly employed in circumstances
where mistakes have important consequences, for example in Electronic Com-
merce. But in practice, verification of agent systems is neglected, because it is
intricate.
So, means are needed to make verification of agent systems manageable.
Developers of agent systems should be enabled to verify the system they are
building, assisted by tools, even if they are not specialists in formal theory.
Properties and proofs have to be intuitively clear to the verifier and even, at
least to some degree, to the stakeholder(s) of the system, as verification results
are part of the design rationale of the system. Also, time complexity of the ver-
ification process has to be controlled. This chapter discusses some principles
that contribute to the support of verification of agent systems. These principles
can be used for all agent systems, but here, they are applied in the context of a
single agent that performs actions in a dynamic environment.
In [70] a compositional verification method was introduced; see also [40]
for its relation to temporal multi-epistemic logic. We extend this method in
this chapter, and we briefly describe it here. A multi-agent system contains
several agents, which interact in a certain environment, the world. Desired
system behaviour is formalised in system requirements. In compositional veri-
fication, proving that a detailed design of an agent system properly respects the
behavioural requirements means finding properties of the agents in the system
and properties of the world, from which the system properties can be proved.
If the agents are built from components, then the properties that have to hold
for the agents should be provable from properties of the sub-components of
the agent. This way, properties are refined across different process abstraction
levels. For each of the agents as well as for the environment of the system
(the world), a specific set of the refined properties is imposed to ensure that the
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combined system satisfies the overall requirements.
The use of compositionality in verification has the following advantages:
∗ Reuse of verification results is supported. Verified system components
can be put into another agent system, and as long as the conditions on
the environment of the component still hold, the properties proved for
this component stay valid. Also, if there are proofs for top-level system
properties from properties of the agents and the world, it doesn’t matter
in which way the agents are composed of sub-components, as long as
the properties of the agents can be proved. The proof of the top-level
properties is independent of details of the composition of the agents.
∗ The verification process becomes less complex, as proofs are more local,
considering only one process abstraction level at a time. So, if an agent
system contains agents which have sub-sub-sub-components, properties
of these sub-sub-sub-components never occur in the proof of top-level
system properties. Only when verifying sub-sub-components, properties
of sub-sub-sub-components are used.
In [14] it was shown how this method can be applied to prove properties of a
system of negotiating agents.
However, the principle of compositionality does not solve all problems.
Even if compositionality is exploited, for nontrivial examples verification is a
tedious process. Also, properties and proofs can still be very complex to read
and to explain. To manage the complexity of the proofs, and to make their
structure more transparent, additional structuring means and reuse facilities are
necessary. This chapter contributes two manners to support proof structuring
and reuse.
On the one hand a notion of language abstraction is introduced that facil-
itates structuring of properties and proofs in a formal manner. To this end, the
language to describe properties of agent systems is extended with new, more
abstract, constructs. Parts of formulae can be given an intuitively enlightening
name. This leads to a more informal look and feel for properties and proofs,
without losing any formal rigour. The abstracted notions form a higher-level
language to describe system behaviour. The terminology of this language ab-
stracts away from details of the system design, and is closer to the way human
verifiers conceptualise system behaviour. There are a number of benefits:
∗ Properties and proofs are more readable and easier to understand.
∗ Coming up with properties and proofs becomes easier, as the words cho-
sen for the abstracted formulae guide and focus the cognitive verification
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process of the verification engineer, providing clean-cut central concepts.
∗ Verification becomes explainable, as part of the design rationale docu-
mentation of a system.
On the other hand, common characteristics of agent systems can be ex-
ploited to support reuse. A range of agent concepts is associated with the
paradigm of agents. For example, most agents receive observations and com-
municated information from their environment and perform actions to manip-
ulate their environment. For this to yield desired results, proper coordination
with the environment is essential. Properties regarding this apply to many agent
systems and thus are highly reusable. Support of reuse requires that a library
of predefined templates of properties and proofs is available. By identifying
generic elements in the structure of proofs and properties, reusable systems of
properties and proofs can be constructed. To illustrate this, this chapter pro-
poses a system of coordination properties for applications of agents acting in
dynamic environments. The properties and proofs of this system are an exam-
ple of the contents of the verification library. Some advantages of reuse are:
∗ Verification becomes faster. Often, the verification engineer only has to
look up suitable properties and proofs from the verification library and
customise these by instantiation.
∗ Verification becomes easier. The contents of the library are usually
phrased using language abstraction, so properties and proofs are more
intuitively clear, making them more easy to use.
In the following section, the generic system consisting of an agent acting
in a dynamic environment is sketched. For this application class, we will prove
action successfulness, which means that all actions the agent performs yield
the expected effects. To achieve this, a system of coordination properties is
given in Section 3.4, as well as part of a proof that the actions of the agent suc-
ceed. But first, in Section 3.3 temporal models of agent systems descriptions
are presented. This section also presents the two languages to describe system
behaviour, the detailed language and the abstract language, and the connection
between them. In Section 3.5, the language abstraction mechanism is applied;
abstract predicates are introduced for parts of properties, yielding an abstract
language. Section 3.6 contains basic properties of the agent and the world. As
these properties describe general features of the agent and the world and the in-
teraction between them, they can be used in proofs of many different properties.
Here, these properties contribute to the proofs of two of the properties from the
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system of coordination properties, which we assumed to hold in the proof of
action successfulness in Section 3.4. These proofs appear in Section 3.7 and
3.8. In these sections, we also present additional properties which we need for
these specific proofs. Section 3.9 shows how the generic properties and proofs
are used to verify a real system that is an instantiation of the generic architec-
ture. Finally, Section 3.10 contains some conclusions, comparisons with other
work and directions for future research.
3.2 The domain of agents in a dynamic world
In this section the characteristics of the application class of a single agent in
interaction with a dynamic environment are briefly discussed. We will present a
reusable system of properties for this class later on, describing proper coordina-
tion of the agent with its environment. As stated in the Introduction (Chapter 1)
of this thesis, we use the term ‘coordination’ to refer to agent behaviour which
takes into account the dynamics of the (physical or virtual) world and the be-
haviour of the other agents, both of which are partly unpredictable. Alongside
the presentation of the generic class, we also show one specific instance of the
class, which will serve as a running example throughout this chapter.
Agents that can perceive and act in a dynamic environment are quite com-
mon. An example is an agent for process control (e.g. in a chemical factory).
For this class of single agent systems, an important property is successfulness
of actions. This means that all actions the agent initiates in its environment
yield their expected effects. In this chapter, we give a generic methodical proof
for successfulness of actions. Because this property is to be proven for a class
of systems, it is needed to abstract from domain-dependent details of systems
and give a generic architecture that defines the class.
The specification of a generic architecture for a single agent in a dynamic
Agent External
World
actions
observation results
Figure 3.1: Agent and external world in interaction
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Figure 3.2: The mouse and the cheese
world depicted in Figure 3.1 consists of two components in interaction: an
agent (Ag) and the external world (EW). Only a few aspects of the functioning
of the system are specified by the architecture. Looking at the information flow
in the system, actions generated by the agent are transferred from the agent’s
output interface to the external world, and observation results generated by the
external world are transferred to the input interface of the agent. The connec-
tions between the agent and the world are called links. Based on the observa-
tion results the agent is to decide which actions are to be performed. The agent
only receives information through observation results; it has no direct access
to the world state. The role of the world in this system is to realise execu-
tion of all actions the agent decides to do, and to generate and execute events.
The world also provides observations results and indications that actions have
ended. Many concrete single agent systems are specialised instantiations of
this generic architecture.
Throughout this chapter, we use a concrete system to illustrate the generic
concepts. This concrete system is the system of the artificial mouse. This
system models a mouse striving to be fed in a dynamic world. Using this sys-
tem, we will show how to instantiate certain parameters of the generic class of
single-agent systems in dynamic environments, in order to verify the concrete
system. In Figure 3.2, we show the mouse in its environment. The agent in
this system is the mouse. The mouse is located in a dynamic world, consisting
of three positions (p0, p1 and p2, which are locations in the ground plane), a
transparent screen, which can go up (and down also) and food (cheese) at p1 or
p2. When the screen is down, it is in position p0. The world is dynamic in the
sense that the screen, which can separate the mouse from the cheese, can go
up and down. Initially, the mouse is at p0 (p0 can be the position of the mouse
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as well as of the screen, without the mouse being squashed by the screen) and
the screen is down. The mouse can perform two kinds of actions, eating and
moving.
We will show the very simple implementation of the agent in the mouse
system. The mouse is not very smart; as a decision model, it only has a knowl-
edge base with two simple rules:
if observation result(at position(food, P ) ∧
¬at position(mouse, P ) ∧
¬at position(screen, p0) )
then to be performed(goto(P ))
if observation result(at position(mouse, P ) ∧
at position(food, P ) )
then to be performed(eat)
These rules are fairly obvious, except perhaps for the representation of vari-
ables. In the knowledge base, P is a variable, which can be instantiated with
one of the three positions (p0, p1 and p2). When the agent obtains observation
results of certain objects being in certain positions, P is instantiated with an
actual position.
The first of these rules states that the mouse will move to a position where
it sees food, when it is not itself at this position and the screen is up. The
second rule means that the agent decides to eat as soon as it observes itself to
be in the same place as the food. So, the mouse simply acts as soon as this
seems to make sense. The mouse doesn’t have any memory or complex goals;
it just decides to do actions based on observations of occasions for the actions.
We call agents that reason like this reactive; to be precise, reactive agents are
agents that decide to do actions immediately when they observe occasions for
these actions, without taking into account other circumstances, such as other
actions that are still in execution or the chance an event will occur.
Though the dynamics of the world are rather limited, and the reasoning
of the mouse is very simple, we experienced in earlier research that proving
action successfulness for the mouse from scratch is extremely complicated and
time-consuming.
We return to the generic class. Like in the previous chapter, we assume that
the internal representation language the generic system employs is an order-
sorted predicate logic (see Section 2.4). The formal ontologies of the system
are very similar to the ontologies defined in Section 2.4.1. The names are
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different and there is no formalisation of communication in this chapter, but
there are no conceptual differences. The generic architecture contains formal
ontologies for representing world information, observations, decisions to do
actions and indications that actions have ended. The ontology for factual world
information is called world info. As we are dealing with a generic architecture
and the contents of this ontology is application-specific, we can’t make general
statements about this ontology, except that it is used to formalise facts about
the state of the world. For example, in case of the concrete artificial mouse
system, at position(food, p1) is a formula based on world info. In the mouse
system, at position is the only relation in the ontology world info. This relation
is binary; the first argument is an object (food, screen or mouse) and the second
is a position (p0, p1 or p2). The ontology world info was called EWOnt in the
previous chapter. Just like previously, other ontologies are on a meta-level with
respect to world info; expressions based on these higher level ontologies make
statements about expressions from world info.
The input interface of the agent is defined by the formal ontologies
observation results and actions finished. The ontology observation results is
based on the sort containing all reified formulae based on world info and the
relation observation result on this sort. Formulae that can be expressed us-
ing this ontology are, for example, observation result(at position(mouse, p0))
or observation result(at position(food, p1) ∧ ¬at position(mouse, p1)). The
ontology actions finished is based on the sort ACTION (which is application-
specific) and the relation ended on this sort. A formula based on this ontol-
ogy is for example ended(A), which means that the execution of action A has
ended. We need ended-atoms to demarcate action executions; an action exe-
cution of action A will be the time period between a to be performed(A)-atom
and a matching ended(A)-atom.
The output interface of the agent is defined by the formal ontology
actions to be performed based on the sort ACTION and the unary relation
to be performed. For example, the statement to be performed(goto(p1)) can
be expressed using this ontology. In the mouse system, ACTION contains four
actions, namely eat, goto(p0), goto(p1) and goto(p2).
In contrast to the previous chapter, here we do focus on the interfaces of the
world. For the external world the input and output interfaces are the opposite of
the agent’s interfaces, as the input of the world receives actions to be performed
and the output of the world provides observation results and indications of the
end of action executions to the agent. Additionally, the ontology world info is
part of the output of the world. The agent only receives observation results, and
never plain facts from world info. The reason world info is part of the definition
of the output interface of the world is that this allows us to phrase properties
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about action effects without having to look inside the world. We define the
agent input ontology by AgInOnt = observation results ∪ actions finished
and the agent output ontology by AgOutOnt = actions to be performed. Also,
we define the agent ontology by AgOnt = AgInOnt ∪ AgOutOnt, the world
ontology by EWOnt = world info ∪ actions to be performed ∪ actions finished ∪
observation results, and the overall ontology by OvOnt = AgOnt ∪ EWOnt.
Realistic characteristics of the agent systems in the class described above
are:
∗ perceptions take time
∗ the generation of actions (reasoning, decision making) takes time
∗ execution of actions in the world takes time
∗ unexpected events can occur in the environment
Proving successfulness of actions under these circumstances is intricate be-
cause an action can only succeed when its execution is not disturbed too much.
If two executions of actions overlap or events happen during executions, ac-
tions could fail. Also, while an agent is observing and reasoning, the situation
in the world might change, such that when the agent has decided to do an ac-
tion, this action is no longer successfully executable. We will propose a system
of coordination properties that takes all these influences into account.
In the literature about action and change, varying attitudes towards these
disturbances can be found. In one part of the literature (e.g., standard situation
calculus, as described in [90, 104, 106]), these disturbances are excluded in a
global manner, e.g., action generation and execution have no duration at all and
no events occur at all. The problem with these global assumptions is that they
violate the characteristics of most of the application domains. Other literature
attaches default effects to actions, thus incorporating non-monotonic logic in
action execution (e.g., [86] and [32]). Some literature takes into account du-
ration of action execution (e.g., [109]). We didn’t find any literature that also
takes into account the duration of reasoning and decision processes in action
generation. Another lack in the literature is that authors don’t try to verify im-
plemented systems; they only state theories regarding actions, without relating
them to practical system design or software specification.
The set of properties we use to prove action successfulness contains prop-
erties of the agent and of the world, from which we will prove action success-
fulness. Thus, we prove properties of the system, assuming properties of the
agent and of the world. When verifying an instance of the generic architecture,
the agent and world properties which form the assumptions of the proofs in this
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chapter have to hold for the particular agent and world in this specific system,
and guaranteeing this will take additional verification effort. The benefit of this
modular verification approach is that it enables reuse of verification results,
and it allows us to abstract from details of the internal agent and of the internal
dynamics of the world.
Part of the proof (and the properties involved) only applies to a subclass of
the generic architecture, namely to reactive single agents acting in a dynamic
environment. We have to make this restriction because proving the properties
for the whole class of systems leads to restrictions of the world dynamics which
are often too strong. Later on, in Section 3.6.2, we will elaborate on this issue.
Preliminary work on the analysis of this domain was reported in [72]. In
continuation of this work we were led to the claims that:
∗ To prove action successfulness for realistic applications, properties are
required that do not (completely) fix the dynamics of the interaction be-
tween agent and environment, but still impose enough structure on the
process to prove that the agent is effective in its behaviour.
∗ These properties are explicitly related to practical system designs in a
formal manner.
∗ Such properties exist: in this chapter we introduce a system of coordina-
tion properties that fulfils the above requirements.
These claims will be supported by the next sections.
3.3 Temporal models and temporal languages
For phrasing properties, a language is needed. Behaviour is described by prop-
erties of the execution traces of the system. In this section, we introduce the
language used for this. Also, this section introduces the language abstraction
formalism.
3.3.1 Basic concepts
By adding a formalisation of time to the language internally used in the generic
system (see the previous section), we obtain a formal language for phrasing
behavioural properties. With this language, properties of traces are described
in a direct manner, meaning that there is a clear relation between the formal
temporal language and the trace semantics of a system specification. We define
the logical languages in the same way as we did in Chapter 2.
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The state language SL(D) of a system component D is the (order-sorted)
predicate logic language based on the interface ontologies of D. The state lan-
guage based on a single ontology Ont is denoted by SL(Ont). The formulae of
these languages are called state formulae. The overall state language is SL; this
is a shorthand for SL(OvOnt). An information state M of a component D is an
assignment of truth values {true, false, unknown} to the set of ground atoms in
SL(D). At each moment in time during execution of an agent system including
component D, there is one information state that fixes the truth values of the
ground atoms that play a role in the interfaces of D. The set of all possible
information states of D is denoted by IS(D).
We assume the time frames are linear with initial time point 0. A time frame
may be discrete or dense. The approach introduced here works for dense linear
time models as well as for discrete linear time models, because finite variability
provides means to discretize dense time (see Section 2.4.3). In the rest of this
chapter, we assume finite variability holds for the traces studied. A trace M
of a component D over a time frame T is a sequence of information states
(Mt)t∈T in IS(D). The semantics of a system specification is a set of traces,
formalising all executions possible. The set of all traces of D that can result
from executing D is named Traces(D); this set constitutes the semantics of D.
Given a trace M of component D, the information state of the input interface
of component C at time point t is denoted by state(M, t, input(C)) where C is
either D or a component within D. Analogously, state(M, t, output(C)) denotes
the information state of the output interface of component C at time point t. To
refer to the overall information state of the system (composed of the agent and
the world) at a certain moment, we use state(M, t).
The information states (e.g. from traces) can be related to formulae via the
satisfaction relation . If ϕ is a state formula from SL(C) expressed in the input
ontology of component C, then
state(M, t, input(C))  ϕ
denotes that ϕ is true in this state at time point t ∈ T.
These statements can be compared to holds-statements in situation calcu-
lus, described in [90, 106]. A difference, however, apart from notational differ-
ences, is that we refer to a trace and time point, and that we explicitly focus on
a specific part of the system. Based on these statements, which only use pred-
icate symbol , behavioural properties can be formulated in a formal manner
in a sorted predicate logic with sorts T for time points, Traces(D) for traces of
component D and SL(D) for state formulae. The usual logical connectives such
as ¬,∧,⇒, ∀,∃ are employed to construct formulae, as well as < and = (to
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compare moments in time). Note that arbitrary combinations of quantification
over time are allowed in this language. The language defined in this manner is
denoted by TL(D) (Temporal Language of D). The union of the temporal lan-
guages of the two system components (agent and world) is TL. An example of
a formula of TL, in which S refers to the whole system, is:
∀M ∈ Traces(S) :
∀t1 : state(M, t1, output(Ag))  to be performed(A) ⇒
∃t2 > t1 : state(M, t2, output(Ag))  to be performed(B)
This expresses that every decision of Ag to do action A is always followed
by a later decision to do B.
In this chapter, we verify behavioural properties through mathematical
proofs of formulae of TL. Usually, these properties start with ∀M ∈ Traces(. . .),
which means that they describe a property of all execution traces of a system
component. In this chapter, we assume the semantics of a system specification,
specified as an architecture or in a programming or design language, has been
obtained as a set of traces as defined above, using a global time frame T for all
parts of the system. For an alternative semantics based on local time frames per
component, we refer to the thesis of Pascal van Eck [39]. We prove behavioural
properties of the generic system of a single agent in interaction with a dynamic
environment from behavioural properties of the agent and behavioural prop-
erties of the world. This way, we abstract from the internal specification lan-
guages used to build the agent and the world (there could even be two different
languages), and just focus our attention on composing the behaviour of the two
system components. When using the generic proofs we provide, it is neces-
sary to prove the behavioural properties of the agent and of the world, in order
to guarantee proper system behaviour. For this, the semantics of the internal
specification language(s) is essential. But for proving properties of the system
from properties of the agent and the world, the semantics of the underlying
formalism(s) for internal specification is irrelevant.
The languages TL(D) are built around constructs that enable the verifier to
express properties in a detailed manner, staying in direct relation to the seman-
tics of the design specification of the system. For example, the state formulae
are directly related to information states of system components. But the de-
tailed nature of the language also has disadvantages; properties tend to get long
and complex. The formalism of language abstraction, described in Section
3.3.2, alleviates this considerably.
As we have assumed finite variability for all traces studied, we also have
that the change pinpoint principle holds for these traces (see Section 2.4.3).
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The change pinpoint principle allows introducing a number of abbreviations.
We first repeat two definitions from Chapter 2:
⊕state(M, t1, interface)  ϕ ≡ state(M, t1, interface)  ϕ ∧
(t1 6= 0⇒ ∃t2 < t1 ∀t ∈ [t2, t1〉 : state(M, t, interface) 6 ϕ)
⊕state(M, t1, interface) 6 ϕ ≡ state(M, t1, interface) 6 ϕ ∧
(t1 6= 0⇒ ∃t2 < t1 ∀t ∈ [t2, t1〉 : state(M, t, interface)  ϕ)
The ⊕-notation, pronounced as just, is used to denote a change to a certain
information state.
Closely related is the new ⊗t1, t2⊕–notation, defined as follows:
⊗t1, t2⊕state(M, t2, interface)  ϕ ≡ ⊕state(M, t2, interface)  ϕ ∧
∀t ∈ 〈t1, t2〉 : ¬ ⊕ state(M, t, interface)  ϕ
⊗t1, t2⊕state(M, t2, interface) 6 ϕ ≡ ⊕state(M, t2, interface) 6 ϕ ∧
∀t ∈ 〈t1, t2〉 : ¬ ⊕ state(M, t, interface) 6 ϕ
This notation can be used to say that the information state has just changed in
some way at t2, for the first time since t1. Sometimes it can be useful to also
have the dual operator; this states that the information state has just changed at
t2 and that this is the most recent change like that prior to t1. For this, we use
the notation −⊗t1, t2⊕, defined as:
−⊗t1, t2⊕state(M, t2, interface)  ϕ ≡ ⊕state(M, t2, interface)  ϕ ∧
∀t ∈ 〈t2, t1〉 : ¬ ⊕state(M, t, interface)  ϕ
−⊗t1, t2⊕state(M, t, interface) 6 ϕ ≡ ⊕state(M, t2, interface) 6 ϕ ∧
∀t ∈ 〈t2, t1〉 : ¬ ⊕state(M, t, interface) 6 ϕ
3.3.2 The language abstraction formalism
Experience in nontrivial verification examples has taught us that the temporal
expressions needed in proofs can become quite complex and unreadable. Also,
details of the formalisation blur the generic agent concepts in properties. As
a remedy, new language elements are added as abbreviations of complex tem-
poral formulae. These new language elements are defined within a language
AL(D) (meaning Abstract Language of component D) with generic sorts T for
time points, Traces(D) for traces and SL(D) for state formulae; additional sorts
are allowed, for example to abbreviate state formulae. The union of AL(Ag) and
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AL(EW), the abstract languages of the two system components of the generic
architecture, is called AL. As a simple example, for the property that there is an
action execution starting in the world at t a new predicate ActionExStarts
can be introduced. Then the property can be expressed in the abstract language:
ActionExStarts(A, t,EW,M)
which is defined as:
⊕state(M, t, input(EW))  to be performed(A)
We use the convention to denote new, abstract language elements using this
font. ActionExStarts is very similar to a “normal” first-order predicate,
except that usually in syntactical formulae from predicate logic, no reference is
made to the semantical models (M in our language).
Semantics of these new language elements is defined as the semantics of the
detailed formulae they abstract from. In logic the notion of interpretation map-
ping has been introduced to describe the interpretation of one logical language
in another logical language, for example geometry in algebra (cf. [63], Chap-
ter 5). The languages AL(D) and TL(D) can be related to each other by a fixed
interpretation mapping from the formulae in AL(D) onto formulae in TL(D). In
Section 3.5, we will define elements from AL as shorter forms of TL-formulae.
The languages AL(D) abstract from details of the design of component D
and enable the verifier to concentrate on higher level (agent) concepts. Each
abstract formula has the same semantics as the related detailed formula, such
that the relation to design specification details isn’t lost. Proofs can be ex-
pressed either at the detailed or at the abstract level, and the results can be
translated to the other level. Because formulae in the abstract level logic can be
kept much simpler than in the detailed level logic, the proof relations expressed
on that level are much more transparent.
3.4 Proving successfulness of actions
In Section 3.4.1, we give an informal introduction to the system of coordination
properties. This set of properties is generic in the sense that it is usable for all
agent systems that match the generic architecture from Section 3.2. The prop-
erties in it are called coordination properties, because in case the agent and the
world behave accordingly, the actions of the agent are coordinated with the oc-
currences in the world in such a way that all actions succeed. The system itself
appears in Section 3.4.2. To demonstrate the power of language abstraction,
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we phrase the properties of the system of coordination properties in AL, before
we define the language constructs of AL in terms of the lower level language TL
(which we do in Section 3.5). In Section 3.4.3, we give part of the proof of ac-
tion successfulness (the topmost part), assuming a number of the coordination
properties. The proof is quite simple and doesn’t require looking into lower-
level details at all. Later on, in Section 3.7 and 3.8, we will prove two of the
coordination properties which we assume to hold in Section 3.4. These proofs
do descend to the detailed level of TL, which is why we present the proofs and
the properties needed solely for these proofs in separate sections, instead of in
this section.
3.4.1 Approaching the problem of proving successfulness of
actions
For the application class described in Section 3.2, the aim is to prove that under
the specified assumptions all actions executed in the agent system are success-
ful, that is, yield all of their effects. To arrive at a reusable and intuitively pleas-
ing proof, it was necessary and illuminating to separate the different aspects
into a number of properties. These will constitute the system of coordination
properties. Here, we informally explore the properties needed.
An action succeeds when its execution renders the appropriate effects. These
effects have to happen during the execution of the action to be recognisable as
effects of that particular action. Recall that actions in our view take time. Just
like the start of an execution of A is indicated by a to be performed(A)-atom,
the end is indicated by an ended(A)-atom. Action effects take place between
the occurrence of these two atoms. It is essential that effects of an action take
place during the action execution, as we have no other manner to establish the
causal connection between the action and the effects.
Note that when an action is performed more than once, the same atoms
indicate start and end of the action. We don’t use specific action instances
for specific occurrences of actions. This more realistic assumption imposes
stronger demands on the properties, as the properties must provide a way to
identify specific action instances.
We will formalise action successfulness in COORD1. COORD1 is the first
property in the system of coordination properties. All other properties we in-
troduce will serve to prove COORD1. This property is a system property, which
means that it can’t be proven from correct behaviour of the agent only or from
correct behaviour of the world only. COORD1 describes that the interaction
between the agent and the world is such that action executions succeed.
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⊕tbp(A) ⊕end(A)
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⊕tbp(B) ⊕end(B)
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⊕tbp(A) ⊕end(A)⊕tbp(A)
t1 t4
t2 t3
Figure 3.3: No overlapping of executions
Action executions can fail because of three reasons. The first reason is over-
lapping of action executions in time. If two action executions overlap, then the
actions can interfere, leading to failure or unwanted effects. So, to guarantee
success, action executions should not overlap. Between the begin and the end of
an action, no other actions should begin or end. Property COORD0 formalises
this. This property is also a system property. COORD0 states that the agent and
the world interact in such a way that action executions don’t overlap. This prop-
erty is proved from other properties of the agent and the world using induction;
we give the rather involved proof in Section 3.7. The properties needed for this
proof constitute a sub-system of the system of coordination properties, and are
named ORDER properties (as they describe the order in which things happen;
see Section 3.7.1). Figure 3.3 illustrates COORD0. In figures, and sometimes
also in the text, we will abbreviate to be performed to tbp and ended to end.
We will use figures like this frequently. In the figure, we show a trace of the
agent (upper time line) and a trace of the world (lower time line). A ⊕tbp-atom
or ⊕end-atom at a time point in a trace signifies that this atom has just become
true in an interface of the agent or the world; the time point is often mentioned
under the atom (see the leftmost execution of A in the figure).
COORD0 serves a double purpose; we need it in order to prove action suc-
cessfulness (COORD1) and it enables us to identify and distinguish specific ac-
tion executions. When tbp-atoms and end-atoms alternate in the depicted way,
it is very easy to form pairs of tbp’s and end’s that demarcate a specific action
instance execution: you simply take the first end(A) following the tbp(A). As is
clear from Figure 3.3, it is easy to distinguish the first execution of A from the
second execution of A. In the figure, there are action executions in the world,
on the lower time line, as well as in the agent, on the upper time line; these
terms will be used frequently. In Figure 3.4, we show a situation where action
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⊕tbp(A) ⊕tbp(A) ⊕end(A) ⊕end(A)
Figure 3.4: Find the action execution . . .
executions overlap. It is clear that in this situation unambiguous identification
of action executions is impossible.
COORD0 says that when one action is executing in the world, it is always
the only one. It is also forbidden that two action executions entirely coincide.
And because effects of an action are defined as expected outcomes that happen
during execution of the action, no action execution can fail because of effects
of other actions.
But action executions can also fail due to events. In our view, events are
changes to the world state that aren’t controlled by the agent. These can be
due to the dynamics of the world itself (natural events). But changes due to
the aftermath of a failed action also are events. For example, when you try to
kill a fly by hitting it, this action has ended as soon as your hand is back in
its original position. When the fly is still alive and kicking, you consider your
action as a failure. But when the fly drops dead after another five minutes due to
internal damage caused by your blow, we call this an event, even though strictly
speaking your blow did kill it. But you didn’t expect this to happen; normally
the fly would have died during execution of the hitting action. Therefore, when
the fly dies later on, this is seen as an event. And maybe the fly didn’t even
really die from the indirect consequences of your blow, but from a heart attack.
This touches upon another point we should stress: when during execution of
an action the expected consequence happens, this doesn’t have to be caused by
the action at all. In case of the fly: maybe it dies during your execution of the
hitting action because of the fact that it was just old and nature called. But in
this case, we see this as an effect of the action. This is reasonable, because there
really is no other straightforward way of defining effects of actions. It is an old
philosophical problem how to define causality, and we suspect these issues to
be part of the problem. So, expected consequences happening in the world
during an action execution are defined action effects, and all other changes are
defined events.
So, in our view, each change to the world state either is the effect of a suc-
cessful action or it is an event. We will formalise this in the property CHANGE,
which we phrase in Section 3.6.3. In some other approaches, events designate
all causes of state changes, including agent-initiated actions. This might be
confusing, but is just a matter of definitions.
Property COORD3 is a property of the world, stating that no events happen
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during action executions. This is quite a strong demand, as not every event
might interfere with an action. The demand can be relieved by only forbidding
interfering events, which is a minor extension. As COORD3 is a property of the
world, we won’t prove COORD3 in this chapter. We don’t make any choices
regarding the nature of the world; it could be the real external environment,
or a simulated, implemented component. In the latter case, COORD3 should
be proved from the semantics of the implementation of the world. But in this
chapter, we restrict ourselves to the interaction between the agent and the world
and to finding properties of the agent and of the world that will guarantee cor-
rect system behaviour. In this light, COORD3 is an assumption underlying the
proof of COORD1; assuming that COORD3 holds (amongst other assumptions),
we can prove COORD1.
A third reason for action failure is that the world can change prior to an
action execution starting in the world. The agent decides to perform an action
based on observation results it receives. If these observation results indicate
there is an occasion for a certain action, which is a reason to do this action,
then the agent will decide to do the action and generate a tbp-atom in its output
interface. But between the moment the occasion arises in the world and the
start of the execution of this action in the world, events or other action effects
could occur, disrupting the applicability of the action. Property COORD5 states
that all actions are still applicable at the moment their execution starts in the
world. This is a system property, as both effects of actions (initiated by the
agent) and events (taking place in the world) can be the cause of ruining the
applicability of an action.
In order to prove COORD5, we need properties of the agent and of the world,
just like we do for proving COORD0. We give these properties and the proof
of COORD5 in Section 3.8. The properties are named PROPER properties (re-
ferring to the proper behaviour of agent and environment that doesn’t affect
applicability), and they constitute another sub-system of the system of coordi-
nation properties.
Both the sub-system for COORD0 and the sub-system for COORD5 are us-
able for a subclass of the generic architecture described in Section 3.2. In Sec-
tions 3.7 and 3.8, where we will go into the details of the proofs of these sys-
tem properties, it becomes clear that proving COORD0 and COORD5 is not well
possible without discerning different types of agents in the generic architecture
described in Section 3.2. In this chapter, we will then focus on reactive agents,
which are agents that decide to do actions immediately when they observe oc-
casions for the actions, without taking into account other circumstances.
In Section 3.4.3, we show that absence of the three causes for failure laid
down in the COORD properties is sufficient to prove successfulness of actions.
79
3.4.2 The system of coordination properties
One of the main objectives of this chapter is to establish a generic set of prop-
erties that enables the verifier to prove that all actions executed will succeed.
We want to give a clear separation of all aspects involved, as described in the
previous subsection, and to formalise demands on world and agent behaviour
that guarantee overall action success. To obtain these goals, a system of coor-
dination properties is devised. The properties are phrased in the abstract lan-
guage AL, although the interpretation of this language in the detailed language
is presented later on, to show the intuitive power of the language abstraction
formalism.
The system is structured in the following way:
∗ COORD1 is the target, topmost property, formalising action successful-
ness and proved from all other properties;
∗ COORD0 is the foundational property, parts of which are frequently used
as condition in other coordination properties;
∗ COORD2 and COORD5 are intermediate properties;
∗ COORD3 and COORD4 are demands on the world.
Actually, this is only the topmost part of the system of coordination properties;
the other part is formed by the properties needed to prove COORD0 (Section
3.7) and COORD5 (Section 3.8).
COORD0 is the foundation of the system of coordination properties. It en-
ables the verifier to identify action executions, by formalising Figure 3.3. The
property states that action executions don’t overlap, not in the world and nei-
ther in the agent. The agent- and the world-part will be part of the conditions
of many properties to come, to enable identification of action executions. This
is the abstract formula:
COORD0 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) :
NoOverlappingInWorld(M) ∧
NoOverlappingInAgent(M)
The abstract predicates NoOverlappingInWorld and
NoOverlappingInAgent will be defined in Section 3.5.
COORD1 formalises action successfulness, stating that all actions executed
in the system are applicable and yield all expected effects. Informally:
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‘When an action execution in the world begins at t1 and ends at t2,
then
the action is applicable at t1 in the world
and
all expected effects of the action in that world situation will be
realised during the execution.’
This is the abstract formalisation:
COORD1 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ⇒
Appl(A, t1,M) ∧
ExpEffectsHappen(A, t1, t2,M)
It is essential that all action executions are applicable at the moment they start
in the world. When actions are applicable at the moment the execution starts,
the expected effects of the action are the desired effects. When an action is not
applicable, there might be no effects at all, or unwanted ones.
COORD2 states that all action executions started at times that the action is
applicable will be successful. Informally:
‘When an action execution in the world begins at t1 and ends at t2,
and
when the action is applicable at t1 in the world
then
all expected effects of the action in that world situation will be
realised during the execution.’
And this is its abstract formalisation:
COORD2 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧
Appl(A, t1,M) ⇒
ExpEffectsHappen(A, t1, t2,M)
COORD3 is a demand on the world that states that there are no events hap-
pening during action executions. Informally:
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‘If there is an action execution in the world
and
action executions do not overlap
then
no events happen during the execution.’
And this is the formalisation in the abstract language:
COORD3 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld(M) ⇒
NoEventsDuring([t1, t2],M)
We need the NoOverlappingInWorld condition in this property because ac-
tion executions can’t be properly identified when action beginnings and endings
can occur at random.
COORD4 is a demand on the world that says that an action execution in the
world will be successful when the action is applicable and there are no distur-
bances caused by overlapping executions or events. As we sketched in the pre-
vious subsection, it is reasonable that actions succeed in these circumstances.
Informally:
‘If an action execution in the world begins at t1 and ends at t2
and
action executions do not overlap
and
no events happen during the execution
and
the action is applicable at t1
then
all effects of the action will be realised during the execution.’
This is the formalisation:
COORD4 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld(M) ∧
NoEventsDuring([t1, t2],M) ∧
Appl(A, t1,M) ⇒
ExpEffectsHappen(A, t1, t2,M)
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COORD5 simply states that an action is applicable at the moment its execu-
tion starts. This is a necessary condition for success of this action. This is its
formalisation:
COORD5 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ⇒
Appl(A, t1,M)
Because the abstraction formalism is exploited, these properties are rela-
tively easy to read and understand, even without knowing the formal meaning
of abstract terms, which we provide in Section 3.5. Technical details are hidden
beneath intuitively clear notions. The clarity and brevity of the formulae make
the verification process more manageable, as the abstract concepts yield a nat-
ural view of the system’s behaviour and prevent getting lost in symbolic clutter
while constructing proofs. The system of coordination properties is applicable
for many systems with a single agent that performs actions in a changing world.
By simple instantiation of the system specific details, such as the set of actions,
the conditions of applicability and the effects of these actions, the system can
be customised, as we will sketch in Section 3.9.
3.4.3 The proof of action successfulness
The proof of COORD1 from the other properties of the system of coordination
properties is extremely simple. In order to prove COORD1, it is possible to
stay entirely within the abstract language AL; no abstractions need to be ex-
panded into the detailed language. All that is needed is performing simple
modus ponens and manipulation of universal quantifiers on a subset of the sys-
tem of coordination properties.
For the proof, we assume that the world properties COORD3 and COORD4
hold. We won’t prove these properties in this chapter, as it is our aim to prove
the system property action successfulness (COORD1) from properties of the
agent and the world. For an instance of the generic architecture, with some
specific (real or simulated) world, COORD3 and COORD4 will need to hold
in order for the proof to be valid. We also assume that the system properties
COORD0 and COORD5 are valid. We will prove these properties in this chapter
from other agent and world properties, in Section 3.7 and Section 3.8, respec-
tively. The proofs of these system properties are quite involved and detailed.
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COORD1
COORD2 COORD5
COORD0 COORD3 COORD4
Figure 3.5: The proof tree
We show the proof tree of COORD1 in Figure 3.5. We will briefly ex-
plain the proof steps. To prove COORD2, we take any trace M of S (as
COORD2 is a system property), an action A and two points in time, t1 and t2 >
t1. We then suppose that ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧ Appl(A, t1,M).
COORD0 gives us NoOverlappingInWorld(M), and now we use COORD3
and modus ponens to conclude that NoEventsDuring([t1, t2],M). Finally,
we apply modus ponens to COORD4 and the other information we have, to
conclude that ExpEffectsHappen(A, t1, t2,M), with which we have proven
COORD2.
Proving COORD1 is even simpler. We again take a traceM of S, an action A
and two points in time, t1 and t2 > t1. We suppose that
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M). COORD5 then allows us to conclude
Appl(A, t1,M), and with this information, we can use COORD2 and modus
ponens to arrive at ExpEffectsHappen(A, t1, t2,M).
3.5 Relating abstract notions to detailed meaning
In this section, we will define the language constructs (predicates and terms)
of the abstract language AL. We do this by relating them to formulae of the
detailed temporal language TL. In Section 3.4, we already used AL notions to
phrase coordination properties, and in later Sections (3.6, 3.7 and 3.8) we will
present more properties written in the language AL. The abstract language en-
ables expressing temporal properties of system behaviour using a vocabulary
of clean-cut concepts. As we stated before, to distinguish elements of the ab-
stract language, a different font is used for the constructs of the abstract
language.
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Concerning action executions
The notion of an action execution is central to the system of coordination prop-
erties, so formalisation is desired. An action execution of A is a period in time
starting with the appearance of some to be performed(A)-atom and ending with
the appearance of the first subsequent ended(A)-atom. In the generic system,
there are two perspectives on action executions. There is the action execution
in the world, which happens between t1 and t2 when a tbp-atom appears in the
input interface of the world at t1 and the first matching end-atom appears in
the output interface of the world at t2. And there is the action execution in the
agent, which happens between t1 and t2 when a tbp-atom appears in the output
interface of the agent at t1 and the first matching end-atom appears in the input
interface of the agent at t2. We need these two variants of action executions
because we sometimes look at agent properties, and other times at environment
properties.
The definitions of the abstract notions of action executions only yield the
right intuitions when property COORD0 holds, as explained in the previous
section. If not, then it is not reasonable to take on the first matching end-atom
as belonging to the tbp-atom, as it could be the end of the execution of another
instance of the same action, which started at some earlier time point.
Besides action execution intervals, we also define notions for action execu-
tions starting or ending. First, we introduce new predicates and explain them
in informal terms. Next, we give formal interpretations in terms of the detailed
language.
Let A ∈ ACTION and t1, t2 > t1 be moments in time. Then, the abstract
formula
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) denotes that there is an execution of A in
the world starting at t1 and ending at t2,
and
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,Ag,M) denotes that there is an execution of A in
the agent starting at t1 and ending at t2.
Interpretation in terms of the detailed language:
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ≡ ⊕state(M, t1, input(EW)) 
to be performed(A) ∧
⊗t1, t2⊕state(M, t2, output(EW)) 
ended(A)
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,Ag,M ≡ ⊕state(M, t1, output(Ag)) 
to be performed(A) ∧
⊗t1, t2⊕state(M, t2, input(Ag)) 
ended(A)
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Let A∈ACTION and t1 be a moment in time. Then, the abstract formula
ActionExStarts(A, t1,EW,M) denotes that an execution of A in the
world starts at t1, and
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M) denotes that an execution of A in the
agent starts at t1.
Interpretation in terms of the detailed language:
ActionExStarts(A, t1,EW,M) ≡ ⊕state(M, t1, input(EW)) 
to be performed(A)
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M) ≡ ⊕state(M, t1, output(Ag)) 
to be performed(A)
Let A∈ACTION and t2 be a moment in time. Then, the abstract formula
ActionExEnds(A, t2,EW,M) denotes that an execution of A in the
world ends at t2, and
ActionExEnds(A, t2,Ag,M) denotes that an execution of A in the
agent ends at t2.
Interpretation in terms of the detailed language:
ActionExEnds(A, t2,EW,M) ≡ ⊕state(M, t2, output(EW)) 
ended(A)
ActionExEnds(A, t2,Ag,M) ≡ ⊕state(M, t2, input(Ag)) 
ended(A)
Concerning first and consecutive actions
We sometimes need to identify the start of the first action in an interval in time
as well as the beginnings of subsequent consecutive actions. We introduce two
abstract notions for this, that both come in an agent variant and a world variant.
Let A∈ACTION, int be an interval in time and t1 be a moment in time such
that t1 ∈ int. Then, the abstract formula
FirstActionBegins(A, t1, int,EW,M)
denotes that A is the first action starting
in the world during int, and it starts at
time t1, and
FirstActionBegins(A, t1, int,Ag,M)
denotes that A is the first action in int
the agent decides to do, and the execu-
tion in the agent begins at t1.
Interpretation in terms of the detailed language:
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FirstActionBegins(A, t1, int,EW,M) ≡
ActionExStarts(A, t1,EW,M) ∧
∀t ∈ [0, t1〉 ∩ int ∀B ∈ ACTION :
¬ActionExStarts(B, t,EW,M)
FirstActionBegins(A, t1, int,Ag,M) ≡
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M) ∧
∀t ∈ [0, t1〉 ∩ int ∀B ∈ ACTION :
¬ActionExStarts(B, t,Ag,M)
Here, [0, t1〉 ∩ int is the sub-interval of int of all time points before t1. As there
is an action starting at t1, no other actions may start in this sub-interval for this
action to be the first one.
Let A, B∈ACTION and t1, t2 > t1 be moments in time. Then, the abstract
formula
ConsecutiveActionsBegin(A,B, t1, t2,EW,M)
denotes that A and B are consecutive
actions in the world, starting at t1 and
t2, respectively, and
ConsecutiveActionsBegin(A,B, t1, t2,Ag,M)
denotes that A and B are consecutive
actions that the agent decides to do,
starting at t1 and t2, respectively.
Interpretation in terms of the detailed language:
ConsecutiveActionsBegins(A,B, t1, t2,EW,M) ≡
ActionExStarts(A, t1,EW,M) ∧
ActionExStarts(B, t2,EW,M) ∧
∀t ∈ 〈t1, t2〉 ∀C ∈ ACTION :
¬ActionExStarts(C, t,EW,M)
ConsecutiveActionsBegins(A,B, t1, t2,Ag,M) ≡
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M) ∧
ActionExStarts(B, t2,Ag,M) ∧
∀t ∈ 〈t1, t2〉 ∀C ∈ ACTION :
¬ActionExStarts(C, t,Ag,M)
Concerning applicability
Actions can only be successfully executed in certain world states. There must
be nothing obstructing the execution of the action. For each action A, we as-
sume there is a state formula appl(A) ∈ SL(world info), describing exactly the
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world situations in which the action can be executed. It is not excluded that the
effects of the action are already present in these world situations; in this case,
execution of the action could leave the world state unaltered.
The formulae appl(A) are parameters of the generic system of properties,
that have to be filled in when verifying an instantiation of the generic architec-
ture. For example, for the artificial mouse (further details in Section 3.2 and
3.9), we use:
appl(goto(p2)) ≡ (at position(mouse, p0) ∧ ¬at position(screen, p0)) ∨
at position(mouse, p1)
appl(eat) ≡ (at position(mouse, p0) ∧ at position(food, p0)) ∨
(at position(mouse, p1) ∧ at position(food, p1)) ∨
(at position(mouse, p2) ∧ at position(food, p2))
The choice of these two formulae is obvious when looking at Figure 3.2 (in
Section 3.2). For example, if we look at the action goto(p2), it is clear that the
mouse can go to p2 either if it is at the other side of the screen (at p0) and the
screen is up, or it is at p1, where nothing can obstruct its movements. Here,
we chose not to include the possibility that the mouse already is at p2 in the
applicability of goto(p2), though this might be an arbitrary choice.
Given these formulae that state in which circumstances each action is ap-
plicable, a temporal applicability notion can be defined straightforwardly:
Let A∈ACTION and t1 be a moment in time. Then, the abstract formula
Appl(A, t1,M) denotes that action A is applicable in the
world at t1.
Interpretation in terms of the detailed language:
Appl(A, t1,M) ≡ state(M, t1, output(EW))  appl(A)
Concerning occasionality
The agents must have a reason in order to decide to do some action. Part of
the reason must be the world situation; you only decide to do an action when
the world situation is such that doing the action might be useful. If the world
situation is such that the agent thinks it is a good idea to perform action A, we
say that the world provides an occasion for A. For example, if you want to cross
a busy road, and the traffic light turns green, this provides an occasion for you
to cross the road.
Note that presence of occasion for an action is not the same as the ac-
tion being applicable: an occasion is a state of the world that eventually (by
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observation and deliberation) causes the agent to decide to do an action, and
applicability means that the world state is such that an action can be fruitfully
executed. In case the agent can obtain sufficient information about the state of
the world and the knowledge of the agent is correct, the fact that there is an
occasion for an action should imply that this action is also applicable. Other-
wise, the agent would decide to perform an action that can’t be executed, which
doesn’t make any sense. Note that when the agent has only partial information
on the world, it might be the case that occasionality doesn’t always imply ap-
plicability. In these circumstances, the agent must sometimes decide to do an
action, without being sure that the action is successfully executable. But for
proving action successfulness, we will rely on the property that occasionality
implies applicability.
Just like applicability, occasionality is a system- and domain dependent
notion. So, we assume that for each action A there is a state formula occ(A) ∈
SL(world info), describing exactly the world situations that form occasions for
action A. For example, in the mouse system, we have:
occ(goto(P )) ≡ at position(food,P ) ∧ ¬at position(mouse,P ) ∧
¬at position(screen, p0)
occ(eat) ≡ ∃P : at position(mouse,P ) ∧ at position(food,P )
The formulae closely match the conditions of the rules of the knowledge base
of the mouse, which we gave in Section 3.2.
Just like with applicability, we define an AL-notion for an occasion taking
place in the external world. But this is not enough, as the agent has to observe
the occasion before it decides to do anything. Just like acting, the process of
observing something might take a while, and so we define notions for an occa-
sion being observable in the output interface of the world and for an occasion
being observed in the input interface of the agent.
Let A∈ACTION and t1 be a moment in time. Then, the abstract formula
Occ(A, t1,M) denotes that there is an occasion for action A
in the world at t1.
Interpretation in terms of the detailed language:
Occ(A, t1,M) ≡ state(M, t1, output(EW))  occ(A)
Let A∈ACTION and t1 be a moment in time. Then, the abstract formula
ObsOcc(A, t1,EW,M) denotes that an occasion for action A is observable
in the world at t1, and
ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M) denotes that the agent observes an occasion for ac-
tion A at t1.
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Interpretation in terms of the detailed language:
ObsOcc(A, t1,EW,M) ≡ state(M, t1, output(EW)) 
observation result(occ(A))
ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M) ≡ state(M, t1, input(Ag)) 
observation result(occ(A))
Returning to the example above, ObsOcc(goto(P ), t,Ag,M) is a shorthand for
state(M, t, input(Ag))  observation result(at position(food,P ) ∧
¬at position(mouse,P ) ∧
¬at position(screen, p0))
and truth of this formula makes the mouse decide to go to P .
Concerning situation specific effects and expected effects
When an action is executed in a certain world state, there (possibly) will be
some effects. By an effect is meant a single ground literal from SL(world info)
that becomes true as a result of an action. For the sake of simplicity, we don’t
consider more involved effects, such as disjunctive effects. An action can have
multiple effects, each happening at some moment during the execution of the
action. The exact nature of the effects depends on the world situation; in this
way, the effects are situation specific. For example, if an agent throws a ball
forward when standing faced towards a lake, then a first effect of this action is
that the ball is no longer in the actuators of the agent. Later on in the action
execution, when the ball lands, another effect is that the ball gets wet. When
this same action is executed in a different world situation, for example when
the agent faces a glass office building, then the second effect of the action will
be very different.
Before we formalise world situations, we explore the nature of the repre-
sentations in component EW. In Section 3.3.1, we defined information states
of components to be three-valued; each interface atom can be true, false or
unknown. If an atom is unknown in an information state, this means that the
component doesn’t have information regarding this atom. For the information
in the output interface of the world, we exclude the possibility of unknown
atoms. The world state is represented using atoms from SL(world info). In in-
formation states of the world (that is, of component EW), ground atoms based
on world info can be either true or false, and never unknown. Later on, we in-
troduce a world property formalising this (2VAL, Section 3.6.3). The intuition
for this choice is that there is no uncertainty regarding facts in the world (if we
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don’t consider quantum-mechanical phenomena). It either rains in New York
at this very moment, or it doesn’t. You probably don’t know which of the two
is the case, but it is clear that “It rains now in New York” either is true or false.
Now, a world situation is formalised as a partial assignment of definite truth
values (true and false) to ground atoms of world info. We use a partial assign-
ment because a world situation often concerns only part of the ground atoms
forming the representation of the world state; the truth values of other atoms
are not relevant. Each world situation can be refined to a number of complete
assignments. A world situation can be represented as a conjunction of ground
literals of world info. An example of a world situation in the mouse system
is at position(mouse, p0) ∧ ¬at position(screen, p0). A world situation W′ is
a refinement of a world situation W, written as W ≤ W′, if their conjunction
representations obey: W′ ⇒ W.
The effects of actions are domain- and system dependent notions. For each
system S, a relation sit spec effect is defined to represent the situation specific
effects of actions. This relation is one of the parameters of the reusable set of
properties, that allows instantiation to a specific system. Given three arguments
(an action A, a world situation W, and l, a groundliteral of type world info),
sit spec effect(A,W, l) means that literal l becoming true is an effect of the
action A in the world situation W. This system-dependent relation must always
satisfy the following demand:
For all A ∈ ACTION, all groundliterals l of type world info and all
world situations W and W′:
W ≤ W′ ∧ sit spec effect(A,W, l)⇒ sit spec effect(A,W′, l).
This property is monotonicity of effects with respect to situations: when more
facts are available concerning the state of the world, the set of predicted effects
will be larger or the same.
The predicate sit spec effect described above is static; it doesn’t have a
trace (M) or moment in time as an argument. Using sit spec effect, we define
a dynamic notion for effects that are expected as a consequence of performing
an action in the world at a certain moment in time. When an execution of an
action A starts at t1 in the world, the effects expected depend on the factual
world situation at t1. So, the following definition takes into account the output
information state of EW, restricted to the factual information type world info.
91
Let A ∈ ACTION, l ∈ groundliterals(world info) and t1 be a moment in time.
Then, the abstract formula
ExpEffect(l,A, t1,M)
denotes that l is expected to happen as a result of executing
A in the world at t1.
This formula is defined within the abstract language by:
ExpEffect(l,A, t1,M) ≡
sit spec effect(A, state(M, t1, output(EW))|world info, l)
The second argument of sit spec effect above is
state(M, t1, output(EW))|world info, which yields the truth values of all ground
atoms in world info in the information state at t1 in trace M. As the world is
two-valued, this is a world situation, so sit spec effect can be applied to it.
We give an example from the mouse system. We focus on the action
goto(p1). We have:
sit spec effect(goto(p1), at position(mouse, p0) ∧ ¬at position(screen, p0),
at position(mouse, p1)) and
sit spec effect(goto(p1), at position(mouse, p0) ∧ ¬at position(screen, p0),
¬at position(mouse, p0))
As moving only has two effects, the above clauses specify all effects of the
mouse going to p1 in the described world situation. We now look at a traceM,
such that state(M, t1, output(EW))|world info is the world situation:
at position(mouse, p0) ∧ ¬at position(mouse, p1) ∧ ¬at position(mouse, p2) ∧
¬at position(food, p0) ∧ at position(food, p1) ∧ ¬at position(food, p2) ∧
¬at position(screen, p0) ∧ ¬at position(screen, p1) ∧ ¬at position(screen, p2)
We call this world situation W. We have that
at position(mouse, p0) ∧ ¬at position(screen, p0) ≤ W,
and thus the situation specific effects for at position(mouse, p0) ∧
¬at position(screen, p0) also happen in W. We then have
ExpEffect(at position(mouse, p1), goto(p1), t1,M) and
ExpEffect(¬at position(mouse, p0), goto(p1), t1,M).
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Concerning effects of actions and events
A literal is defined to be an effect of an action when the literal is an expected
outcome that becomes true during execution of the action. To be precise, if
an execution of A starts at t1 and ends at t2, then all expected effects of A
happening during 〈t1, t2] are defined to be effects of A. We exclude the starting
point of the action execution interval, because at the very moment that an action
starts to be executed in the world, there can’t be any effects yet. Note that when
a literal is an action effect, this doesn’t mean that the literal becomes true as a
result of the action, though this will be usually the case. But when during an
action execution an event happens, which causes changes that are also expected
effects of the action being executed, these changes will be seen as effects of
the action (recall the example of the fly in Subsection 3.4.1). This choice is
made because there is no means by which an external observer can distinguish
changes caused by actions from changes caused by events. A literal is defined
to be an effect of an event when it is not an effect of any action. Before we
define effects of actions and events, we first introduce a notion for something
happening in the world situation. Something happens when a literal of world
info becomes true.
Let l ∈ groundliterals(world info) and t be a moment in time. Then, the abstract
formula
Happens(l, t,M) denotes that at t, l becomes true in the world.
Interpretation in terms of the detailed language:
Happens(l, t,M) ≡ ⊕state(M, t, output(EW))  l
Let A ∈ ACTION, l ∈ groundliterals(world info) and t be a moment in time.
Then, the abstract formula
ActionEff(A, l, t,M) denotes that at t, l happens as a result of execut-
ing A.
Interpretation in terms of the detailed language:
ActionEff(A, l, t,M) ≡ ∃t1 < t ∃t2 ≥ t:
Happens(l, t,M) ∧
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧
ExpEffect(l,A, t1,M)
Let l ∈ groundliterals(world info) and t be a moment in time. Then, the abstract
formula
EventEff(l, t,M) denotes that at t, l happens as a result of some
event.
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Interpretation:
EventEff(l, t,M) ≡ Happens(l, t,M) ∧
¬∃A ∈ ACTION:
ActionEff(A, l, t,M)
The next abstract formula is used to state that during an interval in time
there are no effects of events.
Let int be an interval in time. Then, the abstract formula
NoEventsDuring(int ,M) denotes that there are no events taking
place in the world during int.
Definition within the abstract language:
NoEventsDuring(int ,M) ≡ ∀ l ∈ groundliterals(world info)
∀t ∈ int :
¬ EventEff(l, t,M)
Concerning successful actions
The following formula of the abstract language states that an execution of A is
successful, meaning that all expected effects are achieved during the execution:
Let A ∈ ACTION and t1, t2 > t1 be moments in time. Then, the abstract
formula
ExpEffectsHappen(A, t1, t2,M) denotes that all expected effects
of doing A between t1 and t2 are
achieved.
Definition within the abstract language:
ExpEffectsHappen(A, t1, t2,M) ≡ ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧
∀ l ∈ groundliterals(world info):
(ExpEffect(l,A, t1,M) ⇒
∃t3 ∈ 〈t1, t2]:
ActionEff(A, l, t3,M))
Concerning overlapping executions
The first two abstract formulae state that a certain execution, in the world or the
agent respectively, doesn’t overlap with any other execution.
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Let A ∈ ACTION and t1, t2 > t1 be moments in time. Then, the abstract
formula
NoOverlapDuringExecuting(A, t1, t2,EW,M)
denotes that in the world, between the beginning of an
execution of A at t1 and the end of an execution of A
at t2, no other executions begin or end.
Definition within the abstract language:
NoOverlapDuringExecuting(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ≡
ActionExStarts(A, t1,EW,M) ∧
ActionExEnds(A, t2,EW,M) ⇒
(∀B 6= A ∈ ACTION ∀t ∈ [t1, t2] :
¬ActionExStarts(B, t,EW,M) ∧
¬ActionExEnds(B, t,EW,M)) ∧
(∀t ∈ 〈t1, t2] : ¬ActionExStarts(A, t,EW,M)) ∧
(∀t ∈ [t1, t2〉 : ¬ActionExEnds(A, t,EW,M))
Let A ∈ ACTION and t1, t2 > t1 be moments in time. Then, the abstract
formula
NoOverlapDuringExecuting(A, t1, t2,Ag,M)
denotes that in the agent, between the decision to begin
an execution of A at t1 and the end of an execution of
A at t2, no other executions begin or end.
Definition within the abstract language:
NoOverlapDuringExecuting(A, t1, t2,Ag,M) ≡
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M) ∧
ActionExEnds(A, t2,Ag,M) ⇒
(∀B 6= A ∈ ACTION ∀t ∈ [t1, t2] :
¬ActionExStarts(B, t,Ag,M) ∧
¬ActionExEnds(B, t,Ag,M)) ∧
(∀t ∈ 〈t1, t2] : ¬ActionExStarts(A, t,Ag,M)) ∧
(∀t ∈ [t1, t2〉 : ¬ActionExEnds(A, t,Ag,M))
Next, four abstract formulae are introduced that apply to a number of exe-
cutions, namely the executions during a certain interval in time. There are two
world notions and two agent notions. The abbreviations state that all execu-
tions started during the interval will also end in it, without being overlapped by
other executions and that all executions ended during the interval have started
during the interval, without being overlapped.
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Let int be an interval in time. Then, the abstract formula
ExecutionsStartedEndWithoutOverlapping(int ,EW,M)
denotes that all actions executions started in the
world during int end in the interval, and there is
no overlapping of executions during this interval.
Definition within the abstract language:
ExecutionsStartedEndWithoutOverlapping(int ,EW,M) ≡
∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∈ int :
ActionExStarts(A, t1,EW,M) ⇒
∃t2 > t1 : t2 ∈ int ∧
ActionExEnds(A, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlapDuringExecuting(A, t1, t2,EW,M)
Let int be an interval in time. Then, the abstract formula
ExecutionsEndedStartWithoutOverlapping(int ,EW,M)
denotes that all actions executions ended in the
world during int have started in the interval, and
there is no overlapping of executions during this
interval.
Definition within the abstract language:
ExecutionsEndedStartWithoutOverlapping(int ,EW,M) ≡
∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t2 ∈ int :
ActionExEnds(A, t2,EW,M) ⇒
∃t1 < t2 : t1 ∈ int ∧
ActionExStarts(A, t1,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlapDuringExecuting(A, t1, t2,EW,M)
Let int be an interval in time. Then, the abstract formula
ExecutionsStartedEndWithoutOverlapping(int ,Ag,M)
denotes that all actions executions started by the
agent during int end in the interval, and there is no
overlapping of executions during this interval.
Definition within the abstract language:
ExecutionsStartedEndWithoutOverlapping(int ,Ag,M) ≡
∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∈ int :
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M) ⇒
∃t2 > t1 : t2 ∈ int ∧
ActionExEnds(A, t2,Ag,M) ∧
NoOverlapDuringExecuting(A, t1, t2,Ag,M)
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Let int be an interval in time. Then, the abstract formula
ExecutionsEndedStartWithoutOverlapping(int ,Ag,M)
denotes that all actions executions ended in the
agent during int have started in the interval, and
there is no overlapping of executions during this
interval.
Definition within the abstract language:
ExecutionsEndedStartWithoutOverlapping(int ,Ag,M) ≡
∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t2 ∈ int :
ActionExEnds(A, t2,Ag,M) ⇒
∃t1 < t2 : t1 ∈ int ∧
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M) ∧
NoOverlapDuringExecuting(A, t1, t2,Ag,M)
When, during some interval, every execution started during the interval
ends without being overlapped and every execution ended has started without
being overlapped, it is guaranteed that all executions in the interval don’t over-
lap in any way. So:
Let int be an interval in time. Then, the abstract formula
NoOverlappingInWorld(int ,M)
denotes that there is no overlapping of action executions in the
world during int.
Definition within the abstract language:
NoOverlappingInWorld(int ,M) ≡
ExecutionsStartedEndWithoutOverlapping(int ,EW,M)∧
ExecutionsEndedStartWithoutOverlapping(int ,EW,M)
Let int be an interval in time. Then, the abstract formula
NoOverlappingInAgent(int ,M)
denotes that there is no overlapping of action executions in the
agent during int.
Definition within the abstract language:
NoOverlappingInAgent(int ,M) ≡
ExecutionsStartedEndWithoutOverlapping(int ,Ag,M)∧
ExecutionsEndedStartWithoutOverlapping(int ,Ag,M)
The following two abstract formulae are instantiations of the previous two
formulae. By [0,→〉, the whole time line is denoted.
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The abstract formula
NoOverlappingInWorld(M) denotes that there is no overlapping of
action executions in the world.
Definition within the abstract language:
NoOverlappingInWorld(M) ≡ NoOverlappingInWorld([0,→〉,M)
The abstract formula
NoOverlappingInAgent(M) denotes that there is no overlapping of
action executions in the agent.
Definition within the abstract language:
NoOverlappingInAgent(M) ≡ NoOverlappingInAgent([0,→〉,M)
Concerning occasions and actions
As we explained above when we defined notions for occasions occurring and
being observed, occasions are the world situations that can provide the agent
with a reason to decide to do an action. If the agent in the generic architecture
is a reactive agent, then it decides to do an action whenever it observes an
occasion. For systems with a reactive agent it is thus vital that there aren’t too
many occasions, as this could result in overlapping action executions, which
we want to exclude (COORD0). We define three notions here: the first one
formalises that there is at most one occasion happening in the world between
every two actions starting in a certain interval, and the second and third are
agent and world variants formalising that there is exactly one occasion between
every two actions starting in a certain interval. More precisely:
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Let int be an interval in time. Then, the abstract formula
NotTooManyOccs(int,M)
denotes that
if there occurs an occasion before the first action starting during
int,
then it is the only occasion taking place before the first action
and
if there occurs an occasion between two consecutive actions start-
ing during int,
then it is the only one between these two action beginnings.
Definition within the abstract language:
NotTooManyOccs(int,M) ≡
[∀A,B ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∈ int ∀t0 ∈ [0, t1〉 ∩ int :
FirstActionBegins(A, t1, int,EW,M) ∧
⊕Occ(B, t0,M) ⇒
∀C 6= B ∈ ACTION : ¬ ⊕ Occ(C, t0,M) ∧
∀C ∈ ACTION ∀t ∈ ([0, t1〉 ∩ int) \ {t0} :
¬ ⊕ Occ(C, t,M)] ∧
[∀A,B,C ∈ ACTION ∀t2 ∈ int ∀t3 ∈ [0, t2〉 ∩ int ∀t4 ∈ [t3, t2〉 :
ConsecutiveActionsBegin(A,B, t3, t2,EW,M) ∧
⊕Occ(C, t4,M) ⇒
∀D 6= C ∈ ACTION : ¬ ⊕ Occ(D, t4,M) ∧
∀D ∈ ACTION ∀t ∈ [t3, t2〉 \ {t4} :
¬ ⊕ Occ(D, t,M)]
As before, [0, t1〉 ∩ int is the sub-interval of int, containing all time points
before t1. As in the definition above the first action in int starts at t1, in this
sub-interval of int at most one occasion is allowed to occur (at t0). Similarly,
the interval [t3, t2〉 between two consecutive action beginnings in int contains
at most one occasion (at t4), if NotTooManyOccs(int,M) holds.
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Let int be an interval in time. Then, the abstract formula
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld(int,M)
denotes that
the first action starting in the world in int is preceded by
its occasion occurring, and
this is the only occasion taking place before the first ac-
tion
and
between every two consecutive action beginnings in int,
an occasion for the later action occurs, and
this is the only occasion happening in the world between
these two action beginnings.
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent(int,M)
denotes that
the first action the agent decides to do in int is preceded
by its occasion being observed, and
this is the only occasion the agent observes before the
first action
and
between every two consecutive decisions to do actions in
int, the agent observed an occasion for the later action,
and
this is the only occasion observed between these two ac-
tion beginnings.
Definitions within the abstract language:
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld(int,M) ≡
[∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∈ int
FirstActionBegins(A, t1, int,EW,M) ⇒
∃t0 ∈ [0, t1〉 ∩ int : ⊕Occ(A, t0,M) ∧
∀B 6= A ∈ ACTION : ¬ ⊕ Occ(B, t0,M) ∧
∀B ∈ ACTION ∀t ∈ ([0, t1〉 ∩ int) \ {t0} :
¬ ⊕ Occ(B, t,M)] ∧
[∀A,B ∈ ACTION ∀t2 ∈ int ∀t3 ∈ [0, t2〉 ∩ int :
ConsecutiveActionsBegin(A,B, t3, t2,EW,M) ⇒
∃t4 ∈ [t3, t2〉 : ⊕Occ(B, t4,M) ∧
∀C 6= B ∈ ACTION : ¬ ⊕ Occ(C, t4,M) ∧
∀C ∈ ACTION ∀t ∈ [t3, t2〉 \ {t4} :
¬ ⊕ Occ(C, t,M)]
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OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent(int,M) ≡
[∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∈ int :
FirstActionBegins(A, t1, int,Ag,M) ⇒
∃t0 ∈ [0, t1〉 ∩ int : ⊕ObsOcc(A, t0,Ag,M) ∧
∀B 6= A ∈ ACTION : ¬ ⊕ ObsOcc(B, t0,Ag,M) ∧
∀B ∈ ACTION ∀t ∈ ([0, t1〉 ∩ int) \ {t0} :
¬ ⊕ ObsOcc(B, t,Ag,M)] ∧
[∀A,B ∈ ACTION ∀t2 ∈ int ∀t3 ∈ [0, t2〉 ∩ int :
ConsecutiveActionsBegin(A,B, t3, t2,Ag,M) ⇒
∃t4 ∈ [t3, t2〉 : ⊕ObsOcc(B, t4,Ag,M) ∧
∀C 6= B ∈ ACTION : ¬ ⊕ ObsOcc(C, t4,Ag,M) ∧
∀C ∈ ACTION ∀t ∈ [t3, t2〉 \ {t4} :
¬ ⊕ ObsOcc(C, t,Ag,M)]
Concerning the flow of information
In any agent system, pieces of information are transferred from one system
component to another (from the agent to the world, or the other way around),
and information is processed by the system components. This has to happen
in an orderly manner. Pieces of information shouldn’t overtake each other in
links. Also, when the agent reasons, conclusions following from information
that arrived in the agent later than other information should appear on the out-
put later than the conclusions from the earlier information. And when the world
produces observation results, these should occur in the same order as the facts
that caused them. In order to phrase properties that formalise this, we need to
number the moments that information arrives in (input or output) interfaces.
The use of counting the moments that changes occur in the interfaces will be-
come clear when we define the no-overtaking properties, in Subsection 3.6.5.
We recursively define the notions we need. We start with the notions we need
to phrase no-overtaking for links:
Let t1 be a moment in time and n ≥ 1 be a natural number. Then, the abstract
formula
InputCount(n, t1,Ag,M)
denotes that at t1, information arrives in the
input interface of the agent for the nth time,
and
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OutputCount(n, t1,Ag,M)
denotes that at t1, information arrives in the
output interface of the agent for the nth time,
and
InputCount(n, t1,EW,M)
denotes that at t1, information arrives in the
input interface of the world for the nth time,
and
OutputCount(n, t1,EW,M)
denotes that at t1, information arrives in the
output interface of the world for the nth time.
Definition within the abstract language:
n = 1 : InputCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ≡
∃ k1 ∈ groundliterals(AgInOnt) :
⊕state(M, t1, input(Ag))  k1 ∧
∀t < t1 ∀ k ∈ groundliterals(AgInOnt) :
¬⊕ state(M, t, input(Ag))  k
n > 1 : InputCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ≡
∃ k1 ∈ groundliterals(AgInOnt) :
⊕state(M, t1, input(Ag))  k1 ∧
∃t0 < t1 ∃k0 ∈ groundliterals(AgInOnt) :
⊕state(M, t0, input(Ag))  k0 ∧
InputCount(n− 1, t0,Ag,M) ∧
∀t ∈ 〈t0, t1〉 ∀ k ∈ groundliterals(AgInOnt) :
¬⊕ state(M, t, input(Ag))  k
n = 1 : OutputCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ≡
∃ k1 ∈ groundliterals(AgOutOnt) :
⊕state(M, t1, output(Ag))  k1 ∧
∀t < t1 ∀ k ∈ groundliterals(AgOutOnt) :
¬⊕ state(M, t, output(Ag))  k
n > 1 : OutputCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ≡
∃ k1 ∈ groundliterals(AgOutOnt) :
⊕state(M, t1, output(Ag))  k1 ∧
∃t0 < t1 ∃k0 ∈ groundliterals(AgOutOnt) :
⊕state(M, t0, output(Ag))  k0 ∧
OutputCount(n− 1, t0,Ag,M) ∧
∀t ∈ 〈t0, t1〉 ∀ k ∈ groundliterals(AgOutOnt) :
¬⊕ state(M, t, output(Ag))  k
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n = 1 : InputCount(n, t1,EW,M) ≡
∃ k1 ∈ groundliterals(AgOutOnt) :
⊕state(M, t1, input(EW))  k1 ∧
∀t < t1 ∀ k ∈ groundliterals(AgOutOnt) :
¬⊕ state(M, t, input(EW))  k
n > 1 : InputCount(n, t1,EW,M) ≡
∃ k1 ∈ groundliterals(AgOutOnt) :
⊕state(M, t1, input(EW))  k1 ∧
∃t0 < t1 ∃k0 ∈ groundliterals(AgOutOnt) :
⊕state(M, t0, input(EW))  k0 ∧
InputCount(n− 1, t0,EW,M) ∧
∀t ∈ 〈t0, t1〉 ∀ k ∈ groundliterals(AgOutOnt) :
¬⊕ state(M, t, input(EW))  k
n = 1 : OutputCount(n, t1,EW,M) ≡
∃ k1 ∈ groundliterals(AgInOnt) :
⊕state(M, t1, output(EW))  k1 ∧
∀t < t1 ∀ k ∈ groundliterals(AgInOnt) :
¬⊕ state(M, t, output(EW))  k
n > 1 : OutputCount(n, t1,EW,M) ≡
∃ k1 ∈ groundliterals(AgInOnt) :
⊕state(M, t1, output(EW))  k1 ∧
∃t0 < t1 ∃k0 ∈ groundliterals(AgInOnt) :
⊕state(M, t0, output(EW))  k0 ∧
OutputCount(n− 1, t0,EW,M) ∧
∀t ∈ 〈t0, t1〉 ∀ k ∈ groundliterals(AgInOnt) :
¬⊕ state(M, t, output(EW))  k
We use the agent input and output ontologies AgInOnt and AgOutOnt for speci-
fying possible atoms occurring in the interfaces of both the agent and the world.
It might be surprising that we don’t use world ontologies in the definition of
InputCount(n, t1,EW,M) and OutputCount(n, t1,EW,M). The reason
for this is that we didn’t define specific interface ontologies for the world. The
input ontology of the world is exactly the same as the output ontology of the
agent. The output ontology of the world slightly differs from the input ontology
of the agent, as the world also outputs new world facts, based on the ontology
world info. But as information of this last type isn’t transferred to the agent
through the information link, the only interesting literals are those of AgInOnt.
To specify the no-overtaking property for the reasoning of the agent, we
have to define a notion to count the moments that the agent observes occasions,
as only this agent input information can lead to decisions to do actions. We
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also define a notion for counting the moments that the agent decides to do
actions. Strictly speaking, this is not necessary, as the only output atoms that
the agent generates are decisions to do actions, so we could just as well use
OutputCount(n, t,Ag,M) for this purpose. The only reason for defining a
new notion is aesthetics.
Let t1 be a moment in time and n ≥ 1 be a natural number. Then, the abstract
formula
ObsOccCount(n, t1,Ag,M) denotes that at t1, the agent re-
ceives information about observed
occasions for the nth time, and
ActionCount(n, t1,Ag,M) denotes that at t1, the agent decides
to do an action (or actions) for the
nth time.
Definition within the abstract language:
n = 1 : ObsOccCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ≡ ∃A ∈ ACTION :
⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M) ∧
∀ t < t1 ∀B ∈ ACTION :
¬⊕ ObsOcc(B, t,Ag,M)
n > 1 : ObsOccCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ≡ ∃A ∈ ACTION :
⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M) ∧
∃ t0 < t1 ∃B ∈ ACTION :
⊕ObsOcc(B, t0,Ag,M) ∧
ObsOccCount(n−1, t0,Ag,M) ∧
∀ t ∈ 〈t0, t1〉 ∀C ∈ ACTION :
¬⊕ ObsOcc(C, t0,Ag,M)
n = 1 : ActionCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ≡ ∃A ∈ ACTION :
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M)∧
∀ t < t1 ∀B ∈ ACTION :
¬ActionExStarts(B, t,Ag,M)
n > 1 : ActionCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ≡ ∃A ∈ ACTION :
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M)∧
∃ t0 < t1 ∃B ∈ ACTION :
ActionExStarts(B, t0,Ag,M)∧
ActionCount(n−1, t0,Ag,M) ∧
∀ t ∈ 〈t0, t1〉 ∀C ∈ ACTION :
¬ActionExStarts(C, t,Ag,M)
Finally, we need notions to specify the no-overtaking property for the gen-
eration of observation results from facts happening in the world. Not all facts
happening are relevant; we only will be interested in occasions for actions oc-
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curring, and the matching observation results. We define a notion for counting
the moments that new occasions happen in the world, and a notion for counting
the moments that the world generates observations of these occasions.
Let t1 be a moment in time and n ≥ 1 be a natural number. Then, the abstract
formula
OccCount(n, t1,EW,M)
denotes that at t1, one or more occasions oc-
cur in the world for the nth time, and
ObsOccCount(n, t1,EW,M)
denotes that at t1, the world generates infor-
mation about observed occasions for the nth
time.
Definition within the abstract language:
n = 1 : OccCount(n, t1,EW,M) ≡
∃A ∈ ACTION :
⊕Occ(A, t1,M) ∧
∀ t < t1 ∀B ∈ ACTION :
¬⊕ Occ(B, t,M)
n > 1 : OccCount(n, t1,EW,M) ≡
∃A ∈ ACTION :
⊕Occ(A, t1,M) ∧
∃ t0 < t1 ∃B ∈ ACTION :
⊕Occ(B, t0,M) ∧
OccCount(n− 1, t0,EW,M) ∧
∀ t ∈ 〈t0, t1〉 ∀C ∈ ACTION :
¬⊕ Occ(C, t0,M)
n = 1 : ObsOccCount(n, t1,EW,M) ≡
∃A ∈ ACTION :
⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,EW,M) ∧
∀ t < t1 ∀B ∈ ACTION :
¬⊕ ObsOcc(B, t,EW,M)
n > 1 : ObsOccCount(n, t1,EW,M) ≡
∃A ∈ ACTION :
⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,EW,M) ∧
∃ t0 < t1 ∃B ∈ ACTION :
⊕ObsOcc(B, t0,EW,M) ∧
ObsOccCount(n− 1, t0,EW,M) ∧
∀ t ∈ 〈t0, t1〉 ∀C ∈ ACTION :
¬⊕ ObsOcc(C, t0,EW,M)
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3.6 Basic properties
In the previous section, we have defined predicates of AL, which we will use
(and have used in Section 3.4) to phrase properties. We need a number of
properties which describe requirements on the basic behaviour of the agent and
the world and the information transferral between them. In the proofs made for
this chapter, these properties are part of the premises of the proofs. By their
general nature, the basic properties will be needed in the proofs of many other
properties besides action successfulness. The properties can often be proved
directly from the semantics of the design specification. We won’t go into these
proofs here. Five classes of properties exist.
3.6.1 Properties concerning actions starting and ending
There are two basic demands made on the world regarding the action executions
starting and ending. These are that every start of an execution of action A has to
be followed by an end of such an execution, and that every end of an execution
of A may only appear when there has been an execution of A starting earlier.
END1 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 :
ActionExStarts(A, t1,EW,M) ⇒
∃t2 > t1 : ActionExEnds(A, t2,EW,M)
END2 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t2 :
ActionExEnds(A, t2,EW,M) ⇒
∃t1 < t2 : ActionExStarts(A, t1,EW,M)
Note that these properties don’t state that for every start of an action there is
a matching end. For example, these properties allow ten consecutive starts of
executions of A, followed by a single end. COORD0 does imply that there is
one matching end for every action starting.
3.6.2 Rationality properties
When the agent in the system satisfies the rationality properties presented in
this section, this means that it makes the right decisions to perform actions.
More specifically, there are three properties.
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RAT1 states that the agent will always decide to do an action when it ob-
serves an occasion for the action.
RAT1 :
∀M ∈ Traces(Ag) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 :
⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M) ⇒
∃t2 > t1 : ActionExStarts(A, t2,Ag,M)
We call the agent that always acts when it sees an occasion reactive, as we
stated before. RAT1 above formalises the reasoning behaviour of reactive agents.
But the agent could be more careful, and decide to do an action when it observes
an occasion for the action and it is not still busy with another action execution.
So, this more deliberative agent doesn’t simply decide to do an action whenever
it observes an occasion for it; only when earlier actions have been fully exe-
cuted, a new action can be started. For this class, we could formalise a variant
of RAT1.
We use different properties for formalising the reasoning of subclasses
of agents, because for different subclasses, there are different ways to prove
COORD0 (which states that action executions don’t overlap) and COORD5
(which states that actions are applicable at the time they start in the world). If
we know that the agent always acts when it has occasion for this, we need prop-
erties phrasing that the world doesn’t provide occasions too frequently. When
the agent has a different acting policy, different properties need to be phrased.
If the agent in the generic architecture is of the more deliberative type, then
less strict demands are needed on the dynamics of the world in order to guar-
antee COORD0 and COORD5. Summarising, we could say that if the agent is
more smart, the world can be more wild. If we wouldn’t create subclasses of
agents, then we would have to use the most strict demands on the dynamics of
the world in order to prove COORD0 and COORD5.
RAT2 states that when an agent decides to do an action it must have ob-
served an occasion. This excludes behaviour in which the agent randomly de-
cides to do things, which would certainly invalidate COORD0. RAT2 should
hold for all agents that are instantiations of the generic architecture; no sep-
arate property variants for subclasses of agents are needed here. This is the
formalisation of RAT2:
RAT2 :
∀M ∈ Traces(Ag) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t2 :
ActionExStarts(A, t2,Ag,M) ⇒
∃t1 < t2 : ⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M)
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RAT3 says that occasionality implies applicability. This last property is
necessary, because the agent could have wrong knowledge on when actions
are executable. For example, if the agent is a pedestrian walking in busy city
traffic, it may have the knowledge: ‘When the traffic light goes red, I decide
to perform the action of crossing the street’. So, in this system, an occasion
for the action of crossing the street is a red traffic light. But this is not at all
an applicable situation: in the situation that the traffic light is red, the action of
crossing the street will probably not be executed successfully. Assuming the
agent knows about the signals of traffic lights and their meaning, the agent is
not rational in its knowledge concerning occasions.
In contrast to the other two rationality properties, RAT3 is a property of
the world, as applicability and occasionality are notions defined in the context
of the world.
RAT3 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t :
Occ(A, t,M) ⇒
Appl(A, t,M)
3.6.3 Properties concerning facts and observations
The factual world information is assumed to be two-valued; this is laid down
in 2VAL, which we phrase in the detailed language TL instead of AL:
2VAL :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀ a ∈ groundatoms(world info) ∀t :
state(M, t, output(EW))  a ∨
state(M, t, output(EW))  ¬a
All factual world information will be observed, and all observed informa-
tion corresponds to world facts. To state this, there are properties OBS1 and
OBS2:
OBS1 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀ϕ ∈ SL(world info) ∀t1 :
⊕state(M, t1, output(EW))  ϕ ⇒
∃t2 ≥ t1 : ⊕state(M, t2, output(EW))  observation result(ϕ)
OBS2:
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀ϕ ∈ SL(world info) ∀t2 :
⊕state(M, t2, output(EW))  observation result(ϕ) ⇒
∃t1 ≤ t2 : ⊕state(M, t1, output(EW))  ϕ
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Things don’t happen without a reason in the world. In our generic architec-
ture, a change is always either the effect of an action or of an event. Property
CHANGE formalises this.
CHANGE :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀l ∈ groundliterals(world info) ∀t :
Happens(l, t,M) ⇒
(∃A ∈ ACTION : ActionEff(A, l, t,M) ∨
EventEff(l, t,M))
This property isn’t a demand on the world, as is usual with world proper-
ties. Instead, CHANGE follows easily from the definitions of ActionEff and
EventEff.
3.6.4 Properties of interaction
As can be seen in Figure 3.1, there is information transfer from the world to
the agent and from the agent to the world, respectively. This transferral of
information needs to function properly. This comes down to three demands:
∗ Information at the source must be present at the destination some time
later.
∗ Information at the destination must have been present at the source some
time earlier.
∗ Pieces of information do not overtake each other while being transferred.
We will formalise the first two demands for the two links in the generic
architecture that facilitate information transfer. This results in four properties.
The properties for no-overtaking in links are defined in the next subsection. We
start with the properties for information transfer from the world to the agent,
followed by the properties for information transfer from the agent to the world.
INT1 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) ∀ l ∈ AgInOnt ∀t1 :
⊕state(M, t1, output(EW))  l ⇒
∃t2 > t1 : ⊕state(M, t2, input(Ag))  l
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INT2 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) ∀ l ∈ AgInOnt ∀t2 :
⊕state(M, t2, input(Ag))  l ⇒
∃t1 < t2 : ⊕state(M, t1, output(EW))  l
INT3 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) ∀ l ∈ AgOutOnt ∀t1 :
⊕state(M, t1, output(Ag))  l ⇒
∃t2 > t1 : ⊕state(M, t2, input(EW))  l
INT4 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) ∀ l ∈ AgOutOnt ∀t2 :
⊕state(M, t2, input(EW))  l ⇒
∃t1 < t2 : ⊕state(M, t1, output(Ag))  l
These properties state that every literal put on a link at the source will arrive at
the destination some time later, at that every literal arriving at the destination
of the link was present at the source some time earlier.
Like the properties 2VAL, OBS1 and OBS2 in Section 3.6.3, the properties
above are phrased in TL, instead of in AL. The reason for this is that these
properties describe basic, very low-level behaviour features. Thus, the nature
of these properties fits better with the abstraction level of TL than with the level
of AL. Also, there seems to be no obvious manner to define AL notions in order
to simplify these properties.
In the phrasing of the interaction properties, we assume that only one in-
formation link arrives in the input interface of each system component. This
holds for the generic architecture at which we focus in this chapter, but other
system architectures exist which are different in this respect. For example, in
systems with multiple agents which all communicate with each other, a link
arrives in an agent’s input interface for each of its fellow agents. In systems
like these, information arriving in an input interface can come from different
sources, and thus part of the interaction properties will be structurally different
from the interaction properties given above. If we look at the properties given
here, and imagine that two information links arrive in the agent, this leads to
a modified property INT2, which states that information arriving in the agent
must have come either from the one source or from the other source. Property
INT1 would not be affected by the multiple links; we would use one property
like this for each link.
In the literature on file transmission, interaction properties like ours have
been formally studied. In [54, 115] knowledge-based transmission protocols
are presented that are proven to be correct with respect to these properties.
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3.6.5 No-overtaking properties
It is essential that pieces of information don’t overtake each other, neither in
links nor while being processed by a system component. We give four proper-
ties that phrase this no-overtaking restriction, for the two links of the generic
architecture, for the information processing of the agent and for the genera-
tion of observation results of occasions happening in the world. For this, we
use the notions for numbering the moments in time that information arrives in
interfaces of the agent and the world which we defined at the end of Section
3.5.
In the link properties below, we formally express that information that ar-
rives in an output interface at the moment numbered n should arrive in the
appropriate input interface at the corresponding moment numbered n, and vice
versa. Some time elapses between these moments, as information transferral
takes time. The first property formalises no-overtaking for the link from the
world to the agent, and the second property does the same for the link from the
agent to the world. In all properties in this subsection, n is a positive natural
number.
NOOV1 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) ∀ k ∈ groundliterals(AgInOnt) ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
[⊕state(M, t1, output(EW))  k ∧
OutputCount(n, t1,EW,M) ∧
InputCount(n, t2,Ag,M) ⇒
⊕state(M, t2, input(Ag))  k] ∧
[⊕state(M, t2, input(Ag))  k ∧
InputCount(n, t2,Ag,M) ∧
OutputCount(n, t1,EW,M) ⇒
⊕state(M, t1, output(EW))  k]
NOOV2 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) ∀ k ∈ groundliterals(AgOutOnt) ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
[⊕state(M, t1, output(Ag))  k ∧
OutputCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ∧
InputCount(n, t2,EW,M) ⇒
⊕state(M, t2, input(EW))  k] ∧
[⊕state(M, t2, input(EW))  k ∧
InputCount(n, t2,EW,M) ∧
OutputCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ⇒
⊕state(M, t1, output(Ag))  k]
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Now, it is impossible that pieces of information overtake each other in a link.
This can easily be explained. Suppose a literal k1 arrives in an output inter-
face at t1, and that the later literal k2 arrives there at t2, with t2 > t1. If we
have OutputCount(n1, t1, . . .) and OutputCount(n2, t2, . . .), then we know
that n2 > n1. Suppose t3 and t4 are the corresponding input moments for
the interface at the other side of the link, that is, InputCount(n1, t3, . . .) and
InputCount(n2, t4, . . .). Then the literals k1 and k2 arrive at t3 and t4, respec-
tively, according to the properties above. Because time t4 has a higher number
than t3, t4 is later than t3 and k2 arrives later than k1, as it should.
As with the properties for interaction in the previous subsection, we need
variants of these properties in case more links arrive in the input interface of a
system component. We don’t elaborate on this in this chapter.
We now give the no-overtaking property for the information processing of
the agent. For this property, we use the notions ObsOccCount(. . . ,Ag, . . .) and
ActionCount(. . . ,Ag, . . .) instead of InputCount(. . . ,Ag, . . .) and
OutputCount(. . . ,Ag, . . .), because not all information arriving in the input
of the agent has to lead to new conclusions, while links do transfer each new
bit of information that appears in the output interface at the start of the link. So,
it is possible that an observed occasion at InputCount(4, t1,Ag,M) leads to
the decision to do an action at OutputCount(2, t2,Ag,M), where t2 must still
be later than t1, of course. We have the following property:
NOOV3 :
∀M ∈ Traces(Ag) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
[⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M) ∧
ObsOccCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ∧
ActionCount(n, t2,Ag,M) ⇒
ActionExStarts(A, t2,Ag,M)] ∧
[ActionExStarts(A, t2,Ag,M) ∧
ActionCount(n, t2,Ag,M) ∧
ObsOccCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ⇒
⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M)]
Agents that satisfy this property must reason quick enough to prevent new in-
formation from being overwritten by even newer information before it is pro-
cessed. Suppose the agent doesn’t pay attention to incoming information dur-
ing the time it is reasoning. If there are two or more moments that new infor-
mation arrives in the agent’s input during the period that it is reasoning, then
the agent will process the new information in the next round of reasoning, and
the conclusions from both pieces of information will appear in the output of the
agent at the same time. Situations like this are excluded by NOOV3.
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Finally, we give the no-overtaking property for the generation of observed
occasions by the world. For this property, we make use of the notions
OccCount(. . . ,EW, . . .) and ObsOccCount(. . . ,EW, . . .):
NOOV4 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
[⊕Occ(A, t1,M) ∧
OccCount(n, t1,EW,M) ∧
ObsOccCount(n, t2,EW,M) ⇒
⊕ObsOcc(A, t2,EW,M)] ∧
[⊕ObsOcc(A, t2,EW,M) ∧
ObsOccCount(n, t2,EW,M) ∧
OccCount(n, t1,EW,M) ⇒
⊕Occ(A, t1,M)]
3.7 Proving COORD0
In this section, we will give a proof of COORD0:
COORD0 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) :
NoOverlappingInWorld(M) ∧
NoOverlappingInAgent(M)
As we hinted on earlier, the proof of COORD0 we present in this section is
suitable for a subclass of the generic architecture from Section 3.2. We prove
COORD0 for the subclass of systems with a reactive agent. We would have liked
this proof to be done once and for all, for all possible systems in the class. By
identifying a set of generic demands on the agent and a set of demands on the
world and giving a proof of COORD0 based on these demands, all that would
remain to be done when verifying COORD0 for some specific system is proving
that all demands on the specific world and agent are fulfilled. The reason that
we don’t give a totally generic proof for COORD0 is that there are different
kinds of agents (reactive, deliberative, . . . ). There is a conflict between finding
generic properties that are strong enough to prove COORD0 and weak enough
to allow as much dynamic interaction between agent and world as is possible,
considered the specific design of the agent. Therefore, we think it is better to
prove COORD0 for classes of systems with agents that are similar in the way
they make decisions.
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All reactive systems (which are systems having a reactive agent) are char-
acterised by a large mutual dependency between the agent and the world. The
world immediately reacts to information coming from the agent (that is, actions
to be performed) and the agent also immediately reacts to information coming
from the world (observation results, caused by actions or events). There are
no thresholds of deliberation in the world or the agent; as soon as the agent
sees an occasion for an action, it decides to perform the action, without fur-
ther consideration about past actions or its resources or other matters that could
cause postponement of the action. This is why we call such systems reactive:
there is as little reasoning as possible, observations directly imply actions to
be performed. The world basically works the same way: when an action to be
performed arrives in the world, the world simply starts execution of the action,
without checking whether there is still some other execution going on. In the
light of COORD0, systems like this are very fragile. As soon as there is one
event at an undesirable moment in time, COORD0 doesn’t hold anymore. The
behaviours of the world and the agent fit into each other like a zipper: each
relevant step on one side (an occasion arising, or a decision to do an action)
must be followed by exactly one appropriate step on the other side (a decision
to do an action, or an occasion arising for the next action).
As long as both parties only react to each other in some constrained way,
the no-overlapping of action executions can be guaranteed. The central feature
that all correctly working reactive systems have in common is that occasions
for actions are observable to the agent at exactly the right moments: they are
not allowed to happen too often or too little. Before the agent decides to do
its first action, there must have been exactly one observed occasion, namely
the one that led the agent to its decision to do the first action. And for every
two consecutive decisions to do actions, the agent must have observed exactly
one occasion at some moment in between, namely the occasion for the second
action of the pair. When these demands are fulfilled, there never is some un-
processed observed occasion left over that can lead to a to be performed-atom
at an undesirable moment.
But it is not only important that observations of occasions alternate exactly
with decisions to perform actions; it it also crucial that these occasions are
observed at the right time. When the agent observes an occasion for a new
action while it is still in the middle of an action execution, this may lead the
agent to deciding to do the new action before the current action execution has
ended. Non-overlapping of action executions can be guaranteed if the agent
only observes occasions while it is not executing any action. The agent only
observes an occasion when some time earlier an occasion has arisen in the
world. This means that the state of the world has changed, which is caused
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by an action or an event. So, effects of both events and actions have to be
constrained in their occurrence. In the properties we present in Subsection
3.7.1, we will forbid events during action executions, and demand that new
occasions caused by actions always happen at the end of action executions. To
explain the latter demand, if during an action execution one of the earlier action
effects of the action already leads to an occasion for some new action, the agent
may decide to do another action during the execution of the current one. By
demanding that during an action execution the agent only observes occasions
at the end of the execution, we prevent this.
We use induction to establish a proof of COORD0. The reason for using
induction is that induction allows you to focus on a slice of the time-line the
property applies to and to make strong assumptions regarding the validity of
the property during the rest of the time. In this case, we use induction over the
number of action executions. Focusing on the nth action execution, all exe-
cutions taking place earlier are assumed to be well behaved (that is, COORD0
holds for them). This is (part of) the induction hypothesis. In the induction
step, only the results for the nth execution have to be proved, assuming all ear-
lier executions are proper. Actually, we have an induction hypothesis which is
stronger then just non-overlapping for earlier executions; the hypothesis also
incorporates that occasions and actions alternate, as this is necessary to prove
non-overlapping.
In order to make the induction step, a number of properties of the agent and
of the world, respectively, are needed. They are used in the proof to make the
induction step, so they have conditions that state that earlier executions were
non-overlapping or that earlier occasions and actions alternate.
3.7.1 Properties needed for proving COORD0
Here, we present the properties needed to prove COORD0. They constitute
assumptions on the behaviour of the agent and the world.
First, there is a property describing the demand on agent behaviour in order
to guarantee non-overlapping. Informally, this property states:
‘When the agent decides to do action A at t1
and
the agent decides to do action B at a later time t2
and
occasions and actions alternate in the agent up to t1
then
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the agent must have observed an occasion for B between t1 and
t2.’
This means that the agent never decides to do an action without an observed
occasion, and that these occasions must be observed in between the decisions
to do actions. Formally:
ORDER1 :
∀M ∈ Traces(Ag) ∀A,B ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 ≥ t1 :
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M) ∧
ActionExStarts(B, t2,Ag,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1],M) ⇒
∃t3 ∈ [t1, t2〉 : ⊕ObsOcc(B, t3,Ag,M)
Next, we have a number of properties that phrase demands on the behaviour
of the world. Some properties describe the world behaving naturally; for ex-
ample, one property forbids the world to produce ‘wild’ ended-atoms, that are
not preceded by a matching to be performed-atom. Other properties constrain
the dynamics of the world. We start with the property we just mentioned:
‘When action A ends at t1 in the world
and
action B ends in the world later, at t2
and
action executions don’t overlap in the world up to t1
then
action B must have started in the world between t1 and t2’
And this is the formal form:
ORDER2 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A,B ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionExEnds(A, t1,EW,M) ∧
ActionExEnds(B, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t1],M) ⇒
∃t3 ∈ 〈t1, t2〉 : ActionExStarts(B, t3,EW,M)
The second world property demands that in the world at most one occasion
occurs preceding each action starting. This means that when there is an action
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execution at some moment, which doesn’t yield effects that cause an occasion
for a new action to occur, at most one event is allowed to take place that does
lead to an occasion before the next action. And in case the earlier action execu-
tion gives rise to a new occasion, no events leading to other occasions should
take place. This is the informal form of ORDER3:
‘When action executions don’t overlap in the world until t1
then
there are not too many occasions occurring in the world up to t1.’
The formalisation of this property is:
ORDER3 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀t1 :
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t1〉,M) ⇒
NotTooManyOccs([0, t1],M)
The next world property forbids events happening during action executions.
As we explained in the informal account of the properties needed at the start of
this section, it is not only important not to have too many occasions happening
(ORDER3), but also that these occasions don’t happen during action executions,
as the agent could then decide to do another action before the current execution
is over. Properties ORDER4 and ORDER5 relate to this. As occasions arise as
a consequence of either an action or of an event, we have to make demands
regarding both events and actions, as we do in ORDER4 and ORDER5, respec-
tively.
Informally, this is ORDER4:
‘When there is an action execution in the world from t1 to t2
and
action executions don’t overlap until t1
then
no events happen during the action execution.’
Formally:
ORDER4 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t1〉,M) ⇒
NoEventsDuring([t1, t2〉,M)
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Note that we have another property forbidding events during action executions,
namely COORD3. COORD3 is not usable for proving COORD0, as one of the
conditions of COORD3 is that there is no overlapping of action executions in
the world, and this is (half of) COORD0.
The last property we need for proving COORD0 states that occasions that
happen during action executions and which are caused by actions always be-
come observed at the same time an action execution ends. This implies that
when during an action execution the agent observes an occasion, this is either
at the end of this execution, or at the end of another execution which is over-
lapping with the current execution. During the proof of COORD0, the second
case will be excluded. This is the informal form of ORDER5:
‘When there is an action execution in the world from t1 to t2
and
action executions don’t overlap in the world until t1
and
occasions and actions alternate up to t1
and
no events happen during the action execution
and
an occasion becomes observable in the world at a moment t3
during the execution
then
there is an action execution ending at t3.’
And this is the formal form of this property:
ORDER5 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A,B ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 ∀t3 ∈ [t1, t2〉 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t1〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t1],M) ∧
NoEventsDuring([t1, t2〉,M) ∧
⊕ObsOcc(B, t3,EW,M) ⇒
∃C ∈ ACTION : ActionExEnds(C, t3,EW,M)
This property is rather complex, so we will provide some more explanation.
The property focuses on the execution of A from t1 to t2, and assumes that the
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induction hypothesis (that action executions don’t overlap and occasions and
actions alternate) holds for the period before the action execution. Also, the
property has a condition that no events take place during the execution. Now, if
an occasion for action B becomes observable in the world during the execution,
the occasion that caused the observation must also have happened during the
execution of A. This is so because
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t1],M)makes it impossible that this
occasion takes place before t1, as the occasions for all preceding actions as well
as for A itself already happened before t1, alternating with the beginnings of
the actions. As the occasion takes place during the execution of A, it must be
the effect of an action, because no events take place during the execution. Now,
the demand that ORDER5 makes is that the effects of this action (the occasion
for B) always become observable at the end of the action execution.
3.7.2 The proof of COORD0
As explained before, we do the proof of COORD0 by induction on the number
of action executions. Actually, we prove a theorem which is stronger than
COORD0: we load the induction. We use an induction hypothesis which states
that action executions don’t overlap until the beginning of the nth execution,
and that occasions and actions alternate until this same moment, and in the
induction step we prove that this hypothesis also holds until the start of the
n+1th execution.
The proof is illustrated in various figures throughout the rest of this subsec-
tion. We start the proof by repeating COORD0:
∀M ∈ Traces(S) :
NoOverlappingInWorld(M) ∧
NoOverlappingInAgent(M)
In order to prove this, we use the following induction hypothesis:
IH :
NoOverlappingInAgent([0, t1〉,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t2〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t2〉,M)
Here, t1 and t2 are the moments in time at which the nth action execution
begins in the agent and in the world, respectively. We now start the proof.
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Take a trace M of S. The induction basis is the case n = 0; we want to
prove that until the start of the first action all is well.
Suppose the first action execution starts at time t1 with the appearance of a
to be performed(A)-atom in the output interface of the agent. No other tbp-
atoms have occurred before this in the output interface of the agent. The atom
to be performed(A) is transferred by a link to the world, where it arrives some
time later, at t2 (INT3). Our aim now is to prove:
NoOverlappingInAgent([0, t1〉,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t2〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t2〉,M)
In order to prove the first part of this, we have to show that there are no other
tbp-atoms occurring in the world before t2 and that there are no ended-atoms
before the start of A, neither in the agent nor in the world. We start with ex-
cluding extra tbp-atoms in the world. Suppose that at t3 < t2 the atom tbp(B)
arrives in the world. According to INT4, this means that at an earlier time
t4 < t3 the agent decides to do B. Now, as tbp(B) arrives in the world before
tbp(A) and we have the no-overtaking property NOOV2, we derive that the agent
must have decided to do B before it decided to so A. This contradicts with the
fact that A is the first execution starting in the agent. So, A starting at t2 is the
first action in the world.
Now, we will exclude the occurrence of ended-atoms prior to the start of A.
Suppose that at t3 < t2 the atom ended(B) appears in the output of the world.
Property END2 gives us that action B must have started at an earlier time point
t4 < t3. But this yields a contradiction, because we have just proven that no
other executions start in the world prior to the start of A at t2. Now, suppose
that there is an ended-atom arriving in the agent before t1. This atom must
have come from the world (INT2), which is impossible because we have just
shown that the world doesn’t produce any ended-atoms prior to t2.
We now only have to show that occasions and actions alternate until t1 and
t2, respectively. This means that each action that starts before t1 in the agent or
t2 in the world is preceded by its occasion, and no other occasions take place
in this time interval. This is trivial, as no actions start prior to t1 and t2.
This finished the proof of the induction basis. We now assume the induction
hypothesis:
IH :
NoOverlappingInAgent([0, t1〉,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t2〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t2〉,M)
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and proceed to the induction step. Assuming that the induction hypothesis
holds until the start of the nth execution, we show that we can extend its validity
to the beginning of the n+1th execution, or (if there is no next execution) to
the end of the trace.
We depict the situation in Figure 3.6. We focus on the nth execution, of
action A, which starts at t1 in the agent and at t2 in the world. Every start of an
execution is followed by its end (END1); suppose the first ended(A) following
tbp(A) happens at t3. This ended-atom arrives in the agent some time later, at
t4 (INT1). In case n > 1, there is a preceding execution, which is also shown
in the figure, and which starts in the agent at v1 and in the world at v2, and
ends in the world at v3 and in the agent at v4. In case n = 1, there is no earlier
action execution; we take v1 = v2 = v3 = v4 = 0, in order to avoid certain
case distinctions in the proof. The start of the (possible) n+1th execution takes
place at u1 in the agent and u2 in the world. If the nth execution was the last
one in the trace, we take u1 and u2 equal to the time the trace ends, or (if the
trace is infinite) to ∞.
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v3 t2
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Figure 3.6: Present situation
We now can distinguish six remaining parts to the proof:
O: Prove that occasions and actions alternate in the agent and the world, until
u1 and u2, respectively.
I: Prove that there are no unwanted ended-atoms during the execution of A in
the world.
II: Prove that there are no unwanted ended-atoms during the execution of A in
the agent.
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III: Prove that there are no unwanted tbp-atoms during the execution of A in
the agent.
IV: Prove that there are no unwanted tbp-atoms during the execution of A in
the world.
V: Prove that between the end of the execution of A and the start of the n+1th
execution no unwanted tbp-atoms and ended-atoms occur.
We start with part O. The IH gives us that
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t2〉,M),
and we now have to show that
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, u1〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, u2〉,M).
At this point in the proof, we will only extend the interval where occasions and
actions alternate from [0, t1〉 and [0, t2〉 to [0, t1] and [0, t2], respectively. This
slight extension of the interval turns out to be the larger part of the proof of part
O. Later on, we extend the intervals to [0, u1〉 and [0, u2〉 quite effortlessly.
The agent must have had a reason to decide to do A at t1 (RAT2); we thus
have that there is a t5 < t1 such that ⊕ObsOcc(A, t5,Ag,M). This infor-
mation comes from the world; INT2 gives us that there is a t6 < t5 such
that ⊕ObsOcc(A, t6,EW,M). As observations must have been facts earlier
(OBS2), we have a t7 ≤ t6 such that ⊕Occ(A, t7,M). Because of the induc-
tion hypothesis, we know that NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t2〉,M). We use
ORDER3 to conclude that NotTooManyOccs([0, t2],M). Note that a trace of
the whole system S always contains a trace of EW, which is why ORDER3 is ap-
plicable toM. We now discern two cases, depending on whether the execution
of A is the first (this is so when n = 1) or not.
In case n = 1, we look at A being the first action. In this case, we have 0 ≤
t7 < t1 < t2. When we look at the meaning of NotTooManyOccs([0, t2],M)
as defined in Section 3.5, the first part of the definition states that before the
first action in the world, at most one occasion occurs. So, the occurrence of
an occasion for A at t7 implies that no other occasions happen before t2. We
conclude that there is exactly one occasion preceding the first action in the
world; we have proven OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t2],M).
Now, we will show OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1],M).
This part of the proof is illustrated in Figure 3.7. We already have that the
agent observes the occasion for A at t5 < t1. Suppose the agent observes an-
other occasion for some action B at time t8 < t1: ⊕ObsOcc(B, t8,Ag,M).
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Figure 3.7: Occasions and actions in the agent
In case A = B, we have that t8 6= t5, as otherwise there is only one ob-
served occasion (then, both observed occasions coincide). The observation
of the occasion for B comes from the world (INT2), so we have a t9 < t8
with ⊕ObsOcc(B, t9,EW,M), and in the world there must have been an oc-
casion earlier (OBS2), say at t10 ≤ t9, that gave rise to the observation. As
t10 ≤ t9 < t8 < t1 < t2, we now seem to have two occasions occurring
before t2, one for A at t7 and one for B at t10. But as we just proved that
there is only one occasion preceding the first action in the world, this is im-
possible. So, we conclude that t10 = t7 and A = B. As we now have that
A = B, we know that t8 6= t5, as otherwise the agent observes only one oc-
casion. Now, we have one occasion in the world giving rise to two occasions
being observed by the agent. We use the no-overtaking properties to show that
this is not possible. First, we use NOOV1. As there are two distinct moments,
t8 and t5, that the agent observes an occasion for A, the second part of NOOV1
gives us that the corresponding moments that the occasions became observ-
able in the output interface of the world are also distinct (as different moments
are numbered differently when counted). So, t9 6= t6. Now, we use the sec-
ond part of NOOV4, which gives us that when there are distinct (differently
numbered) observed occasions in the output interface of the world, the occa-
sions leading to these observations are also (differently numbered, and thus)
distinct. We then have t10 6= t7, which contradicts with our earlier conclusion
that t10 = t7. Therefore, our initial assumption that the agent observes another
occasion for some action B at time t8 < t1 is false, and thus the agent only ob-
serves one occasion prior to t1, namely the occasion for A at t5. We conclude
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1],M).
We now come to the second case, which is that n > 1 and A isn’t the first
action execution in the system. Recall that we have that at t5 < t1 the agent
observes the occasion for A: ⊕ObsOcc(A, t5,Ag,M), and that at t7 < t5 the
occasion happens in the world: ⊕Occ(A, t7,M). Reactive agents immediately
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decide to do an action whenever they observe an occasion. We have the no-
overtaking property NOOV3, which implies that two agent decisions must have
had two (observed) occasions, where the occasion of the first decision precedes
that of the second. So, the agent must have observed the occasion for A later
than it observed the occasion for the n−1th action, as the n−1th action precedes
A. This implies (NOOV1) that the observation of the occasion for A occurred
in the output interface of the world later than the observation of the occasion
for the n−1th action did, and thus also that the occasion for A occurring at t7
in the world takes place after the occasion that led to the n−1th action execu-
tion (NOOV4). As we have OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t2〉,M)
(IH), we know that the occasion for the n−1th action arose between the start of
the n−2th action (inclusive) and the start of the n−1th action (exclusive) and
that there are no other occasions in this time span. This means that the occasion
for A arose at or after the start of the n−1th action; t7 ∈ [v2, t2〉. So, there is
at least one occasion taking place during the interval [v2, t2〉. Now, we need to
show ⊕Occ(A, t7,M) is the only occasion happening in this interval. This is
easy; it follows from NotTooManyOccs([0, t2],M), which we derived before
we made the case distinction. The second part of the meaning of this formula
allows us to conclude that between the start of the n−1th execution at v2 and
the start of A at t2, only one occasion takes place, namely the occasion for A.
We now have shown that OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t2],M).
Finally, we show that the agent observes only one occasion between v1 and
t1. We already have that ⊕ObsOcc(A, t5, Ag,M), with v1 < v2 ≤ t7 < t5 <
t1, so we have to show that this is the only one. We reason along the same lines
as we did in the case n = 1, when we showed that the agent observes only one
occasion prior to the first action, so we will be brief here. In case there are two
observed occasions in the interval [v1, t1〉, there would also be two occasions
occurring in the world, giving rise to the observed occasions (because of the no-
overtaking properties NOOV1 and NOOV4). Because the agent observes both
these occasions after it observed the occasion for the n−1th action, the factual
occasions have to take place after the occasion for the n−1th action. Because we
have our earlier conclusion OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t2],M),
we can derive that both of these occasions happen in the interval [v2, t2〉, be-
tween the start of the n−1th action and the start of the nth action, which is
impossible because only one occasion is allowed in this interval. So, we have
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1],M).
Note that we are not finished with part O yet; we need to prove that occa-
sions and actions alternate until u1 and u2 respectively, and now we have only
reached t1 and t2. We come back to part O later on, after we proved parts I to
V, because the rest of part O follows easily then.
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We proceed to part I, which is proving that there are no unwanted ended-
atoms during the execution of A in the world. Suppose there is such an ended-
atom disturbing the execution in the world. We want to derive a contradiction
in order to exclude this. Suppose that at t5, with t2 ≤ t5 ≤ t3, ended(B) is
derived in the world. As ended(A) at t3 is the first ended(A) following the
tbp(A) at t2, we know that B 6= A. Further suppose that t5 is the first time that
the execution of A is disturbed by an ended-atom. We discern two cases, n = 1
and n > 1.
In case n = 1, A is the first action taking place, which is disturbed by
ended(B) at t5. We use END2 to conclude there is a t6 < t5 such that tbp(B)
arrives in the world.
In case n > 1, there are other actions preceding A. We will use ORDER2
now:
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A,B ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionExEnds(A, t1,EW,M) ∧
ActionExEnds(B, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t1],M) ⇒
∃t3 ∈ 〈t1, t2〉 : ActionExStarts(B, t3,EW,M)
Time point t1 in this property is matched with v3, the time the n−1th execution
ends in the world. We substitute t5 for t2. As the IH gives us that
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t2〉,M), we also have that
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, v3],M). Then, the property allows us to con-
clude that there must have been a moment t6, with v3 < t6 < t5, at which an
execution of B starts in the world.
The two cases come together again. Recall that we assume v1 = v2 = v3 =
v4 = 0 when n = 1. In both cases (n = 1 and n > 1) it is impossible that t6 <
t2, because we know that action executions take place in an orderly manner
(that is, no overlapping) before t2, and so if B starts between v3 and t2, it must
end before t2, and making the execution of A the n+1th execution instead of
the nth. Thus, t2 ≤ t6 < t5. Figure 3.8 illustrates this part of the proof. The
tbp(B) at t6 comes from the agent (INT4). Because there is no overlapping of
action executions before t1 (IH) and thus there are no actions starting between
v4 and t1, the agent must have derived tbp(B) at t7, with t1 ≤ t7. Because
t7 < t6 < t5 ≤ t3 < t4, we know t7 < t4. So, we now have a disturbing
tbp-atom in the agent at t7. ORDER1 is a property about disturbing tbp-atoms:
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Figure 3.8: Excluding ended-atoms during A in the world
∀M ∈ Traces(Ag) ∀A,B ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 ≥ t1 :
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M) ∧
ActionExStarts(B, t2,Ag,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1],M) ⇒
∃t3 ∈ [t1, t2〉 : ⊕ObsOcc(B, t3,Ag,M)
We match t1 in this property with t1 in the figure, and we match t2 in the prop-
erty with t7 in the figure. We proved
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1],M) in part O, so we are right-
fully concluding that there is a t8 with t1 ≤ t8 < t7 such that the agent observes
an occasion for B at t8. Note that this already excludes that t7 = t1. Obser-
vations come from the world (INT2), so there must have been a t9 < t8 such
that ⊕ObsOcc(B, t9,EW,M), and observations were facts (OBS2), so there is
a t10 ≤ t9 with ⊕Occ(B, t10,M). Because in part O we proved that
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t2],M) it can’t be that t10 < t2.
We thus have t2 ≤ t10 ≤ t9 < t8 < t7 < t6 < t5 ≤ t3, so t2 ≤ t10 < t3. As
there is an occasion occurring at t10, this must be the effect of either an event
or an action (CHANGE). Now, we use ORDER4:
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t1〉,M) ⇒
NoEventsDuring([t1, t2〉,M)
We substitute t2 for t1 and t3 for t2 in the property. The NoOverlapping con-
dition is fulfilled because of the IH. Thus, we conclude that no events happen
in [t2, t3〉. Consequently, the occasion at t10 must be an action effect. Now we
use ORDER5:
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∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A,B ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 ∀t3 ∈ [t1, t2〉 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t1〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t1],M) ∧
NoEventsDuring([t1, t2〉,M) ∧
⊕ObsOcc(B, t3,EW,M) ⇒
∃C ∈ ACTION : ActionExEnds(C, t3,EW,M)
Again, we substitute t2 for t1 and t3 for t2. The NoOverlapping condition is
fulfilled, and we have just concluded that NoEventsDuring([t2, t3〉,M). We
substitute t9 for t3, and conclude that there is an action C such that
ActionExEnds(C, t9,EW,M). But t9 < t5, which contradicts our initial
assumption that t5 was the first time that the execution of A was disturbed by
an ended-atom. We finish part I by concluding that no other actions end during
the execution of A in the world.
Now, we arrive at part II, proving that there are no unwanted ended-atoms
during the execution of A in the agent. Suppose that this is not true, so suppose
there is a t5 with t1 ≤ t5 ≤ t4 such that there arrives a disturbing ended(B)
in the agent. In case t5 = t4, we have B 6= A. This ended(B) comes from the
world (INT2), so there must have been a t6 < t5 such that B ends in the world.
The situation is depicted in the following figure:
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Figure 3.9: Excluding ended-atoms during A in the agent
In the agent, ended(B) happens between the ended-atom designating the end
of the n−1th action execution and ended(A). So, because of the no-overtaking
property NOOV1 this must also be the case in the world. There are two possibil-
ities for t6: t6 lies between the end of the n−1th action execution and t2 (v3 <
t6 < t2) or t6 is during the execution of A (t2 ≤ t6 ≤ t3). The first possibility
is impossible because the IH gives us NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t2〉,M),
and thus no tbp-atoms or ended-atoms occur between v3 and t2, and the sec-
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Figure 3.10: Excluding tbp-atoms during A in the agent
ond possibility is excluded because we just proved, in part I, that there are no
ended-atoms disturbing the n+1th execution in the world.
Part III is next. Here, we have to prove there are no unwanted tbp-atoms
during the execution of A in the agent. Suppose there is a disturbing tbp(B)-
atom at t5 with t1 ≤ t5 ≤ t4, with B 6= A in case t5 = t1. As the next
part of the proof is analogous to the last part of the proof of part I, we will
proceed somewhat sloppily. We picture this part of the proof in Figure 3.10.
We use ORDER1 to conclude that there is a t6 with t1 ≤ t6 < t5 such that
⊕ObsOcc(B, t6,Ag,M). This observation comes from the world: at a t7 < t6
we have ⊕ObsOcc(B, t7,EW,M) and at a t8 ≤ t7 we have ⊕Occ(B, t8,M).
Because occasions and actions alternate up to t2, we have t8 ≥ t2. Because
there are no events during the execution of A in the world (ORDER4), we can
use ORDER5 to conclude that there must be an action ending at t7, and thus
also in the agent at t6. As t1 < t2 ≤ t8 ≤ t7 < t6 < t5 ≤ t4, we now have an
ended-atom disturbing an execution in the agent, which we proved impossible
in part II.
We now are at part IV, in which we show there are no unwanted tbp-atoms
during the execution of A in the world. Suppose there is a disturbing tbp(B)-
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Figure 3.11: Excluding tbp-atoms during A in the world
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atom occurring at t5, with t2 ≤ t5 ≤ t3 and B 6= A in case t5 = t2 The
situation is depicted in Figure 3.11. The tbp(B)-atom must have come from
the agent (INT4), so tbp(B) became true at t6 with t6 < t5. The IH gives
us that NoOverlappingInAgent([0, t1〉,M), and so no tbp-atoms or ended-
atoms occur between v4 and t1. Thus, we know t6 ≥ t1. Furthermore, we
know t6 < t5 ≤ t3 < t4, so t6 < t4. But then, tbp(B) happens during the nth
execution in the agent, and in part III we proved this to be impossible.
So, we have showed that the nth execution is not disturbed by anything; we
have
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t3],M) ∧
NoOverlappingInAgent([0, t4],M)
We proceed with part V, in which we prove that between the end of the exe-
cution of A and the start of the n+1th execution no unwanted tbp-atoms and
ended-atoms occur. In other words, we extend the intervals where there is no
overlapping of action executions to [0, u2〉 and [0, u1〉, respectively. In case
there is no n+1th action execution, we extend the interval up to the end of the
trace.
So, at time u1 > t4 the n+1th action starts in the agent. No other tbp-
atoms occur in the agent in the interval 〈t4, u1〉. The tbp-atom is transferred to
the world and it arrives there at u2 > u1 (INT3). We now have to show that:
A: There are no other tbp-atoms occurring in the world between t3 and u2.
B: There are no ended-atoms occurring in the world between t3 and u2.
C: There are no ended-atoms occurring in the agent between t4 and u1.
We start with A. In Figure 3.12, we depict the situation. Some aspects of
the picture relate to proof steps we will make soon.
Suppose there is a tbp-atom (say, tbp(B) ) becoming true in the world during
〈t3, u2〉, then this atom must have become true some time earlier in the agent
(INT4), but after the nth tbp-atom (which is tbp(A)) was derived (NOOV2).
Two potentially possible moments are shown in Figure 3.12. Because the nth
action execution is living up to COORD0, as we proved in the part I to IV, it
is impossible that tbp(B) happens during the nth execution. And tbp(B) cannot
have happened after the end of the nth execution but before u1, because we
posited that the tbp-atom at u1 is the first action start following t4. So, we
conclude that there are no tbp-atoms arriving during 〈t3, u2〉 and the execution
starting at u2 in the world is the first action beginning since t2.
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Figure 3.12: Excluding actions starting between the nth and n+1th execution
Part B is next. Suppose that action B ends in the world at time t5 ∈ 〈t3, u2〉.
We now have two consecutive endings of actions, namely A at time t3 and B at
t5. We use ORDER2, which states:
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A,B ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionExEnds(A, t1,EW,M) ∧
ActionExEnds(B, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t1],M) ⇒
∃t3 ∈ 〈t1, t2〉 : ActionExStarts(B, t3,EW,M)
We instantiate t1 from the property with t3 and t2 from ORDER2 with t5. The
NoOverlapping condition is fulfilled, as we concluded after finishing part IV.
Then, the conclusion of ORDER2 yields that there must have been an execution
of B starting at some time between t3 and t5. This contradicts the fact that no
tbp-atoms arrive in the world between t3 and u2 which we proved at A.
We turn to part C, which is showing that there are no ended-atoms arriving
in the agent during 〈t4, u1〉. Suppose ended(B) becomes true in the input of
the agent at t5 ∈ 〈t4, u1〉. This atom comes from the world (INT2), where
ended(B) occurred at a moment t6 < t5 < u1 < u2. As ended(B) follows
ended(A) at t4, the no-overtaking property NOOV1 gives us that t6 > t3. But
now we have an action ending at t6 ∈ 〈t3, u2〉, which we proved impossible in
B.
As no unwanted tbp-atoms or ended-atoms occur between the end of the
nth execution and the beginning of the n+1th execution, we have shown that
there is no overlapping of action executions until the start of the n+1th execu-
tion. We have finished part V, and we now established:
NoOverlappingInAgent([0, u1〉,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, u2〉,M)
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To close the proof, we return to part O. We already proved
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1],M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t2],M)
We can simply extend these properties until u1 and u2, respectively, because
no other action executions start until these moments in the agent or the world,
respectively. This means that there are no new pairs of consecutive actions
starting in the prolonged interval [0, u1〉 and [0, u2〉, and that we thus have con-
sidered all consecutive action beginnings in this interval in our earlier account
of part O. We now have proven:
NoOverlappingInAgent([0, u1〉,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, u2〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, u1〉,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, u2〉,M)
which is the induction hypothesis holding until the start of the n+1th action
execution (or the end of the trace). Induction then gives us that the above
properties hold indefinitely, which implies that COORD0 is valid.
3.8 Proving COORD5
COORD5 states that whenever an execution of an action starts in the world, the
action is applicable. This is a valuable property, as actions will not yield the
desired effects if they’re not applicable. We repeat COORD5 here:
COORD5 :
∀M ∈ Traces(S) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ⇒
Appl(A, t1,M)
Like COORD0, COORD5 is a system property that only holds when both the
agent and the world behave properly. Again, the details of proving COORD5
depend on the nature on the agent. In this chapter, as stated earlier, we focus at
reactive agents.
Before we present the properties, we give a first sketch of the proof. When
an action starts in the world, as the condition of COORD5 states, this is caused
by the agent earlier observing an occasion. As observations always are true,
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we know that the action must have been occasional, and thus applicable, earlier
on. We demand that neither events nor action effects can take place that disturb
this applicability, and thus the action is still applicable at the time the execution
starts. Perhaps surprisingly, we only need demands on the world behaviour to
prove that neither events nor action effects disrupt applicability. The reason for
this lies in the reactive nature of the agent; the agent can’t help deciding that
it will do an action when it sees an occasion. If we want to prevent the agent
from disrupting applicability of an action A by doing other interfering actions
before A starts, then we have to constrain the generation of occasions in the
world, such that the agent won’t decide to do these disturbing actions.
The ORDER properties we introduced in the previous section already con-
strain the dynamics of the world considerably. In the first subsection, we
will present two additional properties of the world which we need for prov-
ing COORD5. As always with properties of the world (and of the agent), we
won’t try to prove these properties from yet other properties, but regard them
as demands on the dynamics of the world. In the second subsection, we present
the proof of COORD5.
3.8.1 Properties needed for proving COORD5
The additional properties we need for proving COORD5 are named PROPER1
and
PROPER2, as they are needed to prove that the state of the world will be proper
for action execution whenever an action starts.
In the world, events can take place that change the state of the world, can-
celling applicability of actions. We will forbid events like this taking place dur-
ing critical time spans in property PROPER1. Informally, this property states:
‘When an action execution starts in the world at t1
and
action executions don’t overlap in the world
and
the most recent time that an occasion for the action arose is at t2
and
the most recent time that the action became applicable is at t3
and
at some moment after t2 and t3 but before t1 the action becomes
not applicable
then
there were no events at that moment.’
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Both at t2 and t3, the action is applicable, because occasionality implies appli-
cability. We need to take into account both these moments in order to keep the
time frame where we forbid events as small as possible. For the same reason,
we only forbid events at those times where applicability is indeed disturbed.
This is the formalisation of PROPER1 where max(t1, t2) is the maximum of t1
and t2:
PROPER1 :
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 < t1
∀t3 < t1 ∀t ∈ 〈max(t2, t3), t1] :
ActionExStarts(A, t1,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld ∧
−⊗t1, t2⊕Occ(A, t2,M) ∧
−⊗t1, t3⊕Appl(A, t3,M) ∧
⊕¬Appl(A, t,M) ⇒
NoEventsDuring([t, t],M)
This property stipulates that when action A suddenly becomes not applicable,
this can’t be due to events, as these never happen at these moments.
We need another world property, that formalises that all effects of an action
happen at the same time. The reason for introducing this property is that when
an action has multiple effects at different moments during the execution, a later
effect can nullify an earlier effect. And if the earlier effect caused an occasion
for a new action, then the agent will decide to do the new action, which can
turn out to be not applicable, if the later effect creates a world state in which
the new action is not properly executable.
Informally, this is PROPER2:
‘When there is an action execution in the world
and
action executions don’t overlap in the world
and
there are two action effects during this execution
then
they happen simultaneously. ’
And this is the formal form:
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PROPER2
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀ l, k ∈ groundliterals(world info)
∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 ∀t3, t4 ∈ 〈t1, t2] :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld ∧
ActionEff(A, l, t3,M) ∧
ActionEff(A, k, t4,M) ⇒
t3 = t4
3.8.2 The proof of COORD5
The following proof is illustrated in Figure 3.13. We have to prove:
∀M ∈ Traces(S) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ⇒
Appl(A, t1,M)
In order to do this, we take an arbitrary trace M of S, an action A and time
points t1, t2 such that ActionEx(A, t1, t2,A,M). This implies that
⊕state(M, t1, input(EW)))  to be performed(A), which is also written as
ActionExStarts(A, t1,EW,M). By INT4, we know that to be performed(A)
became true in the output interface of the agent earlier, at t3 < t1; in case there
are more candidates for t3, we take the latest moment. RAT2 gives us that the
agent must have observed an occasion some time earlier, at t4 < t3, where we
take the latest t4 possible in case there are several observed occasions for A
prior to t3. This observation comes from the world; by INT2, we deduce that
at some earlier time point there was an occasion for A observed in the world.
By OBS2, the observation must correspond to an earlier fact. So, we have that
at t5 < t4, ⊕Occ(A, t5,M). We again choose t5 as late as possible. Figure
3.13 shows the situation. Because occasionality implies applicability (RAT3),
we have Appl(A, t5,M).
Changes can take place in the world situation between t5 and t1, mak-
ing A no longer applicable. These changes will do no harm when later on,
but earlier than t1, there are again changes that make A applicable again. In
case disrupting changes occur, they shouldn’t happen anymore after the last
time the action becomes applicable before t1. Say we have t6 < t1 with
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Figure 3.13: Sketch of the situation
−⊗ t1, t6⊕Appl(A, t6,M). If no changes affecting applicability take place
after t5, it could be that t6 is earlier than t5. In this case, we want to exclude
disrupting changes from t5, as we know that A was applicable at t5. We take
t7 = max(t5, t6); we have t5 ≤ t7 < t1, and Appl(A, t7,M).
In the induction proof of COORD0 we have also proven that
OccsAndActionsAlternateInWorld([0, t],M), for each trace M and time
point t. As a consequence of this, and of the way we chose t3, t4 and t5 to be
as close to t1 as possible, no other actions can start between t5 and t1, and no
other occasions can arise in this period.
Now, suppose there is a moment t8 ∈ 〈t7, t1] such that ¬appl(A) becomes
true. At least one ground literal of world info must have changed truth value to
true then. Take one such literal and call it k. We thus have Happens(k, t8,M).
Now, we use CHANGE to conclude that k either is an action effect or an event
effect. We thus have two cases.
The second case, that k is an event effect, isn’t possible, as easily follows
from PROPER1. We instantiate t1 of PROPER1 with our present t1, t2 with
t5 and t3 with t6. Then, the interval 〈max(t2, t3), t1] is interval 〈t7, t1] in the
figure. We instantiate t with t8. The NoOverlapping-condition is fulfilled
because we have COORD0, and the other conditions are fulfilled by the way we
instantiated the variables. We then conclude NoEventsDuring([t8, t8],M),
which means that k can’t be an EventEffect.
We now look at the first case, which is that k is an action effect. We have
∃B ∈ ACTION : ActionEff(A, k, t8,M). This means that k is enclosed
within a tbp(B)–end(B) pair, with ended(B) becoming true at t9 ≥ t8. Ac-
tion B must have started before t8. In the figure, we show two options for this
moment, namely t10 > t5 and t10 ≤ t5. But it is impossible that B begins
after t5, as earlier we showed that no other actions start between t5 and t1. So,
B begins before or at the same time the occasion for A arises. Now, ORDER4,
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from the previous section, is used:
∀M ∈ Traces(EW) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 :
ActionEx(A, t1, t2,EW,M) ∧
NoOverlappingInWorld([0, t1〉,M) ⇒
NoEventsDuring([t1, t2〉,M)
We substitute B for A in the property, t10 for t1 and t9 for t2. The
NoOverlapping condition is fulfilled because COORD0 is valid. Then, we
can conclude that no events take place during the execution of B. But then the
occasion for A arising at t5 must be an effect of the action B! Using PROPER2,
that states that two action effect of one action happen at the same time, we can
conclude that t8 = t5. As t8 ∈ 〈t7, t1] and t7 ≥ t5, we can also conclude
t8 > t5, and we have a contradiction. This means that k can’t be an action
effect either.
As both cases are impossible, our initial assumption that there was a mo-
ment t8 ∈ 〈t7, t1] such that ⊕¬Appl(A, t8,M), was false. This means that
appl(A) continues to hold and still holds at t1: Appl(A, t1,M).
3.9 Verifying an instance of the class: the Mouse
This section is a bird’s-eye view on applying the system of coordination proper-
ties to a specific system. Now that we presented the generic system of coordina-
tion properties and the proof of action successfulness using these properties, we
will sketch how these generic results can be used to guarantee action success-
fulness for a concrete instantiation of the generic architecture. For the concrete
system, we turn to our running example of the artificial mouse. In order to use
the system of coordination properties, we need to fill in the system-dependent
details. Next, the agent- and world properties of the system of coordination
properties must be shown to hold for the mouse system. The generic proofs
(of COORD0, COORD5 and COORD1) don’t need any adjustment; they are valid
proofs for each instantiation of the generic architecture (provided that the agent
is reactive, for the proof of COORD0 and COORD5). When indeed all properties
of the agent and the world (and the interaction between them) mentioned in this
chapter hold, then action successfulness holds for the mouse system.
The first thing that needs to be done when using the generic properties and
proofs is instantiating the domain-dependent features. The generic architecture
as described in Section 3.2 has several ontologies which are (partly) domain-
dependent. The ontology world info is left totally unspecified in the generic
architecture, and when verifying the mouse system, we need to instantiate this
136
ontology with the information structures used in the mouse system. We already
explained in Section 3.2 that world info for the mouse system provides ground
atoms of the form at position(O,P ), where O is one of mouse, food and screen
and P is one of p0, p1 and p2. The ontologies actions to be performed and
actions finished both make use of the sort ACTION, which is domain dependent
and needs to be instantiated. In case of the mouse system, ACTION is the set
{goto(p0), goto(p1), goto(p2), eat}.
Not only ontologies are domain-dependent. Several notions used in the
properties also need to be provided for each specific instantiation of the generic
architecture. We presented these notions scattered throughout Section 3.5, and
here we repeat them:
∗ appl(A), for A ∈ ACTION, is a formula describing in which world
situations A is applicable.
∗ occ(A), for A ∈ ACTION, is a formula describing when there is an
occasion for A.
∗ sit spec effect is a ternary relation formalising what the effects of a
certain action in a certain world situation will be.
We gave examples of instantiations of these notions for the mouse system in
Section 3.5.
Secondly, we have to anchor the system of coordination properties. The
proofs we did in previous sections generally concerned system properties, that
were proven from agent properties and world properties. We need to be sure
that these properties hold for the particular agent and world present in the sys-
tem, otherwise the coordination properties are not guaranteed to be true. But we
didn’t prove these underlying agent- and world properties, because the proofs
of these depend on the particular implementation of the agent and on the na-
ture of the world. For example, the world could be a real physical environ-
ment, which isn’t controlled by the system in any way. In this case, the world
properties are merely assumptions on the world behaviour, under which proper
system behaviour is obtained. But the world can also be a simulated environ-
ment, which is programmed in some language. In this case, the world prop-
erties should be proven from the semantics of the specification of the world.
The same holds for the agent; in order to prove the agent properties, we need
to have an implementation or specification of the agent in some programming
language or specification language with a well-defined semantics. Having this,
we can try to prove the agent properties.
At this point, there are many difficulties. Most agent programming lan-
guages and specification frameworks don’t have a well-defined formal seman-
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tics. In the next chapters of this thesis, we will try to address this problem
by designing a number of agent programming languages with well-defined se-
mantics. Other people who have worked on agent specification languages with
a firm formal semantics are David Kinny [80], Pascal van Eck [16, 39], Koen
Hindriks [59] and Rogier van Eijk [12].
We again look at the implementation of the agent in the mouse system.
This is the decision model of the mouse, implementing the reactive nature of
its behaviour:
if observation result(at position(food, P ) ∧
¬at position(mouse, P ) ∧
¬at position(screen, p0) )
then to be performed(goto(P ))
if observation result(at position(mouse, P ) ∧
at position(food, P ) )
then to be performed(eat)
Though we now have the knowledge base of the agent in the mouse system,
we can’t prove the agent properties of the system of coordination properties
from this alone. This is because we need information regarding the control cy-
cle of the agent. We don’t know whether the knowledge base is continuously
reasoning, while new observation results come in at all times, or whether it
only reasons during specific time intervals, possibly closing down to new ob-
servation results. This depends on the particular framework or language used
to built the knowledge base, and its unambiguous formal semantics. We choose
not to go into details of this in this chapter, because it is already quite lengthy.
The rules of the knowledge base are intuitive enough to give us an idea of how
the agent works, but as we don’t look at the precise temporal semantics of the
rules, this is not enough to prove the agent properties.
Therefore, we will only give intuitive justifications of the agent properties
mentioned in this chapter. We only want to give an idea of how to use the
generic properties and proofs. We won’t go into world properties and properties
of interaction between agent and world.
In the system of coordination properties and among the basic properties
(Section 3.6), there are only four agent properties. We start with the two agent
rationality properties that are phrased in Section 3.6.2:
RAT1 :
∀M ∈ Traces(Ag) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 :
⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M) ⇒
∃t2 > t1 : ActionExStarts(A, t2,Ag,M)
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RAT2 :
∀M ∈ Traces(Ag) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t2 :
ActionExStarts(A, t2,Ag,M) ⇒
∃t1 < t2 : ⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M)
According to the rules of the mouse, it will decide to start an action when it has
an observation of an occasion for that action. As reasoning takes some time,
the properties above are reasonable.
Next, there is an agent property used in proving COORD0:
ORDER1 :
∀M ∈ Traces(Ag) ∀A,B ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 ≥ t1 :
ActionExStarts(A, t1,Ag,M) ∧
ActionExStarts(B, t2,Ag,M) ∧
OccsAndActionsAlternateInAgent([0, t1],M) ⇒
∃t3 ∈ [t1, t2〉 : ⊕ObsOcc(B, t3,Ag,M)
Suppose the conditions of this property hold for a certain agent trace and certain
actions A and B and moments t1 and t2 ≥ t1. Then we know that B starts after
A, and that up to the beginning of A, observed occasions and action beginnings
alternate. Now, the mouse must also have observed an occasion for B. This
occasion must be distinct from all earlier observed occasions (which give rise
to all earlier actions), as action B follows all earlier actions. This means that the
observed occasion for B must arrive in the agent after the observed occasions
of the earlier actions, including A. As there can be only one observed occasion
prior to each action, the observed occasion for B must take place after action A
has started and before B begins. This makes ORDER1 an acceptable property.
Finally, we have the no-overtaking property for the information processing
of the agent:
NOOV3 :
∀M ∈ Traces(Ag) ∀A ∈ ACTION ∀t1 ∀t2 > t1 ∀n ∈ N \ {0}
[⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M) ∧
ObsOccCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ∧
ActionCount(n, t2,Ag,M) ⇒
ActionExStarts(A, t2,Ag,M)] ∧
[ActionExStarts(A, t2,Ag,M) ∧
ActionCount(n, t2,Ag,M) ∧
ObsOccCount(n, t1,Ag,M) ⇒
⊕ObsOcc(A, t1,Ag,M)]
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This property demands that the reasoning of the knowledge base of the mouse
is implemented in such a way that the mouse generates separate decisions (in
time) to do actions when the mouse observes the occasions for the actions at
separate moments. This is a restriction on the implementation of the control on
the reasoning of the mouse. The knowledge base must be used in such a way to
process incoming information into conclusions that the above property holds.
It might be striking that the majority of properties used for proving action
successfulness for reactive single agents in dynamic environments are demands
on the world, and that we only have four agent properties. The reason for this
is that reactive agents are not very intelligent, and don’t have means to adjust
their decisions to environmental circumstances over time. When the agent isn’t
flexible, the demands on the world behaviour become heavier, as this chapter
clearly demonstrates.
3.10 Discussion
One of the challenges of improving development methods for agent systems
is to provide appropriate support for verification of agent systems being built
in practice. The current state of affairs is that from the theoretical side for-
mal techniques are proposed, such as temporal logics, but that developers in
practice do not consider them useful. Three main reasons for this gap are that
∗ behavioural properties relevant for agent systems in practice usually have
such a high complexity that both fully automated verification and verifi-
cation by hand are difficult,
∗ the formal techniques offered have no well-defined relation to design or
software specifications of the real systems used in practice, and
∗ the formal techniques offered require a much higher level of formal skills
than the average developer in practice possesses.
In this chapter we address these issues in the following manner. Two lan-
guages are proposed: a detailed language, with a direct relation to the system
design specification, and an abstract language in which properties can be for-
mulated in a more conceptual manner. Both languages have been defined for-
mally; moreover, well-defined relationships exist between the two languages
(Section 3.5). The relation between the detailed language and the system spec-
ification language is also well-defined, as the detailed language is built from
the logical constructs used in the system specification language, as explained
in Section 3.3.1.
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The abstract language allows shorter, more intuitive formalisations of prop-
erties of the system. Often, agent notions or properties pertain to a period in
time, which makes the detailed formulae describing them long and rather cum-
bersome. In AL, these temporal notions can be captured in a single abstract
predicate, yielding a compact and clear representation. To illustrate this, we
look at the following abstract formula:
ActionEff(A, l, t,M)
and its interpretation in the detailed language:
∃t1 < t ∃t2 ≥ t :
⊕state(M, t, output(EW))  l ∧
⊕state(M, t1, input(EW))  to be performed(A) ∧
⊗t1, t2⊕state(M, t2, output(EW))  ended(A) ∧
sit spec effect(A, state(M, t1, output(EW)|world info, l)
Proof structures sometimes can be made visible within the abstract lan-
guage, as is the case for the proof of COORD1. As we showed in Section 3.4.3,
the proof of COORD1 from other coordination properties is done entirely within
the abstract language, using only simple modus ponens and quantifier manip-
ulation. By purely abstract proofs like this, complexity of the verification pro-
cess is reduced considerably. More detailed parts of the verification process can
be hidden in the detailed language, and show up in the abstract language only
in the form of, abstractly formulated, reusable properties. Examples of such
properties are COORD0 and COORD5. The proofs of these properties, which
are formulated in the abstract language AL, mainly use other properties of the
agent and the environment phrased in AL. But in the proofs, the abstract notions
are expanded into detailed ones (in TL), and these details are used for establish-
ing validity of COORD0 and COORD5. These proofs are long, involved and not
extremely intuitive, but they only need to be done once. As we have proven
COORD0 and COORD5 in a generic manner, these proofs remain valid for all
reactive single agent systems built according to the generic architecture defined
in Section 3.2. Therefore, when for a specific instantiation of the generic ar-
chitecture action successfulness needs to be shown, there is no need to go into
details anymore; the verifier can simply reuse the proofs we constructed and
only focus at the abstractly formulated properties to get an idea of the demands
on the agent and the world. Of course, the agent and world properties also have
to be proved for the overall proof to be valid.
The languages we use in this chapter are similar to the languages used in
situation calculus [90, 106]. A difference is that our languages allow explicit
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references to temporal traces and time points. In [105], Reiter addresses prov-
ing properties in situation calculus. A difference with our approach is that we
incorporate arbitrary durations in the decision process of the agent, and in the
interaction with the world. Another difference is that in our case the induction
principle works for a larger class of temporal models than the class of discrete
models in his case.
Two roles are distinguished within the verification engineering process: the
verification support developer, who defines libraries of reusable properties in
the abstract language, and their related properties in the detailed language, and
the verification engineer, who uses these libraries to actually perform verifica-
tion for a system being developed in practice. This means that the verification
support developer needs to possess a high level of formal skills, whereas the
requirements for the verification engineer are less demanding.
In this chapter, we have been the verification support developer, as we cre-
ated reusable properties and proofs for establishing action successfulness. Ver-
ification engineers can subsequently use these to verify specific reactive sin-
gle agent systems interacting with a dynamic environment. Under realistic
assumptions, such as action generation and action execution with duration, it
is a complex problem to guarantee the successfulness of action executions. We
addressed and clarified this problem using the approach described above. We
defined a system (with two sub-systems) of reusable coordination properties.
As we phrase the properties in the abstract language, the properties are much
more accessible and explainable than their detailed counterparts are. The co-
ordination properties found have become the beginning of a library of reusable
properties that is being developed.
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CHAPTER 4
An Abstract Model for
Agents Interacting
in Real-Time
Time is a train
Makes the future the past
Leaves you standing in the station
Your face pressed up against the glass
U2
4.1 Introduction
If we look at traditional computer programs and agents, traditional programs
are like vending machines (providing drinks and candy-bars), while agents are
more like waiters. When you want something from a vending machine, you
have to provide input, that is, to put money into the slot and push the keys
that indicate the particular candy-bar you want to buy, and then the machine
moves the candy-bar to its output slot. So, this machine simply computes a
function from input to output, like traditional computer programs. There is no
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interaction with other vending machines (“Hello machine–235, I’m presently
out of cola; do you have some bottles for me?”), nor with the physical world
outside the vending machine (vending machines don’t move, nor do they ob-
serve whether the person buying something looks happy or sad). Waiters are
very different; their job is to interact with their customers. Thus, they will
assist you when you have questions about the dishes on the menu, and they
will adapt their actions to your preferences (if they’re good waiters). Waiters
also communicate with colleagues (other waiters, the cook) and observe and
act in the physical environment of the restaurant (they usually don’t trip over
a handbag, when bringing plates to some table). Also, waiters can cooperate.
If someone orders a very big birthday cake, two waiters could bring the cake
to the table. The ability to interact with their environment makes waiters much
more flexible, and thus more intelligent, than vending machines. On the other
hand, it makes them more vulnerable as well; the actions of two waiters can
interfere (they may bump into each other), or their actions can fail because of
events in the restaurant (if a chandelier suddenly falls from the ceiling, the ac-
tion of a waiter bringing someone a drink can fail). Like the waiters, agents
are involved in an ongoing interaction with their environment, which consists
of the physical world and other agents. On the one hand, this built-in ability
to interact makes agents more powerful than other software entities, and on the
other hand it makes them more vulnerable to disturbances of their activities.
One definition of an agent as given in [125] states:
“An agent is a computational entity such as a software program
or a robot that can be viewed as perceiving and acting upon its
environment and that is autonomous in that its behaviour at least
partially depends on its own experience.”
So, an agent is situated in an environment which can consist of other agents
and a physical or virtual world. For example, in robot soccer the environment
of one agent consists of the other agents and the physical reality of the playing
field and the ball. And a personal agent searching the internet for its owner is
situated in the environment of the web.
In Chapter 2, we argued with many other authors that the benefit of the
agent paradigm is that it provides new (anthropomorphic) concepts of a high
abstraction level. The expressive power and intuitiveness of these concepts
facilitate the design and construction of a new kind of computer systems. A
multi-agent system consists of multiple agents, which can interact with the
world and each other and which have a private internal state. The agents may
be heterogeneous, and the system may be open to agents leaving or entering
the system. Although each agent may have its own motivations, the agents
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generally don’t blindly act on these only. Agents also take into account the
dynamics of the physical environment, where things may change all the time
through actions of other agents or through natural events. Interaction can bring
problems or provide opportunities and solutions. An action of an agent can fail
because of an event taking place in the physical world, or because an action
of another agent interferes with it; a condition that one agent is not capable of
establishing is realised by cooperating with another agent, or it is established
by an event.
Agent programming languages offer programming constructs that opera-
tionalise the mental concepts from the agent paradigm. Typically, agent pro-
gramming languages provide statements for mental updates (of the beliefs,
goals and intentions) [60, 101, 113]. Although agents offer the right level of ab-
straction for building the complex systems needed nowadays, and interaction is
very much at the heart of the agent concept, interaction issues are not properly
treated in many agent programming languages. More specifically, agent pro-
gramming languages generally discard real-time issues such as interference of
actions with duration and discrepancies between the actual state of world and
the world state as the agent observes it. Typically, actions are atomic and take
zero time, events from the environment aren’t explicitly modelled and synergy
of actions into group actions is impossible.
In this chapter, we will identify these and other aspects of agent interaction
and incorporate them in an operational model of agents. The model we pro-
pose is a skeleton programming language with a formal operational semantics.
When using the model, several parameters of the skeleton language have to be
instantiated, in order to obtain a concrete agent programming language. Most
of the flexibility is related to the internal processing of individual agents. We
abstract from internal agent matters, in order to focus on agent interaction and
on real-time aspects. This results in details of the inner agent being flexible,
and shapable to the personal preferences of the system builder.
Many agent programming languages, such as AGENT-0 [113], AgentSpeak
[101] and 3APL [60], abstract from an external real world. Agents in these lan-
guages maintain an internal database, that represents the state of the world.
When the agent acts, this database is changed. The physical execution of an
action is considered to be a side effect of the change in the belief base, and the
underlying implementation has to take care of this execution. As the database
always reflects the current state of the world, observations are implicit. Be-
cause there is no explicit world, the agent models of these languages also ab-
stract from unexpected events taking place. Also, when multiple agents act,
their actions can never interfere with each other, in case they only have private
databases modelling mental states.
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Another issue is the nature of actions. In our model, we model action du-
ration by semantically equating each action with a sequence of atomic sub-
actions. To determine the behaviour of a multi-agent system, we combine the
effects of all sub-actions and events taking place at some time. In many other
agent models, an action is an atomic state transformer, and its semantics is a
priori given and independent of other actions or events taking place concur-
rently.
We think these choices abstract away many problems that can occur when
building an actual system with multiple agents. Therefore, we have developed a
programming language that allows for the full complexity of agents interacting
with each other and the environment. In other words, the language doesn’t
abstract from real problems of complex open multi-agent systems in a dynamic
environment. We have actions which take time, events that can unexpectedly
change the state of the world, agents operating at different paces, mental states
that don’t have to reflect the present state of the world, and so on. Our target
application is a system with a number of robots, situated in some environment.
In such an application the dynamic nature of the world and interferences of
actions are real problems. The previous chapter also provides evidence for
this. There, we worked on verifying that a single agent situated in a dynamic
environment successfully executes its actions, which have a duration. We had
to exclude the occurrence of interacting events in order to be able to prove
this. All situated agents have to deal with interaction issues, but our model
is the only agent programming approach we know of that truly incorporates
them. So, the contribution we make is realism with respect to the dynamics of
interaction.
Although there is a proliferation of agent models, laid down in agent log-
ics, architectures and programming languages, most agents perform the sense–
reason–act cycle. First the agent senses its environment through observation
and communication, then it reasons to update its local state with the new in-
formation and to decide which action(s) to perform next, and finally it acts,
changing the world state, after which the cycle starts again. This could go
on forever, or it could stop as soon as the ultimate objective of the agent is
reached. In [92], it is shown how several architectures for deliberative agents
employ some form of this cycle.
Programs in the agent programming languages we mentioned above also
are executed in sense–reason–act cycles. The agent program only specifies
the reasoning of the agent. The sensing, acting and cycling is built into the
(informal or formal) semantics. A disadvantage of a semantic reason–act cycle
is that it is not very flexible. To modify certain aspects of the cycle means to
modify the semantics of the language, which is by no means easy. So, in our
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programming language we have a syntactic cycle, which is programmed by the
system builder and which specifies reasoning as well as sensing and acting.
This gives freedom to adjust the processing in different rounds of the cycle to
circumstances in the environment and mental state of the agent.
In order to abstract from details of the inner agent and provide maximal
flexibility, our model has:
∗ A definable range of agent concepts. So, there is no fixed set of modal-
ities (such as beliefs, desires and intentions) that is used to program
agents. The set is chosen by the system developer.
∗ A flexible execution cycle. Our model only fixes that during every round
of the cycle reasoning should precede interaction with the environment.
As observation in our view is just a special kind of action, we call the
cycle the reason–interact cycle. The agent programmer has the freedom
to decide which part (if any) of the observed and communicated infor-
mation the agent incorporates in its mental state, and also how the mental
state of the agent determines the actions that are to be performed next.
By offering this flexibility, we allow the user of the model the freedom to fill
in the internal agent according to his/her favourite agent theory or architecture.
In order to make the model more realistic with respect to interaction, we
include:
∗ A world, which is common to the agents, but only partially controlled
by them. So, unexpected changes to the world state, called events1, are
allowed.
∗ Explicit actions of observation. So, the agents’ view of the world as
represented in its local state doesn’t automatically match the state of the
world.
∗ Actions with duration. We allow the result of an action to depend on
whether other actions or events take place during the execution of the
action.
∗ A treatment of the parallelism relevant to multi-agent executions, in which
real-time processing is vital. In our semantic model, concurrent actions
are treated as happening during intervals of time, which can overlap.
1We use the term ‘event’ in a different manner than other authors (e.g., [7]), where an event can
be an agent-initiated action as well as a ‘natural’ change to the world, not caused by any agent in
the system. In our view, events are changes to the world state, not caused by any agent.
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Parts of actions thus take place simultaneously. This contrasts with the
common interleaving semantics, where parallel actions are sequenced in
a non-deterministic order. (See [4] for more explanation.)
∗ Both group actions and individual actions. Group actions are executed
synchronously by the group members. We also define a relation between
group actions and the individual actions of the participants. A group
action is the result of the synchronised execution of individual actions by
the group members.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 informally ex-
plores several fundamental choices of the operational model. In Section 4.3 and
4.4, we give the syntax and semantics of the skeleton programming language,
respectively. In Section 4.5 we prove that the syntax of the language guarantees
appropriate semantical reason–interact cycles. Section 4.6 is an illustration of
the new features of the agent model. In Section 4.7 we conclude.
4.2 Informal explorations
4.2.1 Cycles of reasoning and interaction
A multi-agent system in our agent model consists of a number of agents and
a physical world, which is common to the agents and which they sense and
act upon. Our model is most suitable for embodied agents or robots, as many
complications of interaction are particularly manifest when there is a physi-
cal environment in which the agents operate. The agents can execute different
sorts of actions. First, there are physical actions, which are actions that change
the state of the physical world. Physical actions can be single-agent actions,
or group actions. Obviously, single agent actions are performed by one agent,
while group actions are done by a group of agents. Group actions, like lift-
ing a table, are synchronously performed by the group members. In Section
4.2.3, we provide more intuitions about the relation between group actions and
individual actions. Secondly, there are observative actions (performing an ob-
servation) and communicative actions (sending a message to another agent).
Communication in the model is asynchronous. The third kind of actions are
reasoning actions, which are actions for investigating and updating the local
mental state of an agent.
One of the central ideas of our model is the separation of internal and
external agent aspects. Internal aspects of the agent are the agent’s mental
state, and the reasoning the agent performs. In this chapter (as in many chapters
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of this thesis) we abstract from details of the inner agent. This is why several
parameters of the flexible agent programming language we will define pertain
to internal, mental, local agent features. External aspects of the agent are the
agent’s interaction with its environment, which consists of the physical world
and the fellow agents. Observation, communication and physical action thus
are external actions. And from the point of view of a certain agent, the state
of the physical world and the mental state of other agents are external aspects.
In our model, we take care that external agent actions only directly influence
the external state, and internal actions only modify the internal state of that
agent. So, when an agent performs a physical action, its model of the world
which it stores in informational attitudes in its mental state isn’t immediately
changed. For example, if an agent throws a brick towards a window, it won’t
believe that the glass is broken immediately after it finishes the action. This
can only happen after the agent has performed some observations regarding
the effects of its action. Also, a reasoning action never directly modifies the
state of the physical world. For example, if an agent adopts the intention to do
an action, this doesn’t mean that the action will start automatically. The agent
must explicitly decide to execute the action before it will be performed.
In other agent programming languages, this is different. For example in
3APL [60], all the agent does is updating its belief and goal bases. Here, goals
are the atomic or composite actions the agent will perform shortly. Adding a
basic action as a new goal automatically can lead to execution of the action.
And when the action is executed, the belief base is immediately updated with
beliefs regarding the effects of the action. The reason for these choices is that
the authors of 3APL want to provide a programming language of a high abstrac-
tion level, with the main focus on the internal reasoning of individual agents,
and abstracting from details of interaction with the environment.
In contrast to 3APL, our operational model focuses on environment in-
teraction. We opted for the separation between the inside and outside of an
agent because this allows us to zoom in on details of interaction without clutter
caused by internal reasoning processes of agents.
Each agent in the model has a local state, which consists of two parts: the
sense buffer and the mental state. The mental state belongs to the internal part
of the agent. It contains a set of formulas, describing the agent’s present moti-
vations and information. We don’t fix a set of mental operators for the agents,
such as the classical B(elief) D(esire) I(ntention) combination. The system
builder can choose the set of modalities the agents can use, as this set is one
of the parameters of the skeleton programming language. The sense buffer is
a part of the state of the agent where results of observation and information
communicated by other agents is received. Thus, observation and communica-
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tion don’t directly cause a change to the private mental state of the agent. The
agent can investigate its sense buffer, and then decide whether newly arrived
observed or communicated information should lead to a change to its mental
state (for example its beliefs). This way, the agent can for example discard
messages sent by agents it judges to be unreliable. This has similarities with
the way Zhisheng Huang treats incoming information in his thesis [65]. The
sense buffer is the frontier between the internal and external agent aspects; the
agent receives external information in its sense buffer, and subsequently tests
the sense buffer, using internal reasoning actions.
As stated in the Introduction, a natural way to envisage the processing of
agents is that agents execute sense–reason–act cycles. Agents obtain new in-
formation by sensing (observing, receiving messages from other agents), then
they update their mental state and on the basis of this updated state decide what
to do next, after which they perform the actions. In the model we propose
here, agents also execute cycles, though there is a small difference between the
cycles in our model and the common conception of sense–reason–act cycles.
We choose to classify the performance of observations and the sending of
messages as external actions, together with physical actions. We call actions of
communication and observation and physical actions Interactions, and internal,
reasoning actions Intractions. The cycle agents execute in our model is called
the reason–interact cycle, and each round of this cycle consists of a first phase
in which the agent executes intractions on its local state, and a second phase
in which the agent performs interactions with its environment. We term the
first phase of the reason–interact cycle the reasoning phase, and the second
phase the interaction phase, for obvious reasons. During reasoning, the agent
can modify its mental state, based on newly received observation results and
communicated messages from the sense buffer; for example, it can revise its
beliefs or goals or adopt new intentions. Also, the agent decides which actions
are to be done next. These actions can be physical actions, that will change
the state of the world, or they can be actions of observing or communicating
with other agents. Then, the interacting phase of the cycle begins, in which the
interactions are executed.
When we compare our skeleton programming language to other languages,
our execution cycle provides more freedom. For example, in other languages
the receipt of messages and observation results and the processing of these into
new beliefs happens outside the range of the agent program, in the control cy-
cle of the interpreter. So, there is no way to change the agent program in order
to achieve a different policy with regard to incoming communication. If you
want to change this, you have to change the semantics of the programming lan-
guage and the interpreter of the language. In our language, almost everything
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is programmable. Most programs will have a part that fixes how incoming in-
formation is processed into beliefs or other mental formulas, as well as parts
for other agent features. So, when you want to change some characteristic of
the agent, you can simply change its program.
This is an advantage of our model, as it makes the agents very flexible.
But this choice leads to an execution cycle which is defined quite differently
from the cycles in other approaches. A typical sense–reason–act cycle in other
languages looks like this:
∗ Receive and process incoming messages; update the beliefs.
∗ Revise the goals and/or commitments, according to the agent program.
∗ Execute all commitments which are valid now.
The agent program only specifies the second phase of this cycle. When the
cycle is in this second phase, the program of the agent is interpreted, taking
into account the mental state. Then, the execution phase takes place, in which
the effects of the action(s) are computed and added to the mental state. While
the results of actions that change the world state immediately update the belief
base of the agent, the agent mostly doesn’t perform explicit observations, and
the sense–part of the sense–reason–act cycle isn’t needed. The receipt and
processing of new information and the execution of the commitments are taken
care of by the semantics of the agent program as laid down in the interpreter.
This allows the program to be compact. In our cycle, the program influences
all three phases, and thus it is more elaborate.
Details of the cycle differ across the different programming languages. For
example, sometimes the agent executes all possible mental updates, after which
it performs all actions selected for this time point, as in AGENT-0 [113], and
sometimes the agent takes one reasoning step only, after which it executes one
basic action, as in 3APL [60]. These choices are fixed in the semantics of the
programming languages. This makes these programming languages less flexi-
ble than the programming language of our model. The cycle in our program-
ming language is defined syntactically, by the way the program is constructed;
programs always are an iterated alternation of phases of internal reasoning and
interaction with the external environment.
In our model, physical actions have duration. Each action takes a fixed
number of ticks of a global clock (which is positioned in the world, which is
common to all agents). The presence of a global clock might seem a weakness
of the model, as it forces the agents to be perfectly synchronised. In Section
4.2.3 we will explain the remedy against this unwanted side-effect. We assume
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that reasoning, observing and communication take little time in comparison
to physical action. So, in our model reasoning actions and communicative
and observative actions each take one time unit. As the system builder has to
choose the precise duration of a time unit, he or she has to take care that each
communicative, observative and reasoning action will be completed within one
time unit.
4.2.2 Multiple parallel behaviours?
In our model, the two phases of the reason–interact cycle take time. In the
reasoning phase, the agent uses this time only to reason, and in the interaction
phase, it only performs external actions. While executing the reason–interact
cycle, the agent can perform a number of interactions with its environment
concurrently or be engaged in different parallel threads of reasoning. But as
internal and external operations are strictly separated, it is not possible to reason
and interact in parallel. It might seem a waste of resources not to reason at all
during the interaction phase, and not to act at all during the reasoning phase.
This is why in an earlier version of our agent model, one agent could execute
multiple, parallel reason–interact cycles. We call one cycle a behaviour, and
allowed the agent to have several behaviours. The idea was that an agent can
reason about what to do next in one behaviour while it is busy doing actions
from another behaviour. Also, interactions from different behaviours could be
executed in parallel.
But multiple behaviours are only possible when the agent/robot has several
entirely disjoint interests. The actions in two parallel behaviours should not in-
teract, and the (observed, communicated) information used in two behaviours
should be different. Also, no element of the mental state should be accessed
by two different behaviours. This is because two behaviours are not synchro-
nised in any way, so only when they are completely independent, they can be
concurrently executed in a safe way. Whenever there is potential interaction in
two behaviours, they should be integrated into one behaviour, such that more
control is possible regarding the flow of mental updates and interactions.
So, in order to justify multiple behaviours, we have to think of some exam-
ple of an agent where the agent has at least two completely independent inter-
ests. This is not very easy. The physical actions of the two behaviours should
use different actuators and alter different parts of the physical reality. An ex-
ample would be an agent who is moving from one place to another while at the
same time juggling three balls. This kind of behaviour is nice for amusement,
but is not extremely useful. When thinking of the soccer robots, no parallel
independent behaviours in one robot seems possible. Everything these robots
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do and reason about is connected with the position of the ball relative to the
agent. For example, if a soccer robot is moving forward towards the ball and
simultaneously turning its camera to get new information on the position of
the adversaries, then both these actions are ultimately aimed at getting the ball
into the goal of the opponent. Information from the camera could influence the
moving of the robot. Thus, concurrent execution of these actions makes sense
if this happens in a controlled manner, as is only possible if both actions are
part of the same behaviour.
In fact, it is even difficult to think of parallel behaviour in humans. I am able
to think about what to have for dinner while I cycle home, but this is not a good
example as cycling is done without thinking at all and the actions following my
reasoning about dinner (cycling to the shop) might interact with the behaviour
of cycling home. I can type and listen to music simultaneously, but this is no
good example as listening to music doesn’t incorporate any (physical) action. I
can smoke a cigarette while walking to the supermarket, but this is only possi-
ble because I don’t have to think about how to smoke a cigarette. Usually, when
a human is capable of two parallel behaviours, one of them is purely based on
reflexes, needing no conscious mental processing at all. This view is supported
in the cognitive science textbook [56], by Hendriks, Taatgen and Andringa. On
pages 114–115 the authors describe controlled processes, which are cognitive
processes requiring conscious attention and taking up a lot of the total capacity
of information processing. They state that it is hard to simultaneously perform
multiple controlled processes. Doing two things in parallel is well possible
when at most one of the processes is a controlled process, and the other(s) are
automatic processes, taking up little information processing capacity. This is
why it is hard to do something else when you’re learning a new skill (pages
122-123), such as dancing. Only when you can dance ‘automatically’, it be-
comes possible to have a conversation with your dancing partner. We conclude
that cognitive science doesn’t inspire us to give agents multiple behaviours,
unless only one of these behaviours contains internal reasoning actions. As in
general behaviours contain both reasoning and acting, we decide to give each
agent only one behaviour.
As another argument, imagine a robot performing two totally independent
activities, like doing your dishes and sorting your mail. This robot is likely to
be conceived as containing two agents, one dedicated to the dishes and the other
to the mail, sharing a single body (meant as vehicle of sensors and actuators;
most likely, sensors and actuators are not shared between the two agents).
Summarising, we conclude that we don’t have convincing arguments for
multiple behaviours in one agent. Agents in our model thus execute a single
behaviour, which also has the advantage that the semantics of the programming
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language will be less intricate.
4.2.3 Group action and individual action
Agents can perform individual physical actions and group physical actions.
The sets As of individual actions and Ag of group actions are parameters of
our skeleton programming language, as the actions of the agents are domain-
dependent. One of the objectives of the agent model is that actions have du-
ration, and that two (or more) actions that are executed during overlapping
time frames could interfere, that is, yield effects different from the effects that
would result if the second action starts after the first is finished. To reach this
objective, we have to find a suitable real-time semantic model. An interleaving
semantics, which interprets parallel actions as taking place one after the other,
is not right for this purpose. In this subsection, we will sketch some features of
the semantic model we use for the skeleton programming language.
Physical actions take time. For individual actions, we model this by relat-
ing each action to a fixed sequence of atomic sub-actions, which each takes
one time unit.2 The sub-actions never occur in a program; they only play a role
in the semantics. The precise length of the time unit is chosen by the system
builder. The set Asub is the set of all atomic sub-actions. For example, if an
action c takes three units of time, then it is semantically related to the sequence
c1; c2; c3, where c1, c2, c3 ∈ Asub are the sub-actions of c. When constructing
the execution traces of an agent program containing the action c, three con-
secutive transition steps are generated for the three sub-actions, if the action is
executed successfully. As each sub-action can either succeed or fail, depending
on circumstances in the environment, we attach a sign to each sub-action to in-
dicate this. Thus, there are four possible executions of action c: c1+; c2+; c3+,
c1+; c2+; c3−, c1+; c2− and c1−. When a sub-action fails, the execution of the
action is over; the remaining sub-actions are discarded of.
In case two agents are executing actions, the atomic sub-actions of these
actions aren’t interleaved, as is usual in the semantics of many programming
languages. Instead, the sequences are indivisible but can overlap in time, as
Figure 4.1 illustrates. In this figure, we show part of the trace of an agent
system, where two actions, a and b, successfully take place. The first action
takes five time units and the second takes four time units, as modelled by the
number of sub-actions of a and b. An interleaving semantics could result in ex-
ecution of a sequence like a1+b1+a2+a3+b2+a4+b3+b4+a5+, where the atomic
2This has similarities with the way Cohen and Levesque interpret actions in their landmark
paper [21].
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+a1 +a2 +a3 +a4 +a5
+b1 +b2 +b3 +b4
Figure 4.1: Overlapping action executions
steps of the actions are shuffled in a linear order. Steps are thus not performed
simultaneously, in the same time unit. The semantics we will use for the opera-
tional model is different. In this semantics, which is depicted in Figure 4.1, the
sequences of sub-actions overlap in time; interference of the effects of these
actions is possible. For each time unit, the state change these actions cause is
computed by taking the combined effects of the sub-actions taking place at that
time. This semantics is called a step semantics; we used ideas from [91].
An alternative way to formalise actions with duration is the use of time
intervals [2] associated with actions, as is done in [110]. Then, the actions
from Figure 4.1 would look like a[10, 15] and b[12, 16]. Though this may be
more elegant, this formalisation offers no straightforward manner to arrive at
the state transformation caused by interfering actions. Using step semantics,
a state transformation can be computed for each time unit as will be shown in
Section 4.4.3. This explains our choice for sequences of sub-actions to model
action duration.
In our semantical model as presented above, a global clock is present,
which ticks when time units elapse. The presence of a global clock is not a
realistic assumption for multi-agent systems, as the agents may be very het-
erogeneous and have local clocks ticking at different paces. We don’t know
anything about the local clocks of the agents and the relation of the different
local clocks to the global clock. And we don’t even want to know anything
about this, as the agents in a multi-agent system can be built by different peo-
ple, using different formalisms and conventions, and we want to be able to cope
with this. But we had to add the global clock in the world to be able to give
a semantics to the interacting behaviours of multiple agents. To prevent this
global clock from setting the pace of the entire system, turning it into a syn-
chronised distributed system, we allow arbitrarily long delays preceding each
interaction with the environment. In this way, it is possible that an agent do-
ing a physical action based on some observations it did earlier may find the
world totally different from its observations, because one or more faster agents
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have done some actions in the time it was still busy reasoning and starting the
execution of the action.
For group actions, there are additional matters to consider. A group action
actually is a multi-set of synchronised individual actions. For example, when
four agents are doing the group action LiftTable, then each of these agents is
lifting one table-leg. They could do this perfectly synchronised, but the action
will probably still succeed when one agent starts lifting one time unit before
the others. Also, the agents can lift the table together by lifting a side each,
instead of a leg.
In our model, each group action has a fixed number of participants. Each
possible realisation of a group action is laid down in a group action scheme.
If b ∈ Ag is a group action with k participants, then a group action scheme
A v A∗sub for b is a multi-set with k elements. A group action scheme contains
a sequence of atomic actions for each of the participants. To represent different
starting times of the actions of the participants, some of the sequences have
leading or trailing skip statements. A skip-statement means that the agent does
nothing for one unit of time. We suppose skip ∈ Asub, to technically allow
skips in group action schemes. The duration of a group action can vary across
the different group action schemes realising it. Therefore, we refer to the du-
ration of a particular group action scheme, and not to the duration of the group
action itself.
To illuminate this, we extend the example of LiftTable ∈ Ag. Lifting a table
is done by four agents, which each lift a table-leg. LiftLeg ∈ As is the indi-
vidual action the four agents perform. This action takes three units of time;
during each unit of time, the table-leg can be lifted 15 cm. So, LiftLeg is related
to the sequence LiftLeg0-15; LiftLeg15-30; LiftLeg30-45. Here is a group action
scheme for LiftTable:
[LiftLeg0-15; LiftLeg15-30; LiftLeg30-45; skip; skip,
skip; skip; LiftLeg0-15; LiftLeg15-30; LiftLeg30-45,
skip; LiftLeg0-15; LiftLeg15-30; LiftLeg30-45; skip,
skip; skip; LiftLeg0-15; LiftLeg15-30; LiftLeg30-45]
This group action scheme has a duration of five time units. In other group
action schemes for LiftTable, the LiftLeg-actions could have different relative
delays, or be perfectly simultaneous. In this last case, the group action scheme
would take only three time units. Also, there can be group action schemes
where the four agents each lift a side instead of a leg.
Again, group action schemes are not directly used in the syntax of agent
programs. But when semantics is given to an agent program, and a group action
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is encountered, then this group action is replaced by a non-deterministically
chosen individual contribution from one of the applicable group action schemes.
Like ordinary individual actions, this contribution can fail at any point during
execution, so the sub-actions are annotated with signs for success or failure.
A sub-action annotated with ‘−’ is executable in case the circumstances in the
physical world prevent successful execution and execution will thus result in
an undesirable world situation. For example, if the robot arm is not holding
the table-leg, then the sub-action LiftLeg0-15 will fail, so LiftLeg0-15− is exe-
cuted and the table-leg will stay were it was. If the world circumstances allow
successful execution of a sub-action, then the variant annotated with ‘+’ is ex-
ecutable.
We will illustrate the use of group action schemes. Discarding success and
failure for a moment, the group action (LiftTable, {i1, i2, i3, i4}) in the program
of agent i2 can be replaced (when giving semantics to the program) by
LiftLeg0-15; LiftLeg15-30; LiftLeg30-45; skip; skip or by
skip; LiftLeg0-15; LiftLeg15-30; LiftLeg30-45; skip,
or yet another element from the group action scheme. If there are more group
action schemes for LiftTable, then action sequences from these are also options.
If we add annotations to the sub-actions, then three possible extensions for i2
of LiftTable (based on the second sequence above) are:
∗ skip+; LiftLeg0-15−
∗ skip+; LiftLeg0-15+; LiftLeg15-30−
∗ skip+; LiftLeg0-15+; LiftLeg15-30+; LiftLeg30-45+; skip+
The skip action never fails, as there is virtually no physical circumstance imag-
inable in which doing nothing couldn’t be executed (except destroyal of the
agent or the end of the world; we ignore these somewhat unlikely options). So,
we equate skip+ with skip. The first extension above fails after the first step of
lifting the table-leg, the second after the second step and the third extension is
a successful execution of the whole group action contribution.
A group action can only succeed if there is a group of agents, each execut-
ing an individual contribution to the group action, that fit together according
to one of the schemes of the group action. If these conditions don’t hold, for
example because there are not enough agents contributing to the group action,
or because one of the contributions of the group members fails in the middle,
then the individual attempted contributions could still succeed, but the syner-
getic effect will not occur. For example, when four agents attempt to lift a table
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on which there is a bowl of soup, but the LiftLeg-actions of two adjacent agents
fail in the middle, then the other agents can still lift their table-leg, but the soup
will spill over the bowl as the table is not lifted evenly. In Subsections 4.4.1
and 4.4.3, we go into semantic details of these issues, and in Section 4.6 we
give examples to illustrate these technical details.
In our view on group actions, we look at agent behaviour from an exter-
nal point of view, matching our focus on agent interaction (and not on inter-
nal agent aspects). If there are several agents that perform individual actions
matching a group action scheme, then we perceive the activity of these agents
as a group action, even though they might be doing this combination of actions
purely by coincidence, without any coordination. We are only interested in the
synergy of particular combinations of individual actions, and not in the pres-
ence or absence of internal motivations that agents establish in order to coordi-
nate their activity. In order to purposely obtain the conditions for group action
success, meaning that there is a group of agents agreeing on the group action
scheme to be used, the task delegation and the proper time to start the action,
the group members need to coordinate their activities. Possibly, they might
come to joint mental attitudes, which formalise the agreement of the group on
details of the group action. Though this is very important, this chapter won’t go
into coordination; it is interesting for future research to link the model defined
in this chapter and theories of agent coordination. In the next two chapters, we
will address coordination aspects. We design a programming language and a
coordination language with special features for coordinating agents in Chapter
5 and 6, respectively.
Note also that it doesn’t matter which agent in the group performs some
action sequence from a group action scheme. Our present formalism doesn’t
allow specifying that certain individual contributions to a group action can only
be made by agents that have specified abilities and/or authorisations. In other
words, we have no roles; all group members are equal. Future research could
also address this. We refer to research by Virginia Dignum and others [30] for
some work on roles and agents.
4.3 Syntax
We briefly summarise the sketch of agents given in the previous section, before
we start describing the syntax of the skeleton programming language. Each
agent has a program and a state. The state of the agent has two parts: the sense
buffer, where observed and communicated information is received and stored,
and the mental state, which contains a set of mental formulas. The program
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contains two kinds of actions, namely internal reasoning actions, and external
actions of interaction with the environment. The program explicitly specifies
the reason–interact cycle, and thus it is an iterated statement. A multi-agent
system consists of a set of agents and an external world, executing in parallel.
4.3.1 Basic sets
The basic building blocks of agent programs come from the following sets:
∗ P = the set of propositional atoms formalising environment conditions
∗ I = the set of agent identifiers
∗ Mf = the set of agent modalities which apply to formulas (f refers to
formula)
∗ Ma = the set of agent modalities which apply to actions (a refers to
action)
∗ As = the set of actions agents perform individually (s refers to single
agent); we assume skip ∈ As
∗ Ag = the set of actions agents perform groupwise (g refers to group of
agents)
The set P forms the basis of the logical language we will use to describe the
world situation and to phrase agent properties. Examples of atoms in P are
large obstacle ahead and agent James unreliable. As the last atom suggests, a
first order language is more suitable for phrasing properties of the agent system.
We opt for a propositional language only for reasons of simplicity; the skeleton
programming language can easily be extended into the first-order direction.
The set I doesn’t need any explanation.
Mf and Ma allow the programmer to choose which mental attitudes the
agent employs. The mental state of an agent consists of a number of formulas,
which (for example) represent the beliefs, goals and desires of the agent held
at that moment. Each category of formulas has its own modal operator. The
set of modalities is flexible. So, the programmer can decide whether or not
the agents should have desires, goals or intentions. The programmer is also
allowed to introduce completely new motivational and informational attitudes.
To instantiate the skeleton language, the programmer specifies two modal-
ity sets,Ma andMf . Ma contains the modal operators which apply to actions
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(for example intention or request), and Mf contains the operators which ap-
ply to formulas of logic (for example belief or desire). Formulas constructed
with these modalities are called mental formulas; they can be part of the mental
state. For example, by including the concepts belief, desire, goal, and intention
in the modality sets, BDI-agents can be programmed. As another example,
reactive agents are obtained if the modality sets are both empty, because then
the agents can only decide what to do next on the basis of information they
received by observation and communication. The modality sets can also con-
tain less conventional operators. For example, if one agent has authority over
other agents in the system, a modal operator for commanding to do some action
could be an element of Ma, such that the boss agent can send messages to its
subordinates ordering them to do something. As another example, Mf could
contain an operator for expectation, such that agents can store and reason about
their expectations, for example regarding the effects of actions they perform.
The programming language contains two mental action constructors, ins
and del, for inserting into and deleting from the mental state. For example,
if B ∈ Mf , representing belief, then Bi is the belief operator for agent i and
Bi(ϕ) (meaning “agent i believes ϕ”) is a formula that can be part of the mental
state of agent i. Examples of mental actions are ins(Bi(ϕ)) and del(Bi(ϕ)).
Mental modalities basically are just labels. To give them their intended
semantics, mental formulas have to validate a set of axioms. The system devel-
oper is responsible for this.
There is another important basic set, namely E , the set of events. These
are changes in the world state not caused by any of the agents in the system.
We didn’t mention E in our list of basic sets, because events have no role in
the syntax of agent programs, as they are not under control of the agents. The
agents can observe the effects of events, and these observations can influence
the processing of the agents.
4.3.2 Auxiliary languages
In order to define the syntax of the programming language, we need several
auxiliary languages:
∗ Lw, the set of formulas describing the state of the world, based on P .
∗ Lsb(i), the language of the sense buffer of agent i. This language defines
the set of formulas which can be present in the sense buffer. Basis of
the language are formulas like Odi(ϕ) and Cdi(ϕ), meaning that ϕ is
observed by i or communicated to i, respectively.
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∗ Lm(i), the mental language, that is, the set of formulas that are allowed
in the mental state of agent i. These formulas are constructed with the
mental operators from the flexible modality sets Mf and Ma.
∗ Lrep(i), the language of (internal) representations of agent i. Here
“representations” is meant to cover both sensory and mental information.
A formula of this language can describe a property of the combination
of the mental state and the sense buffer of the agent.
∗ Ls, the language describing properties of the whole multi-agent system,
that is, of the environment and of internal representations of the agents.
Formulas from this language can be the subject of the reasoning of the
agents.
∗ Ao, the set of all actions of observation.
∗ Ac(i), the set of all actions of communication that agent i can perform.
∗ Am(i), the set of mental update actions of agent i.
∗ Interactionsi, the set of composite actions of agent i, constructed only
from actions of observation and communication and physical actions.
∗ Intractionsi, the set of composite actions of agent i, constructed only
from mental actions.
The auxiliary languages are defined by mutual recursion. As the reader may
have noted, some of the languages are parameterised with an agent identity
(for example Ac(i)), while other aren’t (for example Ao). The reason for this
distinction is that the parameterised auxiliary languages contain agent-specific
phrases, while the other languages don’t. This will become clear when we
give the formal definitions below. As explained in Section 4.2.1, we choose to
have a strict separation between internal, mental operations (testing, adding and
deleting information) and external, interacting operations (observing, commu-
nicating, acting). Physical actions only change the state of the world and don’t
directly affect mental states of agents; for this, the agents must observe first.
And even observations and communications don’t directly affect the mental
state. They arrive in the sense buffer, and the agent can examine this and de-
cide to change its mental state then. Mental actions on the other hand only
change mental states. Agents test their sense buffers, and decide to update
their mental state by inserting or deleting formulas; by evaluating their men-
tal state, they can decide to perform interactions with the environment. So,
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the agent programmer has to supply an attention mechanism, to decide when
to observe certain world conditions, and also a relevance evaluation mecha-
nism, which judges the relevance of observed and communicated information.
Usually, agent programming languages contain a built-in mechanism that auto-
matically updates the state of the agent when new observed or communicated
information arrives. Our skeleton programming language offers the freedom
to create any mechanism deemed suitable, at the cost of more programming
effort.
We introduce the two sets of composite actions Interactionsi and Intractionsi
to be able to form agent programs which work in reason–interact cycles, as ex-
plained in Section 4.2.1. For programs, this means that it is forbidden to com-
pose physical actions (including observation and communication) and men-
tal actions in an arbitrary manner. In order to accommodate this, these two
kinds of actions are separated into Interactionsi and Intractionsi. The set
Interactionsi contains all external actions, that is, actions of interaction with
the environment, while Intractionsi contains all internal, mental actions.
The first auxiliary language we define is Lw. Formulas from this language
describe properties of the external world and of the agents, and form the subject
of much of the reasoning of the agents.
DEFINITION 4.1 (Lw)
The set Lw of formulas describing states of the environment is the smallest
set containing:
∗ p, where p ∈ P
∗ ϕ ∧ ψ, ¬ϕ, where ϕ,ψ ∈ Lw
The other logical connectives are defined in terms of ∧ and ¬, as usual. Ex-
amples of formulas in this language are window dirty∧¬other agents present,
¬foggy → window dirty and agent Al stupid ∨agent Al brought passport. So,
formulas of Lw can describe states of the external world, as well as properties
of agents. Note that the expressiveness of Lw depends on the set of propo-
sitional atoms P . Formulas from Lw can be observed and be the subject of
mental modalities from the set Mf . For example, if there is a belief modality
B in Mf , then Bi(¬foggy → window dirty) is a well-formed formula, mean-
ing that agent i believes that, in case it is not foggy outside, the window is
dirty.
162
DEFINITION 4.2 (Lsb(i))
The set Lsb(i) of formulas which can be present in the sense buffer of agent
i is the smallest set containing:
∗ Odi(ϕ), where ϕ ∈ Lw
∗ Cdi(ϕ), where ϕ ∈ Lrep(j), j ∈ I, j 6= i
∗ ϕ ∧ ψ, ¬ϕ, where ϕ,ψ ∈ Lsb(i)
The formula Odi(ϕ) means that agent i has observed that ϕ is true of the en-
vironment, and Cdi(ϕ) means that it has been communicated to agent i that
ϕ holds of the state of the sending agent. The identity of this agent is coded
in the formula ϕ, as will become apparent when we define Lrep(i), and as the
following example shows. Odi(window dirty)∧Cdi(Bj(¬window dirty)) is a
formula of Lsb(i), meaning that agent i has seen that the window is dirty, while
agent j has told him that he believes that the window isn’t dirty. We subscript
the formulas Odi(ϕ) and Cdi(ϕ) with the identity of the agent because the
formulas can be communicated to other agents, and the subscript then clearly
indicates the origin of the information. Observed or communicated informa-
tion in the sense buffer of an agent doesn’t have to be true; observations may
be unreliable, and agents that sent messages could have lied. Also, informa-
tion can get outdated, when the agent doesn’t receive new observations and
communications often enough.
The following definition refers to the language Ls which we will formally
define in Definition 4.5.
DEFINITION 4.3 (Lm(i))
The mental language of the agent i, that is, the logical language that agent
i employs to express its internal mental state is the smallest set containing:
∗ Ci(ϕ), where C ∈Mf , ϕ ∈ Ls
∗ Ci(α), where C ∈Ma, α ∈ Interactionsi
∗ ϕ ∧ ψ, ¬ϕ, where ϕ,ψ ∈ Lm(i)
All mental formulas use operators that are associated with concepts from the
flexible modality sets. So, if Mf contains D, formalising desire, then agent i
can have formulas of the form Di(ϕ) in its mental state. Mental operators from
Mf can be applied to any formula describing the state of the overall agent
system, as will become apparent when we define Ls. And the arguments to
operators from Ma are composite external actions, as agents can for example
intend to do a couple of actions one after the other. Concepts from Mf and
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Ma are subscripted with agent identities, in order to discern between mental
formulas from different agents.
DEFINITION 4.4 (Lrep(i))
The local logical language of agent i, used to describe properties of the
combination of the sense buffer and mental state, is the smallest set con-
taining:
∗ ϕ, where ϕ ∈ Lsb(i) ∪ Lm(i)
∗ ϕ ∧ ψ, ¬ϕ, where ϕ,ψ ∈ Lrep(i)
Agent i can test and communicate any formula from Lrep(i) in its program. An
agent thus doesn’t have to choose between focusing on information in the sense
buffer or information in its mental state; it can test or communicate formulas
describing a property of the union of these two parts of the agent’s state. An
example of such a formula is Gi(¬window dirty)∧Odi(window dirty), where
we assume G (denoting goal) ∈ Mf . Assuming B (denoting belief) is also
present in Mf , another example of Lrep(i) is Bi(Gj(at tropical island)),
which in fact also is a formula of Lm(i). Gi(Odj(flowers on table)) ∧¬Cdi(Odj(flowers on table)) states that it is a goal of i that j has observed
that there are flowers on the table, but j hasn’t told i yet that it saw them.
As a last example of the contents of Lrep(i), Cdi(Cdj(ϕ), ) is a well-formed
formula. This expresses that agent i heard from agent j that agent j heard
something from some other agent, so this means agents can gossip. They can
communicate about what was communicated to them. Also, they can talk about
what they saw.
The basis of Lrep(i) consists of formulas that are an application of some
operator Xi to some other construct. So, for each well-formed formula, it is
always clear of which of the agents the state is described by the formula. This
feature is the reason why the identity of the sender of message ϕ is not indicated
in Cdi(ϕ). The formula ϕ clearly indicates the sender of the message.
DEFINITION 4.5 (Ls)
The setLs of formulas describing the state of the overall multi-agent system
is the smallest set containing:
∗ ϕ, where ϕ ∈ Lw ∪⋃j∈I Lrep(i)
∗ ϕ ∧ ψ, ¬ϕ, where ϕ,ψ ∈ Ls
Formulas from Ls are not constrained to a segment of the multi-agent system.
These formulas can describe properties concerning several local agent states,
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as well as the environment. From the definition it is clear that Lw ⊆ Ls and
Lrep(i) ⊆ Ls, for each agent i ∈ I .
DEFINITION 4.6 (Ao)
The set of all actions of observation an agent can perform is defined:
Ao ≡ {obs(ϕ)|ϕ ∈ Lw}
An agent performing obs(ϕ) employs its sensors to establish whether ϕ is true
in the environment. The agent can observe the external world and/or the (other)
agents. The outcome of an observative action is influenced by the observability
of the information. If, for example, ϕ concerns an object which is outside
the range of the agent’s sensors, then the observation won’t yield the desired
information. Other features of the environment might not be observable at all.
For example, the formula agent James unreliable probably is not observable,
though it is environment information. An agent can come to the conclusion that
it believes this formula by interpreting James’ behaviour.
In case agent i performs obs(ϕ), ϕ is true, and this is observable to i in the
present world state, obs(ϕ) results in the formula Odi(ϕ) being added to i’s
sense buffer somewhat later. In case ϕ doesn’t hold or the information is not
observable, the result is that ¬Odi(ϕ) arrives in the sense buffer.
DEFINITION 4.7 (Ac(i))
The set of all actions of communication agent i can perform is defined:
Ac(i) ≡ {comm(ϕ, j)|j ∈ I, j 6= i, ϕ ∈ Lrep(i)}
An agent performing comm(ϕ, j) sends a message to agent j, containing the in-
formation ϕ. The communicating agent can send every formula which could be
in its local state, independent of the fact whether it is currently true or not. So,
agents are allowed to lie. If i performs comm(ϕ, j), then the formula Cdj(ϕ)
arrives in the sense buffer of agent j some time later.
The actions of observation and communication update the sense buffers of
the agents. In this chapter, the meaning of these actions stays rather abstract,
as we don’t go into the process of revision of the sense buffer. But work has
been done in this direction. In [84], Van Linder, Van der Hoek and Meyer in-
troduce actions for updating the mental state of agents, which can contain both
knowledge and belief. The authors follow the lines of the well-known AGM
framework as proposed by [1] and provide three actions to change the agent’s
minds, which are expansion for adding formulas to the beliefs, contraction for
removing formulas from the beliefs and revision for revising the beliefs with
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new information, yielding a consistent new state. These three update action are
given a rigorous semantics, which satisfies the AGM postulates (which state
demands on belief revision results).
Communication in our model is asynchronous. This means there is no state-
ment for listening and waiting for incoming messages, like there is in for exam-
ple CCP [111]. In CCP, there is a tell statement for sending a message (which
in case of CCP always is a value), and an ask statement for receiving a mes-
sage. If we would adjust these primitives for our purpose, this would result in
statements like tell(ϕ, j) (“tell that ϕ holds to j”) and ask(ψ, i) (“be ready to
receive any answer from i that implies ψ”). Van Eijk took a similar approach in
his thesis [41]. In synchronous communication, the tell and ask statements are
executed synchronously; this means an asking agent has to wait till the appro-
priate agent will tell something, and also that a telling agent has to wait for the
receiver to listen. In our communication model, things are different. An agent
simply receives any message coming in, stores it in its sense buffers (in most
other approaches a queue is used for this; in contrast we opt for an unordered
buffer), and can decide later what to do with the message. It is possible that an
agent totally ignores messages that it received.
The reason we chose asynchronous communication is that it intuitively fits
with agent autonomy and with the openness of many agents. Autonomy implies
that agents don’t have to react to every message from their environment; they
can judge whether reacting is useful for each message coming in. Using syn-
chronous communication, reaction to each message isn’t necessary either, but
in case the addressed agent is not willing to listen, the sending agent is sus-
pended. Though there are ways around this (synchronous and asynchronous
communication are known to be mutually translatable), this is not matching
intuitions around agents. Openness means that agents are open to new infor-
mation and new agents trying to interact with them. So, an open agent never
knows what kind of messages to expect. Therefore it would be inconvenient to
use ask(ψ, j) statements, as the first argument of these statements is the infor-
mation the agent is interested in. If you don’t know what somebody will have
to say to you, there is no appropriate ψ. These reasons made us opt for asyn-
chronous communication, without ask-like statements. Instead, we give each
agent a sense buffer, in which all incoming messages are received. The agent
can then test this buffer to retrieve the information communicated.
Openness also puts demands on the expressiveness of the content language
used for the messages. The fact that agent systems are open and the agents
in them are often heterogeneous means that agents are not built in such a way
that they “expect” communication on certain issues. Only when agents use a
mutually known communication protocol, they know the general flow of the
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conversation; otherwise, they don’t. This is why the contents of a message
needs to have a richer semantics than in classical concurrent programming lan-
guages, where processes simply send values around. If someone comes in to
your office and says “three”, it’s impossible to know what she means. But if
she instead says “I believe you borrowed three of my books”, the matter is
clear. The logical language Lrep(i) offers more expressiveness than the values
(numbers, strings, etc.) used in concurrent programming. By using this lan-
guage, the content of a message can be understandable to the receiver, as the
modalities fromMf andMa indicate what the status of the argument formula
or action is.
As an example of this, assume Ma contains Req do, where Req do(α)
means: I request you to do α for me. If an agent receives the message
Req doi(α), then it is clear what is asked. Note that the flexibility of the
concept sets allows the programmer to introduce speech act types, as used in
KQML [46] and in FIPA ACL [133].
The next definition concerns Am(i), the set of basic mental update actions
of agent i, i ∈ I .
DEFINITION 4.8 (Am(i))
The set of basic mental update actions of agent i is defined:
Am(i) ≡ {ins(Ci(ϕ)), del(Ci(ϕ))|C ∈Mf , ϕ ∈ Ls} ∪{ins(Ci(α)), del(Ci(α))|C ∈Ma, α ∈ Interactionsi}
So, the basic mental update actions in Am(i) are adding and removing basic
mental formulas to and from its mental state, which is made up from different
informational and motivational attitudes. Actually, these are not the only basic
mental actions; the agent can also test its own mental state. For technical rea-
sons (regarding the special semantic functions we need to give semantics to the
mental update actions), we chose not to include test actions in Am(i).
Next, we come to the set of composite actions which are built only from
physical actions and actions of observation and communication, and which can
be executed during the interaction phase in a round of the reason–interact cycle:
DEFINITION 4.9 (Interactionsi)
The set Interactionsi of all composite interactions of agent i is the small-
est set containing:
∗ skip
∗ a, where a ∈ As ∪ Ag ∪ Ao ∪ Ac(i)
∗ α;β, α+ β, α‖β, where α, β ∈ Interactionsi
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The basic actions in Interactionsi are skip and actions from As, Ag, Ao and
Ac(i). Actions may be composed through the conventional operators ‘;’ for
sequential composition, ‘+’ for non-deterministic choice and ‘‖’ for parallel
composition. During the interaction phase of a reason–interact cycle, agent i
executes composite actions from Interactionsi. The interaction phase should
never last forever; this is why we don’t allow iteration of actions, as an iterated
statement could be executed infinitely. Actions can be repeatedly executed by
performing them in a number of consecutive reason–interact cycles.
We go on to define the set of composite actions built up only from mental
actions. These are the actions an agent can perform during the reasoning phase
of the reason–interact cycle.
DEFINITION 4.10 (Intractionsi)
The set Intractionsi of all composite intractions of agent i is the smallest
set containing:
∗ ϕ?, where ϕ ∈ Lrep(i)
∗ a, where a ∈ Am(i)
∗ α;β, α+ β, α‖β, where α, β ∈ Intractionsi
The basic mental actions an agent can do are testing its mental state and sense
buffer, and updating its mental state using the actions from Am(i). These ac-
tions may be composed in an arbitrary fashion using sequential composition,
non-deterministic choice and parallel composition to obtain the mental part of
the agent program. Again, we don’t allow iteration as a program constructor,
for the same reasons as we disallowed it for interactions. The mental part of the
program is executed during the reasoning phase of the reason–interact cycle.
In an agent program, the agent alternates reasoning and interacting. In the
next subsection, we will provide a definition of agent programs that fixes the
intuition of the agent executing reason–interact cycles. Before we come to this,
we give an example of a partial agent program, that clarifies the kind of internal
and external actions an agent executes during one round of the reason–interact
cycle.
EXAMPLE 4.1
A team of agents are exploring an unknown territory together. Possibly,
there are malicious agents around that try to destroy team members. The
agents i, j and k operate in the territory. The modality set Mf contains
(among others) an operator B for belief and an operator Q for asking ques-
tions. The formula Qi(ϕ) means that agent i has the question whether ϕ
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holds. Supposing that agent i is currently moving quite fast, consider the
following program code of agent i:
Cdi(Bj(obstacle ahead))?;
([Bi(agent j reliable)?; ins(Bi(obstacle ahead));EvadeObstacle]
+
[¬Bi(agent j reliable)?; ins(Bi(Cdi(Bj(obstacle ahead))));
(obs(obstacle ahead)‖comm(Qi(obstacle ahead), k)‖SlowDown)])
In this program fragment, agent i reacts in one of two ways when it has
received information from j that there is an obstacle ahead. The two al-
ternative reactions are composed using non-deterministic choice. Both al-
ternatives start with a test of the mental state; this test transforms the non-
deterministic choice to a deterministic decision. In case agent i believes that
the bearer of the message (j, that is) is reliable, it inserts a belief regard-
ing the obstacle in its mental state and subsequently evades the obstacle.
In case it doesn’t believe that j is reliable, agent i is careful; the message
about the obstacle could be a trap. Agent i inserts into its mental state the
belief that agent j communicated to it its belief that there is an obstacle,
and then agent i tries to find out more regarding the alleged obstacle. It
concurrently performs an observation and asks agent k whether it has some
information about the obstacle. Precautiously, agent i also slows down.
4.3.3 Syntax of the programming language itself
We need one more auxiliary language, called Bi, whose elements are valid
behaviours (see also Section 4.2.2). A behaviour specifies the body of the
reason–interact cycle. In an agent program, one behaviour is iterated, as long
as the ultimate objective of the agent is not yet fulfilled.
DEFINITION 4.11 (Bi)
Bi is the smallest set containing:
∗ α, where α ∈ Interactionsi
∗ β, where β ∈ Intractionsi
∗ α;β, where α ∈ Intractionsi and β ∈ Bi
or α ∈ Bi and β ∈ Interactionsi
∗ α+ β, where α, β ∈ Bi
∗ α‖β, where α, β ∈ Bi
169
The composite statement making up the behaviour must be constructed in such
a way that all reasoning, mental actions precede all physical actions and actions
of observation and communication. Therefore, sequential composition of two
actions isn’t allowed arbitrarily and iteration is not allowed at all. Later on,
when we come to the semantics of the programming language, we will take
measures to ensure that the execution of a parallel composition of behaviours
always results in reasoning preceding acting. And in Section 4.5, we will prove
that indeed every execution of a behaviour is proper in this sense.
Although each agent program simply is an iterated behaviour, this doesn’t
mean that the agent executes the same actions over and over again. Each be-
haviour still allows many possible execution traces, as it is a composite state-
ment which can contain tests and choices.
For iteration, we use the notation α+, meaning: “execute α one or more
times.” This isn’t the most obvious choice for an iteration operator. Usually,
iterating a program α is done like this: α∗, which means “execute α zero or
more times”. We use + instead of ∗ because of a minor technical problem,
which we will explain when we define the semantics of agent programs in
Section 4.4.2.
At last, we can now define the set of agent programs of the skeleton pro-
gramming language:
DEFINITION 4.12 (Agent programs)
Si, the set of programs for agent i, is defined:
Si ≡ {ϕ? + ((¬ϕ?; γ)+;ϕ?)|ϕ ∈ Lrep(i), γ ∈ Bi}.
We employ the convention to write “while ¬ϕ do γ” as a syntactically sug-
ared equivalent of ϕ? + ((¬ϕ?; γ)+;ϕ?).
In the definition above, ϕ is the ultimate objective of the agent. The agent keeps
on executing the behaviour γ until ϕ holds. With this definition, we equip the
agents with a syntactic reason–interact cycle.
We give some examples of composed statements and indicate whether they
are valid agent programs. We use the convention of writing actions in this font,
and logical formulas in this font. We will use the while . . . do notation for the
iterated behaviour, as this is more readable.
170
EXAMPLE 4.2
while true do
([Odi(window dirty)?; ins(Bi(window dirty));
Bi(window dirty)?;CleanWindow]
+
[¬Odi(window dirty)?; skip])
This is a (syntactically) valid agent program. Repeatedly, the agent
checks whether it observed dirty windows and updates its beliefs accord-
ingly. If there is a dirty window, the agent proceeds to clean it. In this pro-
gram, each iteration of the cycle first performs some mental actions (updat-
ing the beliefs and testing them) and then some physical actions (cleaning
windows or doing nothing).
EXAMPLE 4.3
while true do
([Odi(window dirty)?; ins(Bi(window dirty));
Bi(window dirty ∧ ¬at window)?;GotoWindow;
Bi(window dirty)?;CleanWindow]
+
[¬Odi(window dirty)?; skip])
This program isn’t correct, because it allows executions where the agent
tests its mental state (which is reasoning) after it performed a physical ac-
tion of moving. It is very easy to correct the error in the syntax of the
previous program, as the second test for a dirty window can just as well be
left out.
4.4 Semantics
4.4.1 Intuitions
The skeleton programming language of which we defined the syntax in the
previous section is generic. The system designer can choose the modalities the
agents will use, and the reasoning actions as well as the physical actions. In this
section, we will provide the generic real-time semantics of the reason–interact
cycle based agent systems that can be built in the skeleton programming lan-
guage.
Reasoning and acting
We use two kinds of operational semantics (Plotkin-style, [98]) for the pro-
gramming language, a local semantics for individual agent programs and a
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global semantics which composes the local behaviours of the agents and events
happening in the world into a global system behaviour. As the effects of exter-
nal interactions depends heavily on the behaviour of the other agents and the
circumstances in the world, the local semantics results in a large set of can-
didate traces, of which only a small part actually will contribute to the global
system traces that constitute the semantics of the overall system. Only those
local agent traces that properly fit together with the local traces of the other
agents and fit with the world circumstances will contribute to the global se-
mantics. The other local traces are discarded.
The local semantics focuses on the behaviour of one agent at a time. The
configuration of an agent i is a triple 〈σ, δ, pi〉, where σ is the sense buffer, δ
the mental state and pi the program still to be executed. Here, both σ and δ
are sets of formulas; σ is a subset of Lsb(i) and δ is a subset of Lm(i). The
local semantics yields a set of local traces. Each trace is a sequence of labelled
transitions and local configurations, like this: S1
l1−→ S2 l2−→ S3 l3−→ S4.
Because of the differences between acting and reasoning, we use two dif-
ferent transition functions for the two phases of the reason–interact cycle. As
reasoning is a process internal to an agent, we call the transition function for
reasoning the internal transition function. Interactions are actions in the en-
vironment of the agent, so the transition function for interaction is called the
external transition function. The reason for this split is the way we deal with
parallelism.
Parallelism is allowed almost anywhere in the agent program. But we give a
different semantics to parallel operations, depending on whether they are men-
tal actions or physical actions. As the agent is the only one altering its own
mental state, it is the responsibility of the agent programmer to use parallel
reasoning actions in such a way that they never interfere with one another. An
example of a possible interference is when the agent program contains concur-
rent statements to insert contradictory formulas into the mental state. Assuming
the agent programmer prevents situations like this, all parallel actions are inde-
pendent, so an interleaving semantics is perfectly acceptable for mental actions.
On the other hand, the outcome of observations, communications and physical
actions an agent performs depends on the actions of the other agents and on
events taking place. This is not under total control of the agent. So, we use a
step semantics [91] for the interaction part of a reason–interact cycle.
Each internal and external transition step takes one unit of time. This way,
we can model that the reasoning process of an agent takes a certain amount
of time, and also that physical actions have duration. We assume each atomic
mental operation and each action of observing or communication can be exe-
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cuted in one time unit. As explained in Section 4.2.3, each individual or group
action an agent performs is translated into a sequence of atomic individual sub-
actions, each taking one time unit.
The external and internal transition functions use different arcs with dif-
ferent labels. This distinction is necessary to properly define the semantics of
our language, because of the dual nature of the semantics needed. For inter-
nal transitions, we use 〈σ, δ, pi〉 i; 〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉. The transitions are labelled
only with the identity of the agent. One internal transition step denotes the ex-
ecution of one mental action (either a test or an update). The reasoning phase
of one round of the reason–interact cycle generally takes a number of internal
transition steps (and thus several time units). Note that the sense buffer can
change at an internal transition step. This change isn’t caused by the reasoning
of the agent, but by information arriving in the agent from the environment.
While the agent is reasoning, other agents can still send messages to it. The
reasoning process of the agent can be influenced by this new information. In-
formation coming in during reasoning can make it hard to come to definite and
consistent decisions. But as we want our model to be realistic with respect
to interaction, we allow these disturbances. For external transitions, we use
〈σ, δ, pi〉 i,(O,C,P )−→ 〈σ′, δ, pi′〉. Here, i again is the agent identifier. The sets O,
C and P contain the observations, outgoing communications and atomic phys-
ical sub-action steps the agent i performs during a particular time unit. These
sets must be part of the label of this transition function in order to be able to
arrive at the global transition function. Because observing, communicating and
physical action differ in nature, we use three distinct sets for them. One external
transition step can mean the execution of many physical sub-actions, observa-
tions and communications, as in step semantics actions are not interleaved but
executed simultaneously in a step-wise manner.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the two different transition functions and the way the
reason–interact cycle is interpreted. Every round of the cycle is unfolded into
a sequence of mental, internal actions followed by a sequence of sets of atomic
external interactions. For the global transition function, the distinction between
the two transition functions is not relevant. Using two different transition ar-
rows in the global transition rule would lead to notational clutter, so we replace
each internal transition by an appropriate external transition. This will be ex-
reasoning steps
i, (On,Cn, Pn)i, (O2, C2, P2)i, (O1, C1, P1)
Figure 4.2: Local agent traces
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plained in Subsection 4.4.2.
So, the resulting local traces of an agent only use the external transition
function. A local trace is a sequence of several ticks of reasoning followed by
several ticks of interaction, followed by several ticks of reasoning, etc. The
global semantics then selects local traces of the agents that fit together and
match the dynamics of the world and composes these into global system traces.
Regarding the semantics of physical actions
In order to define the transition functions for an agent program, we have to
know the most basic actions. The physical actions that occur in agent programs
are member of As or Ag. But actions from these sets can take several ticks of
the global clock, and as we explained in Section 4.2.3, we replace physical
actions in an agent program by one of its candidate extensions before giving
semantics to the program. Each of the candidate extensions is a sequence of
atomic sub-actions from Asub, which are annotated with signs for success (+)
or failure (−). Locally, it cannot be determined whether a sub-action will suc-
ceed or fail (as this depends on the world situation), so the local traces will
contain both options. The annotation with the sign is important for the nature
of the action. In case the environment circumstances are ideal for a certain
sub-action, it can only succeed, so only the positively annotated variant of the
action will yield successor states for the agent system in the global semantics,
while the negatively annotated variant will end in failure, yielding the empty set
of successor states. So, the annotated sub-actions b+ and b− are not identical.
This is why we define a new set of annotated sub-actions, based on Asub. This
set is called Aex, where ex refers to the successful or unsuccessful execution
of the sub-actions.
DEFINITION 4.13 (Aex)
We define the set of sub-actions in execution as follows:
Aex ≡ {b+, b−|b ∈ Asub\{skip}} ∪ {skip}
As we stated before, we equate skip with skip+.
In agent programs, steps of the actions don’t appear. Agents decide to do
some action, without “being aware of” the atomic sub-actions that make up
this action and the time it takes to execute the action. The sub-actions are
not allowed to be part of agent programs. But as actions are executed, the
(abstract) action is replaced by one of its possible extensions. Depending on
the circumstances in the system (the state of the world), one or possibly several
extensions will be picked by the semantics and will become part of the set of
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execution traces of the agent system. By executing a sequence of sub-actions,
each taking one time unit, we implement action duration. Thus, the actions as
they occur in agent programs are abstract, as the duration of the execution and
(for group actions) the way of realising the action are abstracted from.
The actions of observation and communication, members of Ao and Ac(i),
always take one tick of the global clock. So these actions are not composed of
sub-actions; they are atomic themselves.
Below, we define a relation / that links physical actions from As and Ag
to their possible extensions. These extensions are sequences of annotated sub-
actions (from Aex), linked together by the operator for sequential composi-
tion ‘;’. Mathematically, the notation A∗ex denotes the set of all sequences of
elements of Aex. These sequences are not composed by means of sequential
composition, but by concatenation, but for the present purpose, we will identify
these two forms of building sequences. We also did this (without mentioning it)
in Section 4.2.3, when we introduced group action schemes as being multi-sets
of sequences of sub-actions.
DEFINITION 4.14 (Extensions of physical actions)
The relation / (pronounce: “extends into”) is of type (As ∪ Ag)×A∗ex. If
the duration of an individual action c ∈ As is k, then there are k sub-actions
c1, c2, . . . , ck ∈ Asub, which can be part of executions of c. We have:
c / c1+; c2+ . . . ; ck+
c / c1+; c2+ . . . ; ck−1+; ck−
c / c1+; c2+ . . . ; ck−2+; ck−1−
.
.
.
c / c1+; c2−
c / c1−,
and for all other sequences S from A∗ex it is not the case that c / S.
If A v A∗sub is a group action scheme for a group action d ∈ Ag , the
duration of the group action scheme is k, and the sequence d1; d2; . . . ; dk ∈
A, then we have:
d / d1+; d2+ . . . ; dk+
d / d1+; d2+ . . . ; dk−1+; dk−, if dk 6= skip
d / d1+; d2+ . . . ; dk−2+; dk−1−, if dk−1 6= skip
.
.
.
d / d1+; d2−, if d2 6= skip
d / d1−, if d1 6= skip.
There are no other extensions for d then those resulting from successful or
failing executions of contributions from group action schemes for d.
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Note that there can be several group action schemes for a group action, which
each contribute a number of extensions of the group action. In Section 4.2.3, we
gave an example of the generation of extensions of a group action (the LiftTable
example).
In the semantics of the skeleton programming language, we will use the
relation / to replace physical actions in local agent programs by one of their
extensions. The local semantics of an agent program yields a set of traces
for the execution of the program of one agent. In this local semantics, each
extension is considered a possibility, and traces are generated for each of the
possible extensions. We have to generate all of the local traces, because the
local agent state is not sufficient to determine which local behaviour will be
executed. It is essential for the local semantics that the first sub-action of an
extension is recognisable as such, because the execution of a physical action
can be preceded by an arbitrary delay. When we come to the semantics of
physical actions, this will become clear. At this point, we assume that the first
sub-action of an extension is always subscripted with a 1 (although we are
sloppy with this in the examples).
In the global semantics, the local agent behaviours and the dynamics of the
physical world (events) are combined into system traces. The global semantics
takes a local trace of each agent in the system and, taking into account events
happening in the world, intertwines these into a system trace. In construct-
ing system traces, only local agent traces matching the aptness of the world
situation for execution of actions will be used.
4.4.2 Local semantics: agent traces
In this subsection, we will give operational semantics for the local program of
one agent. In order to do this, we first need to formally define local agent con-
figurations, which are transformed by steps of the transition function. We also
need to define extensions of the sets of agent programs, as partial execution of
a syntactically correct program does not necessarily result in another syntacti-
cally correct program. To be precise, if pi is a program according to Definition
4.12 and 〈σ, δ, pi〉 i; 〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉 or 〈σ, δ, pi〉 i,(O,C,P )−→ 〈σ′, δ, pi′〉 is an execu-
tion step of this program, then the remaining composite statement pi′ need not
be a program. We go into this soon.
Some definitions
As we sketched in Section 4.4.1, an agent configuration consists of three ele-
ments: the sense buffer, the mental state and the program remaining to be exe-
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cuted. This last configuration element is the cause of a small technical problem,
which prohibits a straightforward definition of local configurations.
Earlier, in Definition 4.12, we defined the syntax of well-formed agent pro-
grams. Each agent program (as written by the programmer) has to be an iterated
composite behaviour. The set Si contains all programs of agent i. But when
an agent program from Si is executed, and some statements of the programs
are finished, the remainder of the program left to be executed is not very likely
to be another element of Si. One of the things that happens when interpret-
ing agent programs is that abstract physical actions are textually replaced by
one of their extensions, and the definition of the syntax of programs doesn’t al-
low sub-actions as part of programs. Also, execution of the iterated composite
statement which is the agent program generally doesn’t result in another iter-
ated composite statement, as the transition rule for iteration given below will
show. For this reason, we can’t straightforwardly define the third element of a
local configuration of agent i to be an element of Si.
We need extensions of the sets Si. The set S−i contains all program re-
mainders resulting from one or more execution steps of programs from Si.
Local agent configurations, program remainder sets and transition rules are
defined by mutual recursion. We first give the formal definition of local agent
configurations:
DEFINITION 4.15 (Local agent configuration)
The local configuration of an agent i is a triple 〈σ, δ, pi〉, where
∗ σ ⊆ Lsb(i) is the sense buffer
∗ δ ⊆ Lm(i) is the private mental state
∗ pi ∈ S−i is the program to be executed
Next, we define the remainder sets, using the transition functions we will
define below by means of the transition system. Recall that we use 〈σ, δ, pi〉 i;
〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉 for internal transitions, and 〈σ, δ, pi〉 i,(O,C,P )−→ 〈σ′, δ, pi′〉 for exter-
nal transitions.
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DEFINITION 4.16 (Program remainders)
The set S−i of remainders of programs of agent i is inductively defined as
the smallest set satisfying:
∗ √ ∈ S−i
∗ Si ⊆ S−i
∗ If pi ∈ S−i , and either 〈σ, δ, pi〉 i; 〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉 for some σ, δ, σ′ and
δ′ or 〈σ, δ, pi〉 i,(O,C,P )−→ 〈σ′, δ, pi′〉 for some O,C, P, σ, σ′ and δ, then
pi′ ∈ S−i .
We use the symbol
√
to denote the empty program remainder; this results if
there are no more statements left to be executed. We assume pi‖√ = √‖pi = pi
and also
√
;pi = pi. The set of program remainders for agent i thus contains all
programs of agent i, and the composite statements resulting from one or more
execution steps of an agent program of i.
Transition rules
During each atomic transition step, the sense buffer can change because of
observation results or communication coming in. Although the arrival of ob-
servation results is expected, the contents of the results is determined by the
state of the world. Incoming communication isn’t under control of the agent
at all. So, locally we can’t specify the changes to the sense buffer. Therefore,
we allow the sense buffer to change in an arbitrary fashion during each atomic
transition step. Arbitrary changes are also used in the semantics of communi-
cation in CSP [61]. The global semantics will select the appropriate change(s)
to the sense buffer, taking into account the messages other agents sent to the
agent and the result of observational actions the agent performed. We allow
changes to the sense buffer during both the reasoning phase and the interaction
phase. Especially new information coming in during the reasoning part of the
reason–interact cycle can have disrupting effects, as the agent is using informa-
tion from the sense buffer in order to derive conclusions during reasoning. If
the sense buffer isn’t stable, it may be hard or impossible for the agent to come
to definite conclusions.
We now give semantics to the program of an agent with identifier i ∈ I ,
starting with the atomic external actions. This is the transition rule for the
action of doing nothing, skip:
〈σ, δ, skip〉 i,(∅,∅,∅)−→ 〈σ′, δ,√〉
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This transition for the skip action is a physical transition, as skip is a mem-
ber of Interactionsi. Recall that the label of a transition
i,(O,C,P )−→ is inter-
preted like this: i is the identifier of the agent performing the action, O is the
set of observation actions performed during this computation step, C is the set
of communicative actions performed and P is the set of atomic physical sub-
actions performed. As skip means doing nothing, all three sets in the resulting
transition are empty.
Note that the sense buffer σ is transformed into σ′, without any specification
of the relation between σ and σ′. This means that the sense buffer can change
in an arbitrary fashion locally.
Next, we look at physical actions. Actions in As and Ag actually stand for
sequences of annotated atomic sub-actions from A∗ex. The sub-actions always
are single-agent actions taking one time unit to execute. In Definition 4.14, we
introduced the relation /; if a is a physical action, and S is a sequence of sub-
actions, then a/S means that S is a possible extension (execution sequence) of
a. We assume that before giving semantics to a physical action, it extends into
one of the possible sequences. If there are n possible extensions, this leads to
n program variants. Thus, in the transition rules given below we only have to
interpret atomic single-agent sub-actions3.
Before we show the transition rules for action execution, we compare our
practice of representing action duration using extensions with research on the
formal semantics of concurrent processes. Here, actions with duration are often
represented by a pair of events (where an event is an instantaneous action, in
contrast to our use of the term), the first denoting the start of the action and the
second denoting its finish ([62], page 24). So, each action is replaced by two
sub-actions, one denoting the start of the action and the other the finish. Next,
an ordinary interleaving semantics is used. In an article by Rob van Glabbeek
and Frits Vaandrager [52], this splitting of actions is generalised. Actions can
be split into any number of sub-actions, which is close to what we do. But the
authors show that if an interleaving semantics is used:
‘. . . it is impossible to capture durational or structural proper-
ties of actions by splitting them into sequences of any finite num-
ber of parts.’ (page 3)
This advocates our use of a semantics which is non-interleaving, but inspired
by step semantics ([91]).
3One might wonder why we didn’t handle action expansion in a transition rule. The reason for
this is that each transition step, either internal or external, takes one unit of time. Action expansion
isn’t something the agent performs; being merely a technical operation, it shouldn’t take any time.
So, it is dealt with outside the transition system.
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For the following transition rules, we assume a ∈ As∪Ag, a/a1; a2; . . . ; an
and 1 ≤ r ≤ n. Recall from Definition 4.14 that a1, a2, . . . an are annotated
with + or −, to indicate a successful or failing sub-action.
〈σ, δ, a1〉 i,(∅,∅,∅)−→ 〈σ′, δ, a1〉
〈σ, δ, ar〉 i,(∅,∅,{ar})−→ 〈σ′, δ,√〉
There are a number of things to be noted here:
∗ There can be an arbitrarily long delay before the first atomic sub-action
of a physical action is executed. The first transition rule above imple-
ments this idling; the agent doesn’t act yet. This transition rule only ap-
plies to the first sub-action of an extension, which is why we demanded
that these first sub-actions are clearly recognisable (being subscripted
with a 1). As soon as the first sub-action has been done, no delays are
possible anymore.
∗ The mental state doesn’t change as a consequence of performing an
atomic physical action. This is because these actions are external ac-
tions, that depend on and directly affect the environment of the agent.
So, we entirely separate physical actions from mental actions. The ef-
fects of physical actions on the world cannot be given at the local agent
level, as the world is not part of the local agent state.
∗ The consecutive atomic sub-actions of physical actions are sequenced
simply by the operator ;, which will be given the usual semantics later
on.
Next, we interpret observation and communication. Suppose o ∈ Ao.
Then:
〈σ, δ, o〉 i,(∅,∅,∅)−→ 〈σ′, δ, o〉
〈σ, δ, o〉 i,({o},∅,∅)−→ 〈σ′, δ,√〉
Observative actions are also preceded by an arbitrarily long delay, which is
what the first transition rule provides. At the local agent level, we don’t know
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what the outcome of the observation might be, as this depends on the environ-
ment. So, the sense buffer changes in an arbitrary manner, as in all previous
transition rules.
Next, we look at actions of communicating something. Suppose c ∈ Ac(i).
〈σ, δ, c〉 i,(∅,∅,∅)−→ 〈σ′, δ, c〉
〈σ, δ, c〉 i,(∅,{c},∅)−→ 〈σ′, δ,√〉
Again, the first rule provides a delay before the communicative action.
Now, we have looked at all building blocks of interactions. Next, we turn
to the basic actions forming the building blocks of intractions, that is, to basic
mental actions. We use our other transition function ( i; ) for these. We start
with testing the mental state and sense buffer:
δ ∪ σ |= ϕ
〈σ, δ, ϕ?〉 i; 〈σ′, δ,√〉
The formula ϕ is tested on the local agent state, which consists of the sense
buffer and the mental state. In case ϕ is true, the transition can be taken; other-
wise, execution blocks.
The other basic mental actions are actions from Am(i). These actions up-
date the mental state by adding or deleting intentions, beliefs, desires, goals,
etc. To do this in a logically justified manner, we introduce a revision function
for the mental state of agent i, υi : ℘(Lm(i)) × Am(i) → ℘(℘(Lm(i))). This
function takes a mental state and a mental action and returns the set of mental
states that could result from a revision of the mental state caused by the action.
We abstract from details of revision; see e.g., [49] for an overview of tech-
niques for belief revision. Then, this is the transition rule for a mental action
m ∈ Am(i), supposing δ′ ∈ υi(δ,m):
〈σ, δ,m〉 i; 〈σ′, δ′,√〉
This transition rule clearly illustrates that our semantics is a generic semantics
for agent architectures. As the system designer can choose which modalities
and concepts (belief, expectation, desire, request, intention, goal, . . . ) the agent
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will employ, the generic semantics is parameterised with a revision function for
the modalities picked.
Now we will give semantics to the program constructors. Because we have
two transition functions now, one for mental actions and one for physical ac-
tions, this is not entirely traditional. We want to make sure that all reasoning
actions are finished the moment the interaction phase of a reason–interact cycle
starts. This influences the semantics of the program constructors. We will use
the arrow l99K to stand for either l−→ or l;, where l denotes an arbitrary label
(possibly composed of several elements).
We start with sequential composition. Nothing strange happens here.
〈σ, δ, pi1〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′1〉
〈σ, δ, pi1;pi2〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′1;pi2〉
This transition rule states that in order to execute a sequential composition of
two programs, you start by executing the first step of the first program.
We look at non-deterministic choice next. According to the syntax of the
programming language, the operator + can occur between two elements of Bi,
two elements of Interactionsi and two elements of Intractionsi. The first
case appears interesting, as one of the behaviours could start off doing an exter-
nal interaction step, while the other starts with a reasoning step. But the syntax
of the programming language is defined in such a manner that either behaviour
can be chosen, without running the risk of reasoning after acting during one
round of the reason–interact cycle. Later on, in Section 4.5, we will prove this.
〈σ, δ, pi1〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′1〉
〈σ, δ, pi1 + pi2〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′1〉
〈σ, δ, pi2〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′2〉
〈σ, δ, pi1 + pi2〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′2〉
Next, we look at iteration. An iterated program pi+ is executed either one
or more times. For both cases, we have a transition rule:
〈σ, δ, pi〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉
〈σ, δ, pi+〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉
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〈σ, δ, pi〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉
〈σ, δ, pi+〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′;pi+〉
After the first step of the program pi is taken, and the remaining program to
be executed is pi′, the first rule replaces all of the iterated statement pi+ by pi′.
This way, the program pi is executed one time only. The second transition rule
results in a remaining program in which first pi′ is finished, after which there
again will be one or more executions of pi. So, the second transition rule results
in two or more executions of pi.
At this point we can explain why we didn’t choose for the usual iteration
operator ‘∗’. The statement pi∗ means that pi is executed either zero or more
times. A transition rule for the first case would have to look like this:
〈σ, δ, pi∗〉 i; 〈σ′, δ′,√〉
Now, there are two objections to this rule. The first is that it is an arbitrary
choice to use an internal transition step here. We could just as well use an ex-
ternal transition step, labelled like this: i,(∅,∅,∅)−→ . As nothing is happening in
the transition, it is impossible to classify this step as either external or internal.
Secondly, there is a problem regarding time. Each transition, either internal or
external, takes one tick of the clock. So, zero executions of an iterated state-
ment will take a time unit, even though nothing is actually executed. These two
problems made us opt for the ‘+’ iteration operator instead of the ‘∗’.
Now, we come to the transition rules for the local program constructor of
parallel composition. Parallel composition in particular is interesting because
we want to implement simultaneousness in the semantics of parallel executions.
Because we have two transition functions now, one for mental actions and one
for physical actions, the transition rules are rather subtle. When there are two
program fragments in parallel, there are several cases. When the first execution
steps of both fragments are internal steps, they are interleaved. When the first
steps of both fragments are external, they are taken simultaneously, such that
their sets of atomic actions are unified. But when one fragment takes an internal
step, and the other an external step, then we give precedence to the internal step.
This is because we want the reasoning phase of a round of the reason–interact
phase to be totally finished before the interaction phase is started.
These are the transition rules:
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〈σ, δ, pi1〉 i,(O1,C1,P1)−→ 〈σ′, δ, pi′1〉, 〈σ, δ, pi2〉 i,(O2,C2,P2)−→ 〈σ′, δ, pi′2〉
〈σ, δ, pi1‖pi2〉 i,(O1∪O2,C1∪C2,P1∪P2)−→ 〈σ′, δ, pi′1‖pi′2〉
〈σ, δ, pi1〉 i; 〈σ′, δ′, pi′1〉
〈σ, δ, pi1‖pi2〉 i; 〈σ′, δ′, pi′1‖pi2〉
〈σ, δ, pi2〉 i; 〈σ′, δ′, pi′2〉
〈σ, δ, pi1‖pi2〉 i; 〈σ′, δ′, pi1‖pi′2〉
We will explain the way these rules work by means of an example. The example
illustrates that in parallel compositions, the internal steps of the constituent
programs will precede the external interaction steps.
EXAMPLE 4.4 (Three parallel programs)
Suppose we have three composite statements in parallel, that is, the pro-
gram to be executed is pi1‖pi2‖pi3. We will show how three traces, of pi1,
pi2 and pi3 are combined into a trace of the parallel composition. We ab-
stract from the changes to the mental state and the sense buffer, as these
are not relevant for the present matter. We will thus look at abstract tran-
sitions of the form pi l99K pi′ instead of 〈σ, δ, pi〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉. The
trace of pi1 consists of two reasoning steps, followed by one interaction
step: pi1
i
; pi′1
i
; pi′′1
i,(O1,C1,P1)−→ √. The trace of pi2 only has external
steps: pi2
i,(O2,C2,P2)−→ pi′2 i,(O3,C3,P3)−→ √. Finally, the trace of pi3 has one
internal and one external step: pi3
i
; pi′3
i,(O4,C4,P4)−→ √. To compute the
execution trace of the parallel composition, we have to put parentheses into
the parallel composition (it doesn’t matter where, because parallel compo-
sition is associative, as we will justify in Section 4.5). So, we compute the
semantics of (pi1‖pi2)‖pi3. Because the first step of pi1 is pi1 i; pi′1 and the
first step of pi2 is pi2
i,(O2,C2,P2)−→ pi′2, only the second transition rule above
applies, resulting in pi1‖pi2 i; pi′1‖pi2. This transition is interleaved with
the first internal transition step of pi3, where the order is picked randomly.
So, one of the two possibilities is a trace starting like this: (pi1‖pi2)‖pi3 i;
(pi1‖pi2)‖pi′3 i; (pi′1‖pi2)‖pi′3. At this point, the next step of pi′1 is its sec-
ond internal step, while the next steps of both pi2 and pi′3 are external transi-
tions. According to the rules above, the only possibility is that pi′1 proceeds:
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(pi1‖pi2)‖pi3 i; (pi1‖pi2)‖pi′3 i; (pi′1‖pi2)‖pi′3 i; (pi′′1‖pi2)‖pi′3. Now, all
reasoning steps have been taken and the interactions can be executed. First,
we look at the sub-program (pi′′1‖pi2). As we have pi′′1 i,(O1,C1,P1)−→ √
and pi2
i,(O2,C2,P2)−→ pi′2, the first transition rule allows us to derive that
pi′′1‖pi2 i,(O1∪O2,C1∪C2,P1∪P2)−→ √‖pi′2. As √‖pi′2 = pi′2, and pi′3 also takes
an external step, we get (pi′′1‖pi2)‖pi′3 i,(O1∪O2∪O4,C1∪C2∪C4,P1∪P2∪P4)−→
pi′2
i,(O3,C3,P3)−→ √, which is the complete trace of this parallel compo-
sition.
In the following, we will sometimes use the notations S 6; S′ and S 6−→
S′ to denote that there is no internal or external transition step possible, respec-
tively.
Resulting local traces
The local transition rules result in local traces which look like this:
(σ0, δ0, pi0)
i
; (σ1, δ1, pi1)
i
; (σ2, δ2, pi2)
i
; . . . i; (σn, δn, pin)
l1−→
(σn+1, δn, pin+1)
l2−→ (σn+2, δn, pin+2) l3−→ . . . lm−→ (σn+m, δn, pi′0) i;
. . . .
So, every trace is a finite or infinite alternation of reasoning steps and in-
teraction steps. Note again the separation between internal and external agent
behaviour. During the reasoning phase, the mental state (δ) changes. Dur-
ing the interaction phase, it remains the same, as performing physical actions,
observations and communications never directly affect the mental state of the
agent. Each transition, either internal or external, takes one time unit, mak-
ing our semantics a real-time semantics. Although not detectable in the local
traces, an agent reasoning doesn’t directly influence the state of the world or
the mental state of the other agents. Agents in their interaction phase do modify
the world state and the sense buffers.
In order to combine the processing of all agents into one system trace, it is
convenient to only have one kind of transition arrows. So, after we generated
the set of local traces for an agent program, we replace every internal transi-
tion (σ, δ, pi) i; (σ′, δ′, pi′) in a local agent trace with an external transition
(σ, δ, pi)
i,(∅,∅,∅)−→ (σ′, δ′, pi′). The three empty sets labelling the transition
indicate that no interactions are done during this reasoning step.
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4.4.3 Global semantics: system traces
On the global level, we link up the local traces of all agents in the multi-agent
system. Also, we allow events to happen in the world. As the local reasoning
steps (the intractions) of the different agents are independent of the processing
of the other agents or the world situation, the global semantics doesn’t affect the
locally computed semantics of intractions. But the effects of locally computed
interaction steps of the agents do depend on each other and the events taking
place in the world. So, the main use of the global semantics is to compute the
result of individual physical actions, observation, communication and events as
they take place concurrently in possibly interfering or synergetic ways.
In order to define the global semantics, we first need definitions of the state
of the world and of the overall system configuration.
Some definitions
First, we define the state of the world simply to be the set of propositional
atoms currently true of the environment:
DEFINITION 4.17 (World state)
A world state W is an interpretation of the set of propositional atoms P ,
defined as the set of atoms that are true: W ⊆ P . All atoms not part of a
world state are false.
Next we define global system configurations:
DEFINITION 4.18 (Global system configuration)
We define a global system configuration to be a pair 〈W, {Si|i ∈ I}〉,
whereW ⊆ P is the world state, and the Si’s are local agent configurations.
The global transition rule
Because the local behaviour of a single agent is now placed in the context of
the behaviours of the other agents and the world, there are several matters that
need attention at this level. These are:
∗ Updating of the sense buffers of the agents. The sense buffer of an agent
is not updated through deliberation of the agent, but only through obser-
vation results and messages coming in. To update the sense buffers, we
introduce functions ρi, i ∈ I , which takes a sense buffer of agent i and a
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set of new formulas (incoming observations and communication) for the
sense buffer, and returns a set of updated sense buffers. The outcome is
a set because the revision process might yield several new sense buffers.
One of these is non-deterministically chosen. It is not enough to just add
the formulas to the old sense buffer, as new information could contradict
older information. Additionally, we need a function for observability.
We use the functions ξi, i ∈ I, ξi : ℘(P)× Lw → {0, 1}. This function
takes the world state and the formula which is being observed, and re-
turns 1 when the formula is observable in that particular world state and
0 otherwise.
∗ Events taking place in the physical world. As events are occurrences not
initiated by any of the agents in the system, we introduce them at the
global level.
∗ Changing the world state. Performing actions probably will change the
state of the world. We have a function τ , which takes a world state, and
a pair consisting of events and annotated atomic single action steps with
the identifiers of the agents performing them, and then returns a set of
possible new world states. We have a set of world states as it might not
be totally predictable what the outcome of a combination of actions and
events will be. The set of world states represents the possible outcomes,
of which one is non-deterministically chosen.
Note that the function τ , which models world state transformation, incor-
porates all details about which actions and events interfere with each other, and
in which way. In the next subsection, we will touch upon some aspects of τ ,
such as the role it plays in modelling group actions.
As introduced in Section 4.3.1, E is the set of all events possible in the
world. For each event e ∈ E , there is a precondition ϕe ∈ Lw, which expresses
in which world states the event could take place. If this condition isn’t fulfilled
in a world state, the event can’t take place in that state. For example, the event
GasExplosion can only take place in case someone forgot to turn off the gas
or there is a gas leak. If this is the case, it is not certain that there will be a
GasExplosion, but it is possible. In the following, D ⊆ E is the set of events
taking place in some time unit, Si abbreviates 〈σi, δi, pii〉 and S′i abbreviates〈σ′i, δ′i, pi′i〉.
Now, we have the following global transition rule:
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∀i ∈ I : Si i,(Oi,Ci,Pi)−→ S′i, W |= {ϕe|e ∈ D}
〈W, {Si|i ∈ I}〉 −→ 〈W ′, {S′i|i ∈ I}〉
where the following must hold:
∗ For all i ∈ I :
σ′i ∈ ρi(σi,{Odi(ϕ)|obs(ϕ) ∈ Oi and ξi(W,ϕ) = 1 and W |= ϕ} ∪
{¬Odi(ϕ)|obs(ϕ) ∈ Oi and (W 2 ϕ or ξi(W,ϕ) = 0)} ∪
{Cdi(ϕ)| exists j 6= i ∈ I : comm(ϕ, i) ∈ Cj}).
This states that all sense buffers must have been properly updated.
∗ W ′ ∈ τ(W, (D, {(a, i)|i ∈ I and a ∈ Pi})). This computes the next
world state.
This transition rule yields the global execution traces of a multi-agent sys-
tem specified in our programming language. Intuitively, the global transition
sums up all actions and events taking place during one unit of time. We will
explain the details of the rule and the conditions that belong to it.
The body of the rule (the rule without the prerequisites and conditions) ac-
tually doesn’t seem to do anything spectacular. It simply takes a local transition
step of each agent, and integrates all local state changes, from Si to S′i, into a
global state change 〈W, {Si|i ∈ I}〉 −→ 〈W ′, {S′i|i ∈ I}〉. A local transition
step of an agent models a set of observative, communicative and physical sub-
actions being executed during one unit of time. Together with the events taking
place during this time step, D, these sub-actions determine the state change of
the world, from W to W ′.
But not every combination of local transition steps will result in a global
transition. This is due to the two conditions of the transition rule. We start by
looking at the first condition and its selective function.
Recall that in the local transition rules, we allowed arbitrary changes to the
sense buffer in each local transition. This results in many transitions which
are clearly wrong. For example, the sense buffer can change from the empty
set to a set of observation results completely specifying the observable world
state, without the agent executing any observations. Also, when the agent is
performing an observation regarding some formula, the sense buffer can con-
tain an observation result completely opposite to the actual world state, and an
arbitrary set of messages, which might not have been sent at all by the other
agents. The first condition above filters out these wrong local transitions. Only
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if the change to the sense buffer as specified in the local transition matches the
observations the agent is actually performing and the results as depending on
the current state of the world (W in the rule above), as well as the messages the
other agents actually send to this agent in this clock tick, the local transition
could contribute to the global transition.
We look at the details of the first condition. It states that for each of the
agents in the multi-agent system (i ∈ I), the new sense buffer as produced in
the local transition (σ′i) must be a revised version of the original sense buffer
(σ′i ∈ ρi(σi, . . .)). The sense buffer must be revised with a set of formulas,
consisting of three subsets:
∗ {Odi(ϕ)|obs(ϕ) ∈ Oi and ξi(W,ϕ) = 1 and W |= ϕ}. These are the
positive observation results (“It is observed that ϕ holds”) of observative
actions agent i performed in this clock tick (obs(ϕ) ∈ Oi), where the
results are positive because the formulas involved are observable to i in
this world state (ξ(W,ϕ) = 1) and also hold (W |= ϕ).
∗ {¬Odi(ϕ)|obs(ϕ) ∈ Oi and (W 2 ϕ or ξi(W,ϕ) = 0)}. These are the
negative observation results (“It is not observed that ϕ holds”) of obser-
vative actions agent i performed in this clock tick (obs(ϕ) ∈ Oi), where
the results are negative because the formulas involved are not observable
to i in this world state (ξ(W,ϕ) = 0) or do not hold (W 2 ϕ). Note that
a negative observation result ¬Odi(ϕ) is very different from Odi(¬ϕ)!
∗ {Cdi(ϕ)| exists j 6= i ∈ I : comm(ϕ, i) ∈ Cj}. These are the results
(“It is communicated that ϕ holds”) of other agents (j 6= i ∈ I) commu-
nicating something to agent i (comm(ϕ, i) ∈ Cj).
Only if the update of the sense buffer in a local transition obeys the first con-
dition, the local transition could become part of the global computation step.
But in order for this to happen, the second condition, regarding the next world
state, also has to hold. It might not be immediately clear how this condition
rules out certain local agent transitions, as the condition only prescribes the
change to the world state. The condition states that the new world state (W ′) is
a result of the occurrence of a set of events (D) and of the performing of a set of
atomic single-agent sub-actions by certain agents ({(a, i)|i ∈ I and a ∈ Pi})
in the old world state (W ). Recall that these sub-actions are annotated with
either a + for success or − for failure. Note that the sub-actions in the argument
of τ are paired up with the identity of the agent doing them; this is so because
the effect of performing a sub-action might depend on which agent executes it.
The function τ takes into account the interference or synergy (in case of group
actions) of the atomic actions, and yields a set of new world states.
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But in case the given combination of sub-actions or events cannot be ex-
ecuted, the result of τ will be the empty set, and the local transitions giving
rise to the sub-actions won’t contribute to the global system execution. So,
the function τ determines whether an annotated sub-action can be executed
in certain environment circumstances (world situation, other sub-actions and
events taking place). For example, if the local transition of a certain agent i
contains a successful sub-action, that is, ak+ ∈ Pi for ak ∈ Asub, and the
circumstances in the world W are such that this sub-action can only fail, then
τ(W, (D,A)) will yield the empty set of successor world states for each A con-
taining (ak+, i). Thus, no global transition is possible in which ak succeeds.
But the local semantics also provides local traces of agent i containing the fail-
ing variant of this sub-action, that is, ak− ∈ Pi. For this Pi and the same
world state W , τ(W, (D,A)) will yield a set of successor states, representing
the world states that can result from the failing sub-action in combination with
the other occurrences taking place. As another example, suppose two agents
are executing interfering sub-actions, which never can be successfully executed
together. Then, only negatively annotated variants of the sub-actions will lead
to a new world state using τ . Sometimes, there are more options than one. For
example, if three sub-actions happen at the same moment, they might all be
successful, or one might fail. In this situation, differently annotated variants of
the combination of the three actions lead to several possible new world states.
The function τ
As mentioned in the previous subsection, the function τ computes the set of
next world states which could result from performing a set of sub-actions and
events during a time unit. One of these new world states is non-deterministically
chosen by the global semantics. As sub-actions and events can interfere with
each other, or lead to synergetic effects, and there are numerous combinations
of sub-actions and events, specifying τ in a concrete case is a vast amount of
work. The definition of τ depends on the physical actions and events possible
in the domain of the multi-agent system, and τ is thus one of the parameters
of the skeleton programming language. We won’t go into the technical details
of how to concisely specify τ . Other researchers have tried to give logical for-
malisations of the effects of actions in a dynamic environment. Issues like the
frame, qualification and ramification problems play a role here, as well as the-
ories about concurrent actions. We refer to Sandewall’s and Shoham’s work on
non-monotonic logics for a detailed account of these issues [110], and to [7],
for a promising alternative formalisation.
What we will do here is explain how τ contributes to the objectives of
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our operational model. The skeleton programming language and its semantics
are aimed to provide a reasonably realistic model of interaction in multi-agent
systems. We have individual actions and group actions, which have duration,
can fail anytime during the execution and can interfere with each other or with
events taking place. We start with the simpler case, which is individual action.
As we explained in Section 4.2.3 and Section 4.4.1, each individual action
a ∈ As is replaced by one of its extensions when it is semantically interpreted.
For each possible extension, local traces are constructed, which are then com-
bined at the global semantic level into a system trace. We will explain the role
of τ by using an example we introduced in Section 4.2.3. We have an action c
with a duration of three time units (if successful). Imagine this action c is the
action of pouring a cup of coffee. There are four possible extensions of this
action, namely c1+; c2+; c3+, c1+; c2+; c3−, c1+; c2− and c1−. If action c is
part of the program of agent i, then the local semantics yields local traces with
each of these four extensions. Thus, there are local traces where the action is
performed successfully, and there are traces in which pouring a cup of coffee
fails at the first, second or third time unit of the execution. Whether the action
will succeed (first extension) or fail (other three extensions) is determined in
the global semantics, and τ plays a major role in this. We look at one specific
moment in time, at which the execution of c starts. The local traces of the agent
under focus thus start with an external transition step S i,(O,C,P )−→ S′, where
either c1+ ∈ P (in case one of the first three extensions is executed) or c1− ∈ P
(in case the fourth extension is picked). During this time unit, agent i might be
doing other actions, so P can contain more sub-actions, and the other agents
might also be acting. Also, events could be happening. The success or failure
of c1 depends on all these other occurrences, and on the state of the world; the
function τ formalises this. It takes the world state, the set of all atomic sub-
actions and the events taking place during the time unit. Suppose the world
circumstances are ideal for the first sub-action (the cup and the coffee pot are
in the right position, the cup is not (completely) full yet and there is coffee in
the pot) and there are no interfering occurrences. Thus, c1 will certainly suc-
ceed. This means that τ will yield the empty set of successor world states for
each action set containing c1−. The global transition rule doesn’t yield a global
transition if the extension c1− is part of the program to be executed of agent
i. Only the other three extensions thus contribute to a system trace; because
the first step has been taken, the remainders left to be executed are c2+; c3+,
c2+; c3− and c2−, respectively. Now suppose during the second time unit of the
execution, another agent gently touches the arm-actuator of agent i, because it
wants to attract i’s attention. These circumstances both allow success or failure
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of the second sub-action c2, as it is not clear whether the pat on the actuator will
affect agent i’s coffee-pouring. This means that all three remaining sequences
can contribute to the global trace. The result of τ will be different, depending
on whether c2+ or c2− is part of the action set (successful actions lead to ef-
fects different from the effects of failing actions). In the first case, the cup will
continue to be filled with coffee, while in the second case, coffee is spilled all
over the environment of the coffee cup. In the global traces where the second
sub-action fails, execution of c is over; the third sub-action isn’t executed. In
case the second action succeeded, there are again two possibilities for the third
sub-action. Suppose the circumstances cause the third sub-action to fail, for
example because the cup initially contained some coffee already and thus will
overflow now. Only the action c3− will contribute to the global trace. The over-
all result after executing the coffee pouring action is that only two of the four
extensions become part of global traces, namely c1+; c2+; c3− and c1+; c2−.
If two or more individual actions take place during overlapping time in-
tervals, this might cause failure. Then, only failing extensions of the actions
become part of the global traces, and the world state is transformed differently
than would be the case if the actions succeeded. The actions can also lead to
synergetic effects. Then, the actions don’t fail, but yield effects other than the
union of effects of the individual actions. For example, if two soccer-playing
robots kick against the ball in the same direction, the ball moves faster across
the playing field than when only one agent kicks it.
Group actions for the most part are treated identically to individual actions.
A group action is replaced by one of its extensions. There can be extensions
originating from different group action schemes, and they can fail at each time
unit of the execution, just like the extensions of individual actions. Whether
a certain sub-action of a contribution to a group action will succeed or fail is
determined by the world situation, and the other occurrences taking place, anal-
ogously to the way sub-actions of individual actions succeed or fail. The only
somewhat special feature of group actions is that if there is a group of agents ex-
ecuting group action contributions coming from one group action scheme, such
that each contribution from the scheme is done by one agent, if they do this syn-
chronised according to the group action scheme, if there are no other disturbing
occurrences in the world and if the world situation is suitable for execution of
the group action, then there will probably be synergetic effects. This is also for-
malised in the definition of τ . Agents perform group actions mostly to achieve
world situations which they can’t realise on their own, so a well-coordinated
and successful group action execution usually has some synergetic effects. For
the definition of τ , this merely means that the right synergetic effects have to
be established in case the action set of the argument contains sub-actions that
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are part of contributions to a group action coming from a certain group action
scheme.
To illustrate this, we again use an example from Subsection 4.2.3. The
group action we looked at there is LiftTable. We had the following group action
scheme for this action:
[LiftLeg0-15; LiftLeg15-30; LiftLeg30-45; skip; skip,
skip; skip; LiftLeg0-15; LiftLeg15-30; LiftLeg30-45,
skip; LiftLeg0-15; LiftLeg15-30; LiftLeg30-45; skip,
skip; skip; LiftLeg0-15; LiftLeg15-30; LiftLeg30-45]
Now, suppose there is a bowl of soup on the table. If there are four agents ex-
ecuting contributions from the group action scheme in a synchronised manner,
then no soup will spill out of the bowl, unless there are other circumstances
in the world causing the soup to spill. We exclude this last circumstance for
the sake of clarity. For the function τ , this means that the combined execution
of the first four sub-actions LiftLeg0-15, skip, skip and skip (first column of the
group action scheme) should be successful (so only LiftLeg0-15+ is executable)
and also lead to the soup staying in the bowl in the resulting world situation.
The same holds for the next time instants.
In case the group members execute contributions from one group action
scheme that are not properly synchronised (one agent starts two time units ear-
lier with its contribution than the other agents), the group action probably won’t
yield the desired effects. But the individual contributions of the agents could
still be successful. So, if one agent starts lifting its table-leg too early, then the
soup will spill and the bowl will fall off the table, but the table-leg that agent
is holding is lifted, as is the expected outcome of the individual contribution of
that agent. Thus, the only special feature of group actions is that synergy can
be obtained if the agents are properly synchronised.
4.5 Proof of correct reason–interact behaviour
When we defined the syntax of agent programs in Section 4.3.3, we were care-
ful not to compose internal, reasoning statements (Intractions) and external,
interacting statements (Interactions) in an arbitrary manner. We defined sets
(Bi, i ∈ I) of behaviours, which we claimed to be program fragments that,
when executed, always result in all internal statements preceding all external
statements. In an agent program, a behaviour is iterated, to form the reason–
interact cycle of the agent. In this subsection, we will prove that indeed each
execution of a behaviour leads to reasoning preceding acting.
In order to do this, we first have to formalise the concept of execution of
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a program, or rather, of a composite statement. We also define the set of all
composite statements.
DEFINITION 4.19 (Composite statements)
The set CompSi of all composite statements related to agent i is the small-
est set containing:
∗ skip
∗ a, where a ∈ As ∪ Ag ∪ Ao ∪ Ac(i) ∪ Am(i) ∪ Aex
∗ ϕ?, where ϕ ∈ Lrep(i)
∗ α;β, α+ β, α‖β, α+, where α, β ∈ CompSi
Composite statements are simply compositions of basic statements of the
skeleton programming language, without any syntactic restriction. We have
Si ⊂ S−i ⊂ CompSi.
Next, we define traces. A trace of a composite statement is any sequence
of transitions that can result when executing the statement, either partially or
completely. As statements can be part of a larger composite statement (a pro-
gram or program remainder), we need a recursive definition for this. We also
formally define transitions.
DEFINITION 4.20 (Transitions and traces)
If 〈σ, δ, pi〉 and 〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉 are local agent configurations of agent i and l99K
is either an internal transition arrow labelled with the agent identity i or
an external transition arrow labelled with the agent identity i and a triple
of interaction sets (O,C, P ), and 〈σ, δ, pi〉 l99K 〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉, is deducible
by means of the transition system in Section 4.4.2, then 〈σ, δ, pi〉 l99K
〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉 is a transition.
In the following, we will use the convention to equate composite statements
pi to pi0. The use of this convention will become apparent soon. A trace
of a composite statement α ∈ CompSi is recursively defined as follows,
equating α to α0:
∗ 〈σ0, δ0, α0〉 l199K 〈σ1, δ1, α1〉 l299K 〈σ2, δ2, α2〉 l399K . . . lm99K
〈σm, δm, αm〉, where each 〈σk−1, δk−1, αk−1〉 lk99K 〈σk, δk, αk〉 is a
transition. In case αm =
√
, we call the trace successful; otherwise
we call the trace partial.
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∗ if 〈σ0, δ0, pi0〉 l199K 〈σ1, δ1, pi1〉 l299K . . . lm99K 〈σm, δm, pim〉 is a
(successful or partial) trace of α, then so are the following:
•1 〈σ0, δ0, pi0;β〉 l199K 〈σ1, δ1, pi1;β〉 l299K . . . lm99K 〈σm, δm, pim;β〉
•2 〈σ0, δ0, β + pi0〉 l199K 〈σ1, δ1, pi1〉 l299K . . . lm99K 〈σm, δm, pim〉
•3 〈σ0, δ0, pi0 + β〉 l199K 〈σ1, δ1, pi1〉 l299K . . . lm99K 〈σm, δm, pim〉
•4 〈σ0, δ0, pi+0 〉 l199K 〈σ1, δ1, pi1〉 l299K . . . lm99K 〈σm, δm, pim〉
•5 〈σ0, δ0, pi+0 〉 l199K 〈σ1, δ1, pi1;pi+0 〉 l299K . . . lm99K〈σm, δm, pim;pi+0 〉
where β ∈ CompSi is another composite statement.
Thus, a trace of a composite statement α is a number of consecutive transitions
that result when executing α. A trace of α is successful if α is wholly exe-
cuted, and partial if there is a remainder of α left to be executed. At first sight,
the definition of trace-hood might seem hard to grasp, because of its recursive
nature. Intuitively, the first ∗ might seem to capture the idea of trace-hood
completely, making the second ∗ superfluous. But this second ∗ does make
sense. The second ∗ in the definition above postulates that when α is part of
a larger composite statement, in such a way that α is executed before the rest
of the composite statement, then the resulting sequence of transitions is also a
trace of α. We need this in our proofs later on. As an example of this, look
at the statement (a;β)+, where a ∈ As, a / a1+; a2+; a3+, and β ∈ CompSi
is some composite statement. Before giving semantics to a, it is replaced by
its extension. By convention, a trace of an extension of a physical action is re-
garded as a trace of the action itself. Now, 〈σ0, δ0, a1+; a2+; a3+〉 i,(∅,∅,{a1+})−→
〈σ1, δ0, a2+; a3+〉 i,(∅,∅,{a2+})−→ 〈σ2, δ0, a3+〉 is a trace of a1+; a2+; a3+
according to the first ∗ of Definition 4.20, and thus a trace of a. The sec-
ond ∗ then allows to derive that
〈σ0, δ0, a1+; a2+; a3+;β〉 i,(∅,∅,{a1+})−→ 〈σ1, δ0, a2+; a3+;β〉 i,(∅,∅,{a2+})−→
〈σ2, δ0, a3+;β〉
and
〈σ0, δ0, (a1+; a2+; a3+;β)+〉 i,(∅,∅,{a1+})−→
〈σ1, δ0, a2+; a3+;β; (a1+; a2+; a3+;β)+〉 i,(∅,∅,{a2+})−→
〈σ2, δ0, a3+;β; (a1+; a2+; a3+;β)+〉
are also traces of a. Without the second ∗, the last trace would have been a
trace of (a1+; a2+; a3+;β)+, but not of a.
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Note that trace-hood doesn’t survive parallel composition; if α and β are
executed in parallel, then the resulting trace doesn’t start with a trace of α or β
exclusively, as the steps of α and β either are interleaved or accumulated. This
is why Definition 4.20 doesn’t include a case for the ‖-operator.
Now, we can phrase the central theorem of this subsection:
THEOREM 4.1 (Behaviours produce internal steps followed by external steps)
∀i ∈ I ∀γ ∈ Bi : each trace of γ starts with zero or more internal transi-
tions, followed by zero or more external transitions.
This theorem describes a property of the transition arrows of the traces of
behaviours. The sense buffers and the mental states in agent configurations
are not relevant for properties like this. The agent program, the last element
of agent configurations, is relevant, as it is the agent program that determines
to a large extent the set of traces resulting when executing the program. The
only time that the sense buffer or the mental state can influence the trace of a
composite statement is when the program contains mental tests (ϕ?) or mental
update actions (fromAm(i)). Tests don’t influence the nature (external or inter-
nal) of transitions; they can only lead to termination of a trace (failure: ϕ? 6;)
because the condition isn’t true of the sense buffer and the mental state. Mental
updates also don’t influence the nature of the transitions; they merely lead to a
new mental state.
Because of this, we define the notion of abstract traces, in which sense
buffers and mental states are left out. In the proof of Theorem 4.1, we will
make use of these abstract traces, which simplifies matters.
DEFINITION 4.21 (Abstract transitions and traces)
If there are σ, σ′ ⊆ Lsb(i) and δ, δ′ ⊆ Lm(i) such that 〈σ, δ, pi〉 l99K
〈σ′, δ′, pi′〉 is an transition, then pi l99K pi′ is an abstract transition.
An abstract trace of composite statement α ∈ CompSi is recursively de-
fined as follows, equating α to α0:
∗ α0 l199K α1 l299K α2 l399K . . . lm99K αm, where each αk−1 lk99K αk
is an abstract transition. In case αm =
√
, we call the abstract trace
successful, and otherwise we call it partial.
∗ if pi0 l199K pi1 l299K . . . lm99K pim is a (successful or partial) trace of
α, then so are the following:
•1 pi0;β l199K pi1;β l299K . . . lm99K pim;β
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•2 β + pi0 l199K pi1 l299K . . . lm99K pim
•3 pi0 + β l199K pi1 l299K . . . lm99K pim
•4 pi+0 l199K pi1 l299K . . . lm99K pim
•5 pi+0 l199K pi1;pi+0 l299K . . . lm99K pim;pi+0
where β ∈ CompSi is another composite statement.
For each ordinary, full trace, there is exactly one matching abstract trace, which
is obtained by leaving out the sense buffers and mental states. For example, the
abstract version of
〈σ0, δ0, a1+; a2+; a3+;β〉 i,(∅,∅,{a1+})−→ 〈σ1, δ0, a2+; a3+;β〉 i,(∅,∅,{a2+})−→
〈σ2, δ0, a3+;β〉
is the abstract trace
a1+; a2+; a3+;β
i,(∅,∅,{a1+})−→ a2+; a3+;β i,(∅,∅,{a2+})−→ a3+;β. Note that the
traces we used in Example 4.4, Section 4.4.2 were also abstract. Though there
is exactly one abstract trace for every full trace, this is not true the other way
around. For example, del(Bi(ϕ));Bi(ϕ)?
i
; Bi(ϕ)?
i
;
√
is an abstract
trace, for which there are no corresponding full traces. This is immediately
clear when we look at one candidate full trace (we assume the revision function
for the mental state works as one would expect here):
〈σ, {Bi(ϕ)}, del(Bi(ϕ));Bi(ϕ)?〉 i; 〈σ′,∅,Bi(ϕ)?〉
i6;. Also, some abstract
traces have many corresponding full traces. An example of such an abstract
trace is
ins(Bi(ϕ));Bi(ϕ)?
i
; Bi(ϕ)?
i
;
√
.
We now have the following lemma:
LEMMA 4.1 (Abstract traces suffice)
In order to prove Theorem 4.1, it is enough to prove the property mentioned
there for abstract traces instead of for full traces.
PROOF (sketchy):
Take a full trace of a behaviour γ ∈ Bi. Take the corresponding abstract
trace, by leaving out the sense buffers and mental states from the agent con-
figurations. The nature of the transitions (whether the transition is internal
or external) hasn’t changed by this abstraction step. So, if we prove that the
abstract trace consists of zero or more internal transitions followed by zero
or more external transitions, then we have also proven this for the full trace.
End of PROOF.
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Because of this lemma, all subsequent theorems, which contribute to establish-
ing the proof of Theorem 4.1, will pertain to abstract traces instead of to full
ones. Usually we will be sloppy and write ‘traces’ instead of ‘abstract traces’
and ‘transitions’ instead of ‘abstract transitions’.
We can simplify matters even further, as the second lemma shows:
LEMMA 4.2 (Irrelevance of program context)
In order to prove a property of the transition arrows in all (full or partial)
traces of a statement α, it suffices to prove this property for the subset of
traces of α defined at the first ∗ of Definitions 4.20 and 4.21. The property
then also holds for all traces of α in which α is part of a larger composite
statement (defined at the second ∗ of Definitions 4.20 and 4.21).
PROOF (sketchy):
This lemma immediately follows from Definitions 4.20 and 4.21, because
the recursive part of these definitions (second ∗) copies the transition ar-
rows
l199K, l299K, . . . , lm99K of the trace starting at statement pi0 to traces start-
ing at composite statements where pi0 is one of the constituent statements.
End of PROOF
This lemma releases us from having to use induction on the structure of the
program component in the starting configuration of traces, in order to prove a
property of transition arrows in traces.
Because of the way behaviours are defined (Definition 4.11), we need the-
orems regarding traces of statements from Interactionsi and Intractionsi.
We will prove these theorems later on.
THEOREM 4.2 (Interactions produce external steps)
∀i ∈ I ∀α ∈ Interactionsi : each trace of α consists of zero or more
external transitions.
THEOREM 4.3 (Intractions produce internal steps)
∀i ∈ I ∀α ∈ Intractionsi : each trace of α consists of zero or more
internal transitions.
In order to prove the theorems above, we give some more theorems, regard-
ing traces of statements composed using the operators ‘;’, ‘+’ and ‘+’. In the
sequel, we will sometime equate statement pi to pi0, as we did before.
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THEOREM 4.4 (Traces of sequential compositions)
∀i ∈ I ∀α, β ∈ CompSi : each trace of α;β either is a trace of α or a
successful trace of α, followed by a trace of β.
PROOF:
According to Lemma 4.2, we only have to look at the subset of traces of
α;β that start with α;β l99K . Taking into account the transition rule for
sequential composition, such a trace can have two forms, as execution of β
can either have started after successful execution of α (second case) or β is
still to be executed, after partial or successful execution of α (first case).
∗ α0;β l199K α1;β l299K . . . lk99K αk;β, where αj−1 lj99K αj ,
1 ≤ j ≤ k are transitions. Then, α0 l199K α1 l299K . . . lk99K αk
is a trace of α and thus, according to •1 of Definition 4.21, so is
α0;β
l199K α1;β l299K . . . lk99K αk;β.
∗ α0;β l199K α1;β l299K . . . lm99K √;β = β0 lm+199K β1 lm+299K . . . lm+n99K
βn, where αj−1
lj99K αj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m,αm = √ and βj−1 lm+j99K
βj , 1 ≤ j ≤ n are transitions. Then, α0 l199K α1 l299K . . . lm99K √ is
a successful trace of α and thus, according to •1 of Definition 4.21, so
is α0;β
l199K α1;β l299K . . . lm99K √;β. The sequence of transitions
β0
lm+199K β1
lm+299K . . . lm+n99K βn is a trace of β, so α0;β l199K
α1;β
l299K . . . lm99K √;β = β0 lm+199K β1 lm+299K . . . lm+n99K βn is a
successful trace of α, followed by a trace of β.
End of PROOF
THEOREM 4.5 (Traces of compositions by choice)
∀i ∈ I ∀α, β ∈ CompSi : each trace of α + β either is a trace of α or a
trace of β.
PROOF:
According to Lemma 4.2, we only have to look at the subset of traces of
α + β that start with α + β l99K . Taking into account the transition rules
for non-deterministic choice, such a trace can have two forms:
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∗ α0 + β0 l199K α1 l299K α2 l399K . . . lm99K αm, where α0 l199K α1
is a transition. Then, α0
l199K α1 l299K α2 l399K . . . lm99K αm
is a trace of α and thus, according to •3 of Definition 4.21, so is
α0 + β0
l199K α1 l299K α2 l399K . . . lm99K αm.
∗ α0 + β0 l
′
199K β1
l′299K β2
l′399K . . . l
′
n99K βn, where β0
l′199K β1
is a transition. Then, β0
l′199K β1
l′299K β2
l′399K . . . l
′
n99K βm
is a trace of β and thus, according to •2 of Definition 4.21, so is
α0 + β0
l′199K β1
l′299K β2
l′399K . . . l
′
n99K βn.
As these are the only two possibilities, every trace of α+β is either a trace
of α or a trace of β.
End of PROOF
THEOREM 4.6 (Traces of iterated compositions)
∀i ∈ I ∀α ∈ CompSi : each trace of α+ is a concatenation of n+1, n ≥ 0
traces of α, the first n of which are successful.
PROOF:
According to Lemma 4.2, we only have to look at the subset of traces of
α+ that start with α+ l99K . There are two transition rules for iteration, and
at the start of every round of the iteration one of these rules is chosen. In
case the second rule is chosen, then there always is a potential next round.
This next round is started if execution of α in the current round terminates
successfully. We show the construction of a trace of α+, where the second
transition rule is used the first n rounds. In the final round, either the first or
the second transition rule is applied. This construction is the most general
way to arrive at a trace of α+.
We start by looking at the first of the n rounds. We have the trace
α+
l1199K α11;α+
l1299K α12;α+
l1399K . . .
l1m199K √;α+ = α+, where
α0
l1199K α11 and α1j−1
l1j99K α1j , 2 ≤ j ≤ m1, α1m1 =
√
are transitions.
In constructing this trace, we first use the second rule for iteration, and
then m1 − 1 times the rule for sequential composition. We then have that
α
l1199K α11
l1299K α12
l1399K . . .
l1m199K √ is a successful trace of α. It
is not possible to take an unsuccessful, partial trace of α here, as then the
first round of the execution of α+ wouldn’t result in α+, but in αr;α+,
and thus the next round can’t be started. Because of •5 of Definition 4.21,
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α+
l1199K α11;α+
l1299K α12;α+
l1399K . . .
l1m199K √;α+ = α+ is a successful
trace of α.
After this first round, the statement to be executed again is α+, and the
next round starts, again producing a successful trace of α (which might be
different than the one in the first round). After n rounds, the trace of α+
consists of a concatenation of n traces of α: α+
l1199K . . .
l1m199K α+ l
2
199K
. . .
l2m299K α+ l
3
199K . . . l
n
199K . . . l
n
mn99K α+. Then, round n+ 1 starts. There
are two options now, depending on whether the first or second transition
rule for iteration is used:
∗ In case the first rule is used, a trace of the last round is α+ l
n+1
199K
αn+11
ln+1299K . . . l
n+1
k99K αn+1k for some k, where α0
ln+1199K αn+11 is a
transition. Then, α0
ln+1199K αn+11
ln+1299K . . . l
n+1
k99K αn+1k is a trace of α,
and according to •4 of Definition 4.21, then so is α+ l
n+1
199K αn+11
ln+1299K
. . .
ln+1k99K αn+1k .
∗ In case the second rule is used, a trace of the last round is α+ l
n+1
199K
αn+11 ;α
+
ln+1299K . . . l
n+1
k99K αn+1k ;α+ for some k, where α0
ln+1199K αn+11
and αn+1j−1
ln+1j99K αn+1j , 2 ≤ j ≤ k are transitions (these transitions
might be different from those in the previous case, even though we
used the same indices for labels and program remainders). Then,
α0
ln+1199K αn+11
ln+1299K . . . l
n+1
k99K αn+1k is a trace of α, and accord-
ing to •5 of Definition 4.21, then so is α+ l
n+1
199K αn+11 ;α+
ln+1299K
. . .
ln+1k99K αn+1k ;α+
This most general construction of a trace of α+ shows that all such traces
are concatenations of n + 1, n ≥ 0 traces of α, of which the first n traces
are successful.
End of PROOF
Using Theorems 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6, we can prove Theorems 4.2 and 4.3.
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PROOF OF THEOREM 4.2 (Interactions produce external steps)
Take a statement pi ∈ Interactionsi, i ∈ I. Because of Lemma 4.2, in
order to prove that all traces of pi are purely external, we only have to look
at traces starting with pi l99K . The proof is by induction on the structure of
pi.
Induction basis: There are several cases:
pi = skip: For the statement skip, only one trace is possible, namely
skip i,(∅,∅,∅)−→ √, which clearly consists of only external transi-
tions.
pi = a ∈ As ∪ Ag: Physical actions extend into sequences of failing
or succeeding sub-actions. Suppose a / a1; a2; . . . ; ap. Defining
(S
l99K S)
∗
to mean zero or more applications of S l99K S, we
have the following successful trace of a:
(a1; a2; . . . ; ap
i,(∅,∅,∅)−→ a1; a2; . . . ; ap)
∗ i,(∅,∅,{a1})−→
a2; . . . ; ap
i,(∅,∅,{a2})−→ . . . i,(∅,∅,{ap−1})−→ ap ∅,∅,{ap})−→ √.
Partial traces are prefixes of these traces. So, each trace of a
(which is a trace of an extension of a) consists of zero or more
external transitions.
pi = o ∈ Ao: For observative actions, successful traces are:
(o
i,(∅,∅,∅)−→ o)
∗ i,({o},∅,∅)−→ √. Partial traces are prefixes of
these, so all traces of o are purely external.
pi = c ∈ Ac(i): For communcative actions, successful traces are:
(c
i,(∅,∅,∅)−→ c)
∗ i,(∅,{c},∅)−→ √. Partial traces are prefixes of
these, so all traces of c are purely external.
Induction Hypothesis: For simpler statements, all traces consist of zero
or more external transitions.
Induction step: As there are three ways to compose interactions, we have
three cases:
pi = α;β: Theorem 4.4 gives us that each trace of α;β either is a
trace of α or a succesful trace of α followed by a trace of β.
Because of the induction hypothesis, all traces of α and β are
purely external. All traces of α;β thus are also purely external
and consists of zero or more external transitions.
pi = α+ β: Theorem 4.5 gives us that each trace of α + β either is
a trace of α or a trace of β. Because of the induction hypothesis,
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all traces of α and β are purely external. All traces of α+ β thus
are also purely external and consists of zero or more external
transitions.
pi = α‖β: All traces of α and β only contain external transitions.
This means that when computing a trace of α‖β, only the first
transition rule for parallel composition is applicable. As this rule
always results in external transitions, all traces of α‖β are purely
external and consists of zero or more external transitions.
End of PROOF
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.3 (Intractions produce internal steps)
Take a statement pi ∈ Intractionsi, i ∈ I. Because of Lemma 4.2, in
order to prove that all traces of pi are purely internal, we only have to look
at traces starting with pi l99K . The proof is by induction on the structure of
pi.
Induction basis: There are two cases:
pi = ϕ?: There are two possible traces of ϕ?, namely ϕ? i;
√
in
case ϕ holds, and ϕ? 6;, in case ϕ doesn’t hold (failure). The last
trace consists of zero internal steps, and the first of one. Thus, all
traces of ϕ? consist of zero or more internal transitions.
pi = m ∈ Am(i): Mental updates have only one possible abstract trace,
namely m i;
√
, which clearly is purely internal.
Induction Hypothesis: For simpler statements, all traces consist of zero
or more internal transitions.
Induction step: As there are three ways to compose intractions, we have
three cases:
pi = α;β: Theorem 4.4 gives us that each trace of α;β either is a
trace of α or a succesful trace of α followed by a trace of β.
Because of the induction hypothesis, all traces of α and β are
purely internal. All traces of α;β thus are also purely internal
and consist of zero or more internal transitions.
pi = α+ β: Theorem 4.5 gives us that each trace of α + β either is
a trace of α or a trace of β. Because of the induction hypothesis,
all traces of α and β are purely internal. All traces of α + β
thus are also purely internal and consist of zero or more internal
transitions.
203
pi = α‖β: All traces of α and β only contain internal transitions. This
means that when computing a trace of α‖β, only the second and
third transition rule for parallel composition are applicable. As
this rule always results in internal transitions, all traces of α‖β
are purely internal and consist of zero or more internal transi-
tions.
End of PROOF
Now, we can prove the central theorem of this subsection:
PROOF OF THEOREM 4.1 (Correct reason–interact behaviours)
Take a behaviour γ ∈ Bi, i ∈ I. Because of Lemma 4.2, in order to prove
that all traces of γ start with zero or more internal transitions, followed by
zero or more external transitions, we only have to look at traces starting
with γ l99K . The proof is by induction on the structure of γ.
Induction basis: There are two cases:
γ = α, α ∈ Interactionsi: According to Theorem 4.2 every trace of
α consists of zero or more external transitions. Thus, every trace
of α has zero internal transitions, followed by zero or more ex-
ternal transitions, which proves the theorem for this case.
γ = β, β ∈ Intractionsi: According to Theorem 4.3 every trace of
β consists of zero or more internal transitions. Thus, every trace
of β has zero or more internal transitions, followed by zero ex-
ternal transitions, which proves the theorem for this case.
Induction Hypothesis: For simpler behaviours, all traces consist of a se-
quence of internal transitions, followed by a sequence of external tran-
sitions.
Induction step: As there are four ways to compose simpler behaviours
into more complex behaviours, we discern four cases:
γ = α;β , where α ∈ Intractionsi and β ∈ Bi: Theorem 4.4 gives
us that each trace of α;β either is a trace of α or a succesful trace
of α followed by a trace of β. As α ∈ Intractionsi, each trace
of α is purely internal (Theorem 4.3). So, in case a trace of α;β
is a trace of α, it is purely internal, and thus satisfies the property
that it has zero or more internal transitions, followed by zero or
more external transitions. Because of the induction hypothesis,
all traces of β consist of a number of internal transitions followed
by a number of external transitions. Thus, in case a trace of α;β
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is a successful trace of α followed by a trace of β, it consists
of the internal steps of α, followed by first the internal steps of β
and then the external steps of β. The resulting trace has a number
of internal steps followed by a number of external steps.
γ = α;β , where α ∈ Bi and β ∈ Interactionsi: Theorem 4.4 gives
us that each trace of α;β either is a trace of α or a succesful trace
of α followed by a trace of β. Because of the induction hypoth-
esis, all traces of α consist of a number of internal transitions
followed by a number of external transitions. So, in case a trace
of α;β is a trace of α, it satisfies the property that it has zero or
more internal transitions, followed by zero or more external tran-
sitions. As β ∈ Interactionsi, each trace of β is purely external
(Theorem 4.2). Thus, in case a trace of α;β is a successful traxe
of α followed by a trace of β, it consists of first the internal steps
of α, then its external steps, followed by the external steps of β.
The resulting trace has a number of internal steps followed by a
number of external steps.
γ = α+ β, α, β ∈ Bi: Theorem 4.4 gives us that each trace of α+β
either is a trace of α or a trace of β. Because of the induction
hypothesis, all traces of α and β consist of a purely internal trace
followed by a purely external trace. All traces of α + β thus
satisfy the property to be proven.
γ = α‖β, α, β ∈ Bi: All traces of α and β consist of a sequence of
internal transitions followed by a sequence of external transi-
tions. We take two arbitrary terminating traces of α and β, that
is, traces that end in the empty statement
√
or in failure 699K. We
construct a terminating trace of α‖β from these. By doing this
construction in the most general way possible, we consider all
terminating traces of α‖β. Suppose we have the traces
α0
i
; α1
i
; α2
i
; . . . i; αm
p1−→ αm+1 p2−→ . . . pn−→
αm+n
and
β0
i
; β1
i
; β2
i
; . . . i; βj
q1−→ βj+1 q2−→ . . . qk−→
βj+k,
with m,n, j, k ≥ 0. Each of the two traces can either termi-
nate successfully (αm+n =
√
, βj+k =
√) or terminate in fail-
ure (αm+n 699K, βj+k 699K). As long as both α and β still have
internal steps to take, only the second and third transition rule
for parallel composition apply. This rule interleaves the inter-
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nal transitions of α and β into a sequence of internal steps in
the trace of α‖β. After each step, there is a remaining statement
αr‖βs, where 0 ≤ r < m and 0 ≤ s < j, such that there
is a choice between two internal next transitions αr
i
; αr+1
and βs
i
; βs+1 . When all internal steps of one the parallel
branches have been done, this situation changes. Without loss of
generality, we assume all internal steps of α have been done. The
remaining program then is αm‖βt, with 0 ≤ t < j. In case αm
fails, we have that n = 0 and next transitions can only come from
βt. In case αm doesn’t fail, the next step of α is external, namely
αm
p1−→ αm+1. The next step of β is βt i; βt+1, so now
only the third transition rule applies and only β proceeds, until
all of its internal steps also have been done and the remaining
program is αm‖βj . Up till now, the trace of α‖β only contains
internal transitions. Now, only the first transition rule is appli-
cable, and α and β simultaneously take external steps until one
or both are finished. Without loss of generality, suppose β fin-
ishes. Termination is either successful (βj+k =
√) or failing
(with βj+k 6= √, βj+k 6−→). In case β terminates successfully,
the remaining statement is αu‖√, where m ≤ u ≤ m+ n. This
is equal to αu, and the remaining external steps of α become the
last steps of the trace of α‖β. In case β terminates in failure, then
so will the trace of α‖β, as there is no transition rule applicable.
Summarising, in all cases we get a terminating trace of α‖β, con-
sisting of a sequence of internal steps followed by a sequence of
external steps. Non-terminating, partial traces always are a prefix
of a terminating trace, and so these also have the desired property.
End of PROOF
Because agent programs basically are iterated behaviours, and we know that all
traces of an iterated behaviour are concatenations of a number of traces of the
behaviour iterated (Theorem 4.6), we now have conclusive evidence that the
syntax and semantics of the skeleton programming give rise to agents perform-
ing cycles of reasoning and interacting.
Now that we have proven that agents executing behaviours first reason and
then act, we look at two properties of parallel composition. Parallel compo-
sition as we syntactically and semantically defined it should be commutative
and associative, which means that α‖β = β‖α and (α‖β)‖γ = α‖(β‖γ), re-
spectively. Here, the equality sign ‘=’ should be read as ‘is semantically the
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same’. It would seem that α = β if the set of all traces of α is the same as the
set of traces of β. We have a technical problem here, as we defined traces of a
statement α in Definition 4.20 to be sequences of transitions resulting from ex-
ecution of the statement α. Thus, a trace of α never can be a trace of a different
statement β, strictly speaking.
In order to express what it means for two composite statements to have the
same semantics, we introduce trace equivalence. For the present purpose of
proving associativity and commutativity, the changes to the agent state (mental
state and sense buffer) and the actions taking place (labeled transition arrows)
are relevant. To be precise, we call these traces of two different statements α
and β equivalent:
〈σ0, δ0, α0〉 l199K 〈σ1, δ1, α1〉 l299K 〈σ2, δ2, α2〉 l399K . . . lm99K 〈σm, δm, αm〉
and
〈σ0, δ0, β0〉 l199K 〈σ1, δ1, β1〉 l299K 〈σ2, δ2, β2〉 l399K . . . lm99K 〈σm, δm, βm〉,
because the internal and external actions done are the same and are in the same
order. We call two sets of traces equivalent if for each trace in each set there is
an equivalent trace in the other set.
In order to justify commutativity and associativity of parallel composition,
we will reason along the same lines as we did in the case for parallel compo-
sition in the induction proof of Theorem 4.1. As ‘‖’ can occur between two
Interactions, two Intractions or two behaviours, and as Interactionsi ⊂
Bi and Intractionsi ⊂ Bi, we only have to look at the most general case,
which is two or three behaviours in parallel.
THEOREM 4.7 (Parallel composition is commutative)
∀i ∈ I ∀α, β ∈ Bi : the set of traces of α‖β and the set of traces of β‖α
are equivalent.
SKETCH OF PROOF:
We take a trace of α‖β and show that there is an equivalent trace of β‖α.
Analogously, we could show (which we won’t do) that for a trace of β‖α
there is an equivalent trace of α‖β. Thus, α‖β and β‖α have equivalent
trace sets.
So, take a trace of α‖β. It starts with a series (possibly empty) of in-
ternal transitions, followed by a series (also possibly empty) of external
transitions. First, we look at the internal transitions. As the transition rules
for parallel composition show, one internal transition in the trace originates
from one of the two parallel statements, α or β. Because the rules are
symmetrical, we have that if 〈σ, δ, pi1‖pi2〉 i; 〈σ′, δ′, pi′1‖pi2〉, then also
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〈σ, δ, pi2‖pi1〉 i; 〈σ′, δ′, pi2‖pi′1〉. We have an analogous property in case
the step taken originates from pi2. This implies that the internal, reasoning
sub-trace of the trace of α‖β is equivalent to (the first part of) a trace of
β‖α.
Next, we look at the external transitions in the trace of α‖β. The first transi-
tion rule for parallel composition shows that these external steps are created
by summing up two external transitions originating from the parallel state-
ments. As set union is commutative, we have that if
〈σ, δ, pi1‖pi2〉 i,(O1∪O2,C1∪C2,P1∪P2)−→ 〈σ′, δ, pi′1‖pi′2〉, then also
〈σ, δ, pi2‖pi1〉 i,(O1∪O2,C1∪C2,P1∪P2)−→ 〈σ′, δ, pi′2‖pi′1〉. So, from the external
sub-trace of the trace of α‖β in which both external statements from α and
β are performed, we can construct an equivalent external sub-trace which
constitutes the second part of the trace of β‖α we started on earlier. When
there are no more external steps to be taken in one of the parallel branches,
the external steps of the other branch complete the trace of both α‖β and
β‖α.
We conclude that for the trace of α‖β we chose there is an equivalent
trace of β‖α, and thus parallel composition is commutative.
End of PROOF
THEOREM 4.8 (Parallel composition is associative)
∀i ∈ I ∀α, β, γ ∈ Bi : the set of traces of (α‖β)‖γ and the set of traces of
α‖(β‖γ) are equivalent.
SKETCH OF PROOF:
We look at the way traces of (α‖β)‖γ and α‖(β‖γ) are constructed using
the transition rules for parallel composition. As α, β and γ are behaviours,
they each give rise to a number of internal reasoning steps, followed by a
number of external interacting steps. As we saw in the proof of Theorem
4.1, parallel composition of two behaviours interleaves the internal steps of
two behaviours and sums up the external steps. As we now look at a parallel
composition of two behaviours, one of which is another parallel composi-
tion of two behaviours, nothing new happens; we simply apply the transi-
tion rules for parallel composition twice for each transition of (α‖β)‖γ and
α‖(β‖γ). We start by looking at the internal steps of the resulting traces.
For example, the first reasoning step of a trace of (α‖β)‖γ can either be a
first step of γ or a first step of (α‖β). In the latter case, a second choice
has to be made, for either a first step of α or a first step of β. This simply
comes down to a choice between the three statements, and the exact same
choice has to be made in order to find the first step of a trace of α‖(β‖γ).
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Of course, this also applies to the other internal steps in traces of both par-
allel compositions. If the same choices are made along the reasoning phase
of the execution of (α‖β)‖γ and α‖(β‖γ), then the resulting internal sub-
traces will be equivalent.
When the interaction phase is reached, then the third transition rule for par-
allel composition sums up the interactions with the environment from the
three composite statements. As set union is associative, each step taken in
a trace of (α‖β)‖γ is also taken in a matching trace of α‖(β‖γ). When
one of the three statements is finished, the other two keep taking external
steps, until another statement is finished and the remaining statement takes
its last external steps. The external sub-trace of a trace of one associative
variant thus also has a matching, equivalent external sub-trace of the other
associative variant.
For each trace of (α‖β)‖γ, there is an equivalent trace of α‖(β‖γ), and
vice versa. Thus, the trace sets of both associative variants are equivalent
and parallel composition is associative.
End of PROOF
4.6 Illustration
The following example serves to illustrate how our model formalises several
interaction aspects. Though the domain of the example is totally imaginary,
similar interaction takes place in more realistic robotic applications, like in
robot soccer.
Figure 4.3 pictures the scene. Three of the agents are busy doing the group
action of skipping (in the sense of jumping over a swinging rope, and not of
doing nothing). The fourth agent is skating towards the skipping agents on its
John Jack
Mary
Sarah
Figure 4.3: The robot playground
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skeelers. The three agents skipping, John, Jack and Sarah, each have the group
action SkipRope as part of their programs. In each group action scheme for this
action, there are two individual actions SwingRope and one action JumpRope.
The two SwingRope actions have to start at the exact same moment; otherwise,
the rope won’t move in the proper way for the jumping agent. The JumpRope
action can start somewhat later, but not too late, as the jumping agent would
get caught in the rope then. When the group action is executed, each agent
chooses one action from a group action scheme, and starts doing its part. If
they have chosen the same group action scheme, if each action from the scheme
is executed by exactly one agent, and if the individual actions are synchronised
properly, the group action potentially succeeds.
Whether the action SkipRope really succeeds depends on other actions and
events taking place. In the figure, we see the fourth agent, Mary, moving closer
on its skeelers. Mary is executing the individual action Skate. If Mary reaches
the other agents, then the skipping action and the skeelering action will interfere
and both will end in a clutter of falling robots. The skipping action can also be
disturbed by an event. For example, the rope could break. In Figure 4.4, one
possible scenario is depicted.
In this first scenario, the marks on the time lines of the agents indicate units
of time, and the + and − signs indicate success or failure of the sub-action taking
place during that time unit. Solid lines symbolise action parts that actually take
place, and dashed lines show parts of actions that would have been done if there
hadn’t been a disturbance. Recall that global transition steps are computed by
taking all sub-actions and events taking place during a time unit and computing
the combined effects of these. Failing sub-actions also have effects, though
these are disadvantageous.
Jack and John swing the rope perfectly simultaneously, and Sarah starts
jumping over the rope one time unit after the rope began to swing. We as-
sume this combination constitutes a valid group action scheme for SkipRope.
Also, Mary is skating during a time interval which overlaps the interval of the
skipping. So, interference of these two actions would be possible. But in this
scenario, the disturbance is caused by an event, RopeBreaks. At the moment
the rope breaks, the three individual actions contributing to SkipRope fail, and
cannot continue any further.
In another scenario, depicted in Figure 4.5, the rope stays unharmed, but
Mary bumps into Sarah. This means that the actions Skate and JumpRope fail,
in time unit t1. Jack and John still swing the rope at t1, but their actions also
fail in the next time unit, because the two robots lying on the floor obstruct the
movement of the rope.
So, not all group action contributions immediately have to fail when one of
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Figure 4.4: One scenario
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Figure 4.5: Another scenario
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them does. It is even conceivable that one or more contributions are success-
fully terminated. For example, suppose Jack suddenly can’t swing the rope
anymore (his actuators need greasing). Then, the JumpRope action will fail in
the same time unit, or a bit later, but John’s SwingRope action can continue,
in case Sarah moves away from the rope, such that she doesn’t impede the
movement of the rope.
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we defined a real-time model of interacting agents situated in
their environment, in which they execute cycles of internal reasoning and ex-
ternal interaction. We focus on faithfully modelling interaction of agents with
each other and with their environment, including real-time aspects. We ab-
stract from the inner functioning of the agents and let the programmer design
the mental parts of the agents according to his own view of agents. The model
consists of a skeleton programming language with its formal operational se-
mantics. In order to obtain a usable programming language, several parameters
of the language and the semantics have to be instantiated, namely:
Domain parameters:
∗ P , the set of propositional atoms used for formalising environment con-
ditions
∗ I, the set of agent identifiers
∗ As, the individual actions
∗ Ag, the group actions
∗ E , the set of events
∗ ξi, i ∈ I, the observability functions of the agents
∗ τ , the world state transformation function
Internal agent parameters:
∗ Mf , the mental formula constructors applying to formulas
∗ Ma, the mental formula constructors applying to actions
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∗ υi, i ∈ I , the revision functions for the mental states of the agents, defin-
ing the change to the mental state when a mental formula is inserted or
deleted
∗ ρi, i ∈ I, the revision functions for the sense buffers of the agents, defin-
ing the change to the sense buffer when new observed and communicated
information arrives
∗ |=, the consequence relation used for the internal agent state (consisting
of mental state and sense buffer)
Domain parameters are common to many agent models, as modelling only one
particular domain is not very fruitful. The internal agent parameters are more
discerning, as in agent logics, architectures and programming languages it is
often fixed which motivational and informational attitudes the agents use. By
making the internal make-up of agents shapable by parameters of the skeleton
programming language, we both add flexibility to our model and abstract away
from details regarding internal reasoning. More specifically, it is the task of the
system developer to make sure that mental formulas have a proper semantics
and validate certain axioms. There are several ways to establish this, as both the
revision functions for mental states (υi) and the consequence relation (|=) are
language parameters, and the system developer can program rules that ensure
that axioms are always validated.
Another discerning feature of our model is that we have a strict sepa-
ration between internal and external agent aspects. All operations an agent
can perform either are Intractions, affecting only the internal agent state,
or Interactions, influencing the state of the environment of the agent. This
separation is also manifest in the reason–interact cycle, which is syntactically
defined instead of semantically, as in other agent programming languages. A
benefit of our reason–interact cycle is that it is fully programmable, while in
other programming languages details of the processing of new information and
the execution of commitments are fixed in the semantics of the language. We
gave a proof that the syntactic restrictions on the skeleton programming lan-
guage and the definition of the operational semantics indeed lead to the agents
executing cycles in which internal reasoning precedes external interaction.
The semantical model we used for the skeleton programming language is
inspired by step semantics, as used in [91]. It might seem that partial order
semantics such as event structures [127] and Mazurkiewicz traces [87] also
provide suitable models of true concurrency for our purposes. An event struc-
ture is a set of events (in the sense of actions of agents) with an associated
partial order, representing causal dependencies between events. Events which
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are independent can take place concurrently. Mazurkiewicz traces look differ-
ent from event structures, but the underlying ideas are the same. An interesting
issue in this context is that present partial order semantics usually are event-
based, and thus don’t model state transformations. As we are interested in
computing the effects, that is the state transformation, resulting from a combi-
nation of actions and events, we would have to extend partial order semantics
with states and state transformations. This has been done, as Van Eck relates
in Section 7.2.1 of his thesis [39]. A global system state is described by the set
of all events that have occurred in all processes (or agents). This set has to be
closed with respect to causal dependency: if an event causes another event, and
the second is in the global state, then so is the first.
The problem with the notion of state in partial order semantics is that it
doesn’t model in any straightforward way interference or synergy of events
that are not causally dependent, and which take place simultaneously. For
causally independent events, it doesn’t matter which event is executed first, or
not even whether the events take place during overlapping time frames. This is
abstracted away in partial order semantics. In all cases, the outcome will be the
same, because the events are independent. This view doesn’t match with our
aims for our model. In our view, actions and events don’t have to be indepen-
dent (non-interfering) in order to take place during overlapping time frames, as
in partial order semantics. The outcome of interfering actions in our model is
determined (among other things) by the timing of the actions. This idea contra-
dicts the underlying ideas of partial order semantics, making them unsuitable
as a candidate semantic model for the skeleton programming language.
In Section 7.2.1 of his thesis, Van Eck also argues that it is impossible or at
least very hard to have global time available in distributed processes. At first
sight, this claim seems to sweep away the foundation of our agent model, as
we suppose there is a global clock, at the clock ticks of which the agents inter-
act. Van Eck states that in order to establish global time, either there must be
a single source of time that provides the clock signals of all processes (that is,
agents), or the processes have different local clocks, which must be synchro-
nised. A central clock is not feasible when systems are physically distributed,
and the time signal is delayed in different ways during transportation. More-
over, synchronisation of local clocks is very difficult, according to Tanenbaum
(pages 471–476 in [116]). Tanenbaum states that getting the local clocks syn-
chronised to within 5 or 10 msec is expensive and hard. We can rebuke these ar-
guments for our framework, because we study common sense agent behaviour.
Therefore we operate on a different level of abstraction than the level Van Eck
describes, which is the level of processor clocks and atomic processor actions.
We take a higher-level viewpoint, at which the length of the time unit is much
214
larger than a clock tick of an agent processor. So, synchronisation to within 5
or 10 msec would be enough for our purposes.
Our model of interacting agents incorporates features that seem to be miss-
ing in other approaches to agents:
∗ A dynamic world, in which events can occur. We realise this through
the incorporation of a separate world state, in which changes can occur
without some agent causing them (events).
∗ Actions of observation, which agents perform to obtain an internal rep-
resentation (in their sense buffers) of the state of the world. In other
approaches, sensing the environment is done implicitly, resulting in an
internal database which is always consistent with the world state. In our
approach, the agents need to observe and communicate to maintain ac-
curate information.
∗ Actions with duration. Both group actions and individual actions take a
number of time units. So, interaction of several actions happening during
overlapping time frames can be modelled in a natural way. A real-time
model of action execution is incorporated in the semantics of the skeleton
programming language. In the global semantics, two actions of different
agents could interfere, yielding results different from the results of some
interleaving of the actions.
∗ The choice between group actions and individual actions. Agents can co-
ordinate some of their actions while doing other actions by themselves.
Group actions and individual actions are related through group action
schemes, which specify the individual actions the group members con-
tribute to the group action and the way these individual actions have to
be synchronised.
Thus, we have created an operational, abstract model of interacting agents,
incorporating real-time aspects. As our model is abstract, it is possible to com-
pare several agent systems constructed using different instantiations of our ab-
stract model.
Other approaches of agent programming generally abstract from some or
all of the issues mentioned above. This yields agent models in which important
problems can’t be studied. Because of the presence of these features, our model
allows a more realistic view on the behaviour of diverse systems of agents
situated in dynamic environments.
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CHAPTER 5
An Abstract Programming Language for
Agents Interacting through
Group Actions
If we stopped talking in circles we might
get closer to the earth
Hothouse Flowers
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we introduce the syntax and semantics of a constraint program-
ming language for multi-agent systems with facilities for group communica-
tion, group formation and group collaboration. The language is called GrAPL,
which abbreviates Group Agent Programming Language. Groups in GrAPL
are dynamic, and can be created at runtime. Coordination and cooperation,
which are crucial notions in multi-agent systems, are modelled in GrAPL by
means of formally defined primitives for dynamic group communication and
synchronisation.
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One of the central ideas of the agent paradigm is that there is added benefit
in having multiple, autonomous agents in a system. The strength of this is
that these agents can pursue their own goals, but also form alliances with other
agents when this is necessary or more beneficial than individual activity. As we
stated in earlier chapters, interaction is at the heart of the agent concept. In this
chapter, we focus on interaction between agents that form groups to negotiate
about and execute group actions, and we leave interaction between an agent
and its environment out of consideration.
While coordination of agents is crucial in multi-agent systems, proper for-
malisations in agent programming languages nevertheless are scarce. Formali-
sations do exist in other areas of agent research. If we divide the work done on
agents into agent theories, architectures and languages (the classical ATAL cat-
egories), then we find that collaboration and coordination of groups of agents
are studied in agent theories and in agent architectures, while this isn’t happen-
ing so much in agent programming languages. Existing agent theories logically
describe mental attitudes held by groups of agents, like joint beliefs and inten-
tions [83]. Also, theories about commitments are proposed to formalise group
agreements that influence future actions of the agents participating in the group
[33, 103, 114]. In the area of agent architectures, there are various proposals
for architectures for multi-agent coordination [67, 118]. Jennings developed
GRATE∗ [67], which is a layered architecture. One of the layers takes care of
cooperation and control. The architecture is heavily inspired by logical theo-
ries of beliefs, desires, and (joint) intentions. Tambe proposes STEAM [118],
which is an architecture for flexible teamwork, where shared partial plans are
executed by dynamic teams. But in agent-oriented programming languages,
formally defined statements for group communication and synchronisation are
novel.
The language GrAPL fits in the tradition of the programming languages
ACPL [12] and 3APL [59, 60]. Each of these languages focuses on a different
aspect of agency: ACPL contains statements for agent communication, 3APL
focuses on the internal practical reasoning of agents trying to reach their goals,
and GrAPL offers primitives for group formation and group action. GrAPL
provides functionality not present in 3APL (which is mainly single-agent ori-
ented) and ACPL (which isn’t focused at coordinating actions). We almost
exclusively focus on group negotiation and group action, while ACPL is con-
structed for general agent communication. We don’t devote attention to the
effects of actions on the environment and the beliefs of the agents, as this is
already covered in 3APL. In this sense, GrAPL is an abstract programming
language; we primarily developed novel statements for group formation, group
communication and group action execution, and didn’t put in much effort for
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the other agent abilities, such as ordinary communication, observation and
practical reasoning. GrAPL is not meant to be yet another agent programming
language; ultimately, we aim at a language incorporating all aspects of agency.
We first give an informal explanation of the main ideas underlying the new
features of the programming language GrAPL. The basic idea of GrAPL is
that agents synchronously communicate in order to dynamically form groups
which synchronously perform certain actions. The agents negotiate about con-
straints on these group actions. The constraints are logical formulas, prescrib-
ing properties of the action parameters, e.g., the time and place of a meeting,
and the group of participants of the meeting. Subsequently, several agents can
synchronously execute the action, obeying the constraints associated with the
action.
The programming language GrAPL is based on the paradigm of constraint-
based reasoning which enjoys much interest in artificial intelligence because
it has proven to be a powerful method for solving complex problems like
planning, resource allocation and scheduling. Our programming language can
be implemented on top of a constraint solver [119], which finds a consistent
assignment of the action parameters satisfying the constraints of a group of
agents. GrAPL incorporates ideas from concurrent constraint programming
[111] to enable agents to produce and query constraints about the parameters
of the group actions. An important difference is that each agent has a local
constraint store for each action, while in constraint programming there usually
is one global store.
Another inspiration for GrAPL comes from synchronisation mechanisms
in concurrent programming, more specifically from synchronous communica-
tion in CSP [61]. In this language, synchronous communication is used to
communicate values. The principles of communication in GrAPL are similar,
although communication is not bilateral but multilateral, and formulas are com-
municated instead of values. We opt for synchronous communication instead of
asynchronous communication, because using synchronous statements, agents
can’t communicate a constraint to other agents if these other agents aren’t also
communicating with them. This way, the agents always control whether in-
formation is written in their constraint stores. By using established ideas from
concurrent programming and constraint solving, we hope to prevent reinvent-
ing the wheel. Although multi-agent systems have their unique features, many
aspects of agents have been studied in other fields of computer science, and
results can be adapted to fit multi-agent systems.
More specifically, the communication and coordination process which
should lead to the synchronous execution of an action by a group of agents,
distinguishes two phases. During the first phase, called the negotiation phase,
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groups of agents negotiate about the constraints they impose on a certain group
action a by synchronously communicating their constraints on the action pa-
rameters. All actions have an implicit parameter which denotes the group in-
volved. By means of this parameter agents may express their constraints on
the composition of the group. Group communication updates the constraints of
the participating agents on the action a to be the conjunction of the individu-
ally proposed constraints. Subsequently, this resulting formula constrains each
execution of a for each agent that has participated in the communication, until
the constraint on the action a is changed again. In this second phase, called the
execution phase, a group of agents tries to synchronously execute a group ac-
tion which was the subject of negotiation. If the actual parameters of all agents
in the group are compatible, and the constraints of the agents allow these ac-
tual parameters, the action is executed by the group. Otherwise, group action
execution fails. The constraints thus monitor the execution of the action.
In Section 5.2 we give an intuitive account of the new constructs in GrAPL.
In Section 5.3 we introduce the syntax of GrAPL. Section 5.4 describes the
formal operational semantics. In Section 5.5, we illustrate the new features of
GrAPL in three extensive examples. Section 5.6 concludes this chapter.
5.2 Intuitions
Before going into the formal details of the syntax and semantics of the pro-
gramming language, we will give an intuitive sketch of the new features of the
language. As stated in the introduction, the focus of this work is group for-
mation, group communication and group action. First, agents synchronously
communicate with each other in order to form groups that are committed to
performing group actions together. The agents communicate about constraints
on the action they might do together. Subsequently, several agents can syn-
chronously execute the action, obeying the constraints associated with the ac-
tion. Not all actions need to be constrained, but if a set of constraints is associ-
ated with an action, then action execution has to obey the constraints, which can
specify demands on the parameters of the action and the group of agents par-
ticipating in the action. In other words, the constraints monitor the execution.
To facilitate this, there are three special statements in the programming lan-
guage. The first two implement group communication (CommGroupAdd and
CommGroupReset) and the third implements (group) action execution (simply
a(t1, . . . , tn), where a is an action and t1, . . . , tn are the actual parameters of
the action).
Actions in GrAPL are parameterised. Each action has a certain arity, which
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is the number of parameters it needs. An example of an action of arity two
is PlayGame(v1, v2), where the first parameter v1 is the particular game to
be played and v2 is the starting time of the game. Apart from these explicit
parameters, each action has one implicit parameter, which is the group of agents
performing the action. This group is always denoted by the special variable g.
In the introduction, we mentioned the two phases of the coordination pro-
cess for a group action. In the first phase, the negotiation phase, the agents
interested in establishing conditions for execution of a group action a perform
CommGroupAdd and CommGroupReset statements, thereby exchanging pro-
posals for constraints on the action a. As the name of the statements already
suggests, CommGroup statements (both kinds) are synchronously performed
by a group of agents. In this respect, CommGroup execution is similar to the
synchronous communication primitives in (for example) CSP [61]. A differ-
ence with CSP is that we have multi-party synchronisation, while in CSP only
two processes participate in synchronous communication. The constraints the
agents communicate about in GrAPL are constraints on the explicit and im-
plicit parameters of a. So, agents talk about the details of the action and about
the group which is going to perform the action.
Each agent has a private, local constraint store, where it keeps the present
constraint on each action. We could also have opted for a global constraint
store for each action, in which agents communicating about the action write
their constraints. Local constraint stores have several advantages over global
stores:
∗ They fit better with the concept of autonomous agents. The intuitive
idea of an agent is that it reasons about its own motivations and the cir-
cumstances in its environment, and then decides to do certain actions,
by itself or in cooperation with other agents. All information the agent
needs for this is stored locally (in its mental state) or is received from
the environment (through observation and communication). As the con-
straints in the constraint store describe information about how future ac-
tions need to be executed, this information fits well in the local agent
state. As another argument, a multi-agent system generally consists of a
number of agents, situated in an environment. Global constraint stores
aren’t agents, and thus their presence as separate entities in a multi-agent
system is counterintuitive, from the agent-oriented viewpoint.
∗ They allow multiple groups of agents to discuss and execute the same
action. When two disjoint groups of agents negotiate on an action a,
then the local constraint stores of the agents in each group contain the
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constraints which the agents in this group communicated, and no con-
straints coming from the agents of the other group. In case there is a
global constraint store, the constraints of both groups would arrive in the
same global store, making separate negotiations impossible. With lo-
cal constraint stores, the two groups can execute the action a, resulting
in two separate executions of instances of a, each with different actual
parameters, which fit the constraints of the two groups involved.
∗ The local constraint store of an agent represents its own view on the ne-
gotiation about a certain action. During each synchronous CommGroup
meeting, only communicating agents update their local stores. So, in or-
der to know what’s going on, it is essential to be present in meetings,
like in many real-world organisations. The group of negotiators which
communicates about a certain action instance doesn’t have to be fixed.
Agents can leave the group, and others can join it, when the constraints
on the group composition allow this. When agents leave, they aren’t in-
formed anymore about new demands on the action. They can reset their
constraint store, and start negotiation with another group.
Local constraint stores thus match the intuitions associated with agents. Ini-
tially, the local constraint stores contain the constraint >, which denotes the
logical formula that is always true. So, initially no agent has any demand on
any action.
CommGroupAdd and CommGroupReset both take two arguments, a con-
straint ϕ and an action a. The difference between CommGroupAdd(ϕ, a) and
CommGroupReset(ϕ, a) is that in the first case the agent adds ϕ to its present
constraint on a, and then proposes the conjunction, while in the second case,
the agent forgets about its current constraint on a and simply proposes ϕ. When
a group of agents is communicating about a group action, some agents in
the group may perform a CommGroupAdd action and others may perform a
CommGroupReset action. All agents in the group have to agree upon the focus
of the communication, that is, the action. Each agent brings its own set of con-
straints, demanding execution of the action to take place in a certain manner.
The composition of the group of communicators must satisfy the demands of
each agent. If this is not so, group communication fails. Each successful syn-
chronous combination of group communication actions updates the constraints
of the agents communicating on the action discussed to be the conjunction of
the proposals, as this is the weakest constraint implying all individual con-
straints.
After one or more synchronous executions of CommGroupAdd and
CommGroupReset statements, the second phase, the execution phase, takes
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place. In the execution phase, a group of agents tries to execute the group
action which was the subject of negotiation. Each agent ι chooses actual pa-
rameters for the action a, named tι1, . . . , tιn if the action takes n parameters.
As the parameters can contain free variables, certain agents in the group can
communicate actual parameters to other agents. This implicit communication
which takes place as a side-effect of action execution is called execution-time
communication. We will show how this works in Example 5.1 below. If the
actual parameters of all agents in the group are compatible, and the constraints
of the agents allow these actual parameters, the action is executed by the group.
So, the second ‘new’ element in our language (next to group communication) is
group action execution. As can be seen above and in Example 5.1, the syntax of
action execution is conventional; it’s the semantics that is different. Whenever
an action a(t1, . . . , tn) is to be executed by an agent, the abstract interpreter
of our language checks whether there is a constraint bound to this action. This
is done for all agents about to perform the action. There must be no conflicts
in the actual parameters and all constraints in constraint stores of agents par-
ticipating have to be satisfied. If so, the action can be done. Otherwise, group
action execution fails.
Each agent has its own belief base, which it uses to store information. The
beliefs of an agent can influence the decision making of the agent, for exam-
ple about the constraints the agent imposes on some action. When designing
GrAPL we didn’t focus on sophisticated mental agent processing, as this is
already done in other agent programming languages. We abstract from the
agent’s mental processing, and provide two basic operations on the belief base,
namely insertion and testing. In this chapter, we reserve the term constraint
store for sets of formulas which describe demands on parameters of certain
actions. In constraint programming languages, like for example CCP ([111]),
this term covers all information stores. Our use of the term is different; in
our view, belief bases need not be constraint stores. Belief bases can be con-
straints, describing the partial information of the agents about certain world
features (represented by variables), or they can be sets of closed formulas, de-
scribing the information which the agents hold true of the world state. Because
we choose for the second option in this chapter (which isn’t a principled choice
in any way), we only refer to constraints on actions with the phrase ‘constraint
store’.
As a first example of the constructs of GrAPL, we return to the game play-
ing action.
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EXAMPLE 5.1 (Playing a game)
Suppose we have agents with names Gabrie¨l, Jan-Ybo, Martha and Jantina.
It is a boring Sunday afternoon, and the agents are talking about playing a
game. Initially, all four agents have the empty constraint (>) on PlayGame
in their local store. They enter the negotiation phase. The four agents
synchronously perform a CommGroupReset(ϕid,PlayGame) action. Here,
ϕid is the constraint of the agent named id, as shown below. Recall that the
action PlayGame, introduced above, needs two parameters, which we refer
to as v1 and v2. As will be explained later, in constraints all agents always
use formal parameter vi to refer to the ith parameter of some action. Each
of the agents proposes a different constraint:
∗ ϕJantina is the following constraint: v1 = Rummikub ∧ v2 < 16.00.
So, the only game Jantina is prepared to play is Rummikub, and she
wants to start before four o’clock. Jantina has no demands on the
composition of the group playing the game.
∗ ϕGabrie¨l is this constraint: v1 = Rummikub → Martha ∈ g. So,
Gabrie¨l is willing to play any game at any time, but if the game is to
be Rummikub, he wants Martha to play along.
∗ ϕJan-Ybo is the constraint v2 > 14.30. His belief base contains the
information that his favourite TV-show is on from 13.30 till 14.30
and that he has to do his homework up to 13.30. So, Jan-Ybo has
other things on his mind until half past two. Only at some later time
he is prepared to play a game.
∗ ϕMartha = >. Martha is a very easy agent. She doesn’t have any
constraints.
These four constraints are consistent; the conjunction of the constraints
is equivalent to v1 = Rummikub ∧ 14.30 < v2 < 16.00 ∧Martha ∈ g. Con-
sequently, the four individual local constraints are replaced by the con-
straint just mentioned.
Now, after the negotiation phase, which in this case consists of only
one synchronous group communication action, the four agents can actually
play the game. They enter the execution phase. Each of the four agents
executes a PlayGame action. The actual parameters for this action may
differ, as long as they can be unified and they obey the constraints agreed
upon. The agents can test their constraint stores for Rummikub to find out
which demands the other agents communicated, and to choose appropriate
actual parameters. We don’t go into this now.
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Some actual action parameters can be free local variables. This way,
execution time communication about action parameters is possible. This
form of communication is a side-effect of action execution. Suppose this is
what the four agents try to do:
∗ Jantina: PlayGame(Rummikub, t1). So, Jantina doesn’t provide a
value for the starting time of the game. Instead, she uses a free local
variable, denoting that she doesn’t want to be the one to choose the
definite time, even though she initiated the constraint that the game
has to start before 16.00.
∗ Gabrie¨l: PlayGame(p1, t2). Gabrie¨l is open to anything (as long as
the constraints are satisfied). He simply uses two free local variables
as actual parameters.
∗ Jan-Ybo: PlayGame(Rummikub, 15.00). So, Jan-Ybo sets the time at
which the game will start.
∗ Martha: PlayGame(p2, t3). Martha still is a very easy agent. She
is prepared to adjust herself fully to the other agents, as long as the
constraints communicated to her in the first phase are respected.
An attempt to synchronously execute this group action will succeed, as
the concrete parameters of the four agents can be unified, and the resulting
action parameters satisfy the constraints. Jantina and Jan-Ybo agree on
the first parameter of the action, and they communicate Rummikub to the
other agents. The second parameter is picked by Jan-Ybo to be 15.00, and
implicitly communicated to the others. These two actual parameters satisfy
the demands made on the formal parameters v1 and v2 in the (now identical)
constraint stores of the agents. Also, Martha is part of the group playing
the game, and so the demand on the group composition (Martha ∈ g) also
holds.
But in case Jantina would have demanded the time 14.45 as the sec-
ond parameter, the group action would have failed. In this case, there are
two agents in the group who don’t agree on a parameter and execution time
communication fails. A group action can also fail when the agents agree
on the actual parameters. This happens when the unified parameters result-
ing from execution time communication conflict with the constraints of the
participants. For example, Jan-Ybo can choose the second actual parameter
of PlayGame to be 17.00, and tell this to the other agents using execution
time communication. Agent Jan-Ybo then chooses to ignore the constraint
on PlayGame that the agents agreed upon in the negotiation phase. As the
other agents use a free local variable for the second parameter, execution
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time communication succeeds, but the action can’t succeed, as the time
17.00 doesn’t obey the constraint on PlayGame. When a group action fails,
the agents can wait until the action can be successfully executed, or they
can choose to continue doing other actions from their programs.
The picture sketched above just gives a general impression of the features of
the programming language. There are many subtle issues and different interest-
ing options for the precise meaning of group communication and coordination
in this language. We will elaborate on this later on in this chapter.
5.3 Syntax
5.3.1 Basic sets and conventions
The programming language we are about to define is based on the principles of
constraint programming. The sets underlying GrAPL are:
∗ A = the set of atomic actions. Typical elements are a and b. Each action
has an arity, which is the number of parameters it takes.
∗ I = the set of agent identities. Typical elements are ι and κ.
∗ V = the set of variables. There are two kinds of variables; V = LV ∪GV .
Here, LV are local variables. Each agent has its own local variables, so
the set of local variables is the disjoint union of sets of agent-specific
local variables.
GV contains the global (system) variables, defined as
GV = {vk|k ∈ N} ∪ {g}.
∗ D = the value domain. Elements of this set are used as constants and can
be bound to variables. Two subsets of D are I and ℘(I).
Local variables are used for processing information only relevant to one
agent, such as testing the local constraint store and specifying formulas to be
inserted into the belief base. For this last purpose, the programmer must make
sure that free local variables are instantiated with ground values at the time the
insertion is executed, as the belief base is a closed formula. Local variables
are also used to specify actual action parameters, when an agent doesn’t care
about the precise value of certain formal parameters. Above, we attributed dis-
joint sets of local variables to all agents. These disjoint sets make it impossible
226
for two agents in a system to use the same local variable name. This pre-
vents name clashes, which could occur during synchronised action. In group
action execution, the local variables of a number of agents meet when there is
execution-time communication. The following example illustrates the potential
problems:
EXAMPLE 5.2 (Local variables clash)
Suppose two agents ag1 and ag2 attempt a group action a, having three
parameters. Agent ag1’s program contains the statement a(x, 4, 58.3) and
ag2 has the statement a(1, x, 58.3). To come to a successful execution of
this group action, we want to find a global substitution which unifies the
actual action parameters. The local variable x of ag1 has to be bound to
the value 1, while the variable x of ag2 has to be bound to 4. Globally
(at the system level), these two value associations clash, as there exists no
unifying overall substitution doing the trick. But when we look at the action
statements, it is clear that the group action can be executed successfully:
the common first parameter has to be 1, the second 4 and the third 58.3. As
soon as one of the agents replaces x with y, a unifying global substitution
does exist.
In order to prevent these name clashes, we define the sets of local variables in
such a way that each agent uses different local variables.
GV is the set of all variables vi and g. We use these variables to specify
the formal parameters of actions. We adopt the practice to refer to these pa-
rameters in a uniform manner. We call the formal parameters of an action a
v1, v2, . . . , vk if the arity of a is k. The implicit formal parameter for the group
performing the action is g. In GrAPL-programs, these formal action parameters
occur in constraints on actions and in formulas tested on the constraint stores.
All agents use the same set of global variables to refer to formal parameters
of the whole range of actions. Constraints are always specified relative to an
action, so the global variables have an unambiguous meaning. Thus, the set GV
exactly contains the variables needed to work with constraints. To avoid con-
fusion, global variables are only allowed in conjunction with constraints. Also,
global variables are never bound to values. Even if v1 = 7 is a demand on an
action a, v1 isn’t bound to 7; the constraint just means: “The first parameters
of a must be 7”, it doesn’t mean that the variable v1 always has the value 7. We
don’t generate bindings to global variables because they are used in constraints
on different actions, and it is undesirable that a constraint like v1 = 7 on one
action demands the first formal parameter of every action to be 7. Because
global variables aren’t bound to values, there can be no value clashes between
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agents involving global variables. We chose to introduce special global con-
straint variables because it simplifies communicating about action parameters
by groups of agents. If an agent is communicating with other agents about con-
straints on some action, it doesn’t have to indicate which names it uses to refer
to the different parameters of the action. Each agent uses the convention of re-
ferring to the ith parameter by vi. So, no unification is necessary and programs
become more clear.
We stress that our use of the terms ‘local’ and ‘global’ may be different
from use elsewhere. In many programming languages, the terms ‘local’ and
‘global’ are meant relative to pieces of program code. Here, we have a different
usage. ‘Local’ means private to one agent, and ‘global’ means shared by all
agents in the multi-agent system. Global variables are used in communication
and group actions, which naturally involve a number of agents, while local
variables are used for operations concerning one agent only.
GrAPL makes use of a multi-sorted predicate logical language L. Each
agent possesses a belief base; this contains closed formulas (no free variables)
from L. The constraints on actions are also formulas from L, prescribing prop-
erties of action parameters. Each agent locally stores the present constraint for
each action. We elaborate on L now.
DEFINITION 5.1 (The logic L)
L is a multi-sorted predicate logic. The set of variables of the logical lan-
guage is V and the set of constants is D. The logic includes set theoretic
predicates and functions, such as ∈,⊆,∪ and ∩, to express properties of
the composition of groups of agents, as well as predicates and functions to
describe properties of action parameters. We use ϕ and ψ to denote arbi-
trary formulas from L and > and ⊥ to denote the formulas that are always
true and false, respectively.
We denote the set of free variables in an expression, term, formula,
program, or other syntactic form w by free(w) and the set of all its variables
by var(w).
We assume the logic L is equipped with an entailment relation, denoted
by |=.
As an example of the use of L for formulating constraints, we give some con-
straints on the action MoveObject(v1, v2, v3). Here, the first formal parameter is
the object to be moved, the second parameter is the original location of the ob-
ject and the third parameter is the location to which the object has to be moved.
A very simple constraint is: v1 = table. If an agent has this constraint on action
MoveObject(v1, v2, v3), then it is only willing to move the table; any attempt
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of this agent to move something else will fail. If the predicate logic contains
a function distance which takes two locations and yields the distance between
these two locations, then another simple constraint is distance(v2, v3) < 10.
An agent having this constraint associated with the MoveObject action, is not
prepared to move something over a distance which is 10 or greater. A last ex-
ample of a simple constraint is James ∈ g. This means that the agent having
this constraint is only prepared to move things when James is part of the group
performing the MoveObject action.
By using logical operators, more complex constraints are obtained. An
example is the constraint
distance(v2, v3) ≥ 20→ (v2 = Utrecht ∧Max /∈ g) ∨#(g) > 5,
which states that when the distance an object has to be moved over is 20 or
more, the agent having this constraint only agrees to help if there are at least
five agents cooperating or if the moving starts in Utrecht and the agent doesn’t
have to cooperate with Max.
If a certain constraint is associated with an action a, then this constraint
monitors future executions of a. Agents can repeatedly communicate with
each other, using CommGroupAdd(ϕ, a) and CommGroupReset(ϕ, a). By do-
ing this, the agents define the parameter space of the actual parameters of a.
When agents perform CommGroupReset statements, then their local constraint
stores are re-initialised with fresh constraints, and when agents add constraints
using CommGroupAdd, they narrow down the possible values for the formal
parameters of the action.
Group communication can be used by the agents for different purposes. By
performing CommGroup-statements, the agents can communicate their prefer-
ences (desires), or take care that the group action is executed in such a way that
their objectives (goals) are reached. Another view on group communication
is that agents establish social norms on the permissible action parameters and
enforce proper societal behaviour this way. Group communication can also be
used to exchange information on the precondition of a certain action execution.
An action may be executable with all possible parameter sets, in which case
constraints of a group of agents only display their personal preferences or their
group norms, not their knowledge on executability of the action. On the other
hand, it is possible that the agents have to discover the environment conditions
that allow action success. In this case, the action has a precondition, which is
only partly known to the agents. So, the agents have to cope with the well-
known qualification problem ([88]). Using CommGroup statements, they can
exchange information on the precondition in a cooperative manner. The con-
straints on the action parameters narrow down the actual parameter space. So,
the precondition of the action is strengthened by group communication. The
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postcondition isn’t directly affected, but as the action can only be executed with
certain parameter sets, the set of possible resulting world situations will also be
narrowed down.
Actions are primitive notions; their meaning and effects are laid down in
semantic functions. Nevertheless the agent program can influence the meaning
of actions, because agents can constrain the set of permissible actual parameters
by group communication.
5.3.2 Syntax of programs
We denote the set of agent programs by P . In order to define this set, we first
define the set of basic statements S .
DEFINITION 5.2 (Basic statements)
The set S of basic statements is the smallest set containing:
∗ skip
∗ ?ϕ, where ϕ ∈ L and var(ϕ) ∩ GV = ∅.
∗ ?(ϕ, a), where ϕ ∈ L and a ∈ A.
∗ ins(ϕ), where ϕ ∈ L and var(ϕ) ∩ GV = ∅.
∗ CommGroupAdd(ϕ, a), where a ∈ A and ϕ ∈ L.
∗ CommGroupReset(ϕ, a), where a ∈ A and ϕ ∈ L.
∗ a(t1, . . . , tk), where a ∈ A, the arity of a is k and all ti are terms of
L, such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : var(ti) ∩ GV = ∅.
The language includes a statement for doing nothing, skip.
There are two kinds of tests, namely tests of the belief base (simply denoted
?ϕ) and tests of the constraint bound to an action (denoted by ?(ϕ, a)). These
tests check whether the formula ϕ is logically entailed by the belief base or
the current constraint on a, respectively. Both kinds of tests can yield bind-
ings of values to variables, but these variables never are global variables. For
tests of the belief base, this is achieved syntactically, by forbidding global vari-
ables in the formula tested. Because global variables are used by all agents to
refer to the formal parameters of all actions, it would be unpractical to gen-
erate bindings to global variables. Besides the practical reason of making
no bindings to global variables, there also is a conceptual reason for exclud-
ing global variables from some statements. This reason is that we introduced
global variables specifically for constraint handling. Therefore, they are for-
bidden in formulas tested on and inserted into the belief base, and also in
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actual action parameters (this is what is meant in the definition above by for
all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : var(ti) ∩ GV = ∅). This way, we maintain a clear separa-
tion between global and local processing, which adds clarity and elegance.
In tests of actions, we do allow global variables, as the constraint on the
action can contain global variables. For example, suppose an agent has the
constraint v1 ≤ 10 on action a, meaning that the first parameter of a must not
be larger than 10. The test ?(v1 = 10, a) tests whether the constraint on a
implies that the first parameter of a is 10. As this is not a logical consequence
of v1 ≤ 10, the test fails. In case the current constraint on a would have been
v1 = 10, then the test succeeds. The semantics of GrAPL is defined such
that this successful test doesn’t result in a binding of the value 10 to the global
variable v1. In case we would perform ?(v1 = x, a), where x is a local variable,
and the constraint on a implies that v1 = 10, then only the local variable x is
bound to 10.
The statement ins(ϕ) adds the information ϕ to the belief base. As men-
tioned above, we want global variables only to be used in conjunction with
constraint stores, so we forbid them to occur in new belief base formulas. An-
other issue is that free local variables are not allowed in new belief formulas,
as the belief base has to be a set of closed formulas. But we won’t demand that
free(ϕ) = ∅, because this would mean that each belief inserted into the belief
base must already be completely specified at compile time. So, we allow free
local variables in the new belief formula ϕ, but we demand that each free vari-
able is guarded by a preceding test or action execution, which yields a value
for this variable. (Note that action execution can generate bindings, through
execution time communication.) Here is a simple example to make matters
clear:
EXAMPLE 5.3 (Guarded statements)
?weight(x) < 10;
WalkTo(supermarket);
ins(light(x))
In this peculiar program, where an agent is thinking about light objects
while walking to the supermarket, there is an insertion into the belief base
which contains the free variable x. But this free variable is bound by the
test on the belief base, which takes place earlier. So, the execution of the
ins-statement is guarded.
The most innovative statements of the programming language are
CommGroupAdd(ϕ, a) and CommGroupReset(ϕ, a). Here, a is the action the
agent communicates about and ϕ is a constraint stating demands of the agent on
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future executions of the action a. Using these statements, agents synchronously
communicate about the details of the action and about the group which is go-
ing to perform the action. Each agent in a group of communicators executes
either a CommGroupAdd-statement or a CommGroupReset-statement. Arbi-
trary combinations of these two statements are allowed. Group communication
succeeds if every agent in the group of communicators approves of the presence
of all communicators.
Thus, group communication posits demands on the group of agents that
communicates as well as on the group of agents that executes the action later
on. The global variable g refers to both these groups. Alternatively, we could
use two variables, one for the group of communicators and one for the group
of actors. This would make the language more expressive, because different
demands can be made on both groups. For example, in this variant of GrAPL
it is possible to do action delegation, by establishing a constraint of the form
ga = {ι1, ι2, ι3, . . .} on the group of actors (denoted by ga). As this constraint
doesn’t apply to the group of communicators, these two groups can be different,
while in the present formalisation of GrAPL the groups must be the same. In
the next chapter, we present a coordination language which is similar in spirit
to GrAPL. In this language we do make the distinction between negotiators
and actors. There are advantages to using one variable to constrain the group
of communicators and the group of actors. For example, when a constraint
implies that agent Gareth has to be part of the group of agents executing the
action TakeTrip, then Gareth also has to be present in the negotiation phase of
this action. This way, we make sure that the autonomy of Gareth is respected.
As Gareth can communicate his demands on the trip to be taken, he has no
reason later on not to take part in the joint execution of action TakeTrip.
If an agent executes CommGroupAdd(ϕ, a), then it proposes its previously
accumulated constraint on action a strengthened with ϕ. If an agent executes
CommGroupReset(ϕ, a), then it erases its present constraint on a and offers
ϕ as a fresh proposal. In both cases, the resulting constraint on a will be the
conjunction of the proposals of all communicators. The local bindings of a are
updated accordingly. If the agents disagree, the resulting constraint will be ⊥.
We allow this because ⊥ in a constraint store indicates that group communi-
cation has failed, and agents can test their constraint stores to find out whether
this is the case. Subsequently, the resulting formula constrains each execution
of a for each agent that has participated in the group communication, until the
constraint on the action a is changed again. As the constraints are local and
communication is synchronous, it is impossible for one agent to alter the con-
straints of another agent, without communicating with the other agent.
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The syntax allows free local variables in CommGroupAdd statements and
CommGroupReset statements. For these, we make the same restriction as we
did for the free local variables in ins statements; they must be guarded, as a
constraint containing a free local variable doesn’t buy you much. When the
free local variables in new constraints are guarded, they act as place-holders,
lying in the scope of a binding statement (tests or action executions). This
implies that at runtime, the local variables are instantiated with ground terms.
The last basic statement is action execution, denoted by a(t1, . . . , tk) (some-
times abbreviated to a(t¯)). We use this statement both for individual action and
group action. As explained earlier, global variables are forbidden in actual ac-
tion parameters. The constraints associated with the action in the local states
of agents trying to perform the action determine how many agents are needed,
and sometimes make demands on their identities. If a group of agents (possibly
consisting of only one member) tries to synchronously execute an action, the
constraints of the agents on this action have to be consistent with each other and
the actual parameters (the terms t1, . . . , tk) and the group composition have to
satisfy all constraints. In implementations of GrAPL, a constraint solver has to
be plugged in to check this.
Another aspect of action execution is execution time communication. If
one or more agents use a free local variable in an actual parameter, and at
least one agent specifies a definite value for this parameter, then the last agent
communicates the value to the other agent(s). Example 5.4 below illustrates
this. This form of communication generates bindings to the free variables used
by the listening agents.
The following example illustrates the novel statements.
EXAMPLE 5.4 (Jogging agents)
Two agents, James and Clare, arrange to go jogging. They discuss and sub-
sequently execute Jog(v1, v2), where v1 and v2 are the formal parameters
of the action. The first one is the time at which the agents start jogging, and
the second parameter is the distance to be jogged.
Each agent has a constraint it wants to impose on the parameters of Jog.
In these constraints, the agents use the formal parameters v1 and v2 to refer
to the explicit parameters of the action. Each action also has one implicit
parameter, denoted by g, which is the group composition. These are the
constraints of Clare and James:
James: ϕ : v1 > 19.00 ∧ (v2 = 7 ∨ v2 = 8) ∧ Clare ∈ g
Clare: ψ : v1 < 20.00 ∧ (v2 = 8 ∨ v2 = 9) ∧
(v1 > 19.00→ James ∈ g)
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So, James wants to start jogging after 19.00 o’clock, he wants to run 7 or
8 km., and he wants Clare to join him. Clare on the other hand only wants
James to jog with her when she leaves after 19.00 o’clock, she wants to
start before 20.00 o’clock, and she wants to run 8 or 9 km.
They synchronously communicate:
James: CommGroupReset(ϕ, Jog)
Clare: CommGroupReset(ψ, Jog)
The result of this synchronous communication is a new constraint, which
holds for future executions of Jog of both agents:
19.00 < v1 < 20.00 ∧ v2 = 8 ∧ James ∈ g ∧ Clare ∈ g
Next, the agents synchronously execute:
James: Jog(19.30, 8)
Clare: Jog(x, 8)
Note that there is execution-time communication here. James communi-
cates the time 19.30 to Clare; Clare uses a free variable as first actual
parameter, thereby indicating she is expecting James to pick the definite
time. The constraint solver checks whether the actual parameters satisfy
the constraints of James and Clare. This is the case, so the action is suc-
cessful. In case James had performed Jog(y, 8) instead of Jog(19.30, 8),
there would have been multiple possibilities for the first parameter (namely,
every time between 19.00 and 20.00). In this situation, one value is picked,
or the overall action fails. When we define the semantics of GrAPL, we
show several variants which differ in this aspect.
Having defined the set S of basic statements, we now define the programs
of GrAPL.
DEFINITION 5.3 (Agent programs)
The set P of valid single-agent programs is the smallest set containing the
following programs:
∗ α, where α ∈ S .
∗ if ϕ then pi1 else pi2, where ϕ ∈ L, var(ϕ)∩GV = ∅ and pi1, pi2 ∈ P .
∗ if ϕ for a then pi1else pi2, where ϕ ∈ L, a ∈ A and pi1, pi2 ∈ P .
∗ pi1;pi2, where pi1, pi2 ∈ P .
∗ pi1 + pi2, where pi1, pi2 ∈ P .
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We defined programs for single agents here. A multi-agent system simply is a
set of single agent programs. These will be executed in parallel.
More complex programs can be formed using the if–then–else constructs,
sequential composition and non-deterministic choice. The composed statement
if ϕ then pi1 else pi2 first checks whether ϕ can be inferred from the belief base
of the agent. If this is the case, pi1 is executed, and if not, pi2. The statement
if ϕ for a then pi1 else pi2 is similar, except that this statement tests the constraint
bound to the action a. Inclusion of these statements is useful, because it enables
testing whether something can’t be inferred, which is not possible with the
test statements ?ϕ and ?(ϕ, a). Later on, in Examples 5.13 and 5.14, we will
encounter if ⊥ for a then pi1 else pi2. This checks whether the constraint on a
has become inconsistent (because of group communication), and chooses an
appropriate course of action. Statements like these allows the programmer to
explicitly encode backtracking mechanisms in negotiation.
Repetitive behaviour is not essential for our approach. So, for technical
convenience we didn’t include iteration or recursion. Including iteration in
the language would lead to problems. This is because we use variables in
this language in a logical manner instead of in an imperative one. So, once a
variable is bound to a value by a substitution, no other value can ever be bound
to it. In an iterated loop, there typically are some variables that are assigned a
new value in every round of the loop. This cannot be done in our language. A
solution would be to rename variables when a new iteration starts, but this is
not a very intuitive solution. In order to allow for (possibly infinite) repetitive
behaviour, we could add recursive procedures to the language, in combination
with variables local to program fragments. This is a well-studied technique.
As we want to focus our attention at group coordination aspects, we will not
pursue this. This matter is orthogonal to the issues discussed and the extension
can be made in a straightforward manner.
5.4 Semantics
GrAPL has a formal operational semantics, in the style of Plotkin [98]. To de-
fine the semantics of an agent system, consisting of a number of agent programs
in parallel, we first have to provide some definitions.
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5.4.1 Preliminaries
First, we have to define the nature of agent configurations.
Each agent has a local configuration, which is a quadruple 〈µ, δ, ι, pi〉. The
first element of the configuration is µ, which stores the constraints bound to
actions. These bindings are local to the agent. This way, it is possible for two
agents to have different constraints for some action. This happens when the
agents are part of separate groups which have communicated about the action
independently. The constraints contain no free local variables. The function
µ is total, as each action is initially bound to > (no constraints). When the
constraint on a certain action a is updated, we use the notation µ[ψ/a], which
denotes the function which is equal to µ except for the constraint on a, which
has become ψ. The second configuration element is the belief base of the agent,
denoted by δ. We don’t allow free variables in the belief base. Finally, ι ∈ I
is the identity of the agent and pi is the agent program fragment still to be
executed.
DEFINITION 5.4 (Agent configuration)
A local agent configuration Aι is a quadruple 〈µ, δ, ι, pi〉. Here,
∗ µ : A → L where for all a ∈ A : free(µ(a)) ∩ LV = ∅.
∗ δ ⊆ L, free(δ) = ∅, and var(δ) ∩ GV = ∅.
∗ ι ∈ I
∗ pi ∈ P
A multi-agent system consists of a number of agents executing in parallel.
A global system configuration simply is a set of local agent configurations of
all agents present in the system. The set of agents present in a system is fixed.
So, we just as well assume that I is exactly the set of all agents in the system.
Then, we have:
DEFINITION 5.5 (System configuration)
A global system configuration is a set {Aι|ι ∈ I} of local agent configura-
tions.
As seen above, we use µ to store the bindings to actions. But local variables
can also be bound to values, for example when the belief base is tested. In our
semantics we use ground substitutions to implement this. A substitution is
ground if it binds variables to terms without variables in them.
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DEFINITION 5.6 (Substitution)
∗ A substitution θ is a finite set of pairs (also called bindings) of the
form xi := ti, where xi ∈ LV and ti is a term of L, xi 6= xj for every
i 6= j, and xi /∈ free(tj) for every i and j.
∗ A ground substitution θ is a substitution such that for every pair
x := t ∈ θ the term t is ground, i.e. free(t) = ∅.
∗ The domain of a substitution θ, denoted by dom(θ), is the set of
variables x for which θ contains a pair x := t.
By definition, substitutions can only bind local variables. Global variables
can be used as formal parameters for different actions and in many constraint
stores. Creating a binding to a constraint variable thus could potentially influ-
ence the meaning of many constraint stores, so we don’t allow it.
We define application of a substitution only informally, as it is a well-known
notion and a complete formal definition would involve a lot of notational clut-
ter.
DEFINITION 5.7 (Application of a substitution)
Let e be any syntactic expression, be it from L or P , and let θ be a substi-
tution. Then eθ denotes the expression where all free variables x in e for
which x := t ∈ θ are simultaneously replaced by t.
We sometimes use substitutions to unify different sets of terms. We need
some definitions for the notions of unifier and most general unifier.
DEFINITION 5.8 (Unifiers and most general unifiers)
∗ Let θ and η be two substitutions. Then, the composition θη is the
substitution {(x := (xθ)η)|x ∈ dom(θ) or x ∈ dom(η)}.
∗ Let{ei|i = 1, . . . , n} be a set of expressions. A substitution θ is a
unifier of these expressions if ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : eiθ = ejθ.
∗ Let {ei|i = 1, . . . , n} be a set of expressions. A substitution θ is a
most general unifier of these expressions if θ is a unifier of
{ei|i = 1, . . . , n} and for all other unifiers ζ it holds that ζ = θη,
for some substitution η.
So, the application of the composed substitution θη means that first θ is applied,
and then η. A unifier of a set of expressions is a substitution such that the
expressions are all equal after application of the substitution, and a most general
unifier is a unifier that keeps the expressions as general as possible.
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The semantics of GrAPL we will give in the next two subsections is de-
fined on two different levels, the local agent level and the global system level,
like in the previous chapter. The reason we use a two-layered semantics is
that the behaviour of a multi-agent system is an amalgamation of the interact-
ing behaviours of the agents. Each agent can perform social actions (group
communication and group action execution) and individual actions (the other
statements). Individual actions don’t depend on or influence the other agents.
The meaning of these actions can be defined locally. The transitions of these
actions are labelled with the symbol τ . At the global system level, these ac-
tions simply are interleaved with the actions of other agents. The outcome of
social actions depends on the behaviour of the other agents. The meaning of
these actions can only be defined at the global system level. Nevertheless, a
dummy local transition step is generated for social actions, labelled with the
action details necessary to define the semantics of the social action globally.
The semantic model we use in this chapter is quite different from the model
in the previous chapter. Here, we don’t pay any attention to real-time aspects.
We simply interleave the individual actions of the different agents, and let so-
cial actions shake hands by executing them synchronously. In the semantics
of GrAPL, we abstract from interacting physical actions and from details of
agent communication. Agents don’t send messages back and forth in GrAPL;
instead, group communication is synchronous. Thus, the two programming
languages are on different abstraction levels. In devising the skeleton program-
ming language of Chapter 4, our aim was to build a realistic, generic model of
agent interaction, and here we want to design high-level communication prim-
itives for group coordination. These different aims lead to different semantic
models. It might be interesting to combine the two models into a new model,
for example by adding real-time aspects to GrAPL, and allowing agents to state
demands on the duration of group actions. We leave this for future work.
5.4.2 Local semantics
In general, a local transition looks like 〈µ, δ, ι, pi〉 l−→θ 〈µ′, δ′, ι, pi′〉. We use
labelled transitions, because sometimes information present in the local level
is needed to synchronously execute certain statements at the global level. The
label τ marks internal individual agent steps, resulting from local reasoning.
When the statement locally executed is group communication or group action
execution other labels are used to represent information necessary for the global
semantics, as explained later on. The transition arrow is subscripted with a
substitution, which contains bindings created by tests or communication that
have to be passed on to the rest of the agent’s program.
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First, we give the transition rules for the basic statements. These are fol-
lowed by the transition rules for composite programs. We again use the symbol√
to denote the empty program remainder; this results if there are no more
statements left to be executed.
The first transition rule we give is for doing nothing, that is, execution of
skip.
〈µ, δ, ι, skip〉 τ−→∅ 〈µ, δ, ι,√〉
As expected, skip doesn’t affect anything, except the program to be done next.
We continue with tests of the belief base and actions, respectively. Testing
generally yields values for the free variables in the formula tested, that is, sub-
stitutions. For example, if the belief base contains the formula
Birthday(Wieke, 12-12), then performing the test ?Birthday(Wieke, d) yields
the value 12-12 for the variable d. The only difference between the two test
statements is the domain of the substitution yielded. As there can occur global
variables in formulas tested on constraints of actions, and bindings to global
variables are undesirable, we exclude these from the domain of the substitu-
tion.
Let θ be a ground substitution such
that dom(θ) = free(ϕ).
δ ` ϕθ
〈µ, δ, ι, ?ϕ〉 τ−→θ 〈µ, δ, ι,√〉
Let θ be a ground substitution such
that dom(θ) = free(ϕ) \ GV .
µ(a) ` ϕθ
〈µ, δ, ι, ?(ϕ, a)〉 τ−→θ 〈µ, δ, ι,√〉
So, if tests are successful, they always yields ground terms for all free local
variables in the tested formula. This doesn’t have to mean that the belief base
or constraint store uniquely determines a value for each variable. In case this is
not so, there are multiple possible outcomes (substitutions yielded) for the test.
The next example clarifies this.
EXAMPLE 5.5 (Tests in action)
We could have a belief base containing these three formulas:
distance(Amsterdam,Utrecht) = 10
distance(Amsterdam,Rotterdam) = 13
distance(Amsterdam,Den Haag) = 10
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If we test this belief base using the statement ?distance(Amsterdam, x) =
10where x is a free variable, then there are two substitutions that can result,
namely {x := Utrecht} and {x := Den Haag}. Similar things happen in
tests of constraint stores. Look at this constraint on action a, which poses
three demands on the first formal parameter of a:
distance(v1,Utrecht) = 10 ∧
distance(v1,Rotterdam) = 13 ∧
distance(v1,Den Haag) = 10
If we test this constraint store with ?(distance(v1, x) = 10, a) (meaning
“For which city does the constraint on a imply that the distance to the first
action parameter must be 10?”), then there are again two possible substitu-
tions resulting, namely {x := Utrecht} and {x := Den Haag}.
In the transition resulting from the transition rule, the obtained values are
stored in the substitution attached to the arrow. In the transition rules for the
composite programs, these values will be substituted throughout the rest of the
program. In case no suitable substitution can be found, there is no transition
generated; the test fails.
Inserting something into the belief base causes a belief revision. This is by
no means trivial; much research has been done on the subject (see eg. [49]).
Here, we abstract from the belief revision process, by supposing a belief revi-
sion function ρ : ℘(L)×L → ℘(℘(L)). This function takes the old belief base
and a formula to be inserted, and yields the set of new belief bases that could
result from belief revision. One of these is non-deterministically chosen. Then,
this is the transition rule for insertion into the belief base:
δ′ ∈ ρ(δ, ϕ)
〈µ, δ, ι, ins(ϕ)〉 τ−→∅ 〈µ, δ′, ι,√〉
The condition of this transition rule formalises the process of belief revision.
As insertion of a belief formula doesn’t yield any new information, the sub-
stitution yielded is the empty one. Note that we stipulated that free variables
occurring in formulas inserted into the belief base are guarded. This means
that when these insertions are executed, the free variables have been replaced
by ground values from the domain D. This is necessary as the belief base is
defined to be a set of closed formulas.
Next are the CommGroup-statements, CommGroupAdd and CommGroup-
Reset. Locally the resulting set of constraints cannot be found, as this is also
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determined by the other communicators. Therefore, the update of bindings to
actions takes place globally. The local transition is a dummy transition, which
has the purpose to deliver information on the particulars of the CommGroup-
statement, in the label of the transition arrow, to prepare a transition step of the
whole system.
〈µ, δ, ι,CommGroupReset(a, ϕ)〉 a::ϕ−→∅ 〈µ, δ, ι,√〉
〈µ, δ, ι,CommGroupAdd(a, ϕ)〉 a::µ(a)∧ϕ−→ ∅ 〈µ, δ, ι,√〉
As these rules yield dummy transitions, the resulting configuration is not com-
puted locally. So, the resulting configuration 〈µ, δ, ι,√〉 at the right-hand sides
of the transition arrows isn’t the actual local configuration resulting from group
communication. More specifically, in the rules above the constraint store com-
ponent doesn’t seem to be affected by the CommGroup, while we know that
group communication updates the constraint stores. This update is computed
globally, and overwrites the unchanged constraint store function µ. The only
relevant information in the resulting configurations is the program component,
which will be built up by a bottom-up application of the local transition rules.
The label a :: ψ above the transition reads “I propose to do a under the
constraint ψ.” In case of a CommGroupAdd-statement, ψ is the conjunction of
the stored constraint on a and ϕ, meaning that the agent strengthens its present
constraint with ϕ. In case of a CommGroupReset-statement, ψ is ϕ, meaning
that the agent overwrites its stored constraints and offers the fresh proposal ϕ.
Note that group communication doesn’t yield any bindings to local vari-
ables; the resulting substitution is ∅. The only thing communicated are con-
straints on global variables; local variables are not involved in this form of
communication.
Group action execution is influenced by all group members, so local seman-
tics also yields a dummy transition labelled with action details, which serves
to prepare a global transition step. Action execution can be done individually
or groupwise. There is no real difference between these two options. Indi-
vidual actions simply are group actions where the group only has one member.
Locally, an agent tries to execute a(t¯). The terms t¯, which are the actual param-
eters of the action a, may contain free variables, indicating that the agent hasn’t
chosen a specific value for some formal parameters. In the global semantics, a
substitution for these free variables is generated. Also globally, the local belief
base is updated to reflect changes in information on the state of the world after
the action has been done. Now, this is the local transition rule:
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〈µ, δ, ι, a(t¯)〉 a(t¯)−→∅ 〈µ, δ, ι,√〉
We use the label a(t¯), which indicates that the agent intends to perform a
with actual parameters t¯. Again, the fact that in the resulting configuration the
belief base hasn’t changed doesn’t mean anything, as the change to the beliefs
is computed globally.
Now, we arrive at the program constructors. We employ the convention that√
;pi equals pi.
First, we define the semantics of the if–then–else-statements. These come
in two variants, one which tests the belief base and one which tests the con-
straint on an action. The semantics of both variants is similar. There are two
transition rules for each variant, one for a succeeding test and one for a failing
test.
We start with if–then–else-statements that test the belief base. In the fol-
lowing transition rules, let Θ be the set of ground substitutions θ such that
dom(θ) = free(ϕ).
θ ∈ Θ, δ ` ϕθ
〈µ, δ, ι, if ϕ then pi1 else pi2〉 τ−→θ 〈µ, δ, ι, pi1〉
6 ∃θ ∈ Θ : δ ` ϕθ
〈µ, δ, ι, if ϕ then pi1 else pi2〉 τ−→∅ 〈µ, δ, ι, pi2〉
Note that if the test fails, there is no substitution to propagate. These rules give
the semantics of the test in the if–then–else statement, and the choice made be-
tween the two programs. It isn’t surprising that these transition rules resemble
those of ?ϕ and ?(ϕ, a).
For testing the constraint on a, we have the following two rules, in which
Θ is the set of ground substitutions θ such that dom(θ) = free(ϕ) \ GV .
θ ∈ Θ, µ(a) ` ϕθ
〈µ, δ, ι, if ϕ for a then pi1 else pi2〉 τ−→θ 〈µ, δ, ι, pi1〉
6 ∃θ ∈ Θ : µ(a) ` ϕθ
〈µ, δ, ι, if ϕ for a then pi1 else pi2〉 τ−→∅ 〈µ, δ, ι, pi2〉
For sequential composition, the rule is entirely conventional, except for
substitution propagation. A substitution resulting from testing or communicat-
ing must be applied to the remainder of the program left to be executed. If we
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have pi1;pi2 and executing the first statement of pi1 yields a substitution θ and a
remaining program pi′1, then this substitution has to be applied to pi2 when the
sequential composition is executed.
〈µ, δ, ι, pi1〉 l−→θ 〈µ′, δ′, ι, pi′1〉
〈µ, δ, ι, pi1;pi2〉 l−→θ 〈µ′, δ′, ι, pi′1;pi2θ〉
Note that the substitution isn’t applied to pi′1 in this rule. This is not necessary,
because the transition in the antecedent of the rule takes care of this. The
transition in the consequent of the rule still carries the substitution θ, as there
might be other parts of the program not mentioned in the rule, to which the
substitution still has to be applied.
To clarify why θ isn’t applied to pi′1, we use the following example.
EXAMPLE 5.6 (Substitution propagation)
Look at this simple program:
(?Birthday(Wieke, d); buy present before(d)); give present(Wieke, d)
To compute the semantics of this program, we start with the semantics of
the first atomic statement. For ease of explanation, we leave out all ele-
ments of the local agent configuration, except the program. Now, the tran-
sition rule for testing the belief base yield this transition:
?Birthday(Wieke, d) τ−→d:=12-12 √
Because of the above rule for sequential composition, we then have
?Birthday(Wieke, d); buy present before(d) τ−→d:=12-12√
; buy present before(12-12)
The resulting program is equivalent to buy present before(12-12). Then
the first transition step of the entire program becomes:
(?Birthday(Wieke, d); buy present before(d)); give present(Wieke, d)
τ−→d:=12-12
buy present before(12-12); give present(Wieke, 12-12)
Note that the substitution d := 12-12 already has been applied to the
statement buy present before(d) in the computation of the previous transi-
tion.
Next are the rules for non-deterministic choice.
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〈µ, δ, ι, pi1〉 l−→θ 〈µ′, δ′, ι, pi′1〉
〈µ, δ, ι, pi1 + pi2〉 l−→θ 〈µ′, δ′, ι, pi′1〉
〈µ, δ, ι, pi2〉 l−→θ 〈µ′, δ′, ι, pi′2〉
(σ, δ, ι, pi1 + pi2)
l−→θ (σ′, δ′, ι, pi′2)
Again, the substitution has already been processed on the non-deterministic
alternative chosen, and it only needs to be propagated.
5.4.3 Global semantics
To obtain the semantics of a multi-agent program, we use an interleaving se-
mantics with a handshaking mechanism for synchronisation. Group commu-
nication and group action need to shake hands; the other basic statements are
interleaved.
We start with group communication. When a group communicates about an
action, the local constraints of the agents communicating are updated to be the
conjunction of the proposed constraints. This might be an inconsistent formula,
if the agents have conflicting interests. The resulting constraints can control
the participation of agents in the future execution of the action communicated
about, but we also want to control the group of agents that takes part in the
group communication itself. If, for example, one or more agents demand that
agent Jane should be excluded from the group doing the action discussed, it
could be useful to forbid this agent to be part of the group negotiating the
constraints on the execution of the action. So, we demand that agents may only
participate in communication about the details of a future group action as long
as presence of these agents is not inconsistent with the demands of each agent
on the group composition. If the group communicating violates the demands of
(at least) one group member, then the group communication fails, in the sense
that no global transition is generated. Of course, the demands on the group
composition must also hold when the action is to be executed by some group.
We need only one transition rule to cater for both CommGroupAdd and
CommGroupReset statements, as the only difference between them is the pro-
posed constraint (either a strengthening of the current constraint or a com-
pletely fresh proposal). We dealt with this locally; the label of the local transi-
tion contains the constraint proposed. Now, this is the transition rule for group
communication:
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Let J ⊆ I be a set of agent names and let Aι = 〈µι, δι, ι, piι〉.
for all ι ∈ J : Aι a::ψι−→∅ 〈µι, δι, ι, pi′ι〉
{Aι|ι ∈ I} −→ {〈µ′ι, δι, ι, pi′ι〉|ι ∈ J} ∪ {Aι|ι ∈ I \ J}
where µ′ι = µι[
∧
ι∈J ψι/a] and the following condition holds:
for each ι ∈ J it holds that g = J ∧ ψι 6` ⊥
The antecedent of this transition rule consists of (dummy) local transitions for
group communication. The labels above the arrows have to match on a, the
action discussed. Each agent ι brings its own constraint, ψι. As a result, a
is constrained by
∧
ι∈J ψι in the new constraint stores µ′ι. Note that this glob-
ally computed update of the constraint stores overwrites the resulting constraint
stores from the dummy local transitions (which are still µι, like in the configu-
rations before execution of the group communication). The group communica-
tion takes place in a synchronised execution step. In this respect, CommGroup
execution is similar to the synchronous communication primitives in (for ex-
ample) CSP [61]. For the agents not participating in the communicative action,
the local state stays the same.
The condition that for each ι ∈ J it holds that g = J ∧ ψι 6` ⊥ controls
the composition of the group of agents communicating about the action. The
formula g = J , stating that g is the group of communicating agents, should
be consistent with the constraints of the agents. If the constraint of one of
the communicating agents implies that there have to be at least three agents
involved in the action, then each group communicating about this action must
also contain at least three agents. As another example, if the constraint of one
the agents (say ι1) implies that agents ι3 and ι6 have to participate in the group
action, then group communication with ι1 in the group can’t succeed if these
agents don’t put in a word.
Note that the transition rule and the associated condition don’t demand that
the constraints of the communicating agents are consistent, that is, that ⊥ can’t
be inferred from
∧
ι∈J ψι. As long as the group of communicators is consis-
tent with the constraints of the agents, the group communication succeeds. In
case the agents have conflicting demands on action details, the constraint on
a will become ⊥ in the constraint stores of the agents. The reason for this
choice, which may seem strange, is that ⊥ in a constraint store has a signalling
function. The agent can test its constraint store, and when it turns out that the
constraint is⊥, the agent knows that there was disagreement in an earlier nego-
tiation round. Subsequently, the agent can try to re-initiate the communication
about the group action by performing a CommGroupReset, which will remove
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⊥ from the constraint store if the constraints of the agents communicating in
this new negotiation round aren’t inconsistent.
It is important to note that group communication essentially is
non-deterministic. The resulting constraint store is fixed, being the conjunction
of the constraints of the communicators, so this is not the non-deterministic el-
ement. But the group of agents communicating allows many possibilities, as
long as the constraints are not too strong, as we show in the following example.
EXAMPLE 5.7 (Non-determinism in group communication)
Some agent called Peter wants to form a group of agents that will help
him in painting his new house. He needs at most four people to help
him, and he would like Eunice to help, as she is very good at painting.
Then, he could come up with a constraint ϕ which is the formula Eunice ∈
g ∧ Peter ∈ g ∧ #(g) ≤ 5. What could happen if Peter performs
CommGroupReset(ϕ,PaintHouse)? This generates a dummy local transi-
tion labelled with PaintHouse :: ϕ. One scenario is that indeed Eunice
and exactly three other agents are prepared to answer with a synchronous
CommGroup-statement. In this case, it is not at all certain that all four
of these agents will synchronously communicate with Peter. The seman-
tics defined above allows any group of agents that is consistent with the
demands of the participants. So, if the four agents have no additional de-
mands, the only agent who will certainly communicate is Eunice, as Peter
has demanded her to be present. Any subset of the other three agents could
also communicate with Peter and Eunice; for now, the choice is a non-
deterministic one.
But it could also happen that the only agent reacting to Peter’s request is
Eunice. The group communication will succeed, as this group also satisfies
the demands on the group. Another situation occurs when twenty agents
state their willingness to assist Peter. Then, each group with at least Eunice
and Peter in it, and at most five members, could end up communicating
about the painting of Peter’s house, as well as groups without Peter. We go
into this last option. If Peter isn’t part of the communicating group, then
his demands don’t need to be satisfied, and other communicators can come
to very different agreements on the painting of the house.
It is possible to limit this kind of non-determinism by adding another de-
mand to the transition rule for group communication. We could demand the
communicating group to be maximal or minimal with respect to set inclusion.
But we won’t make a decision on this issue, as this choice is influenced by the
specific domain of the multi-agent system.
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The transition rule for action execution poses a dilemma. We have to decide
in which way actual parameters of an action can be determined when the agents
executing the action are not specific about them. To make matters clear, here’s
an example.
EXAMPLE 5.8 (Jogging again)
We revisit agents James and Clare, that have negotiated about jogging in
the park together. As before, the action Jog has two explicit parameters, the
first being the starting time and the second one the distance to be jogged.
James and Clare have agreed upon constraints on these parameters, so their
constraint stores associated with Jog are the same. They contain the con-
straint: g = {James, Clare} ∧ v1 = 19.00 ∧ 8 ≤ v2 ≤ 10. These
constraints are not decisive; there are still three possibilities for v2 (assum-
ing the value is a natural number). So, what happens when the agents try
to jog together? There are a number of cases; we will give a representative
example of each kind:
1. James and Clare both try to execute Jog(19.00, 8). So, their action
parameters agree and satisfy the constraints. The action will take
place.
2. James tries Jog(x1, 8) and Clare tries Jog(19.00, y2), where both x1
and y2 are free (local) variables. This implements execution time
communication: James tells Clare that they will run 8 km., and Clare
communicates that they will start at 19.00. All parameters are deter-
mined and satisfy the constraints, so the action Jog(19.00, 8) will be
jointly executed.
3. James tries Jog(x1, 8) and Clare doesn’t feel like making any deci-
sions, so she tries Jog(y1, y2). The outcome of this is not immediately
clear. It is clear that James communicates the distance parameter to
Clare. The first parameter is not talked about, and seen mathemati-
cally, this is not necessary either, as the value of v1 is fixed by the
constraints agreed upon. So, one choice is to let the above group
action succeed; Jog(19.00, 8) is synchronously executed. The other
choice is to let this group action fail, because there is no run-time
agreement on all action parameters. There is something to say for
both options.
4. James tries Jog(19.00, x2) and Clare tries Jog(19.00, y2). It seems
intuitively justified that this group action has to fail, as there is no
clarity about the distance to be jogged, neither in the action param-
eters of the agents nor in the constraints. But another view is that
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the value space for the second parameter still contains three possible
values, and therefore there are three possible executions of the above
statement, in which James and Clare jog 8, 9 or 10 kilometres, re-
spectively.
As suggested by the example, it is not immediately clear what is the right se-
mantics for action execution. In this chapter, we create three alternative seman-
tics. One of these yields success for cases 3 and 4 above, the second failure for
both and the third yields success for case 3 and failure for case 4. Before pre-
senting these options, we will pinpoint the subtle semantical issues at hand.
In group formation and group action, there are two types of communication.
There is communication during the negotiation phase, performed through one
or more CommGroup-statements. Also, there is execution time communication,
which takes place if some agents participating in the actual group action don’t
instantiate all action parameters with ground values, but use free local variables
for these. Typically, during the negotiation phase each agent will make sure all
its important demands on the action are incorporated into the set of constraints
agreed upon. An agent might be willing to drop some of its less important
demands, if this is the only way to form a group, but it will usually hold on
to its major constraints. After group formation, the constraint stores of the
agents need not be decisive on each action parameter. Often, there will still
be a parameter space from which each choice is perfectly acceptable to all
agents involved. The choice from this parameter space can be made during the
execution phase. An agent can pick a value for an action parameter from the
set of values allowed by the constraint on the action, and use this value for the
parameter. This is what happened in case 2 of the example: the distance wasn’t
fixed by the constraints yet, so James chooses the distance to be 8 by trying to
execute Jog(x1, 8). Clare tries Jog(19.00, y2), and because she didn’t pick a
value for the distance parameter, she lets James determine the distance.
The combination of execution time communication and negotiation phase
communication makes matters opaque here. For ease of formulation, we intro-
duce a new term. We call a formal parameter of an action a definite for a group
of agents J if the conjunction of the constraints associated with a by the agents
in J allows only one value for that parameter. This is the formal definition:
DEFINITION 5.9 (Definite action parameters)
Let J ⊆ I be a set of agent identities, and let 〈µι, δι, ι, piι〉 be the local
configuration of agent ι. A formal parameter vk of an action a is definite
for J if there exists a value d ∈ D, such that∧
ι∈J µι(a) 6` ⊥ and
∧
ι∈J µι(a) ` vk = d.
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We will sometimes be sloppy, and call action parameters definite without re-
ferring to an agent group. In the above definition,
∧
ι∈J µι(a) is the joint con-
straint of the agents in J on action a. If this constraint implies that the formal
parameter vk must have a certain ground value d, then this parameter is defi-
nite. We need to exclude the case that the joint constraint is inconsistent, as then
everything can be derived from it, and the constraint thus determines nothing.
In case 3 of the example above, the essential action parameter is the first
one, the time James and Clare will go jogging. This parameter is definite for the
agents; their constraint stores fix the time at 19.00. So, group communication
about the constraints on Jog has settled on a value. Now we focus solely on
execution time communication. During execution time communication, both
agents use a free variable for the first parameter, thereby indicating that they
are willing to let the other agent determine the value of the first parameter. But
as none of the agents supplies a value, execution time communication alone
can’t fix the first parameter. Still focusing only on execution time communica-
tion, we can choose between two possible scenarios: the communication could
succeed where the value is non-deterministically chosen from the domain of
the first parameter, or the communication, and thereby the overall group ac-
tion, could fail. In the former case, the constraints of both agents will single
out the only possible group action parameter.
In case 4, the second parameter is the essential one. This parameter is
not definite; the constraints still allow three possible values. But actually this
is the only difference between case 3 and case 4 of the example. Both agents
again use a free variable for the parameter in their action call, so again run-time
communication could fail or yield success with a non-deterministic outcome.
In case we choose the second option, the range of possible values for the second
parameter will be considerably narrowed by the constraint stores, yielding three
possible action executions.
So, from these considerations it seems that there are two options for the
semantics of group action. In the first, execution time communication doesn’t
have to be conclusive to yield action success. If it isn’t, then actual action
parameters are chosen in a non-deterministic manner. In the second option, we
demand run-time communication to be conclusive, and the action will fail if
this isn’t the case. There is still a third option, which lies in between these two
alternatives.
Although there are three options for the semantics, we don’t need three
different transition rules. The difference will be made in the subtle choices in
the conditions associated with the rule. First, we will present the transition rule
with the most permissive conditions, formalising the semantics where run-time
communication need not be conclusive.
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Group action execution has a synchronised semantics, just like group com-
munication. Action execution can be done individually or group-wise. Indi-
vidual actions simply are group actions where the group has only one member.
There are two conditions associated with action execution. First, the actual ac-
tion parameters of all agents in the group have to be compatible. We model this
by requiring the parameters to be unifiable. So, if for example one agent in the
group tries the value 5 for the first action parameter, and another group member
tries 6, then no successful group action is possible. Secondly, the constraints of
all agents in the group on the action have to be obeyed. This is the monitoring
of the action execution; the group action has to be executed according to the
agreements made by the agents prior to the action.
Action execution might change the belief base of the agent. We assume
that for each agent ι we have a belief revision function ξι, which models this
change. This function takes an action with definite parameters and the old
belief base, and returns the set of belief bases that could result from a revision
of the belief base with the effects of the action. One of these candidates is
non-deterministically chosen. By introducing the function ξι, we abstract from
details of belief revision; again, see [49] for details.
For the global transition for action synchronisation, we use the same con-
ventions as in the previous transition rule. So, let J ⊆ I be a set of agent
names, let Aι = 〈µι, δι, ι, piι〉, let θ be a ground substitution and let a be an
action with formal parameters v¯.
for all ι ∈ J : Aι a(t¯ι)−→∅ 〈µι, δι, ι, pi′ι〉
{Aι|ι ∈ I} −→ {〈µι, δ′ι, ι, pi′ιθ〉|ι ∈ J} ∪ {Aι|ι ∈ I \ J}
where δ′ι ∈ ξι(a(t¯ιθ), δι) and the following conditions hold:
∗ dom(θ) = ⋃ι∈J free(t¯ι) and θ is a unifier of {t¯ι|ι ∈ J}
∗ ∧ι∈J µι(a) ∧ v¯ = c¯ ∧ g = J 6` ⊥, where c¯ = t¯ιθ for any ι ∈ J
The first condition above demands that the substitution θ provides a ground
value for the free variables in the actual action parameters of all agents. More-
over, it states that θ has to be a unifier of the actual parameter settings of all
agents in the group; this means that t¯ιθ = t¯κθ for each ι, κ ∈ J . This explains
why the definition of c¯ (a shorthand for the unified actual parameters) in the
second condition ends with ‘for any ι ∈ J’. The substitution θ instantiates all
free variables in the action parameters of the agents in the group in such a way,
that all agents use the same set of actual parameters. Only this way, the action
can be done in a coordinated manner.
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The action with the unified actual parameters constitutes an input to the
belief update function. Also, the substitution θ is applied to the programs left
to be executed, because in general action execution generates bindings to free
variables which have to be passed on to the remainders of the programs. Both
these updates overwrite elements in the resulting configurations of the dummy
local transitions.
The second condition states that the actual values of the parameters of the
group action and the composition of the group have to be consistent with the
constraints of all participating agents. We explain this formula in detail. The
formula
∧
ι∈J µι(a) is the result of adding up the constraints that the partici-
pating agents associated with a. To this formula, two conjuncts are added. The
first formula, v¯ = c¯, states the unified actual values of the formal parameters.
The second formula, g = J , states the actual composition of the group about to
perform the action. If there is a clash between the constraints of the agents and
the actual action parameters, then an inconsistency can be derived, resulting in
failure of the execution.
In an implementation of the language, a constraint solver can check con-
sistency. Sometimes, a group action execution allows more than one possible
unifier θ. In this semantic variant, we leave this non-determinism unresolved;
alternatively, it could give rise to failure, as is the case in the semantic variant
we will present later on.
Looking back at the example of James and Clare going jogging, this choice
of conditions implements the case that both case 3 and case 4 succeed:
EXAMPLE 5.9
The constraint on Jog is
g = {James, Clare} ∧ v1 = 19.00 ∧ 8 ≤ v2 ≤ 10.
We revisit the third and fourth case of Example 5.8:
3. James tries Jog(x1, 8) and Clare tries Jog(y1, y2). As the free vari-
ables in the actual parameters are {x1, y1, y2}, this is the domain of
θ. The substitution θ must be a ground substitution, and a unifier
of {(x1, 8), (y1, y2)}. It is clear that y2θ must be 8. Furthermore,
x1θ = y1θ = t, where t can be any time point according to the first
condition of the global transition rule. The second condition demands
that the unified actual parameters obey the constraint on Jog, which
means that the only legitimate value for t is 19.00. The instantiated
action Jog(19.00, 8) is executed.
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4. James tries Jog(19.00, x2) and Clare tries Jog(19.00, y2). Now,
dom(θ) = {x2, y2}. The ground substitution θ must be a unifier of
{(19.00, x2), (19.00, y2)}. In order to unify x2 and y2, any distance
can be assigned to them, but as the constraint on the distance must be
obeyed there are three options: x2θ = y2θ = 8, x2θ = y2θ = 9 and
x2θ = y2θ = 10. One of these options is randomly picked, and the
Jog action takes place accordingly.
So, with these conditions, run-time communication need not be conclu-
sive. This happens if all agents in the group J use a variable for a particu-
lar parameter of a. The substitution θ, being ground, fixes a value for this
parameter in an arbitrary manner. The second condition of the transition rule
checks this value against the aggregate constraints of the agents. If the parameter
is definite (that is, completely determined by the constraints), then the range of
values that θ can assign to the parameter is reduced to one possibility. (This
matches case 3 of the jogging example.) If the parameter is not definite, then
multiple substitutions are possible, yielding a non-deterministic action execu-
tion. (This matches case 4 of the example.)
If we want to implement the option for the semantics where execution time
communication has to be conclusive in order to successfully execute the group
action, we have to replace the first demand of the global transition rule for
action synchronisation, which was:
∗ dom(θ) = ⋃ι∈J free(t¯ι) and θ is a unifier of {t¯ι|ι ∈ J}
with this one:
∗ dom(θ) =⋃ι∈J free(t¯ι) and θ is the most general unifier of {t¯ι|ι ∈ J}
With this demand, there is only one permittable ground substitution θ, namely
the most general unifier of the actual action parameters of all agents. In case
there are one or more action parameters for which none of the agents deter-
mines a domain value, then the most general unifier will not be a ground substi-
tution, and the group action can’t be successful. Only if a value for each action
parameter is fixed solely through run-time communication (without looking at
the constraints), this variant of the semantics will yield action success. So, both
the third and the fourth case of Example 5.8 above will fail with this semantic
variant:
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EXAMPLE 5.10
We look at the third and fourth case again:
3. James and Clare try to execute Jog(x1, 8) and Jog(y1, y2), respec-
tively. The most general unifier of these action parameters is {x1 :=
w, y1 := w, y2 := 8}, where w is some variable, which isn’t a ground
substitution. So, this group action won’t generate a global transition
step.
4. James and Clare attempt Jog(19.00, x2) and Jog(19.00, y2), respec-
tively. The most general unifier of the parameter tuples is {x2 :=
u, y2 := u}, where u is a variable. Again, this isn’t a ground substi-
tution, so no global transition results.
There is a third option for the semantics. In this variant, case 3 of the
example succeeds and case 4 fails. More generally speaking, group action
execution is successful if each formal action parameter is definite for the group
attempting the action or run-time communication is conclusive about its actual
value. If this is so, there is only one unifying substitution that yields actual
parameters satisfying the constraints of the agents. For this semantical variant,
we add an extra condition to the two original conditions of the global transition
rule for action synchronisation, resulting in these conditions:
∗ dom(θ) = ⋃ι∈J free(t¯ι) and θ is a unifier of {t¯ι|ι ∈ J}
∗ ∧ι∈J µι(a) ∧ v¯ = c¯ ∧ g = J 6` ⊥, where c¯ = t¯ιθ for any ι ∈ J
∗ There is only one ground substitution θ that satisfies the two conditions
above.
We again revisit the jogging example:
EXAMPLE 5.11
The third and fourth case in this semantic variant:
3. James and Clare try to execute Jog(x1, 8) and Jog(y1, y2), respec-
tively. In Example 5.9, we have seen that there is only one unifying
ground substitution, such that the constraints of James and Clare are
respected. This means that the group action Jog will successfully be
executed, with actual parameters 19.00 and 8.
4. James and Clare attempt Jog(19.00, x2) and Jog(19.00, y2), respec-
tively. In Example 5.9, there were three candidate unifying ground
substitutions, such that the constraints of the agents are obeyed by the
instantiated actual parameters. So, the Jog action fails.
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It might very well be possible to devise more, also interesting, variants of the
global semantics for group action.
Group communication and group action execution are the only statements
that are synchronously executed by a group of agents. All other statements
of individual agents can simply be interleaved. All local transitions of these
statements are labelled with the symbol τ . So, let ι ∈ I be some agent taking a
local execution step, let Aκ = 〈µκ, δκ, κ, piκ〉 and A′κ = 〈µ′κ, δ′κ, κ, pi′κ〉, where
κ is some element of I.
Aι
τ−→θ A′ι
{Aκ|κ ∈ I} −→ {A′ι} ∪ {Aκ|κ ∈ I \ {ι}}
One agent program is executed for one transition step, while the configurations
of the other agents don’t change.
5.5 Illustrations
To illustrate the mechanisms of the semantics and show the usefulness of our
language, we will give three additional examples. The first example is very
simple in nature, and we use it to explain the functioning of the two-layered
semantics.
EXAMPLE 5.12 (Arranging a meeting)
Dr. Van der Broek and Prof. Meyer are two scientists who would like to
cooperate with each other. So, they want to make an appointment for a
meeting which lasts a day. They communicate with each other about the
action Meet. This action has one explicit parameter, the date of the meeting.
These are the programs they employ:
Program of Van der Broek:
CommGroupReset(g = {Van der Broek, Meyer} ∧
(v1 = 26–1 ∨ v1 = 29–1 ∨ v1 = 30–1),Meet);
if v1 = x for Meet
then Meet(x)
else CommGroupAdd(v1 = 26–1 ∨ v1 = 29–1,Meet);Meet(y)
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Program of Meyer:
CommGroupAdd(g = {Van der Broek, Meyer} ∧
(v1 = 29–1 ∨ v1 = 30–1 ∨ v1 = 31–1),Meet);
if v1 = w for Meet
then Meet(w)
else CommGroupAdd(>,Meet);Meet(z)
Informally, these programs mean the following. Both Van der Broek and
Meyer have the demand that the group which meets has to consist of the
two of them. Also, they both initially propose three possible dates for the
meeting. Note that two of these dates are possible to both scientists. They
communicate with each other, which succeeds because the group commu-
nicating {Van der Broek, Meyer} satisfies the constraints of both agents. If
another agent would have tried to join in the negotiation, this would not
have succeeded. Van der Broek uses a CommGroupReset statement and
Meyer uses a CommGroupAdd statement in the first group communica-
tion. As we assume that the constraint on Meet for both agents is > be-
fore execution of the multi-agent program, it doesn’t matter which of both
CommGroup statements the agents use in the first communication round,
as the resulting demand proposed turns out the same (ϕ = > ∧ ϕ). The
updated constraint stores of both agents then contain the formula g =
{Van der Broek, Meyer} ∧ (v1 = 29–1 ∨ v1 = 30–1) as the new constraint
on Meet. Then, both agents test whether their constraints fix one date for
the action parameter, using the test in the if–then–else statement (we will
explain the working of this test later on). If this would be so, they would
meet at this date. But in this case, there are still two dates possible. So,
Meyer leaves it up to Van der Broek to strengthen her preferences, as he
adds the empty constraint > to his present constraint. Van der Broek then
narrows down her possible dates to two, and the scientists communicate for
the second time. Now, their constraint stores allow only one date, which is
29–1. So, they meet then.
We now look at how the interplay of local and global semantics yields
a trace of this system. Each global trace represents an actual computation
of the system. Local transitions play an auxiliary role in the construction of
global traces. To build a system trace, we alternately apply local and global
transition rules. Local transitions of individual actions are interleaved in
the global trace, and dummy local transitions for group actions lead to one
synchronised global transition.
We start with the local semantics of the first CommGroup statements
in both programs. The local transition rule for CommGroupReset yields a
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dummy transition for Van der Broek, with labelled arrow Meet::ϕ1−→ ∅, where
ϕ1 ≡ g = {Van der Broek, Meyer}∧(v1 = 26–1∨v1 = 29–1∨v1 = 30–1).
Similarly, the local transition rule for CommGroupAdd yields a dummy lo-
cal transition for Meyer, with labelled arrow Meet::ψ1−→ ∅, where
ψ1 ≡ g = {Van der Broek, Meyer}∧(v1 = 29–1∨v1 = 30–1∨v1 = 31–1).
The global transition rule for group communication checks whether the
group of communicators satisfies the demands of both agents, and as this
is the case, updates the constraints of both agents on Meet to be the conjunc-
tion of the proposals, which is (equivalent to) g = {Van der Broek, Meyer}∧
(v1 = 29–1 ∨ v1 = 30–1).
Now, both agents locally test their constraint on Meet, as part of the
if–then–else statements. We focus at the test of Van der Broek; the test of
Meyer is analogous. The formula tested is v1 = x, where x is a free local
variable. We look at the local transition rule for if–then–else statements
that test the constraint stores. If µ is the present constraint store func-
tion of Van der Broek, then a ground substitution θ is sought with dom(θ)
= free(v1 = x) \ GV = {v1, x} \ GV = {x}, such that (v1 = x)θ
follows from the constraint µ(Meet). As the current constraint on Meet
still allows two values for v1 (v1 = 29–1 ∨ v1 = 30–1), such a sub-
stitution can’t be found. The test for definiteness thus fails, and the sec-
ond transition rule for the if–then–else statement is used, which results in
Van der Broek taking the else branch. In case the constraint would have
been v1 = 29–1, then the test would have succeeded, yielding the substi-
tution {x := 29–1}. This substitution then would have been applied to
the rest of the program of Van der Broek, resulting next in an execution of
Meet(29–1). Like Van der Broek, Meyer also tests the constraint on Meet
and takes the else branch. As these tests are individual actions, the global
semantics interleaves them.
Both agents again arrive at a group communication statement, a
CommGroupAdd in both cases. Meyer chooses not to strengthen the current
constraint on Meet; he adds >, resulting in a transition Meet::ψ2−→ ∅, where
ψ2 ≡ g = {Van der Broek, Meyer} ∧ (v1 = 29–1 ∨ v1 = 30–1). Van der
Broek adds the constraint v1 = 26–1 ∨ v1 = 29–1, resulting in a dummy
local transition with arrow Meet::ϕ2−→ ∅, where
ϕ2 ≡ g = {Van der Broek, Meyer} ∧ v1 = 29–1. The global transition
rule combines these dummy local steps into a synchronous global step, in
which the constraint on Meet of both agents is updated to be ϕ2. Now, the
date has been agreed upon.
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Finally, both agents try a Meet-action, where the actual parameter of
Van der Broek is the free local variable y and the actual parameter of Meyer
is the free local variable z. The local transition rule for action execution
generates two dummy local transition, with arrows Meet(y)−→ ∅ and Meet(z)−→ ∅,
respectively. The global transition rule will find a substitution unifying the
two free variables y and z. Whether these two local transitions combine
into an actual synchronised Meet action depends on the semantic variant
employed for the global transition rule for action execution. Recall that
we introduced three variants in Section 5.4.3. Suppose we use the third
variant. Then, according to the first condition, the domain of the ground
substitution θ associated with the global transition rule must be the set of
free variables in the actual parameters of the actuators, which in this case
is the set {y, z}. This condition also states that θ is a unifier of the actual
parameters. As both agents use a free local variable, many unifiers are
possible. A unifier of the action parameters is {y := d, z := d}, where d
is any specific date. The second condition of the transition rule for group
action execution states that the actual action parameter after substitution
has to satisfy the aggregate constraints of both agents. To be specific, if the
date substituted for y and z is d, then the second condition in this specific
situation is:
(g = {Van der Broek, Meyer} ∧ v1 = 29–1) ∧ (v1 = d) ∧
(g = {Van der Broek, Meyer}) 6` ⊥.
The only value for d which satisfies this, is 29–1. So, there is only one
substitution θ possible, namely the substitution {y := 29–1, z := 29–1}.
The third condition of the global transition rule (uniqueness of the unifier)
is also satisfied. This means that the agents meet on 29–1.
The Meeting will also take place in the first semantic variant of group
action execution; in the second variant, it won’t.
The above programs are oversimplified, for expository reasons. For example,
if the agents initially have inconsistent demands, then their resulting constraint
stores will contain ⊥ for Meet. But as every formula is a logical consequence
of ⊥, the test v1 = x (or v1 = w) would succeed for any value for x (or w,
respectively). So, the agents should test for ⊥ first, in a realistic multi-agent
program where the agents have no foreknowledge of the demands the other
agent is going to make.
The reader might wonder how the negotiation phase is programmed in a re-
alistic agent system, as in the example above both agents seem to ‘know’ which
communication steps are expected. As agents are supposed to be autonomous,
it might seem strange that agents anticipate each other’s communication moves.
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To be specific, when the agents Van der Broek and Meyer start their negotiation
phase, they synchronously execute their CommGroup statements, with the ac-
tion Meet as the action discussed. Only if both agents synchronously perform
CommGroups about the same action, the negotiation can start. There isn’t an
initiator of the conversation; both agents act simultaneously. It all seems a bit
too symmetrical to be realistic.
There are several responses to these questions. In the first place, GrAPL
is an abstract programming language for group coordination. Thus, the state-
ments for communication and action execution are on a high abstraction level.
In an implementation of GrAPL, the synchronous primitives are likely to be
implemented using a series of asynchronous communication primitives. So,
on a lower abstraction level, the agents send messages to and fro according to
a lower-level communication protocol which has an initiating agent and isn’t
symmetrical. The implementation underlying CommGroupAdd and Comm-
GroupReset statements might be like this: the first agent arriving at a
CommGroup statement on a certain action a broadcasts its initial demands to
all agents that aren’t excluded from the group of communicators by its own
constraints. If there are agents in this group of potential negotiation partners
which are willing to communicate about this action (which means that they
also have a CommGroup statement with the action a as second parameter),
then these agents all send their constraint on the parameters of a to the initi-
ating agent. This agent waits for incoming messages with demands on a until
enough agents have reacted to form a group of communicators for this commu-
nication round which satisfies the demands of all members of this group. Then,
the initiating agent sends a message to the agents in this communicating group
containing the resulting constraint (which is the conjunction of the constraints
of the communicators).
The advantage of using the abstract synchronous statements of GrAPL over
the asynchronous statements of the underlying communication protocols is that
the program code for multi-lateral negotiation and group action execution can
be more compact. The agent metaphor has been claimed to provide powerful
abstract notions that can aid in the construction of the complex software needed
nowadays, and GrAPL is an agent programming language in this spirit.
Returning to the abstraction level of GrAPL, we go into the use of the co-
ordination primitives of GrAPL to construct program code for negotiation. In
general, there are two ways to do this. The programmer can write negotiation
protocols in GrAPL, or he can choose for ad hoc negotiation. In the second
case, it is unclear how the conversation between negotiating agents will take
place, so the agent program should contain many branches to take care of the
different scenarios. When an agent reaches a CommGroup statement, it tries to
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execute it, but if there is no suitable group of communicators which synchro-
nises with the agent, then the agent waits until such a group does arrive (see
the global transition rule for group communication; if there is no suitable group
of communicators, no global transition is yielded and execution stalls for this
branch of the agent program). During the negotiation phase, the agents can
test the constraint on the action, to find out whether the negotiation has already
converged to definite action parameters or whether the negotiation has led to
conflicting demands on the action. Depending on the outcome of these tests,
the agents decide whether they will try to communicate again and in which
way (weaker or stronger demands), or to stop negotiating and start the exe-
cution phase. Example 5.14 shows an example of agent coordination without
negotiation protocols. In case the agents use negotiation protocols, then the
program code is less messy. As all agents are assumed to use the same pro-
tocol, each agent knows which synchronisation points to expect, and thus less
branching is required. We will show an example of a coordination protocol for
a group action next. In order to write down the protocol, we assume GrAPL
includes recursive procedures.
EXAMPLE 5.13 (A coordination protocol)
We give a negotiation protocol, for groups of benevolent agents discussing
a future group action. We first show the protocol, and then explain it:
NegotiationProtocol(a, ψ(g), ϕmin(v¯), ϕsat(v¯), ϕopt(v¯)) :
CommGroupReset(ψ(g) ∧ ϕmin(v¯), a);
if ⊥ for a
then (ψ′(g) := Adjust(ψ(g));
NegotiationProtocol(a, ψ′(g), ϕmin(v¯), ϕsat(v¯), ϕopt(v¯)))
else (CommGroupAdd(ϕsat(v¯), a);
if ⊥ for a
then CommGroupReset(ψ(g) ∧ ϕmin(v¯), a)
else (CommGroupAdd(ϕopt(v¯), a);
if ⊥ for a
then CommGroupReset(ψ(g) ∧ ϕmin(v¯) ∧ ϕsat(v¯), a)
else skip));
The negotiation procedure takes five parameters, namely the action dis-
cussed (a), a demand on the group composition (ψ(g)), the minimal de-
mand of the agent on the formal action parameters v1, v2, . . . , vk, where k
is the arity of the action (ϕmin(v¯)), a demand on the formal parameters that
formalises what the agent would like best (ϕopt(v¯)) and a demand on these
parameters that formalises a satisfactory intermediate solution (ϕsat(v¯)).
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The agent first tries to find a group satisfying its group demand ψ(g), which
agrees with its minimal demand on the action parameters. The agent waits
until it can communicate with a group satisfying ψ(g). If this group doesn’t
agree with the minimal demand on the action parameters, then the first test
for⊥ succeeds, and the agent alters its constraint on the group composition
(we don’t go into details of the procedure Adjust). The recursive call to Ne-
gotiationProtocol results in an attempt to agree on the minimal parameter
demands with a new group. As soon as there is a group that agrees with the
minimal demands (and has minimal demands that this agent agrees with),
then the agent tries to constrain the action parameters further according to
its preferences. It starts carefully, by adding ϕsat(v¯). If the others don’t
agree with this (⊥ for a), then the agent resets the constraint to the previ-
ous parameter constraint, on which the agents agreed. As the other agents
do the same thing, this group communication will always succeed, and the
protocol is finished. If there is agreement in this round, the agent tries
strengthening the constraint on a by adding ϕopt(v¯). The other agents also
follow the protocol, so they do the same. If this succeeds, then the proto-
col is finished; otherwise, the agents reset the constraint to their previous
agreement.
Note that we assume that the group of agents negotiating is fixed dur-
ing execution of one call of NegotiationProtocol. This can be achieved by
always using a ψ(g) of the form g = J , with J a set of agent names.
In the next example, we show agents which discuss an action without a
protocol. To keep the example reasonably brief, the programs don’t contain
alternative branches for each possible flow of the conversation. The example
illustrates that the agents strengthen their demands when there are no conflicts
and there is no definite agreement yet, and that they weaken their demands
when they have disagreements. We assume we use the first or third semantic
variant for group action execution.
EXAMPLE 5.14 (Arranging a dinner date)
Two agents, Martha and Matthew, negotiate the time they will have dinner
together. They definitely want to dine with each other, so each of these
agents has the constraint that the other agent has to be part of the group
performing the dine action. They don’t agree yet on the precise time of
their dinner. During the negotiation process, the demands of the agents can
turn out to be inconsistent. To solve this, at least one of the agents has to
weaken its demands. It can also happen that the aggregate constraints are
still rather weak and don’t fix one specific time for the dinner. Then, the
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agents can strengthen their demands.
The dine action is unary; its sole explicit argument is the time. This is
the program of Martha:
01. CommGroupReset(v1 ≤ 19.00 ∧Matthew ∈ g, dine);
02. if ⊥ for dine
03. then (CommGroupReset(v1 ≤ 20.30 ∧Matthew ∈ g, dine);
04. if v1 = t for dine
05. then dine(t)
06. else dine(u))
07. else if v1 = w for dine
08. then dine(w)
09. else (CommGroupAdd(v1 = 19.00, dine);
10. dine(19.00))
We number program lines for ease of reference. After the first
CommGroup-statement, the program tests whether the resulting constraint
set is inconsistent. Inconsistency results if the demand Matthew communi-
cated is irreconcilable with Martha’s demand. If so, then Martha weakens
her constraints in a new communication attempt (line 03). As the inconsis-
tent constraint has to be overwritten, a CommGroupReset is needed here;
a CommGroupAdd would just add constraints to the already inconsistent
store. The subprogram of lines 04–06 tests whether v1 = t can be derived
from the result of this communication. If this is the case, the agents agree
on one precise time, which is bound to the variable t. Then, Martha goes
to dinner at time t. If not, she leaves the choice up to Matthew (through
the free variable u). If the outcome of the first communication action is not
inconsistent, the else-branch of line 07 is taken. The constraint resulting
from the first CommGroupReset is tested. If this constraint is not strong
enough to fix one definite time for the dinner, Martha communicates again.
Now, a CommGroupAdd is appropriate, because the earlier constraint on
dine has to be kept and strengthened.
Now, this is the program of Matthew:
01. CommGroupReset(v1 ≥ 18.00 ∧Martha ∈ g, dine);
02. if ⊥ for dine
03. then (CommGroupReset(v1 ≥ 18.00 ∧Martha ∈ g, dine);
04. ?(v1 ≤ x ∧ 6 ∃y < x : v1 ≤ y, dine); dine(x))
05. else if v1 = y for dine
06. then dine(y)
07. else (CommGroupAdd(v1 ≥ 19.00, dine);
08. dine(z))
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Matthew wants to dine after 18.00. If this proposal is not accepted, he
tries to persuade Martha to give in by repeating his proposal of dinner after
18.00. In line 04, Matthew’s constraint on dine is tested in a quite subtle
way. We will come to this later. If the first proposal is accepted, Matthew
tests whether one definite time is agreed upon. If not, he strengthens his
constraints.
When these programs are executed, the first CommGroup action of the
agents yields the consistent constraint 18.00 ≤ v1 ≤ 19.00 ∧ Matthew ∈
g ∧ Martha ∈ g. Martha proceeds with line 07, and Matthew with line 05,
in which they both test their resulting constraints (stored locally now) for
definiteness. Because the constraint still allows a range of times, the agents
communicate again. The constraint resulting from this communication is
v1 = 19.00 ∧Matthew ∈ g ∧Martha ∈ g. The agents dine at 19.00.
But Martha and Matthew may not be the only agents around. Suppose
there is another agent, Lucy, who would like to join Martha and Matthew.
These agents haven’t forbidden other agents to join the dinner; they just
demanded that both of them should be present. Here is Lucy’s program:
01. CommGroupReset(g = {Matthew,Martha, Lucy}∧v1 ≥ 21.00, dine);
02. if ⊥ for dine
03. then(CommGroupReset(g = {Matthew,Martha, Lucy} ∧
v1 ≥ 20.00, dine);
04. dine(s))
05. else dine(21.00)
If the agent programs are executed now, then the first lines of the three
programs can synchronise. This results in an inconsistent constraint (v1 ≤
19.00 ∧ v1 ≥ 21.00 ` ⊥). So, all programs continue at line 03. Communi-
cation of the three agents results in the constraint
g = {Matthew,Martha, Lucy} ∧ 20.00 ≤ v1 ≤ 20.30. Lucy then tries to
execute dine(s), but she has to wait for the other two agents to arrive at the
dine-statement. Martha first finds out that the constraint is not yet definite
(line 04), and then proceeds to dine(u). Note that Martha and Lucy both
use free variables; this means they want Matthew to pick the definite time,
as long as it is within the constraints they agreed upon. Matthew picks this
time by testing the constraint in line 04. The formula tested states that x is
the smallest upper bound on the time of dinner. The outcome of this test is
that x is bound to 20.30. Matthew then executes dine(20.30) and the dinner
party for three takes place.
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5.6 Conclusions
We proposed a constraint programming language for agents with novel prim-
itives for group communication and group cooperation. The statements for
group communication are very expressive and allow groups of agents to ne-
gotiate over the conditions of execution of future group actions. These con-
ditions are constraints on the composition of the group of participants and the
parameters of the action. Communication is synchronous, allowing the dy-
namic formation of groups. In a language with only bilateral communication,
programming a negotiation phase would be much more involved than in the
language introduced here. If agreement is reached in the negotiation phase,
the constraints agreed upon monitor the execution of the action discussed. The
agents have to stick to their word; only then, group action can be successful.
This way, social cohesion is enforced. Action execution is also synchronous,
which is an intuitive manner to implement group action.
Our programming language only provides primitive means for negotiation.
More sophisticated negotiation protocols or mechanisms can be programmed
in GrAPL.
In an implementation of GrAPL, a constraint solver is built in. The un-
derlying constraint solver accumulates the constraints of the communicating
agents, computes the resulting constraint and delivers this to the communicat-
ing agents. The constraint solver makes communication of constraints possible,
even if the number of communicating agents is large (imagine going to lunch
with eighty agents), as in the implementation of GrAPL the agents send the
constraints to the constraint solver, instead of to all other agents involved. One
of the benefits of our approach is that we use results from another research area
(constraint solving) to construct an agent programming language. In order to
implement GrAPL, a suitable constraint solver can be selected and customised
to the domain of group action parameters.
Many coordination problems in agent systems are about finding a solution
on which all agents agree in some solution space; constraint solving is espe-
cially apt for this. A successful application of constraint-based approaches
in artificial intelligence depends on suitably encoding the problems into con-
straints. But proving that this is possible for any coordination issue agents
could encounter doesn’t yield a practical coordination language. As we want
to focus at applicability, and constraint programming and solving have proven
their practical worth, we believe GrAPL is a significant contribution.
We provided the language with a well-defined operational semantics, built
in a similar manner as the languages [12] and [59]. This gives the language a
clear and unambiguous meaning, and offers a solid basis for building an im-
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plementation. Such an implementation involves the development of suitable
constraint solvers which is one of the main topics of future research.
The gap between theory and practice in agent research is a matter of con-
cern for several researchers, including ourselves (see [18, 29, 55] for three con-
tributions on these issues in CEEMAS 2001). By providing GrAPL with a
formal semantics, we have created an agent programming language which is
theoretically sound, and which can be implemented to build practical agent ap-
plications. GrAPL doesn’t feature joint mental attitudes frequently used in logi-
cal theories on coordination ([33, 83], and more recently [28, 36]), as we didn’t
focus on the mental aspects of group collaboration. We do think that these
aspects are important, and that integration of joint mental attitudes with the
programming constructs of GrAPL is a promising direction for further work.
When we compare GrAPL with the skeleton programming language from
the previous chapter, then GrAPL is more abstract. In the previous chapter,
our aim was to give a realistic model of agent interaction, that doesn’t abstract
away from possible interaction problems. So, the semantic model of the pre-
vious chapter was rather detailed, including events taking place in the world,
actions with duration and a model of real-time that allows different individual
actions and group actions to be executed during overlapping time frames. Com-
munication was asynchronous; agents send messages to each other, which they
can pick up later by testing their sense buffers. In the previous chapter, we had
both group actions and individual actions, but these were unparameterised and
there were no specialised means to negotiate about the group performing the
action. In this chapter, we abstract from real-time interaction issues, such as in-
teracting actions and events disturbing action executions, and instead we focus
on providing synchronous communication primitives for negotiating about im-
plicit and explicit action parameters and on synchronous action execution. So,
actions do have parameters in this chapter. The semantic model here is simpler;
individual actions are interleaved, and group actions and communication are
performed synchronously. We don’t have any model of real-time. This higher
abstraction level allows us to focus on details of group action coordination and
to provide powerful statements. The use of synchronous communication in this
chapter is a natural consequence of the more abstract approach. Synchronous
communication can be implemented using asynchronous communication; it
abstracts from the sending of messages to and fro to establish transfer of the
message.
The new primitives of GrAPL, that is, the two forms of group communica-
tion and synchronised group action execution, are abstract and succinct means
to construct programs of agents that interact with each other in order to first
negotiate about group actions and later on execute them.
264
CHAPTER 6
An Abstract Coordination Language for
Agents Interacting in Distributed
Plan–Execute Cycles
Don’t worry about the future
Or worry, but know that worrying is as effective as
Trying to solve an algebra equation by chewing bubble gum
Mary Schmich, by way of Baz Luhrmann
6.1 Introduction
Agents are social, according to the most commonly accepted definition of
agent-hood [130]. This means that agents communicate with each other, in
order to exchange information and request and provide services. Agents can
perform actions for or together with other agents, depending on their own mo-
tivations and available resources. These agent capabilities contribute to agents
being interacting pieces of software. Agents pay attention to the actions of
their fellow agents in the environment they inhabit, and sometimes try to per-
suade other agents to help them. In this chapter, we focus on agents that form
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temporary alliances to jointly achieve common goals.
Collaborative agents can cooperate to achieve a mutually beneficial goal by
developing a plan together for this goal. This is clearly a form of distributed
planning. We abstract from the specific planning algorithms the agents use (see
[27, 78, 97, 103, 126]), and instead focus on coordination between the agents.
We provide a coordination language and an agent architecture that facilitate
distributed planning and synchronised execution of the resulting plan. A coor-
dination language provides statements for coordination of agents, abstracting
from the internal make-up and processes of the agents. Aspects of agents like
reasoning or message passing should be programmed in an ‘ordinary’ program-
ming language, like AGENT-0 [113], 3APL [59] or JAVA. The statements of
the coordination language should also be implemented in these lower level lan-
guages. The statements of our language enable agents to form groups dedicated
to constructing a distributed plan together, to communicate about details of the
plan (as produced by the planning algorithms used by the agents), to jointly
decide that the plan is sufficiently elaborated by committing to it, and finally
to execute it. The benefit of using a separate coordination language is that it
focuses on one aspect of agents, namely coordination, and defines primitives
for this in a clean and abstract manner, without distractions caused by details
of internal agent statements. A coordination language can be used as a wrap-
per, to go around agents written in different programming languages. In the
program of an agent, statements from the coordination language appear among
statements from the programming language used for the agent. The primitives
of the coordination language enable the agents to interact with each other in
order to form and perform plans. This way, heterogeneous agents can coordi-
nate their activities. The coordination language provides a neat separation of
concerns, and enables reuse.
Our approach is based on constraint programming [111]. In constraint pro-
gramming, indeterminacy about the value of a variable is gradually resolved by
agents adding constraints on the value of this variable. In our approach, a plan
is a named tuple consisting of several elements, like the set of actions, the or-
der of these actions and the set of agents involved in execution of the plan. By
establishing constraints on these components, the plan is formed. A constraint
solver [119] is used to check whether the constraints of the agents forming the
plan are consistent. After the negotiating agents have committed to the plan,
the plan might still be partial, and the constraint solver uses its built-in planning
knowledge to arrive at a sufficiently specified plan.
The starting points of this new coordination language are the same as those
of the programming language GrAPL (described in Chapter 5): we use con-
straints, and the synchronous primitives of our coordination language are sim-
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ilar (to a large extent) to the statements of GrAPL. But as we widen the scope
of constraints from single actions to entire plans, there are many new aspects
to be dealt with.
The set of actions of a plan can contain individual actions and group actions
as well as see–to–it actions. These last actions simply specify that a certain
goal is to be achieved, without details on how to go about this. When a plan
is executed and a see–to–it action is encountered, a plan for the goal has to
be formed and subsequently executed. So, a plan doesn’t need to be fully
elaborated before execution. Plans like this, which are gradually refined by
introducing subgoals, are called hierarchical plans; hierarchical planning is
also used in [103, 118]. Hierarchical plans have the advantage that part of the
plan formation can be postponed and thus can take into account more up-to-
date environment circumstances.
For each goal the agents want to achieve, there are two phases: the plan
creation phase and the plan execution phase. In the plan creation phase, there
is a group of negotiator agents, that communicate with each other, using a
constraint store, to find a plan for the given goal. This means that the agents
pick a plan name, and then start inserting constraints on the actions, the agents
performing the actions and the order of the actions of that plan. For each ac-
tivated plan name, there is a constraint store which is shared by the group of
negotiator agents, but not accessible to agents outside this group. This is a de-
parture from the principles of GrAPL, because there we only had local agent
constraint stores. Here, we have a kind of global store, only accessible to a par-
ticular group (we call this semi-global). In Section 5.2 in the previous chapter,
we offered several arguments in favour of using local constraint stores instead
of global ones. Here, we choose to have global constraint stores, because a
distributed plan by its nature is a global notion. A plan can be compared to a
treaty between autonomous parties, which will govern the future behaviour of
the parties. Like treaties, distributed plans are independent concepts that sur-
pass the local agents that form and execute the plan. Therefore, it is intuitively
obvious that plans in creation or execution are represented using a constraint
store which is semi-global, instead of using local constraint stores. When the
negotiators have inserted all of their constraints into the store of the plan, they
commit to the plan, and the execution phase can start. Because the plan can
contain synchronised group actions, it is useful to have a plan controller that
decides on the details of plan execution. Each plan in execution has its own
associated plan controller. This controller has authority over the actors of the
plan; when it tells certain agents to synchronously perform an action, they have
to do this. When the next action to be executed is a see–to–it action, the plan
controller suspends and a new plan–execute cycle is started for the new goal.
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Figure 6.1: The plan–execute cycle
After a group of agents has formed a plan to obtain the goal and has executed
it, the plan controller resumes with the rest of the outer plan. This way, the
agents execute distributed plan–execute cycles.
It might seem that a global plan with a plan controller that dictates agent be-
haviours conflicts with agent autonomy, but as the plan being formed is agreed
upon by the negotiating agents, these agents later on are obliged to honour the
agreement. However, it is possible that some actors of the plan weren’t nego-
tiators, and thus didn’t agree on their role in the plan. We will come back to
this issue later on.
In Figure 6.1, we depict a plan–execute cycle. There is an outer plan (the
partially ordered plan with actions a, b, c, d and !ψ) which is in execution; it
has an associated plan controller, which already has taken care of the execution
of a, b and c, and is currently suspended at action !ψ. The goal ψ is broadcast to
the agents, and some of them react by starting a new plan–execute cycle. They
develop a plan P that will lead to ψ, and execute it. After the plan controller of
this plan finishes, the controller of the outer plan takes over again. If plan exe-
cution finishes successfully, the plan controller terminates and a new planning
phase can start. If actions fail due to synchronisation problems or environment
conditions, the plan controller first informs the negotiators of the plan about
the failure, such that they can decide to replan. After this, the plan controller
terminates just as in the case of successful plan execution.
Thus, we propose a generic architecture for plan formation and execution.
This architecture contains the agents, which form and execute plans, the con-
straint solver with the constraint stores of the plans, and the plan controllers.
The statements of the coordination language enable the agents to interact with
each other, update the constraint stores that represent plans being created, and
start plan controllers. The constraint solver contains additional planning knowl-
edge and can thus detect errors the agents make in their planning process and
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complete the plan when the agents have inserted their constraints. The set of
plan controllers is dynamic; whenever a new plan starts execution, a new plan
controller springs up, which can suspend when a sub-plan has to be formed and
which disappears when the execution of the plan is finished.
In the next section, we go into the nature of plans and the constraint stores
that contain constraints on plans. In Section 6.3, we formally define the syntax
and semantics of our coordination language. Section 6.4 provides an exten-
sive example, illustrating the use of the coordination language. In Section 6.5,
we describe the coordination architecture. Finally, Section 6.6 concludes this
chapter.
6.2 Plan features and constraint stores
Underlying the definition of both plans and statements of the coordination lan-
guage are these sets:
∗ A = the set of atomic physical actions. For simplicity, we focus on un-
parameterised actions here.
∗ I = the set of agent identities.
∗ PN = the set of plan names.
∗ PV = the set of plan variables; each agent has at its disposal its own plan
variables, a subset of PV .
∗ LV = the set of local agent variables.
∗ L = a predicate logical language used to formalise constraints on plans.
We assume L is equipped with a a consequence relation denoted by |=cs
(CS abbreviates Constraint Solver). As in previous chapters, free(ϕ) is
the set of free variables in the the formula ϕ.
As stated in Definition 6.1 below, actions from the set A form the basis of
plans. To keep things manageable, we look at unparameterised actions in this
chapter, in contrast to the actions in the previous chapter. In the concluding
section, we will briefly discuss a combination of the coordination language
with GrAPL, in which actions are parameterised.
The allocation of actions to particular agents or groups of agents is part of
the planning process. The task allocation determines whether a certain action
will be an individual action or a group action. Of course, some actions from
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A can only be allocated to one agent, while other actions always must be per-
formed by a group. For example, in the domain of cleaning office buildings,
the action of vacuuming a room is an individual action, the action of moving a
heavy cupboard is a group action, and the action of cleaning the windows can
be both individual or collective, depending on the amount of glass present in
the office.
The sets PV and PN are closely related. Both plan variables and plan
names are used to refer to different plans. At each moment during execution of
a multi-agent system, there can be various plans under construction and in exe-
cution, by disjoint or even overlapping groups of agents (see also Section 6.4).
Plan variables from PV are assigned values from the set of plan names PN .
When including a coordination statement in an agent program, the programmer
should use a plan variable to refer to a plan and its associated constraint store.
When the coordination statement is executed, and there is not yet a binding to
the plan variable, the system chooses a new, unused plan name and binds this
to this variable. The programmer is not allowed to choose a plan name himself,
because he could choose a plan name already used by another agent for another
plan, and thus create confusion. Example 6.3 later on will clarify this. The set
of plan variables is divided into disjoint subsets, such that each agent has its
own private plan variables. The use of these sets will also become apparent in
Example 6.3. The set LV contains local variables that agents can use to test the
constraint store of a plan (named plan store from now on).
Our notion of plans is very close to the notion of operators, used in e.g.,
[118]. Though the definition of operators differs, an operator usually contains
a precondition, a postcondition and a plan body. The precondition specifies
environment circumstances in which the plan body can be executed, with the
goal of achieving the postcondition. The plan body specifies the actions and
the order in which they need to be done. In our architecture, the plan body is
represented by a partially ordered set of actions. These actions can be atomic
actions from A or actions of the form !ψ. This should be read as “see to it
that ψ becomes true”. Actions like these allow hierarchical planning. If a plan
contains !ψ, then a sub-plan to achieve ψ is made when !ψ is executed, and
not earlier. This is useful, because it enables agents to adjust the plan to the
circumstances in the environment close to the time of execution.
DEFINITION 6.1 (Plan components)
The set PC of plan components is defined:
PC = A ∪ {!ψ|ψ is a closed formula of L}.
So, a plan can have two different kinds of actions: basic actions, which are
simply executed, and see–to–it–actions, where a whole new planning and exe-
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cution phase are started in a recursive manner. As the actions in the set A are
physical in nature, we don’t have mental actions in the plans. In the terminol-
ogy of Chapter 4, plan execution is an interaction with the environment. The
coordination language entirely abstracts from internal agent reasoning, called
intraction in Chapter 4. The coordination language enables the agents to com-
municate with each other and execute plans, which both are classified as inter-
action.
As described in the introduction, a plan is formed by inserting constraints
into the constraint store associated with the plan name. The constraints pertain
to certain features of the plan, such as the action set or the task allocation. Each
plan feature is represented by a special variable.
DEFINITION 6.2 (Plan features)
We define six plan features
[Purpose, Circumstances, Actions, <, Negotiators, Actors],
where Purpose and Circumstances are variables of type L, Actions is a
variable of type ℘(PC), < is a variable of type ℘(PC × PC), Negotiators
is a variable of type ℘(I) and Actors is a variable of type A 99K ℘(I) (the
set of partial functions from A to ℘(I)).
The six features of a plan all are variables, which gradually are constrained
during the plan creation phase. To be precise, the values of the plan features
Purpose, Circumstances and Negotiators are determined at the start of the plan-
ning phase, when the group of negotiators is formed. The other three vari-
ables are worked out during the planning phase. The name of the plan actually
doesn’t refer to a plan, but to the constraint store containing the demands on
the plan. We will often be sloppy with this, and talk about “the plan called
P ”. During the plan creation phase, the constraints in the plan store allow a set
of possible plans. Example 6.1 below illustrates this. At the end of the plan-
ning phase, when the agents have committed to the plan, the plan is ready and
definite. All six plan components then have been completely determined, that
is, the constraints imply that Actions is a specific set, Purpose is equivalent to
a ground formula from L, etc. As the six variables each have a definite value,
the space of possible plans has been narrowed down to one.
A plan thus is an association of values with a six-tuple of plan features.
After the planning phase has ended, the formula associated with Purpose for-
malises the goal of the plan, and the value of Circumstances is a formula de-
scribing suitable environment conditions for the plan to be performed. These
two formulas correspond to the postcondition and precondition of operators.
The planning agents use these two formulas as an input to their planning rou-
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tines, from which we abstract, and which yield contributions to the distributed
plan under construction. Purpose and Circumstances can also play a role at the
start and end of plan execution, to check whether proper Circumstances indeed
are present in the world before execution, and to check whether the Purpose of
the plan indeed has been achieved after execution. These checks are performed
at the lower agent level, and so we don’t go into them. The value of Actions
in a finished plan is the set of plan components constituting the plan. Note
that a committed plan is still partial, in the sense that it can contain see–to–it-
statements! The value of < is a partial order on the action set. To ensure this,
the consequence relation |=cs used by the constraint solver has the properties
of partial orders as axioms. The partial order fixes the execution order of some
actions. Actions that are not ordered by it are independent and can be executed
in parallel (according to the planning agents). The value of Negotiators is the
set of agents which have agreed to form the plan together, and the value of
Actors is a function, associating a group of agents to each atomic action in the
plan. Actions which have been allocated to a group containing more than one
agent must be done by these agents in a synchronised manner. So, the value of
Actors describes the task allocation of the plan.
Plan features of a certain plan fulfil the same role as the formal parameters
v1, . . . , vk and g of a certain action in GrAPL. A plan can be seen as a compos-
ite action, with formal parameters that determine the exact nature of the action.
These formal parameters are the plan features. Just as in GrAPL, we always
use the same variables for the parameters of any plan, namely the six plan fea-
tures introduced above. Like in GrAPL, the agents communicate to establish
constraints on the parameters of the plan. Differences with GrAPL are that
we have semi-global (accessible to the Negotiators only) constraint stores here,
and that a plan can only be executed when the formal parameters are definite.
In GrAPL agents have local constraint stores and actions can be executed when
the constraints of the actors don’t fix a specific value for each action parameter.
During the plan creation phase, the plan is partial, because the six variables
are only determined by the constraints given by the planning agents (the Ne-
gotiators), and generally these won’t completely fix the values of the variables
during the planning process. The language L for phrasing constraints at least
contains set-theoretic operations (e.g., ∈,⊆) among its predicates. Addition-
ally, there can be predicates expressing characteristics of agents. For example,
the constraint reliable(James) ↔ James ∈ Actors(transport diamond) de-
mands that James should be involved in transporting a certain diamond if and
only if he is a reliable agent. Typically, during the plan creation phase we will
have constraints like A ⊆ Actions, where A is a set of plan components. So,
other plan components could also become part of the plan later on. This is an
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example of a plan store during the planning phase, specifying a set of possible
plans:
EXAMPLE 6.1 (A plan under construction)
Purpose = room clean ∧
Circumstances = room messy and dirty ∧
Negotiators = {James,Martha} ∧
{!floor very clean, empty ashtray, open windows} ⊆ Actions ∧
open windows <!floor very clean ∧
Actors(empty ashtray) = {John}
Note that in the example above, the set of actions is not fixed yet and the allo-
cation and the ordering of the actions is only partial.
After the negotiators have committed to the plan and the plan is finished by
the constraint solver, the constraints allow only one plan. This is an example
of a finished plan:
EXAMPLE 6.2 (A definite plan)
Purpose = room clean ∧
Circumstances = room messy and dirty ∧
Negotiators = {James,Martha} ∧
Actions = {!floor very clean, empty ashtray,
open windows, !¬room messy} ∧
open windows < !¬room messy ∧
!¬room messy < !floor very clean ∧
Actors(empty ashtray) = {John} ∧
Actors(open windows) = {Mary,Martha}
Though this plan is definite, the order of the actions is still partial and not total.
To store the constraints on plans, the state of the system has to contain a
plan constraint store association:
DEFINITION 6.3 (Plan constraint store association)
A plan constraint store association is a partial function µ : PN 99K L.
This function maps plan names to the present constraint on that plan. The
function is partial, as only part of the plan names are in use for plans being
formed or in execution.
We also provide a definition that formalises that a plan store is definite,
which is the case when the constraints on the plan allow only one value for
each of the six plan features.
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DEFINITION 6.4 (Definiteness of a plan store)
A plan store P ∈ PN is definite in the context of a constraint store associ-
ation µ when the following holds:
∗ There is a closed formula ϕ ∈ L, such that µ(P ) |=cs Purpose = ϕ.
∗ There is a closed formula ψ ∈ L, such that
µ(P ) |=cs Circumstances = ψ.
∗ There is a set of plan components A ⊆ PC, such that
µ(P ) |=cs Actions = A.
∗ There is a relation R ⊆ PC × PC, such that µ(P ) |=cs < = R.
∗ There is a set of agentsN ⊆ I , such that µ(P ) |=cs Negotiators = N .
∗ There is a partial function f : A 99K ℘(I) with domain A ∩ A (all
atomic actions in the plan), such that µ(P ) |=cs Actors = f .
This definition is related to Definition 5.9 in Section 5.4.3 in the previous chap-
ter. When a plan store is definite, we often say that “the plan is definite”, and
identify the constraints on the plan with an association of specific values with
the plan features.
6.3 Syntax and semantics of the plan coordination
language
After establishing this background, we define the statements of the coordina-
tion language:
DEFINITION 6.5 (Coordination statements)
The coordination language contains the following statements:
∗ FormGroup(α, ω, p, ϕ), where α, ω, ϕ ∈ L are closed formulas and
p ∈ PV .
∗ CommGroup(ϕ, p), where p ∈ PV and ϕ ∈ L is a closed formula.
∗ ?(ϕ, p), where ϕ ∈ L and p ∈ PV .
∗ Commit(p), where p ∈ PV .
∗ Execute(p), where p ∈ PV .
To define agent programs, the statements above are combined with a lower
level (agent) programming language. This programming language provides
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statements for other agent capabilities, such as reasoning and ordinary commu-
nication. Also, this programming language provides control constructs, such as
conditional branching, recursion, sequential composition and non-deterministic
choice. Below, we explain the coordination statements and give their formal
operational semantics.
The semantics we use is two-layered, like in the previous two chapters. As
we only look at agent coordination and abstract from the local agent reasoning,
we only need to give transition rules for the global level semantics of the co-
ordination statements. We assume the underlying programming languages (or
language) used to program the agents have well-defined local semantics.
In order to define global transition rules, we first define global system con-
figurations. The global system configuration at each moment contains at least
the local agent configurations, the set of plan controllers that are active at that
time, the set of plans that are committed and ready but not in execution yet and
a plan constraint store association:
DEFINITION 6.6 (Global system configuration)
A global system configuration is a tuple 〈. . . , {〈Sι, piι〉|ι ∈ I}, χ, ρ, µ〉.
Here,
∗ 〈Sι, piι〉 is a local agent configuration of agent ι ∈ I , where piι is the
local program left to be executed and Sι is the local agent state.
∗ χ ⊆ PN is the set of plans that are currently being executed.
∗ ρ ⊆ PN is the set of plans that are ready for execution, but aren’t in
execution yet.
∗ µ : PN 99K L is a plan constraint store association.
∗ . . . are other global configuration elements which we abstract of, be-
cause these aren’t relevant for plan coordination (for example, the
state of the world).
We demand that χ ∩ ρ = ∅, and that for each P ∈ ρ ∪ χ it holds that P is
definite.
The demand that χ and ρ have no elements in common is made because a plan
can’t be in execution and waiting to be executed at the same time. The plans in
χ each have an associated plan controller, to which we also refer with the name
of the plan. The plans in the sets ρ and χ must be definite, because otherwise
they are still too partial to be executed. The plan constraint store association µ
binds a constraint to each plan name which is in use by the system of agents.
We largely abstract from the contents of the local agent configurations 〈Sι, piι〉,
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as the details of the internal make-up of the agents belong to the lower agent
level. We do explicitly represent the local agent program, as execution of coor-
dination statements changes the program left to be executed. Sι represents the
local agent state, which can for example consist of a belief base, a set of current
intentions and a set of joint intentions. We sometimes use Aι as a shorthand for
〈Sι, piι〉. The global configuration can contain additional elements from which
we abstract, such as the state of the world. In the above definition, these ele-
ments are suggested by including . . . as an element of the global configuration.
For readability and brevity, we leave out these dots in the sequel of this chapter.
In general, a global transition rule of a coordination statement C will look
like this:
for all ι ∈ J : Aι C(argsι)−→ A′ι
〈{Aι|ι ∈ I}, χ, ρ, µ〉 −→ 〈{A′ι|ι ∈ J} ∪ {Aι|ι ∈ I \ J}, χ′, ρ′, µ′〉, other info
Here, Aι abbreviates 〈Sι, piι〉, and A′ι abbreviates 〈S′ι, pi′ι〉. In this rule, a group
of agents J synchronously executes the coordination statement C. Each agent
has its own coordination parameters: agent ι tries to execute C(argsι). This co-
ordination statement is part of the program of the agent, which is largely writ-
ten in some other programming language. In order to be able to phrase global
transition rules for the coordination statements, we have to make assumptions
about their local semantics, even if we aren’t looking at the local semantics
of the programming language the rest of the agent program is written in. As
can be seen above, we assume that local semantics of a coordination statement
yields a local transition labelled with the coordination statement and its argu-
ments, C(argsι). By putting the coordination statements in the labels of local
transitions, they are available for the global semantics to process. The meaning
of the coordination statements is largely determined at the global level, though
there can also be local effects. For example, when agents form a group to make
a plan, they can establish a joint intention to achieve the Purpose of the plan
to be formed. Whether this happens depends on the mental make-up of the
agents. If a mental update is a result of executing FormGroup, this is encoded
in the local semantics of this coordination statement, by transforming the local
state Sι into S′ι. The local transitions of coordination statements always model
successful executions of the coordination statements. Of course, the coordina-
tion statement can fail; the global semantics is defined in such a way that the
local updates to the agent states aren’t performed in case of failure.
On the basis of the information in the labels of the local transitions above
the line of the transition rule, a global transition is constructed. This global
transition transforms the old global configuration into the new one, and it can
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yield additional information, such as a boolean value to indicate whether the co-
ordination statement has succeeded. This information, which appears as “other
info” in the template transition rule above, can be used by the local agent pro-
grams in the sequel of the execution. We don’t know the structure of the local
agent states; this is the reason that we add the “other info” as the second result
of a global transition (the first being the new global configuration). Depending
on the design of the agents, this information will become part of the local agent
states in some way or another.
There are two manners in which coordination statements can fail. In the
first place, synchronisation can fail. This happens for the coordination state-
ments that require the whole group of Negotiators to be present. When not all
negotiators are synchronously performing their coordination statement, then no
global transition is generated. This means that the global computation blocks,
and the local agents have to wait until all Negotiators are present and the co-
ordination statement can be performed. The global computation also blocks
when an agent unsuccessfully tests a plan store. This doesn’t mean that the
computation of the system is over; agents can take other branches of their lo-
cal programs that don’t lead to deadlock. The second way of failing happens
when agents try to form the plan by executing CommGroups. When the Nego-
tiators propose constraints on the plan which aren’t consistent with each other
or earlier constraints on the plan, then this type of failure occurs. The con-
straints are not added to the plan store, as this would result in the constraint ⊥
(inconsistency), and all earlier planning information would be lost. Instead, a
global transition is generated that keeps the plan store unchanged, and returns
a boolean value false to the negotiating agents. The agents thus can find out
that the group communication has failed because of disagreement, and subse-
quently try other proposals in group communication.
Now, we come to the discussion of the statements of our coordination lan-
guage. The statement FormGroup(α, ω, p, ϕ) informally translates into: “Form
a group which will negotiate about a plan referred to by p aimed at realising
ω starting from situations where α holds, and the group composition has to
obey the constraint ϕ.” A FormGroup is synchronously performed by a group
of agents. This is the semi-formal semantics of FormGroup:
Whenever a number of agents J ⊆ I try to form a group by each
(ι ∈ J) executing FormGroup(α, ω, pι, ϕι), then this will succeed
if
∧
ι∈J ϕι ∧ Negotiators = J 6|=cs ⊥, that is, if the composition
of the group is consistent with the conjunction of the demands
on group composition. Note that the agents have to agree upon
the purpose ω and circumstances α of the plan. If successful, the
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system chooses a new, unused plan name P (P 6∈ domain(µ)), and
passes this name to the agents, which associate the name with the
plan variables they use (pι, ι ∈ J). Also, the FormGroup-operation
initialises the constraint bound to P , as the purpose, circumstances
and negotiator group are fixed. Formally: µ(P ) := Purpose = ω
∧Circumstances = α∧Negotiators = J . If the group of agents J
doesn’t satisfy the constraints of the agents, then execution blocks;
no global transition is generated.
When a group is formed, only these agents are allowed to add constraints to the
plan. A successful FormGroup-statement initiates a plan store for the new plan
with Purpose ω and Circumstances α, and the fixed group of Negotiators J .
All members of the group J have to be present when the plan is updated. This
way, we can be sure that intruders from outside can’t influence the plan and that
the negotiators agree on the shared plan being formed. If group formation fails,
because the present group doesn’t satisfy the demands of the group members,
then it is possible that there is another group (at the same time or later on) that is
suitable. If there is no such group available, all agents wait at their FormGroup
statements for a suitable group to arise, of which they may or may not be part.
Another result of FormGroup is that the new plan is named. This is im-
portant, because this name will be bound to the constraint store shared by the
negotiators, that will gradually define the plan, and the name of the plan is
needed to be able to execute it, and to phrase constraints on the plan. Though
the name formally only refers to a constraint on the plan (through the plan con-
straint store association), we will also use the name to refer to the definite plan
resulting at the end of the plan creation phase and to refer to the plan controller
of the plan in the execution phase. The agents use different plan variables to
refer to the plan, and a result of a FormGroup is that these variables can be
bound to the chosen plan name by the local agents.
The FormGroup-statement doesn’t correspond to any statement in GrAPL.
This is because in GrAPL, the group of agents talking about constraints on a
group action isn’t fixed. This makes GrAPL quite flexible. Agents can come in
at any time (as long as the constraint–under–construction on the action allows
this), add some constraints, and then not take part in the negotiation anymore.
Here, this would be peculiar, because we have a semi-global constraint store.
This is necessary and intuitive, because the agents are constructing a plan, and
it would be awkward to have this plan scattered in the local constraint stores
of the agents. But then, if we wouldn’t work with a fixed set of planners, the
constraint store could be written by any agent that likes to, and there is no
way to control the constraints written into the store. As the plan is shared, all
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planning agents involved should agree on each constraint added. So, we need
to know what the group of planners is, and for this, we need the FormGroup-
statement. We are not alone in making the distinction between group formation
and planning. For example, in [131], Wooldridge and Jennings also separate
the stage of team formation from the stage of plan formation.
Now, we give the formal transition rules for FormGroup. Let J ⊆ I be a
non-empty set of agent names, let P ∈ PN be a plan name, let Aι = 〈Sι, piι〉
and let A′ι = 〈S′ι, pi′ι〉. This is the transition rule for FormGroup:
for all ι ∈ J : Aι FormGroup(α,ω,pι,ϕι)−→ A′ι
〈{Aι|ι ∈ I}, χ, ρ, µ〉 −→ 〈{A′ι|ι ∈ J} ∪ {Aι|ι ∈ I \ J}, χ, ρ, µ′〉, P
where the following conditions hold:
∗ P 6∈ domain(µ)
∗ ∧ι∈J ϕι ∧ Negotiators = J 6|=cs ⊥
∗ µ′ = µ[Purpose = ω ∧ Circumstances = α ∧ Negotiators = J/P ]
This rule is just a formalisation of the informal semantics we gave earlier. The
result of the global transition is a new global configuration, as well as the name
P of the new plan in creation which is now available for the local agents to
bind to their plan variables pι. The local updates to the states of the agents as
a result of forming a group (for example, a joint intention towards the Purpose
of the plan) indeed take place; the local changes to the agent configurations
(Aι → A′ι) are part of the change to the system configuration. The config-
urations of agents that don’t participate in the group formation stay the same.
Forming a group fails if the group composition is inconsistent with the demands
of the group members, or these demands are inconsistent among themselves.
No global transition results for this group J trying to initiate a plan creation
phase. The local agent programs of the agents in J are stuck at the FormGroup
statement. This situation remains like this until a suitable group of agents syn-
chronously attempts to form a group. It seems likely that some agents from J
won’t be part of this new group.
To actually plan, we have CommGroup(ϕ, p), which informally translates
to “Add the constraint ϕ to the present constraint on the plan referred to by p”.
Here, ϕ is a formula stating demands of the agent executing the CommGroup on
the properties of the plan (that is, on the actions in the plan, their order and the
agents performing them). As CommGroup-statements must always be preceded
by a FormGroup-statement, the plan variable p is already bound to a plan name
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P ∈ PN . CommGroup is a synchronous communication statement, that can
only be successful if all of the Negotiators of plan P execute it simultaneously.
This is the semi-formal semantics of CommGroup:
Whenever a number of agents J ⊆ I try to modify a plan by each
executing CommGroup(ϕι, pι), then this will succeed if all pι, ι ∈
J are bound to the same plan name P , µ(P ) |=cs Negotiators = J
(that is, the proper group of agents present) and µ(P ) ∧ ∧ι∈J ϕι6|=cs ⊥ (that is, the constraints of the agents are consistent with
each other and the stored plan constraint). If successful, the op-
eration updates the constraint bound to P . Formally: µ(P ) :=
µ(P ) ∧ ∧ι∈J ϕι. Finally, the execution yields a boolean value,
indicating whether the attempt to update the plan succeeded.
If the constraints of these agents are consistent, then the conjunction is added
to the plan store. If not, then the plan store remains unchanged. The boolean
is available for the agents to include in their local state; it can be tested by the
agents involved to determine their next step.
The coordination statement CommGroup is similar to the statement
CommGroupAdd from the programming language GrAPL from the previous
chapter. CommGroupAdd also strengthens the current constraint by adding a
new conjunct to the local constraints on a certain group action. But unlike
the coordination statement CommGroup, CommGroupAdd doesn’t fail when
the proposals of the group members lead to inconsistency. Here, we choose
to let CommGroup have no effect on the plan store in case of inconsistency of
proposals, because otherwise one would lose all information about the plan in
creation stored in the plan store, as it is overwritten with ⊥.
We give the two global transition rules for CommGroup, for successful and
failing group communication, respectively. With failing group communication,
we refer to the situation that the proper group of Negotiators takes part in the
group communication, but with proposals which aren’t consistent with each
other and/or the previous constraint in the plan store. For the situation that
the proper Negotiators aren’t present, no global transition results. Then, the
agents which are present have to wait for the rest of the negotiating agents.
We again assume that J ⊆ I is a set of agent names, P ∈ PN is a plan
name, Aι = 〈Sι, piι〉 and A′ι = 〈S′ι, pi′ι〉. We start with the rule for a successful
CommGroup:
for all ι ∈ J : Aι CommGroup(ϕι,P )−→ A′ι
〈{Aι|ι ∈ I}, χ, ρ, µ〉 −→ 〈{A′ι|ι ∈ J} ∪ {Aι|ι ∈ I \ J}, χ, ρ, µ′〉, true
where the following conditions hold:
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∗ µ(P ) |=cs Negotiators = J
∗ µ(P ) ∧ ∧ι∈J ϕι 6|=cs ⊥
∗ µ′ = µ[µ(P ) ∧ ∧ι∈J ϕι/P ]
Again, we simply formalise the semi-formal semantics given earlier. The result
of the global transition is a new global configuration, in which the local config-
urations of the communicators are modified and the plan store of P is updated,
and the boolean true to signal that the group communication has succeeded.
This is the transition rule for an unsuccessful CommGroup:
for all ι ∈ J : Aι CommGroup(ϕι,P )−→ A′ι
〈{Aι|ι ∈ I}, χ, ρ, µ〉 −→ 〈{〈Sι, pi′ι〉|ι ∈ J} ∪ {Aι|ι ∈ I \ J}, χ, ρ, µ〉, false
where the following conditions holds:
∗ µ(P ) |=cs Negotiators = J
∗ µ(P ) ∧ ∧ι∈J ϕι |=cs ⊥
Because of the first condition above, the group of communicators must still
be the group of Negotiators of the plan, as was the case for successful group
communication. In case the second condition also holds, the demands of the ne-
gotiating agents are inconsistent with each other or with the previous demands
on the plan. As a result, the plan store isn’t changed and the boolean false is
returned. The CommGroup statement is removed from the programs left to be
executed of the participants (piι → pi′ι), but the update to the local agent states
(Sι → S′ι) which was locally computed isn’t performed. For example, if in a
particular implementation of CommGroup an agent forms an intention towards
each action it adds to the plan, this results in a transformation of the local agent
state (Sι becomes S′ι) when a proposed constraint of this agent implies that ac-
tions are added to the plan. If the CommGroup doesn’t succeed, this intention
shouldn’t be established, so the local agent state stays Sι.
The CommGroup-statement is close to the tell-statement from constraint
programming [111], in that it adds information to the constraint store. We also
need an equivalent of ask, to test the constraint store. For this, we have ?(ϕ, p),
with informal reading: “Test whether ϕ follows from the constraint on the plan
referred to by p”. This is the semi-formal meaning of this statement:
Whenever an agent ι ∈ I tries to test the store of a plan by ex-
ecuting ?(ϕ, p), and p is associated with the plan name P , then
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this will succeed if µ(P ) |=cs ι ∈ Negotiators (that is, ι is one
of the Negotiators of the plan) and there is a ground substitution
θ, with dom(θ) equal to the set of free local variables in ϕ, such
that µ(P ) |=cs ϕθ (that is, the store of P entails this instantiation
of ϕ). If successful, the operation yields the substitution θ, which
represents information about the values of features of P . If not,
the execution blocks.
For the definition of substitutions and their domains, we refer to the previous
chapter, Subsection 5.4.1, Definition 5.6. Typical tests of a plan are ?(a ∈
Actions, p), which tests whether a is an action of the plan p, ?(a < b, p), which
tests whether action a precedes action b, and ?(Actions = x, p), where x is a
free local variable and which tests whether the action set of p is fixed to one
specific set. We will explain the semantics of this last statement in more detail.
Suppose P is the plan name bound to p. The test succeeds if the testing agent is
allowed access to the information about the plan P and if there is a substitution
which binds a ground value to x such that the constraints on P entail that the
set of actions of P equals this value. This implies that the ground value bound
to x must be a set of plan components. If the test succeeds, that is, if indeed
the action set of P has been constrained to one specific set of plan components,
then this set is bound to x, such that the agent which performed this test can
use this information.
We only have a global transition rule for successful tests. In case the test
fails, no global transition results, which means that the local execution of the
test blocks. Let ι ∈ I be an agent name, let P ∈ PN be a plan name, let θ be
a ground substitution with dom(θ) = free(ϕ) ∩ LV , let Aι = 〈Sι, piι〉 and let
A′ι = 〈S′ι, pi′ι〉:
Aι
?(ϕ,P )−→ A′ι
〈{Aι|ι ∈ I}, χ, ρ, µ〉 −→ 〈{A′ι} ∪ {Aι|ι ∈ I \ {ι}}, χ, ρ, µ〉, θ
where the following conditions hold:
∗ µ(P ) |=cs ι ∈ Negotiators
∗ µ(P ) |=cs ϕθ
These conditions state that only Negotiators of a plan have access to its plan
store, and that an instantiation of the formula tested (ϕθ) follows from the plan
store.
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Next is Commit(p), which informally reads “Complete the plan referred
to by p by filling in missing details”. This statement is also executed syn-
chronously by the group of negotiators of the plan referred to by p. By jointly
executing Commit-statements, the negotiators end the plan creation phase of
this plan. This doesn’t have to mean that all plan features have been totally
determined by the negotiations (CommGroups) of these agents, but just that
the negotiators have established all their demands on the plan and that they
don’t care about the further details. Now it’s up to the constraint solver to fill
in the rest of the plan. We assume the constraint solver incorporates planning
knowledge in its associated planning function $ : L → L to allow it to finish
plans. This function takes a constraint on a plan, which describes a set of pos-
sible plans, and returns a strengthened, definite constraint which only allows
one plan, which means that the new constraint prescribes one specific value for
each of the six plan features. We demand that $(ϕ) |=cs ϕ, that is, the re-
sulting constraint on the plan must imply the original constraint. This way, the
demands of the Negotiators always are respected. The planning knowledge can
be very powerful, enabling the constraint solver to even construct plans when
the agents didn’t add any constraints to the plan store. The constraints of the
Negotiators reduce the size of the search space for the constraint solver, which
speeds up the planning process. A Commit-statement fails in case of absence of
one or more negotiators in the synchronous execution. This is the semi-formal
semantics:
Whenever a number of agents J ⊆ I try to commit to a plan
by each (ι ∈ J) executing Commit(pι), then this will succeed if
all pι, ι ∈ J are bound to the same plan name P and µ(P ) |=cs
Negotiators = J (that is, the proper group of agents present). If
successful, the operation updates the plan store of P , such that the
resulting store is definite. Formally: µ(P ) := $(µ(P )). Finally,
the Commit statement adds the plan name P to the set ρ of plans
which are ready to be executed.
Note that this rule doesn’t yield a boolean indicating whether the Commit oper-
ation succeeded. This is so because when all Negotiators take part in the Com-
mit operation by synchronously executing the Commit statement, the operation
always succeeds. If not all Negotiators are present, then the global transition
can’t be taken, so the agents wait until all Negotiators Commit to the plan. As
the planning function $ yields a definite plan, it is safe to add the plan to the
set ρ of definite plans which are ready to be executed.
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Assuming that J ⊆ I is a set of agent names, P ∈ PN is a plan name,
Aι = 〈Sι, piι〉 andA′ι = 〈S′ι, pi′ι〉 this is the global transition rule for the Commit
statement:
for all ι ∈ J : Aι Commit(P )−→ A′ι
〈{Aι|ι ∈ I}, χ, ρ, µ〉 −→ 〈{A′ι|ι ∈ J} ∪ {Aι|ι ∈ I \ J}, χ, ρ ∪ {P}, µ′〉
where the following conditions hold:
∗ µ(P ) |=cs Negotiators = J
∗ µ′ = µ[$(µ(P ))/P ]
After committing to a plan, the plan creation phase for this plan has ended
and the plan execution can start. To start the execution phase, we have
Execute(p), which simply means “Execute the plan referred to by p”. This
statement again has to be synchronously performed by the negotiators of the
plan, and it results in starting a plan controller for the plan referred to by p.
A plan controller is a special process that coordinates and synchronises plan
execution and takes care of proper execution of the plan. The global semantics
of an Execute statement transfers the plan name from the set ρ (plans ready
to be executed) to the set χ (plans in execution). As the global transition rule
is relatively simple, we skip the semi-formal semantics and present the global
transition rule. Again, assume that J ⊆ I is a set of agent names, P ∈ PN is
a plan name, Aι = 〈Sι, piι〉 and A′ι = 〈S′ι, pi′ι〉.
for all ι ∈ J : Aι Execute(P )−→ A′ι
〈{Aι|ι ∈ I}, χ, ρ, µ〉 −→ 〈{A′ι|ι ∈ J} ∪ {Aι|ι ∈ I\J}, χ∪{P}, ρ\{P}, µ〉
where the following condition holds:
µ(P ) |=cs Negotiators = J
This rule only implements the start of the plan execution, in which the plan
is transferred to the set of plans in execution. The plan controller which is
associated with the plan then directs the agents that are Actors of the plan to
execute the actions of the plan. We will restrict ourselves to an informal account
of plan execution, because plan execution takes place at the lower agent level.
An execution step of a plan controller amounts to finding the minimal elements
of the partial order of the plan, and executing these, either simultaneously or
one after the other. Execution of an action a of the plan means synchronising
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this action with the agent(s) involved, as laid down in Actors(a); these agents
take care of the actual execution. When the action has been done, it is removed
from the set of actions of the plan. In case the action to be executed is a !ψ,
then the goal ψ is broadcast in the hope there will be a group of agents willing
to form and execute a plan resulting in ψ. If so, a new plan–execute cycle
takes place and the controller of the outer plan suspends until such a plan has
been made and executed. The plan made in this inner plan–execute cycle can
contain other see–to–it statements, recursively resulting in new cycles. In case
the plan fails during execution, for example because there are no agents willing
to make a plan for a goal which has been broadcast through a see–to–it action,
then the plan controller informs the negotiators of the plan, such that they can
replan. The advantage of using plan controllers for plan execution over letting
the agents execute the plan on their own is that it minimises communication
between the actors. An example of a plan part that can be easily executed using
a coordinator is a < b (no actions in between), with Actors(a) = {ι1, ι2} and
Actors(b) = {ι3, ι4}. So, two consecutive group actions have to be performed
by disjoint groups of agents. Without a plan controller, this would involve
communication between these two groups.
As explained in the previous paragraph, the start of the execution phase is
decided by the Negotiators of the plan, not by the Actors. We now have to
direct our attention towards the group of actors. Until this point, we simply
assumed that this group of actors will accept the plan and the role delegation
made by the planners. As agents are (supposed to be) autonomous, we can
only assume this if all actors were part of the group of negotiators, or if all
actors stand in an authority relation below at least one planner. Nothing in
our coordination architecture enforces this, so it is possible that an actor is
suddenly called upon by the plan controller to perform an action, while this
actor agent is otherwise engaged and not willing to assist in the plan at all. It
can be argued that this aspect of the architecture conflicts with agent autonomy.
This problem is easily solved; we could add a coordination statement to the
language to inform actors which aren’t negotiators about the contents of the
plan. Then, we change the semantics of the Execute-statement by demanding
that both the negotiators and the actors synchronously execute it. This way,
the actors can refuse their cooperation. If they agree to take part in the plan
execution, a (joint) commitment towards the plan can be established among the
acting agents.
The reader might wonder why we opted for separate groups of negotiators
and actors, which can overlap, coincide, or even be disjoint. The reason for
this is that we gain expressivity. Our coordination language allows ‘manager
agents’ to construct plans through negotiation, which ‘labourer agents’ have
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to execute. The language also allows the negotiators to be part of the group of
actors, or vice versa. These possibilities yield a coordination language which is
suitable for writing coordination protocols for different organisational profiles.
The global semantics which we defined in this section gives a high-level
description of the execution of the coordination statements. We abstract from
implementation issues and from the mental consequences of executing coor-
dination statements. Here, we will make some brief remarks on these mat-
ters. The statements of the coordination language need to be implemented in a
lower-level language, such as an agent programming language or JAVA. A syn-
chronous coordination statement performed by a group of agents is translated
to a coordination protocol in the lower-level language, in which the agents send
messages to each other, check their mental state to find out whether they are
willing to take part in the coordination, and perhaps establish mutual beliefs or
joint intentions. The coordination protocol underlying a coordination statement
can be fairly complicated, and it is one of the benefits of using a coordination
language that we can abstract from these hairy details.
Depending on the mental make-up of the agents, part of the coordination
protocols which implement coordination statements might be concerned with
establishing (joint) mental attitudes [83]. For example, when agents form a
group, they can establish a joint goal towards the purpose of the plan. Dur-
ing the following group communication process the agents execute several
CommGroup statements, to establish their demands on the plan being formed.
In between the execution of CommGroups, individual agents can use their in-
dividual beliefs and goals to decide which constraints they want to post. When
the agents Commit to the plan, this could result in a joint intention to perform
the actions of the plan (in case the actors all are negotiators). And when the
plan is executed, the agents could first check whether there is mutual belief
in the presence of the Circumstances in which the plan can be executed, and
when the plan is finished, establish mutual belief that the Purpose of the plan
has been achieved.
6.4 Illustration
We give an extensive example to illustrate the use and usefulness of the coordi-
nation language and the functioning of the plan–execute cycles. In this example
we use this font for agent names and actions, and this font for logical formulas,
like constraints and goals of plans. The domain of the example is imaginary
(we picture a large group of robotic agents devoted to running the household of
the author of this thesis), but serves well to illustrate the various subtleties of
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agent coordination.
EXAMPLE 6.3 (Cleaning up the living-room)
Agent James wants the living-room in the house of his owner to be metic-
ulously clean. This isn’t an easy job, as his owner is a sloppy woman,
who isn’t very into cleaning. So, James reckons he could do with some
help. The household is run by five agents, called Martha, Paul, Mary, John
and James. Each of them is programmed in an (agent) programming lan-
guage. Different agents could be programmed in different programming
languages, but they all use the coordination language defined in the previ-
ous section to coordinate plan formation and execution. Thus, the programs
of the agents are interspersed with coordination statements.
James starts by trying to form a group to achieve the condition
room clean. The circumstances before the cleaning activities of the agents
are started is room messy and dirty. There are dirty dishes on the table, and
there are old newspapers and empty potato chips bags lying around. James
wants Martha to be part of the group of negotiators concerned with the
plan to be formed, as she is very good in managing large cleaning projects.
Martha also agrees that a plan needs to be formed to clean the room, so she
also executes a FormGroup action. She demands that agent John is not part
of the negotiation group, for reasons that will become apparent later on.
But she wants somebody else to aid in the planning; she wants the group
of negotiators to have at least two members. John is trying to have a say in
the plan, so he is also trying to execute a FormGroup-statement. These are
the coordination statements James, Martha and John attempt to execute:
James: FormGroup(room messy and dirty, room clean, p1,
Martha ∈ Negotiators)
Martha: FormGroup(room messy and dirty, room clean, q18,
John 6∈ Negotiators ∧#Negotiators ≥ 2)
John: FormGroup(room messy and dirty, room clean, r3,
#Negotiators ≥ 3)
All three agents use a different plan variable to refer to the plan they want
to create (p1, q18 and r3, respectively). The system will choose a plan name
for the plan and associate this name with the variables of the agents. If the
agents were to choose the plan name, then they each had to know the names
of all plans that have been created in all corners of the multi-agent system.
Each agent uses plan variables from its own, disjoint set (for example, all
plan variables of James start with p). If all agents would use the same set
of plan variables, then name clashes could occur. For example, then agent
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James could use the variable q18 to refer to a plan to arrange a surprise
party for his owner. If the system then tries to associate q18 to the cleaning
plan, this creates a problem for James, as the variable q18 already denotes
another plan of his.
The above combination of FormGroup-statements can’t succeed, as the
group {James,Martha, John} doesn’t satisfy the demands of the three
agents. To explain the semantics of the coordination language, we look
at the functioning of the global transition rule for FormGroup in this partic-
ular case. There are three agents that execute FormGroup statements, which
can in principle be synchronously executed, if the conditions of the transi-
tion rule are satisfied. We first take J (the set of synchronising agents) to be
{James,Martha, John}. For each of these three agents there is a local tran-
sition labelled with the FormGroup statement which that agent tries to exe-
cute, as shown above. For example, the local transition of James will look
like AJames
FormGroup(room messy and dirty,room clean,p1,Martha∈Negotiators)−→ A′James.
The transition rule stipulates that the first and second arguments of the
FormGroups of the three must be the same, and this is indeed the case.
We now look at the conditions of the transition rule. The second condition
is the essential one here; it states
∧
ι∈J ϕι ∧ Negotiators = J 6|=cs ⊥.
When we instantiate this formula for this particular case, we get
Martha ∈ Negotiators ∧ John 6∈ Negotiators ∧ #Negotiators ≥ 2 ∧
#Negotiators ≥ 3 ∧ Negotiators = {James,Martha, John} 6|=cs ⊥.
This condition isn’t satisfied (because of John), so no global transition re-
sults from the FormGroup statements of the three agents.
But there is exactly one subset that can succeed, and this consists of
the statements of Martha and James. The group {Martha, James} is the
only subset for which the second condition of the global transition rule is
satisfied, as can be easily checked. They become the Negotiators of a plan
the system calls PlanA. The first condition of the transition rule stipulates
that the plan name PlanA must be previously unused. The name PlanA is
part of the right hand side of the resulting global transition, such that the
name is available to the local programs of James and Martha to bind to
their plan variables. The result of the FormGroup is that the Purpose, the
Circumstances and the group of Negotiators of PlanA are fixed; Purpose
= room clean ∧ Circumstances = room messy and dirty ∧ Negotiators =
{James,Martha} is the current constraint on PlanA, as the third condition
stipulates.
So now, Martha and James can start planning. They use their own
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knowledge and reasoning capacities to decide which actions can contribute
to the goal room clean. Note that the agents can have different ideas about
what this goal incorporates. Though our coordination architecture doesn’t
focus on internal agent processes, we look inside the knowledge bases of
the agents for a moment to illustrate this. Martha believes the formula
room clean ↔ no dust on objects ∧ ashtray empty ∧ fresh atmosphere,
while James thinks room clean ↔
no dust on objects∧ fresh atmosphere ∧ ceiling clean ∧ floor very clean.
The knowledge of the agents about details of the goal is partial. This leads
to different decisions about the actions to be done, which complement each
other:
James: CommGroup({!floor very clean, dust left side,
dust right side} ⊆ Actions, p1)
Martha: CommGroup(empty ashtray ∈ Actions ∧
Actors(empty ashtray) = {John} ∧
open windows ∈ Actions, q18)
Both agents want to add constraints on the plan feature Actions, and Martha
also has a constraint on the feature Actors. The agents want to add both
atomic actions and see–to–it actions to the plan. As the constraints of the
agents are consistent, and they are both present to synchronously execute
a CommGroup-action, this succeeds. We again look at the functioning of
the global transition rules for CommGroup in some detail. The group J
here is {James,Martha}. The plan variables p1 and q18 have been lo-
cally bound to PlanA in the FormGroup which initiated the plan creation
phase, so we take P to be PlanA. There are two local transitions for the
CommGroups of the two agents, each labelled with the CommGroup state-
ment of that agent. We assume the local semantics takes care of replacing
the plan variables the agents use as second parameter with the plan name to
which they are bound, which is PlanA here. Thus, the second parameter of
both CommGroup statements are the same, as the antecedent of the transi-
tion rule demands. We now look at the conditions attached to the rule. The
first condition is µ(PlanA) |=cs Negotiators = {James,Martha}, and this
indeed is the case, as is clear when looking at the constraint µ(PlanA) that
resulted from the formation of the group; this is Purpose = room clean ∧
Circumstances = room messy and dirty ∧ Negotiators = {James,Martha}.
The (instantiated) second condition states that the potential new constraint
must be consistent:
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µ(PlanA) ∧
{!floor very clean, dust left side, dust right side} ⊆ Actions ∧
empty ashtray ∈ Actions ∧ Actors(empty ashtray) = {John}∧
open windows ∈ Actions 6|=cs ⊥.
This condition is satisfied, and therefore the rule for successful CommGroup
is used. In case this condition wasn’t satisfied, the transition rule for a fail-
ing CommGroup would have led to a global transition. The third condition
takes care of the updating of the plan store with the new constraint.
As a result of this action, the plan now contains a number of unordered
actions, one of which (empty ashtray) is allocated to John (who hates this
chore (which is the reason he tried to join the Negotiators. . . ; Martha al-
ways does this!)). In the next coordination action, the agents impose some
ordering and allocation constraints upon the actions. Martha thinks that
first the windows have to be opened, unless it is part of the plan to wash
the windows. So, she first tests the plan, as James could have added the
wash windows actions to the plan:
Martha: ?(wash windows ∈ Actions, q18)
This test fails, so Martha can demand that the open windows-action pre-
cedes all others. James also tests the plan, and finds out that open windows
is part of PlanA. He then tries to allocate this job to himself, and to prevent
that Mary has to dust the left side of the room by herself:
Martha: CommGroup(∀a ∈ Actions : open windows ≤ a ∧
Actors(open windows) = {Mary}, q18)
James: CommGroup(Actors(open windows) = {James} ∧
Actors(dust left side) 6= {Mary}, p1)
This CommGroup fails, as the agents have a conflict on the task allocation
of open windows. The failing of the group communication doesn’t mean
that execution blocks, but that the second transition rule for CommGroup is
used instead of the first. The first condition of this rule stipulates that the
proper group of Negotiators has to be present, as is the case. The second
condition states that the conjunction of the current plan constraint with the
new proposals of the Negotiators leads to ⊥. This condition also holds,
because of the conflict on the task allocation. Thus, a global transition is
generated in which the local states of Martha and James stay the same,
except for their programs, which advance to the statements following their
respective CommGroups.
Both agents try again, relaxing or changing their constraints:
290
Martha: CommGroup(∀a ∈ Actions : open windows ≤ a, q18)
James: CommGroup(Actors(open windows) = {Paul}∧
Actors(dust left side) 6= {Mary}, p1)
This does succeed, and the constraints are added to the plan store of PlanA.
Now, James checks whether the plan incorporates cleaning the ceiling, and
tries to add this action if not:
James: ?(clean ceiling /∈ Actions, p1);
CommGroup(clean ceiling ∈ Actions, p1)
Note that we use ‘;’ for sequential composition, so we assume that the
lower level programming language in which James is programmed con-
tains this. The test succeeds, and the CommGroup is attempted, but as
Martha is not responding by executing a CommGroup, the coordination fails
and the cleaning of the ceiling isn’t added to the plan. This failure is of the
blocking kind; no global transition is generated for the group communica-
tion, and James either has to wait until Martha responds and communicates
with him, or James’s program can continue with another branch (if the
local agent programming language contains some choice constructor).
Following this, both agents decide that they have put enough constraints
on the plan, and they commit to it:
Martha: Commit(q18)
James: Commit(p1)
When this is executed, the constraint solver of the coordination archi-
tecture takes the plan and adds enough constraints to it to result in a definite
plan that attains the purpose specified by the negotiators. In this case, the
plan needs more actions (!¬room messy), actions need to be ordered (first,
the mess must go, then the room has to be dusted, and then the floor has to
be cleaned) and tasks have to be allocated. Figure 6.2 shows the resulting
plan.
Now, the plan can be executed by the actors. Martha and James start
execution by synchronously performing an Execute-statement, and a plan
controller for PlanA is started. The plan controller starts by telling Paul to
open the window. Fresh air and light stream into the living-room, thereby
revealing a pile of laundry in a dark corner. After this action is done, there
are two actions in the plan which have not been ordered by the planning
of the agents or of the constraint solver. So, the plan controller can de-
cide to order them arbitrarily, or execute them in parallel. We suppose the
plan controller opts for concurrency. John empties the ashtray, and at the
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open windows (Paul)
empty ashtray (John)
dust left side (James, Mary) dust right side (Martha)
floor very clean!
¬ room messy!
Figure 6.2: Plan A
same time the plan controller broadcasts that a plan needs to be created and
executed for the purpose ¬room messy, after which the plan controller sus-
pends until this new plan is formed and executed. Note that it proves useful
to postpone the planning for ¬room messy, as the opening of the windows
has revealed more mess to be thrown out. If a plan had been made be-
fore the windows had been opened, than this plan wouldn’t have included
actions for putting the laundry away.
Three agents react to the broadcast message, by doing a FormGroup-
statement:
John: FormGroup(room messy,¬room messy, r8,Mary ∈ Negotiatiors)
Mary: FormGroup(room messy,¬room messy, s2, John ∈ Negotiatiors)
James: FormGroup(room messy,¬room messy, p2,#Negotiators < 4)
The group is formed with no problems, the system calls the plan PlanB and
the negotiations on the plan to clean out the mess begin. John and Mary
would love to do chores, as long as they can do them together (they have
hidden motives. . . ).
John: CommGroup(put laundry in washing machine ∈ Actions ∧
Actors(put laundry in washing machine) =
{Mary, John}, r8)
Mary: CommGroup(remove garbage ∈ Actions ∧
Actors(remove garbage) = {Mary, John}, s2)
James: CommGroup(remove garbage ∈ Actions ∧
Actors(remove garbage) = {James}, p2)
As the agents don’t agree on the task allocation, this negotiation step fails.
The agents try again, where James weakens his demand, and the others
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change theirs. James now wants one agent, not busy with other tasks in
this plan, to remove the garbage. Mary and John also change tactics; they
try to get the other agents out of the room by allocating tasks to them, such
that they end up in the living-room together:
John: CommGroup(put laundry in washing machine ∈ Actions ∧
Actors(put laundry in washing machine) =
{Martha}, r8)
Mary: CommGroup(remove garbage ∈ Actions ∧
Actors(remove garbage) = {James} ∧
remove dishes ∈ Actions ∧
Actors(remove dishes) = {Paul}, s2)
James: CommGroup(remove garbage ∈ Actions ∧
∃x : Actors(remove garbage) = {x} ∧
∀a : a ∈ Actions ∧ a 6= remove garbage →
x /∈ Actors(a), p2)
The constraints of the agents now are consistent, and so the three actions
are added to PlanB. All three actions are allocated to different single agents,
as the constraints prescribe. These agents don’t have to be part of the
Negotiators-group. Note that it seems that Mary and John have communi-
cated about their change in tactics in order to obtain what they want. If they
did, this is lower-level communication, performed using communication
statements from the lower-lever programming language. The higher-level
statements from the coordination language are used to add well-considered
proposals of the negotiators to the plan. In case the agents haven’t con-
sidered their proposals in enough detail, for example because they didn’t
find out whether other negotiators agree with their opinions on the plan in
formation, high-level communication fails.
The three agents Commit to PlanB, and because the three actions of the
plan can achieve its purpose and there is no need to order the independent
actions, the constraint solver returns the plan with the three unordered ac-
tions. Then, the negotiators initiate execution of the plan, after which the
agents Martha, James and Paul execute this plan. A new plan controller
starts, to coordinate the execution, and after the plan is finished, the plan
controller of PlanA takes over again. The plan of Figure 6.2 is continued.
The room is dusted concurrently by Martha, James and Mary. After this is
finished, the plan controller again has to execute a see-to–it-action, namely
!floor very clean. Again, this goal is broadcast and the plan controller of
PlanA suspends.
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Martha and Mary react to the broadcast, and they successfully form a
group to create a plan for cleaning the floor. In order to thoroughly clean
the flour, the big couch has to be lifted such that an agent can vacuum the
floor underneath it. Lifting the couch has to be done by at least two agents.
During the first CommGroup-action, Martha proposes a set of actions, while
Mary agrees with anything:
Martha: CommGroup(Actions = {lift couch, vacuum under couch,
put couch back, vacuum rest} ∧
#Actors(lift couch) = 2, q21)
Mary: CommGroup(>, s4)
After this, Mary performs a series of tests on the plan store of this plan
(called PlanC), to find out whether lift couch is part of the plan (this suc-
ceeds), whether lift couch has already been allocated (this fails), and how
many agents are needed to lift the couch. We will show the last two test
statements.
The test ?(Actors(lift couch) = x, s4) uses the free local variable x. In case
the constraints on PlanC imply that there is a group of agents that will lift
the couch, this set will be bound to x. As the constraints presently don’t
imply this, this test fails.
The test ?(#(Actors(lift couch)) = y, s4) does succeed, and the value 2 is
bound to the local variable y. Now that Mary knows that only two agents
will have to lift the couch, she proposes a new plan constraint. Meanwhile,
Martha puts some ordering constraints on the actions:
Martha: CommGroup(lift couch < vacuum under couch <
put couch back, q21)
Mary: CommGroup(∀x ∈ Actors(lift couch) : strong(x), s4)
These coordination statements succeed, and subsequently Martha and Mary
commit to the plan. As the constraint solver contains the domain knowledge
that the only strong agents are John and Paul, it allocates the group action of
lifting the couch to them. The constraint solver allocates the two vacuuming
actions to Mary, and adds an ordering constraint to first vacuum the rest of
the room before vacuuming under the couch. The agents execute PlanC,
after which the overall plan PlanA also terminates.
6.5 The coordination architecture
In Figure 6.3, we depict the coordination architecture described earlier.
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Figure 6.3: The distributed plan coordination architecture
There are two levels in the architecture. In the lower level are the agents,
programmed in some (agent) programming language. The ‘ordinary’ state-
ments of the agent programs are executed in the lower level. The higher level
is the plan coordination level, on which we focus in this chapter. This level con-
tains two spaces: the plan formation space and the plan execution space. The
plan formation space contains the plan stores of plans still in the plan creation
phase. In the figure, each store is indicated by a circle. The size of the circle
indicates the size of the set of plans which are consistent with the constraints
in the store; that is, the smaller the circle, the further the creation of the plan
has advanced. The little grey circles indicate plan stores which are definite and
thus only allow one plan. These plan stores can be equated with plans. The
constraint solver interacts with the plan stores, checks the constraints the nego-
tiating agents want to add to plan stores and uses its planning knowledge to aid
in creating and finishing the plan. The plan execution space contains finished
plans, which are being executed. Each plan has an associated plan controller to
coordinate plan execution with the agents involved.
Looking at the global system configuration 〈{Aι|ι ∈ I}, χ, ρ, µ〉, we can
pinpoint the spaces of the architecture: {Aι|ι ∈ I} are the agents in the lower
level, χ are the plans in the plan execution space, ρ matches the plans that are
definite (the little grey circles from Figure 6.3), and µ are the other plans in the
plan formation space.
As the figure shows, there can be many plans under construction and in exe-
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cution simultaneously. This feature of the architecture is useful, as independent
plan coordination activities can be done in parallel. One group of agents doesn’t
have to wait until another group has finished executing its plan before starting
on a new plan. Of course, multiple plans of possibly overlapping groups of
agents require more deliberation and communication of the agents, to decide
whether they are available to contribute to a plan. This reasoning takes place at
the lower agent level.
The programs of the agents contain statements from the plan coordination
language, which are executed at the higher level. The arrows in the figure
mainly indicate data flow. For example, when agents do a CommGroup, infor-
mation is added to a certain plan store. When agents test a plan store, agents
obtain information about the plan being formed. Execution of coordination
statements in the plan formation store involves the constraint solver. For exam-
ple, when a group of negotiators commits to a plan, then the constraint solver
checks whether this plan is definite, and if not, uses its planning knowledge to
arrive at a definite plan. When a finished plan is executed, it moves from the
plan formation space to the plan execution space and gets a plan controller asso-
ciated. The plan controller coordinates the agents to perform the actions of the
plan, according to the order dictated by the partial order. So, if the next action
to be executed is a group action for agents {ι2, ι5, ι6}, the plan controller syn-
chronises with these agents, such that they perform the action together. When
the next action to be executed is a see–to–it action, the plan controller broad-
casts this to the agents, such that a new distributed plan–execute cycle can start,
inside the current one. After execution of the plan is finished, the plan is dis-
posed of. In case a plan fails during execution, for example because not all
actors are present to execute a group action or because no agent reacts to a
see–to–it message, the plan controller reports the failure to the negotiators of
the plan, after which it terminates.
6.6 Conclusion
We defined an architecture for agents that coordinate with each other in order
to create and execute plans. Also, we introduced a novel coordination language
which can be used to enable agents to form temporary alliances for planning
and performing the group plan. Coordination languages are very useful for
agent applications, as agents often are heterogeneous and thus need a common
language of a high abstraction level to coordinate their behaviour. This coordi-
nation language uses ideas from constraint programming [111] and is similar to
GrAPL [122], the language to coordinate group actions from Chapter 5. When
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we compare the coordination language to GrAPL, GrAPL is more expressive
with respect to details of the actions: actions are parameterised and the agents
negotiate about the parameters. A combination of GrAPL and the coordina-
tion language is well conceivable. In this new language, there are constraints
on two levels, namely the constraints on the structure of the plan and the task
allocation, and the constraints on parameters of actions which are part of the
plan.
Our work is also related to classical Linda-like coordination languages [17],
which use a blackboard to exchange information. Instead of the blackboard, our
architecture features constraint stores, which have the added benefit of logical
structure and inference mechanisms.
In a way, the coordination language can be compared with agent communi-
cation languages like KQML [46]. The coordination statements (FormGroup,
CommGroup, Commit and Execute) correspond to speech act types, and the
constraints and other parameters of these statements form the content of the
messages. The statements of our language are of a higher abstraction level;
one can imagine implementing them in KQML. The benefit of our language
is that it is specifically designed for the coordination of agents creating and
executing plans, and that its semantics precisely describes the manipulation of
the plan stores. In order for communication and coordination to be success-
ful, the agents must have ontological agreement on the language they use. It
remains future work to show how our coordination language can be useful in
negotiating about ontological issues.
The coordination architecture is generic, and is to be combined with plan-
ning methods for the agents and the constraint solver. The agents use these
planning algorithms to decide which constraints they want to add to a plan
store, and the constraint solver uses a planning algorithm to check whether
the combined proposed constraints of agents indeed contribute to a plan that
reaches its purpose, as well as to complete the plan when the agents have com-
mitted to it. By abstracting from specific planning methods, the coordination
language can be suitably used by agents using different planning approaches.
Plans in our approach are partially ordered sets of actions. This matches
with the plan format in partial order planning (eg., [97]), where plans are
formed by gradually constraining the action set and the order of the actions,
as is necessary to obtain the goals of the plan. Planning algorithms like these
can be very well combined with constraint satisfaction techniques, to be imple-
mented in the constraint solver of our coordination architecture. Other, related
planning methods which combine well with our coordination architecture are
distributed hierarchical task network planners [27], which work by gradually
refining a goal into subgoals and/or actions. Recently, a new generation of fast
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planners like Graphplan [11] and satisfiability based planning [78] has arisen.
These planners are not of the usual deductive kind, but use satisfiability instead.
As this view matches with constraint satisfaction, these new planners are very
usable in the coordination architecture. There are also planners that formalise
the planning problem as a constraint satisfaction problem, and then use con-
straint solving to achieve a solution [6]. This results in a very fast planner,
according to the authors of [6]. In this planning method, the variables which
are constrained describe the states which are achieved by performing actions,
while in our formalism the variables (plan features) describe the actions in the
plan and their properties. The multi-agent constraint-based planner MACBeth
[53] combines constraint programming with hierarchical task network plan-
ning. The (human) user and the planner cooperate to tailor a sketchy plan to a
specific situation. The user posts constraints on the relations between sub-tasks
in the plan under construction, and on the value of task parameters. Thus, the
constraints both describe demands on the structure of the plan and on the re-
source allocation. MACBeth uses constraint management techniques to arrive
at a definite plan. This seems similar to the set-up in our coordination architec-
ture, where the agents which negotiate about the plan first post constraints on
the plan, thus narrowing down the search space for the constraint solver. But
our coordination architecture is of a different nature; it isn’t entered around a
planner (while MACBeth is), but provides a generic system structure for agents
doing distributed planning and a language through which the agents can jointly
post their demands on the plan.
In this chapter, we only briefly touched upon mentalistic aspects of group
activity [33, 103, 118]. We see work in this area as valuable, and establishing
connections between the construction of plans and the proper mental attitudes
as very relevant. But presently, we chose to focus on plan construction and
execution. Another relevant field of research concerns the structuring of coor-
dination processes, for example using coordination protocols [95]. Here, we
don’t mean the lower-lever coordination protocols used to implement the co-
ordination statements, but the higher-level coordination protocols constructed
using statements from the coordination language. Structuring coordination is
essential, to guide the agents in using the proper coordination statements at the
right times. This prevents them from arbitrarily trying to achieve agreement
on matters, which will take a lot of communication effort. Our coordination
language can be used to implement coordination protocols.
Our coordination architecture and language enable the agents to negotiate
about demands on the plan being created by posing constraints on the plan.
These constraints shrink the space of possible plans, after which the planner
implemented in the constraint solver can complete the plan. This way, the
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preferences of the agents and the knowledge of the planner can be combined.
The coordination language offers abstract and formally well-defined primitives,
enabling agents to interact through the construction and execution of distributed
plans.
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CHAPTER 7
Conclusion:
Abstract Interaction
is what Agents are for!
What you don’t have you don’t need it now
What you don’t know you can feel somehow
U2
As we studied several entirely separate aspects of agent interaction and
applications of abstraction for multi-agent systems, it is hard to come to all
encompassing conclusions at the end of this thesis without resorting to rather
empty platitudes. Therefore, we sweep together the main conclusions of the
chapters in this book in an overview. Then, we briefly touch upon some direc-
tions for future work. And as platitudes have their own particular charm, we
will not resist temptation and conclude with some more general remarks.
Summary of chapter conclusions
Chapter 2: Abstracting Agent Interaction Histories into Intentionality
We have defined formal criteria which relate intentional notions to his-
tories of an agent’s interaction with its environment. To be specific, we
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relate beliefs, desires, and intentions of an agent to the observations and
communication an agent receives and the actions it performs over time.
From an external viewpoint, an agent is a black box, with its behaviour
history (past actions and received observations and communications) as
input, and its new actions as output. Like we do with our fellow human
beings, it can be very useful for an agent to explain the behaviour of a
fellow or rival agent in terms of belief, desire and intention, in order to
be able to understand and predict the actions of this other agent. Thus,
the intentional notions serve to abstract the interaction histories of the
agent into manageable, short representations.
The criteria for being an externally grounded belief, desire or intention
formula formally relate the abstract, intuitive BDI notions to the com-
putational reality of traces of the agent’s observable behaviour. As we
provide formal definitions of BDI in terms of dynamic behaviour, our
work in a way formalises the philosophical account of Dennett [25, 26],
promoting the intentional stance. But the definitions also work the other
way around, by giving the usually rather vague BDI notions a rigorously
defined meaning.
The criteria for intentional notions which we have defined can be used in
several ways:
∗ Agents can use the criteria to attribute intentional notions to another
agent and to perform anticipatory reasoning about future behaviour
of this agent, which may lead to attempts to make the other agent
change its mind.
∗ In case agents internally use BDI-notions, the criteria for BDI can
be used to verify whether belief, desire and intention have the proper
relation to the external agent behaviour, as fixed in the criteria.
∗ The abstract BDI-notions can be helpful for requirements engineer-
ing, which is concerned with specifying requirements that systems
have to live up to. These requirements often concern complex be-
haviour, and our BDI-notions can be used to abstract behaviour
patterns into shorter, more intuitive concepts, which still have a
well-defined relation to the behaviour of the system. This aids in
managing the complexity of the requirements.
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Chapter 3: Reuse and Abstraction in Verification: Agents Interacting with
Dynamic Environments
In this chapter, we have provided two principles to make verification
of agent systems a more manageable process. In order to be able to
verify properties, we need a specification language for properties which
is closely related to the specification (or programming) language used to
specify the agent system. Though there are temporal logics available that
could be used to specify properties of agent systems, it is often unclear
how to relate the semantics of these logics to the semantics of agent
system specifications. Therefore, we started at the semantical side in this
chapter.
The semantics of an agent system is assumed to be a set of traces, which
represent all possible behaviours of the system. These traces are tempo-
ral sequences of information states of the agent(s) and the world. Based
on the representations used in these information states, we have defined a
detailed language, for phrasing behavioural properties. As this language
results in rather long, unreadable, unintuitive properties, we introduced
the first principle to make verification easier, which is language abstrac-
tion. Language abstraction means finding intuitive, conceptual terms to
abbreviate temporal phrases from the detailed language, resulting in an
abstract language. As each abstract term is formally related to its mean-
ing in the detailed language, we aren’t losing any formal rigour through
language abstraction, and the intuitive abstract language is firmly an-
chored in the detailed language. Though this is an almost trivial idea, it
aids considerably in reducing the inherent complexity of agent verifica-
tion.
The second principle we have presented is the idea of reusable systems
of generic properties and proofs. Many agent systems have behaviour
in common, in an abstract sense. For example, most agents perform ac-
tions and receive observations. By abstraction from domain and system
dependent details, we obtain abstract agent architectures, each represent-
ing a generic class of agent systems. We can phrase generic properties
applying to an abstract agent architecture. These generic properties can
be formalised in the abstract language, for brevity and intuitiveness. By
proving the properties in a generic manner, the proofs and the properties
can be reused for all agent systems which belong to the generic class of
systems. All that needs to be done is instantiate domain and system de-
pendent details and prove the underlying assumptions of the verification
proofs. In this chapter, we demonstrate this principle by constructing
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a system of properties and proofs for action successfulness for reactive
single agents interacting with dynamic environments. The two principles
have the following benefits:
∗ Properties in the abstract language are intuitive, and can be un-
derstood by agent software engineers without extensive training in
logic.
∗ Generic properties and proofs save time and trouble, as verification
results can be reused, without going into the dirty details of the
verification process again.
Chapter 4: An Abstract Model for Agents Interacting in Real-Time
We have constructed a model for multi-agent systems which includes
real-time and focuses on the interaction of agents with each other and
with the world in which they are situated. The model abstracts from
details of the internal mental state and of the reasoning processes of
the agent. We define the model through the operational semantics of
a skeleton agent programming language. The formal operational seman-
tics unambiguously defines the meaning of the abstract programming
statements of the skeleton programming language. As we don’t focus
on the internal make-up of the agents, the model has several parameters,
such that the system builder can shape the internal agent according to his
own favourite agent theory. We strictly separate internal agent process-
ing (reasoning) and external agent processing (observing, communicat-
ing, and physical acting).
The agents execute the reason–interact cycle. In each round of this cy-
cle, an agent first performs internal actions, followed by external actions.
The cycle is defined syntactically, and we prove that the syntactic restric-
tions indeed take care of proper alternation of reasoning and interacting.
As all parts of the reason–interact cycle can be completely specified in
the skeleton programming language, we provide a high degree of flexi-
bility. In other programming languages, it is fixed in the semantics of the
language how incoming information is processed by the agents, and also
how and when the execution of actions following from commitments of
the agents takes place. (However, in [24], efforts are underway to pro-
gram the cycle of the agent programming language 3APL [59]). The
most important features of our agent model are:
∗ It explicitly contains a dynamic world, which is not under total
control of the agents. Thus, events can take place, which could
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interfere with the actions of agents. In many agent programming
languages action execution is a side effect of updates to the mental
state, and thus the world is not explicitly modelled. Actions can’t
fail in the semantical models of these languages; in our model, they
can.
∗ Agents can perform observative actions, to obtain information about
the world situation. If agents don’t observe, they’re likely to have
faulty, outdated world information, leading to wrong decisions. In
many other semantical models of agent programming languages,
sensing is implicit and the agents always have an accurate view of
the world.
∗ Physical actions have a duration, which we model by dividing each
action into a number of steps or sub-actions. The semantics of the
skeleton programming language doesn’t interleave actions, but al-
lows actions to take place during overlapping time frames. Thus,
interference or synergy of actions can be modelled.
∗ Agents can perform actions individually or group-wise. We relate
group actions to individual actions using group action schemes,
which formalise the individual contributions of the group members
to a group action.
As our agent model doesn’t abstract away these issues, it provides a more
realistic view on the interaction of agents with their environment.
Chapter 5: An Abstract Programming Language for Agents Interacting
through Group Actions
We have designed an agent programming language, called GrAPL, specif-
ically tailored to group coordination and collaboration. Agents are social,
and they can aid each other to establish their joint or selfish objectives.
Facilities for negotiation about the parameters of group actions and for
group action execution seem to be missing from existing agent program-
ming languages. We define a novel constraint agent programming lan-
guage with statements for exactly these purposes.
The agents can communicate their demands on the parameters of future
group actions by means of constraints. The constraints of the commu-
nicating agents narrow down the parameter space of a group action, and
posit demands on the composition of the group of agents which will ex-
ecute the action, as well as on the group of communicators itself. The
language also contains a statement for joint group action execution. This
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can only succeed if the actual parameters the executing agents use obey
the constraints established earlier.
The new coordination statements of GrAPL enable high-level social
agent interaction. The new GrAPL statements for group communica-
tion and group action execution are highly abstract, capturing the intu-
itive idea that groups of agents meet in order to discuss how some future
group action will be performed, and that the agents later on perform the
action according to previous agreements. The formal operational seman-
tics of GrAPL anchors the new abstract programming statements to their
precise computational meaning. GrAPL is also abstract in the sense that
the semantic model doesn’t include real time or a world. Action execu-
tion is instantaneous and effects immediately affect the belief base(s) of
the acting agents. Also, the language doesn’t have statements for ordi-
nary communication, observation or extensive practical reasoning. Other
agent programming languages do provide facilities for these features.
Summarising, GrAPL:
∗ provides abstract communication and cooperation statements, en-
abling groups of agents to negotiate about group actions and exe-
cute these when there is agreement.
∗ is an agent programming language with a formally defined opera-
tional semantics, which gives a rigid basis for its future implemen-
tation.
∗ uses established ideas from constraint programming, and can be
implemented on top of a constraint solver; there is no reinventing
the wheel.
Chapter 6: An Abstract Coordination Language for Agents Interacting in
Distributed Plan-Execute Cycles
We have defined an agent coordination language for the construction and
execution of distributed plans. Agents can form temporary groups of
negotiators, which communicate with each other to propose constraints
on a plan to achieve a certain purpose in certain circumstances. Like
GrAPL, the coordination language is constraint-based; the constraints
pertain to the actions of the plan, their order, the agents executing the
actions and the composition of the group of negotiators.
Being a coordination language, the language abstracts from all aspects
not relevant to agent coordination, such as the internal reasoning of the
agents. The coordination language can be used for heterogeneous agents,
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programmed in different agent programming languages. It provides
highly abstract coordination primitives, facilitating agent interaction in
the form of negotiation and execution of distributed plans. The formal
operational semantics of the coordination language provides a clear def-
inition of the precise meaning of the abstract coordination statements.
We also have provided an architecture for agent coordination, which con-
tains the agents, a constraint solver, constraint stores containing the de-
mands of the agents on the plans and plan controllers, which coordinate
the distributed execution of plans. The agents locally use planning algo-
rithms to decide which actions, order and actors to propose. After the
agents have communicated their preferences, the space of possible plans
has shrunk, and the constraint solver finishes the plan, using its built-in
planning knowledge. We abstract from the specific planning methods
employed by the agents and the constraint solver; this leads to a flexible
framework for distributed planning. The coordination language is:
∗ formally well-defined; it has an operational semantics, built on top
of the local semantics of the programming language(s) used for the
agents.
∗ constraint-based, which allows us to reuse techniques from con-
straint solving and constraint programming.
Future work
Each of the separate chapters above evoke issues that need attention in future
research, but there are also possibilities to integrate the work from different
chapters. We start with the issues that pertain to a particular chapter.
The work in Chapter 2 (as in all of this thesis) is mainly theoretical. An
implementation of an agent architecture for attribution of BDI has partly been
built (see [76]). In order to make this architecture useful in practice, efficient
algorithms to check the BDI criteria for candidate formulae must be included.
Also, the use of the externally defined BDI notions for requirements engineer-
ing must be further investigated by analysing practical case studies.
In Chapter 3, we started a library of reusable properties and proofs for veri-
fication of agent systems by defining such a system to prove action successful-
ness for single agents interacting with dynamic environments. However, this
is clearly just the beginning. Other systems of properties and proofs have to
be constructed for this generic class as well as for other classes to arrive at an
actual well-endowed library. Another matter for future research is to relate our
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logical languages or subsets thereof to temporal or dynamic logics, such that
we come closer to bridging the gap between implemented agent systems and
agent theories. A start with this has been made in [40].
The operational agent model of Chapter 4 is an abstract model. By instan-
tiating the parameters of the model, actual agent programming languages can
be obtained. It could be interesting to mimic established agent programming
languages using the operational model, by customising the skeleton program-
ming language, and to study their differences and real-time behaviour. The
model itself can also be further studied and enhanced. We just mention one
major issue. The world state transformation function, which takes all atomic
sub-actions and events taking place during a time unit and computes the change
to the world state, is a parameter of the model. Defining this function for ac-
tual systems is by no means easy, and it might be interesting to investigate the
connection between this problem and research on the frame, qualification and
ramification problems. Also, theories of concurrent action could be useful to
come to a definition of this function.
The main challenge for the programming language GrAPL from chapter
5 and the coordination language for distributed planning lies in implementing
them. Attempts in this direction are currently undertaken.
The work in the last three chapters is clearly related, as in each of these
chapters we define a (programming or coordination) language and its opera-
tional semantics. We already mentioned in the conclusion of Chapter 6 that
it might be interesting to combine GrAPL and the coordination language, such
that the agents constructing distributed plans can also discuss action parameters
(actions are unparameterised in Chapter 6). The languages of chapter 5 and 6
both abstract from many agent aspects, such as observation, practical reason-
ing and asynchronous communication. Integration of the features of GrAPL
and the coordination language with the features of the agent programming lan-
guage for communication ACPL (by Van Eijk and others [12]) and the agent
programming language for practical reasoning 3APL (by Hindriks and others
[59]) might be very fruitful, and lead to a rich programming language including
many useful agent features. Also, it could be quite interesting to add features
from the real-time agent model of Chapter 4 to the semantical model of this
resulting language, or, if this turns out to be a bit too ambitious, to the combi-
nation of GrAPL and the coordination language.
The criteria for being an intentional notion grounded in external behaviour,
which we defined in Chapter 2, could be used for the verification of agents, as
we performed in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, we chose not to look inside agents;
we only proved that the behaviour of the agent is such that its actions always
succeed. Other properties worth verifying could concern the relation between
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the BDI notions that agents use internally and their external behaviour, and the
criteria for being an externally grounded intentional representation could be
the properties proven in this case. Another connection worth investigating is
to use the criteria for BDI in language abstraction, in order to make behaviour
properties simpler and more intuitive, even if it is unknown whether the agent
internally uses BDI.
The connection between the first part of this thesis (Chapters 2 and 3) and
the second part (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) is less clear. The first part starts from
the semantics of agent system specifications in the form of sets of traces with-
out looking into the syntax of the specification language nor at the way the
semantics results in the set of traces, while in the second part we define syn-
tactical languages and semantical machinery, without studying the resulting set
of traces. These observations also show the bridge between these two parts;
by relating the operational semantics of the last chapters to the trace semantics
employed in the first chapters, an integration can be established. This is by no
means straightforward; as the reader may have noticed, the concepts and lan-
guages used in Chapter 2 and 3 of this thesis are different from those used in
Chapter 4, 5 and 6. In order to relate both approaches, it is necessary to map the
semantical models used in the last three chapters to the traces used in Chapter 2
and 3. We suspect this will take considerable effort. When this connection has
been established, the verification techniques from Chapter 3 can be applied to
agents programmed in one of the languages of the last chapters, and intentional
notions can be attributed to them according to the criteria in Chapter 2.
Famous last words
Three popular viewpoints on agents are agent theories, agent architectures and
agent languages. (The former ATAL workshop was named after this classifi-
cation.) Here, theories are agent logics [21, 34, 85, 102], formalising anthro-
pomorphic concepts such as belief, desire and intentions, which are used for
agent specification. Architectures are structural, component-wise designs and
implementations of agent systems [13, 67]. Languages are agent programming
languages [59, 101, 113], used to build agents (in the end) and to explore the
necessary vocabulary to build agents (which is what they seem to be used for
presently). The dependencies and connections between work from these differ-
ent viewpoints often are blurred, as researchers tend to be focused on just logic
or just language or just architecture. In our opinion, this cannot be a good thing.
Some logical theory of agency only is useful if it can be related to implemen-
tations of agents in certain architectures or languages. And any architecture or
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language needs an accompanying logic, when formal specification and/or veri-
fication is necessary. In this thesis, we have worked from all three perspectives,
and this has strengthened our conviction that the agent field needs to unify the
three perspectives. Having said this, we recognise that this is not easy, as we
have stayed mostly within one perspective in each of the chapters of this book.
Nevertheless, when the field of agent research keeps developing in divergent
directions, we will never come to a stable agent concept and to multi-agent
systems which will be omnipresent in everyday life.
So, what exactly is the relation between programming languages and archi-
tectures, and between programming languages and theories? It seems that the
way we try to develop programming languages now, in the agent paradigm, is
totally opposite to the way this happened first. Earlier programming languages
started with the operations computers perform (manipulating memory places,
and shifting bytes around) and then worked their way up the abstracting ladder.
Theories about programs in these programming languages where constructed
later, and so were architectures. We now seem to work the other way around:
there already are intuitions about agents, as well as agent theories and sketches
of architectures, and we try to use these in order to interpret system behaviour,
define models of agents and devise programming languages. As we start from
intuitions and ideas, as well as from complex agent logics, it is essential to also
consider the practical aspects of agents and their complex interactions, in order
to come to results which truly contribute to the future of the agent paradigm.
On the other hand, one of the major benefits of the agent paradigm is that multi-
agent systems start from intuitions rather than from technicalities.
We think that the work in this thesis has shown that intuitive abstractions are
not just aesthetically pleasing frills, but indispensable tools to come to powerful
multi-agent systems. In this book, we have captured different features of agent
interaction in abstract concepts, thus making them more tangible, intuitive and
usable, be it as a coordination or programming statement, as a means to inter-
pret agent behaviour or as a phrase in a property to be verified. We have found
ways to structure the enormous complexity which always comes with agent
interaction into abstract concepts. We named these concepts in an intuitive
manner, inspired by the anthropomorphic nature of the agent paradigm. We
have always taken care of properly relating the newly found abstract concepts
to the underlying complex computational reality, by either providing them with
a formal operational semantics (Chapter 4, 5 and 6), defining them in terms
of more detailed notions (Chapter 3) or providing criteria that relate them to
execution traces of agent systems (Chapter 2). This way, we don’t provide
empty phrases, but instead introduce new, well-defined, powerful abstractions
for agent interaction.
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Agents are tailored to perform interaction with their environment. As in-
teraction between computing components becomes ever more abundant, the
agent-oriented paradigm will gain in importance and use. Equipped with the
proper abstract notions for agent interaction, the agent paradigm will be even
more suitable for providing the applications that are needed nowadays. Sum-
marising the main conclusion of this thesis, agents are a powerful metaphor,
offering many abstract yet intuitive concepts which contribute to the concep-
tion and construction of software entities which interact with one another and
with the environment in which they exist. In short, abstract interaction is what
agents are for!
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Samenvatting
Computers en hun toepassingen worden steeds ingewikkelder. Moderne com-
putersystemen bestaan vaak uit min of meer zelfstandige onderdelen (hardwa-
re en software) die interacteren met hun omgeving. Computers communiceren
met andere computers, ontvangen informatie en opdrachten van hun menselij-
ke gebruikers en kunnen sensoren hebben om hun fysieke of virtuele omgeving
waar te nemen. Deze toegenomen interactie vraagt om handvaten om de inhe-
rent grotere complexiteit te kunnen beheersen.
Een belangrijk middel om ingewikkelde zaken beter hanteerbaar te maken
is abstractie. Dit betekent dat je intuı¨tieve concepten zoekt, deze vanuit een
duidelijke visie op de materie benoemt en details weglaat. Een goed voorbeeld
van abstractie is de metrokaart van Parijs: hoewel Parijs een grote stad is met
een ingewikkelde plattegrond, is het met een abstracte metrokaart snel duidelijk
hoe je moet reizen, en welke kleuren metrolijnen (de intuı¨tieve concepten) je
moet nemen. In het onderzoeksgebied van multi-agentsystemen, waarin het on-
derzoek in dit proefschrift past, wordt veel gebruik gemaakt van abstractie. Bij
deze nieuwe visie op software zijn de basisconcepten vertrouwde menselijke
begrippen zoals kennis, geloof, plannen, doelen, acties, intenties en observa-
ties. Een agent is een stuk software met een zekere mate van zelfstandigheid,
ontworpen en/of gebouwd met behulp van genoemde concepten, dat interac-
teert met andere agenten en met zijn omgeving, op zo’n manier dat de agent
inspeelt op de voortdurende dynamiek van de omgeving en z’n doelstellingen
behaalt.
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Er is al veel onderzoek verricht naar de ‘losse’ agent. In mijn proefschrift
richten we ons dan ook op de interactie tussen agenten onderling en hun om-
geving. We introduceren een aantal nieuwe abstracte concepten voor agentin-
teractie, vanuit verschillende gezichtspunten binnen het onderzoeksgebied van
de multi-agent systemen. Een gevaar van het gebruik van handige abstracte
concepten is dat ze geen enkele of een erg vage relatie hebben met de onderlig-
gende complexe werkelijkheid van de berekeningsprocessen in computers. Om
te voorkomen dat we luchtkastelen bouwen, zorgen we ervoor dat elk nieuw ab-
stract concept verankerd is in de complexe computationele werkelijkheid, door
een formele definitie te geven die een relatie legt tussen het concept en zijn
computationele betekenis. Op deze manier zijn nieuwe abstracte interactiecon-
cepten niet alleen intuı¨tief en handig, maar ook krachtig en correct.
We beginnen in hoofdstuk 2 met het verankeren van drie al bestaande en
veel gebruikte agentconcepten, te weten geloof, verlangen en intentie, in het
uiterlijke gedrag van de agent. Dit gedrag bestaat uit het observeren van de
omgeving, het communiceren met andere agenten en het doen van acties. De
drie abstracte concepten geloof, verlangen en intentie worden vaak gebruikt
om de interne toestand van een agent in uit te drukken. Een agent gelooft be-
paalde informatie (omdat de agent observaties gedaan heeft, bijvoorbeeld), hij
verlangt een bepaalde toestand te bereiken en om dat te realiseren heeft hij de
intentie om zekere acties uit te voeren. Omdat de interne, mentale toestand van
een agent enkel afhangt van diens interactie met de omgeving in de loop van
de computationele geschiedenis is het mogelijk om een relatie te leggen tussen
intenties, verlangens en geloofde feiten en de voorafgaande interactiegeschie-
denis. In hoofdstuk 2 geven we formele criteria die deze relatie vastleggen.
Met behulp van deze criteria is het ondermeer mogelijk dat e´e´n agent het uiter-
lijke gedrag van een andere agent observeert, en vervolgens geloof in een feit,
verlangen naar een toestand of intentie tot het doen van een actie toeschrijft aan
de geobserveerde agent, met het doel het geobserveerde gedrag te verklaren en
te voorspellen, en wellicht ook te manipuleren.
Het volgende hoofdstuk, hoofdstuk 3, ligt op het gebied van verificatie van
agent systemen, dat wil zeggen het bewijzen dat agenten zich zo gedragen als
de bedoeling is. Omdat multi-agent systemen complex gedrag vertonen is ve-
rificatie vaak de enige manier om vast te stellen dat een systeem goed werkt.
Maar voor verificatie is een wiskundige taal met bijbehorende bewijsprincipes
nodig, een logica. Systeem ontwikkelaars zijn in het algemeen niet erg be-
kwaam in logica, en dus wordt er in de praktijk zelden geverifie¨erd. Om het
verificatieproces te vergemakkelijken introduceren we twee principes, namelijk
taalabstractie en generieke herbruikbare stelsels van eigenschappen en bewij-
zen. Taalabstractie maakt de logische formules begrijpelijker, zodat ook de
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a-logicus ze kan begrijpen. Door bibliotheken te bouwen met daarin herbruik-
bare stellingen en hun bewijzen wordt het verifie¨ren van een bepaald systeem
ook makkelijker; je zoekt een bewijs op, instantie¨ert de systeemspecifieke pa-
rameters, en kijkt of de condities waaronder het bewijs gemaakt is voor dit
bepaalde systeem gelden. Dit laatste kan weer tot nieuwe verificatiestappen
leiden. In hoofdstuk 3 illustreren we dit idee met een herbruikbaar bewijs van
de eigenschap dat acties van een individuele agent in een dynamische omge-
ving slagen in bepaalde omstandigheden.
In hoofdstuk 4 presenteren we een nieuw model van agenten, waarin we ons
vooral richten op de interactie van agenten met elkaar en met hun omgeving.
Dit betekent dat we de dynamische omgeving niet weglaten uit het model, zoals
in andere modellen wel vaak gebeurt. Elke actie heeft een tijdsduur, en acties
die gedeeltelijk gelijktijdig plaatsvinden kunnen met elkaar interfereren en tot
ongewenste effecten leiden, of juist tot een positiever resultaat leiden (bijvoor-
beeld: een grote tafel is te verplaatsen door met z’n tweee¨n elk een kant op
te tillen, terwijl het in je eentje niet gaat). Het model bestaat uit een flexibele
programmeertaal en haar betekenis. Die betekenis geven we met behulp van
een formele semantiek, waarmee voor elk nieuw abstract concept in de pro-
grammeertaal met wiskundige precisie een betekenis wordt vastgelegd. Een
voorbeeld van een nieuw abstract interactieconcept in ons model is de groeps-
actie; agenten voeren samen een groepsactie uit door elk een individuele actie
te doen, op een goed gesynchroniseerde manier (zoals bij het samen optillen
van een tafel).
In hoofdstuk 5 is de groepsactie het centrale concept. We ontwikkelen een
programmeertaal, genaamd GrAPL (Group Agent Programming Language),
die specifiek bedoeld is om multi-agent systemen mee te programmeren waar-
in de agenten groepen kunnen vormen om gezamenlijk acties te doen. Voordat
een groep daadwerkelijk een groepsactie uitvoert communiceren agenten met
elkaar over de details van de actie en de samenstelling van de groep agenten
die de actie gaat doen. Ze stellen eisen aan de groepsactie in de vorm van logi-
sche formules. Als de eisen van de agenten verenigbaar zijn, dan kan de actie
uitgevoerd worden. Zowel voor de groepscommunicatie als voor het uitvoeren
van groepsacties hebben we nieuwe programmeerconcepten gevonden. Net als
in het vorige hoofdstuk zorgt de formele semantiek van de programmeertaal er-
voor dat de abstracte concepten een eenduidig gedefinie¨erde betekenis hebben.
We kunnen het idee van hoofdstuk 5 generaliseren door te kijken naar
groepsplannen in plaats van naar losse groepsacties. Een groepsplan is een
geheel van individuele acties en groepsacties, en hun verbanden in de tijd (ge-
beuren acties tegelijk of na elkaar?). Elk plan is gemaakt met een doel voor
ogen; als het plan goed in elkaar zit, en de omstandigheden meewerken, dan
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wordt dit doel bereikt als het plan uitgevoerd wordt. In hoofdstuk 6 introduce-
ren we een coo¨rdinatietaal voor het maken en uitvoeren van plannen voor en
door groepen agenten. Een coo¨rdinatietaal is een taal van een hoog abstractie-
niveau die gebruikt kan worden om agenten die in verschillende programmeer-
talen gebouwd zijn met elkaar te laten interacteren. Onze coo¨rdinatietaal bevat
communicatieconstructen, zodat groepen agenten kunnen overleggen over een
plan in wording, kunnen besluiten dat het plan voldoende uitgewerkt is en het
plan in werking kunnen zetten. Ook deze taal is uitgerust met een formele
semantiek om de nieuwe abstracte interactieconcepten grondig te verankeren.
In dit proefschrift hebben we manieren gevonden om de grote complexiteit
die agentinteractie met zich meebrengt te structureren met behulp van intuı¨tieve
abstracte concepten. De concepten zijn zo intuı¨tief omdat ze geı¨nspireerd zijn
door begrippen die we dagelijks gebruiken om het menselijk handelen en rede-
neren te beschrijven. We hebben er altijd zorg voor gedragen dat de abstrac-
te concepten een duidelijke betekenis hebben in termen van de onderliggende
complexe details. We introduceren dus geen lege frases, maar goed gedefi-
nie¨erde, krachtige begrippen. Hoewel het werk in dit proefschrift theoretisch
van aard is, is het van waarde voor de praktijk, omdat het gebruik van goed ge-
fundeerde, intuı¨tieve abstracte concepten het ontwerpen, bouwen en analyseren
van de computersystemen die we nodig hebben mogelijk maakt.
330
Curriculum Vitae
Wietske de Vries
12 december 1971: Geboren te Sneek
1984 – 1990: Voorbereidend Wetenschappelijk Onderwijs aan het
Christelijk College Nassau Veluwe te Harderwijk
1990 – 1996: Studie Informatica aan de Universiteit Utrecht
1996 – 1999: Assistent in Opleiding bij de afdeling Kunstmatige Intelligentie,
faculteit Exacte Wetenschappen, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
2000 – 2002: Assistent in Opleiding aan het Instituut voor Informatica en
Informatiekunde, faculteit Wiskunde en Informatica, Universiteit Utrecht
331
332
SIKS Dissertation Series
1998-1 Johan van den Akker (CWI)
DEGAS - An Active, Temporal Database of Autonomous Objects
1998-2 Floris Wiesman (UM)
Information Retrieval by Graphically Browsing Meta-Information
1998-3 Ans Steuten (TUD)
A Contribution to the Linguistic Analysis of Business Conversa-
tions within the Language/Action Perspective
1998-4 Dennis Breuker (UM)
Memory versus Search in Games
1998-5 E.W. Oskamp (RUL)
Computerondersteuning bij Straftoemeting
1999-1 Mark Sloof (VU)
Physiology of Quality Change Modelling; Automated Modelling of
Quality Change of Agricultural Products
1999-2 Rob Potharst (EUR)
Classification using Decision Trees and Neural Nets
1999-3 Don Beal (UM)
The Nature of Minimax Search
1999-4 Jacques Penders (UM)
The Practical Art of Moving Physical Objects
333
1999-5 Aldo de Moor (KUB)
Empowering Communities: A Method for the Legitimate User-
Driven Specification of Network Information Systems
1999-6 Niek J.E. Wijngaards (VU)
Re-design of Compositional Systems
1999-7 David Spelt (UT)
Verification Support for Object Database Design
1999-8 Jacques H.J. Lenting (UM)
Informed Gambling: Conception and Analysis of a Multi-Agent
Mechanism for Discrete Reallocation.
2000-1 Frank Niessink (VU)
Perspectives on Improving Software Maintenance
2000-2 Koen Holtman (TUE)
Prototyping of CMS Storage Management
2000-3 Carolien M.T. Metselaar (UvA)
Sociaal-Organisatorische Gevolgen van Kennistechnologie; een
Procesbenadering en Actorperspectief.
2000-4 Geert de Haan (VU)
ETAG, A Formal Model of Competence Knowledge for User Inter-
face Design
2000-5 Ruud van der Pol (UM)
Knowledge-based Query Formulation in Information Retrieval
2000-6 Rogier van Eijk (UU)
Programming Languages for Agent Communication
2000-7 Niels Peek (UU)
Decision-theoretic Planning of Clinical Patient Management
2000-8 Veerle Coup (EUR)
Sensitivity Analyis of Decision-Theoretic Networks
2000-9 Florian Waas (CWI)
Principles of Probabilistic Query Optimization
2000-10 Niels Nes (CWI)
Image Database Management System Design Considerations, Al-
gorithms and Architecture
2000-11 Jonas Karlsson (CWI)
Scalable Distributed Data Structures for Database Management
2001-1 Silja Renooij (UU)
Qualitative Approaches to Quantifying Probabilistic Networks
2001-2 Koen Hindriks (UU)
Agent Programming Languages: Programming with Mental
Models
334
2001-3 Maarten van Someren (UvA)
Learning as Problem Solving
2001-4 Evgueni Smirnov (UM)
Conjunctive and Disjunctive Version Spaces with Instance-Based
Boundary Sets
2001-5 Jacco van Ossenbruggen (VU)
Processing Structured Hypermedia: A Matter of Style
2001-6 Martijn van Welie (VU)
Task-based User Interface Design
2001-7 Bastiaan Schonhage (VU)
Diva: Architectural Perspectives on Information Visualization
2001-8 Pascal van Eck (VU)
A Compositional Semantic Structure for Multi-Agent Systems
Dynamics
2001-9 Pieter Jan ’t Hoen (RUL)
Towards Distributed Development of Large Object-Oriented
Models, Views of Packages as Classes
2001-10 Maarten Sierhuis (UvA)
Modeling and Simulating Work Practice BRAHMS: a Multiagent
Modeling and Simulation Language for Work Practice Analysis and
Design
2001-11 Tom M. van Engers (VU)
Knowledge Management: The Role of Mental Models in Business
Systems Design
2002-01 Nico Lassing (VU)
Architecture-Level Modifiability Analysis
2002-02 Roelof van Zwol (UT)
Modelling and Searching Web-based Document Collections
2002-03 Henk Ernst Blok (UT)
Database Optimization Aspects for Information Retrieval
2002-04 Juan Roberto Castelo Valdueza (UU)
The Discrete Acyclic Digraph Markov Model in Data Mining
2002-05 Radu Serban (VU)
The Private Cyberspace Modeling Electronic Environments
Inhabited by Privacy-concerned Agents
2002-06 Laurens Mommers (UL)
Applied Legal Epistemology; Building a Knowledge-based
Ontology of the Legal Domain
335
2002-07 Peter Boncz (CWI)
Monet: A Next-Generation DBMS Kernel For Query-Intensive Ap-
plications
2002-08 Jaap Gordijn (VU)
Value Based Requirements Engineering: Exploring Innovative
E-Commerce Ideas
2002-09 Willem-Jan van den Heuvel (KUB)
Integrating Modern Business Applications with Objectified Legacy
Systems
2002-10 Brian Sheppard (UM)
Towards Perfect Play of Scrabble
2002-11 Wouter C.A. Wijngaards (VU)
Agent Based Modelling of Dynamics: Biological and Organisa-
tional Applications
2002-12 Albrecht Schmidt (UvA)
Processing XML in Database Systems
2002-13 Hongjing Wu (TUE)
A Reference Architecture for Adaptive Hypermedia Applications
336


Take me to the place
where your heart hurts most
Lead me through the dark world gates
down there, where all the ghosts
of sorrow and pain, fear and despair stay hiding
And we’ll walk right through, to our own way, our own place.
There’s a beach that we’ll walk,
So long and so broad
Oceans await, miles longer than pain
In my glad dreams I take you there and it’s easy
’cause the work and the hours and the pain
are far behind our sure steps.
My heart longs to be next to you
My heart wants to be there, be there with you
Where it’s warm and tender
Mercy flows like a river
And there you stand with your wide open hands and say
Abide with me.
Deacon Blue
